- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

arm client locale stats on connection page
by Klaus Layer 20 Dec '11

20 Dec '11

Hi, I am using arm to monitor 3 tor nodes running on the same box. On the connection page I get very different results when pressing "c" to get the client locale stats: Node A - nothing happens Node B - the window with the client locale stats is displayed Node C - a message "Usage stats aren't available yet, press any key..." is displayed Under which conditions are the stats available? Regards, Klaus

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bandwidth authority test
by Softail 12 Dec '11

12 Dec '11

I'm also running a guard relay that for some months was pushing 600kBs pretty steadily. In the last couple weeks it's lower and very variable and today it has basically cratered. Is this a likely results of the bandwidth algorithm testing that's going on or might I have other problems? Thanks, Wayne -- A man in chains knows he should have acted sooner... Julian Assange

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ARM crashes on connection tor
by Klaus Layer 10 Dec '11

10 Dec '11

Hi, I am no longer able to connect with ARM to one of my relays. ARM crashes with the following error: debian-tor@host:/home/user$ arm -i 127.0.0.1:4711 Traceback (most recent call last): File "/usr/share/arm/TorCtl/TorCtl.py", line 710, in _loop isEvent, reply = self._read_reply() File "/usr/share/arm/TorCtl/TorCtl.py", line 885, in _read_reply raise ProtocolError("Badly formatted reply line: unknown type %r"%tp) ProtocolError: Badly formatted reply line: unknown type 'P' Terminated To another instance running on the same machine ARM connects without any problem. Has anyone experienced the same issue or knows how to fix it? Thanks, Klaus

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Logs full of "eventdns: All nameservers have failed"
by Klaus Layer 10 Dec '11

10 Dec '11

Hi, my logs are full of these messages: 05:54:07 [NOTICE] eventdns: Nameserver 127.0.0.1 is back up 05:54:07 [WARN] eventdns: All nameservers have failed At first I thought that the DNS of my ISP sucks, so I changed to Google Public DNS. But the warnings are still there. Google shows some older reports of this warning, where is was supposed to be an error in tor. Are there any news on this? I am wondering if the high bandwidth nodes from torservers and noisebridge also show this kind of messages and how they configured their nodes to get rid of it. