Hiho,
we got a notice that currently several exploit attempts for the log4j
flaw going through Tor exit nodes und using LDAP. See
https://www.greynoise.io/viz/query/?gnql=tags%3A%22Apache%20Log4j%20RCE%20A…
The sender asked to do something against the currently running attacks.
One possibility is, in my opinion, rejecting connection over ports 389
and 636. What do you think? Should we as exit node operators block
connections over those LDAP ports for some amount of time?
Best,
qbi
Dear relay operators,
Today the torproject.org was officially blocked in Russia. You can read
more about the situation here[1].
Russia is the country with the second largest number of Tor users, with
more than 300,000 daily users or 15% of all Tor users.
As it seems this situation could quickly escalate to a country-wide Tor
block, it's urgent that we respond to this censorship!
We need your help NOW to keep Russians connected to Tor!
We are calling on everyone to spin up a Tor bridge.
If you've ever considered running a bridge, now is an excellent time to
get started, as your help is urgently needed. You can find the
requirements and instructions for starting a bridge in the Help Censored
Users, Run a Tor Bridge blog post: https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/
Gus
[1]
https://blog.torproject.org/tor-censorship-in-russia/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40050
--
The Tor Project
Community Team Lead
Hi folks,
I spent some time this week refining a new exit scanner, and today we
pushed some new reject rules to kick out some relays that we confirmed
were running mitmproxy to do more sslstrips.
For past context, see these urls:
https://blog.torproject.org/bad-exit-relays-may-june-2020https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-July/018656.htmlhttps://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html
Expect some upcoming next steps that aim to change the fundamental arms
race, including experiments to use https by default in Tor Browser, either
via HTTPS Everywhere's "Encrypt All Sites Eligible" option (you can turn
that on right now) or via Firefox's upcoming built-in version of the idea:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/19850
For completeness, I'm including below the set of fingerprints that we
bumped out. Note that we didn't confirm misbehavior from all of them --
some of them we're bumping out because they seemed sufficiently similar
to the confirmed ones. If any of these are your relays, please speak up!
Thanks,
--Roger
Group #1: COMID (coronamitmdisease2019) at OVH
019839E66C7229039367BEB4E83B27D08A9C2B37
110F26C0BFB2122BBB856EADC9A2D497989DE949
1B473D4B5C1D7C594E88B3044823D04E2BC51DBA
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8FAB1ADF9BE2D0E821AF92B8215F692CD715FD73
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BD32854443E891DBB685E43854BB382DEF081E94
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DE50C4066BE7200F5D6AD0FC88452667451D39A9
F2D5E3A3E8B11CA72FF340C450A46F4C67AD8D1E
Group #2: info(a)cypherpunklabs.com at OVH
023455597DAB689EE84FB3A7BC7FC5F9A3E27FD6
044E647F34EDA4AC975EDAD628C4E9BCFFF1FB08
04699AF0CB2B5A7F5CF943D31011F50F601BE8C7
05601B110B888BF3A12E10E8BF3C0B02166BF3F1
075FDD85EF4B783BCC9040580168F1FC5576B101
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0B7B08C50E419004F77447A72FFD578061F58311
0BAE1E20ACCB1F454A3A473185D83743E140B9D5
0BB27C3A307B35B5B2D2E8774D69DF7FA4B97867
0BE6EEB76C5641BF5D2E63C49C28CD50D2A40C15
0BF30C2AC9DBEF9C79B1119808F2FCC3FD81EE0A
0D58067912EA84D955565C82A4C00A47CDEF11DC
0DD55CF27BBA1F51131A46BC0A0EED68A177D1BB
1766E98ECC8A457FDBCBA7322C93F51FE1F896E7
186FF078A2EE09E8208ACBF4DDB61FFF96AD64B0
1B1351D85E8328BE21539EA9C0C0317E3A1CE380
1BD9EEB6725555246E8ADFFA5FA6B1D82F43447D
1C11D59B0144E9B33BB932A031BA8A3A5B81C65E
1D0971FA9B98AE2807D6A44AE6EB7EB120AB5675
1D515E91312D5F79895D607D6C27392DD5F6A84E
1EC0CCAFA8ABD5470B062AF470EAC97DD069C655
1F00A270AFDA1172DEDEC138AFEE977CFFB0FAD1
1FD39D081A3AA8E3D6F0962F8281A448D536C879
2369F6855A7CF31E3174CE26678FBBAD6A31D883
23BCFD8AB533AAE05639D1D79A445DEE76F8E57A
2541C0EB6F66C1344B3F14AB65EE7D6882EEF15F
29EC42BC7A3E7ED811578D5F656EC76D7A7AA2A5
2DE12251A7AF25B2CDFA9DE0F1B4022685ABAF3B
325499E7D6927D51229019F2EE031F26EBE095BB
386425D28458D4DB41F74F256AFF99ADB7E25271
38C36322890194015837A1085907DFA6AE3A9B00
3A6164437EF523E4907E7D97CAB135EFC39621F6
3BB398CA2D1F1E83AFC46641ABF8FECC989B8F19
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3CAA25A190B2F030DE86D0E99329E4D399472FB4
3CE91268F607E373482D1BCD33018CF1C77FAFA6
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5BA611940BC239597312636D257F615F4F4D7BEB
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BC70877D0CBDFA77E6B4B88DDC23D03F8299CC02
BD9E37F7FD8773AD0C07B22394F179288DC5E2CC
BEE5A27A9DD05BD7D9B6E046AEDEF43D2A4B85CE
C31A5F636926B69C72F992F005D0BDF48040B283
C50ED548D22C1908E58AA194AD3DC966FD267E06
C6F1E2ECA92A5DE6710F1317DB040EF2CFFC5C92
CDAA1A9F705EBE23E9FB63B3EFE6699205E2F8C6
D018720BE031BA9CC0DF4C0E21ADBC649C325C62
D2816DE9B3040231DE6A431583C26FE65B5C929D
D57751F73AE9DBFEAFAC282473615E5F6D269614
D7204D395ED3E4B6F6D81C38D8D6A9241F58250F
D74C47EA991FAE041C2CBB233493C6780B197A14
D888307FB9A44E75FEDF0DD2DE3AB9659E6DC6F9
DC74048330C6037ADC505E0AF63E2A9F765F6B57
DCB6273B2D2AD09AAC021141136CD461994D1533
DFE448D8C5D81AE687289A225B64F704A7FAC877
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E8F32BBFEAD7EDC6A40732EAEB15CF5C6DEFF225
F0CD6DD3766EFB6CB409EB148B6B22FF0B765533
F6CDD5AAF675F44B88BB326EC0738BD7277CBC12
F8E6613A7AA382960E00FC70A2E15A7B2F3F3FA0
F9DF89DCD30D238443245B5483A5E10F3D52C101
FA611C0BABB9DF7A63AC2877A5AB5A6880FBA51F
FC33CA0B739EB8290180C7D22A536726B8EE90E4
FD00BDB335960AFDCA6CD565B81DEF2BA7F27E7D
FE9313D50FB0E68F674812BF7CED0D8F2C2B65E6
FFF5DF7E9EF2A78210BE8E17E396CFC79797AC92
Group #3: Cypherpunklabs(a)protonmail.com at OVH
0D97E4B39B1986B688E90BE1FD996E492F2552DB
0E0D2A2E71A61B9D209DB4CE5E6DBEB98473E4EB
175D1B74B0271F5997C27E020AA167A013FFB7C9
215A723CB44D8ACB001D12C7832FC742921B4F64
241F67E50CA7D5E522F94E28B5AB5ABE4F166616
2723A5FFD3B6ED842EB44C380D3AB4D26DEF60AA
34BA457C5120D5E7DA9513C7B98733C57503E3E6
3A992EE90A372FF4ED0DB1E26D9662E967C84A92
3DAEC5687EAB19CC9FBE98303780137E143236AB
4169E219D6FFCF419A5F5DA6A66E0DC5782F8F8B
42215683AE0D359B6BADF2674D09BEA348BE388A
438587D73152254E935FC1D387003DFA18166EC5
56B310D18861A5F2A57D73269B6C11EDFA4EED1A
63584BC1EF29E794A63C264136D7825C33F0889D
78E40CFC92AA9265BB50494B75BE8E7F94659E8E
8049F8C058587A66246E8A93A56957CE29165F72
84D4A8CCE76EEAC3FC45ED7A78A05F7DCD68CE72
A613E402885F5D248889CD6EA85DE61D022D760E
B3AA9132A7D759863BFAB6CD12DA6646F2A5D1AD
B4598727C0B2A1313AB9DE822EDC6ECFDCC78FC0
BE1E17C00A4BE0FF280CFE062D03F261061E2E63
BE48173BCF9F2C3448192916BEEF01EA745F7DA3
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FC8C3644FEE491C828EF7A980F9E2CB0D12F4D0C
Group #4: other OVH relays probably run by the above
029F57C3B3504B797C189C208AC57B5D141F66D3
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11F30B96054A494093AE43310B1BD681AF76CADD
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EFAB57D3EBABB4F922F850763E88B447A2F4CC09
Group #5: at Frantech
13BFB7E95E303AC22A005F7D4D08CA9655925B40
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BCE0092B89D2C804483161D6E4C8FC81C56AA2B6
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DB739627A2E20DE302A0D25F21B8B372D4AC2963
F44CDC27499333A14D55B8E28B9240BC8B206532
Group #6: at Leaseweb
0110D7D65C572B36C4CF4DD564B0BBB0B2ABF98D
08D8EC605A5CF77B6AC3F9CF34FA2B32E6F0EB3A
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1AC81B2F05A3EE1DFEA330D3FD981E2E7F450C79
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333396E790E6CFA31C594B0D5F08DECBD02F8FEA
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3767BCA088F4C54D688F47C57B9868C9DF7D8D64
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46A97AF8E2E20178EDD4D9F931B054FC1BEDC00A
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4839BD15B8E8BBDA5CDF304ECD7516D104CDC7F4
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6C03F70B7A90BF179ABBD3E0A854C2A1AF123966
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BD7D0FB739E204D23B1B0B74DC9D8E311A0552A3
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C556E08E13E012ED234362C1EEBC0588AAF1F1FE
C75B26E3D4675F93F15AA2518860302A43D9BAC3
C85B7E5F3D06AB55AB0465E5CF66E777B1375DE5
CCC48AC17A89195AB8552EE9B5734C40B47B1075
CCF5C7C279A21C592E5DDF67D57542DD84C7146A
CE67975EF0235DB732ADA85C6BF36CFDEFA18555
D25B78BB13249FA73B1AA5641847A66BDF014A6B
D35EF561445474543064CC0C531BE0F3CCD198A4
E158EAA8788B8CFFF06A4D888D0C6B28DC1F057B
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EA8762F2D07FD5FA29B6BE05AA567A28D1545B4F
EF0682CFD3724312FD550EB9646F72EFCFBA1B1D
F788B67C42309E3B3A889E4CADB75D962CBF81C5
FB71593F68213499DA493FF6A4BFE015203272C9
Group #7: other
4E6C7297F16523A236EE1A2EE23AF54ABEF15490
55D490E9E440DD4458F16ABCDD79F48396D55EA9
78F699D58F3353AB6C4CE39E3BD96CE87439753A
B1896E58FDEB5627B6B8334E6ABD42767AB8B0D9
hi i don't understand how to run relay on my laptop
while i run orbot on my android
On Wed, 8 Dec 2021, 17:32 , <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> wrote:
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> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Responding to Tor censorship in Russia (gus)
> 2. Re: Responding to Tor censorship in Russia (John Ricketts)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 17:16:05 -0300
> From: gus <gus(a)torproject.org>
> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org
> Subject: [tor-relays] Responding to Tor censorship in Russia
> Message-ID: <20211207201605.GN2321@localhost>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Dear relay operators,
>
> Today the torproject.org was officially blocked in Russia. You can read
> more about the situation here[1].
>
> Russia is the country with the second largest number of Tor users, with
> more than 300,000 daily users or 15% of all Tor users.
>
> As it seems this situation could quickly escalate to a country-wide Tor
> block, it's urgent that we respond to this censorship!
>
> We need your help NOW to keep Russians connected to Tor!
>
> We are calling on everyone to spin up a Tor bridge.
>
> If you've ever considered running a bridge, now is an excellent time to
> get started, as your help is urgently needed. You can find the
> requirements and instructions for starting a bridge in the Help Censored
> Users, Run a Tor Bridge blog post:
> https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/
>
> Gus
>
> [1]
> https://blog.torproject.org/tor-censorship-in-russia/
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40050
> --
> The Tor Project
> Community Team Lead
>
Hi!
I've also noticed suddenly 3-5x more bridge users using the one I run with
a concrete difference in Russian connections highly increased in number of
unique users compared as the others countries which are looking stable.
(Sorry for my bad English, I hope it was comprehensible enough)
Have a nice week!
Nils
Le lun. 6 déc. 2021 à 13:00, <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> a
écrit :
> Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to
> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available (Vin?cius Zavam)
> 2. Is Tor Actually "Blocked" In Russia, or Are Some Users
> Unblocked for now? (Neel Chauhan)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2021 19:30:38 +0000
> From: Vin?cius Zavam <egypcio(a)googlemail.com>
> To: undisclosed-recipients:;
> Subject: [tor-relays] Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available
> Message-ID:
> <
> CA+Kr6DNtCC6-iQ7Et71UyTkqArcB_ruO4CcY8nMUm278BJaeyg(a)mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> ol?! :)
> agora temos um pacote para instalar Snowflake em FreeBSD. aproveitem!
>
> tl;dr; we now have a package to install Snowflake on FreeBSD. enjoy!
>
> since the 14th of Nov 2021 we have a port that builds a Snowflake package
> that can be installed on FreeBSD. it gives us all 3 different
> features/functions that we can use Snowflake for:
>
> - client
> - proxy
> - server
>
> don't know Snowflake yet?
>
> - https://snowflake.torproject.org/
> - https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/
> -
>
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow…
>
> if you are using the "latest" branch of pkg, try it out! the package is
> called "snowflake-tor"
>
> # pkg update -f
> # pkg install -U snowflake-tor
>
> wanna checkout the source of its port?
>
> -
>
> https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/commit/?id=057c0c3c0645c0b237bb2a96dda440e04…
>
> did you know about the "Run a Bridge" campaign?
>
> - https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/
>
> that's it! stay safe and have a great one
> obrigado ]=)
>
>
> --
> Vin?cius Zavam
> keybase.io/egypcio
>
Hello everyone!
Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast majority were
middle-only relays. We don't have any evidence that these relays were
doing any attack, but there are attacks possible which relays could
perform from the middle position. Therefore, we decided we'd remove
those relays for our users' safety sake.
While we were already tracking some of the relays for a while, a big
chunk of them was also independently reported by a cypherpunk and nusenu
helped analyzing the data. Thanks to both of them from our side.
Foe what it is worth: a large part of those relays did not set any valid
contact info and/or when we tried to contact some of the relays'
operators the emails bounced. However, we sometimes need to have ways to
reach relay operators, be it for debugging purposes or for helping them
with relay misconfiguration. Thus, please set a valid contact info when
running relays.
Finally, anyone running relays: try to get connected to the community so
we can build some trust among each other. That seems to be an essential
part in our long-term strategy to fight bad relays trying to enter our
network.
Georg
[1] https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs
Hello!
Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never
really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might
recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to
get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1] but
then we dropped the ball. Alas.
We just started that process again by contacting every relay operator
running an outdated Tor version (any version not 0.3.5.x or 0.4.5.x or
0.4.6.x or 0.4.7.x) by email where possible. Additionally, we created a
wiki page outlining the current process and things we still need to
figure out.[2] On that page we plan to make statistics related to the
EOL relay removal available as well, including the final list of relays
we'll reject. Thus, stay tuned. Feedback, as always, is very much welcome!
We plan to keep this topic on our radar this time while refining the
process as we go. Meanwhile, if you are running a relay with an
unsupported Tor version, please upgrade for the sake of our users' safety.
If you need help, join us on #tor-relays or #tor-relays:matrix.org if
you use Element.
Thanks,
Georg
[1] https://blog.torproject.org/removing-end-life-relays-network
[2]
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Relay-EOL-pol…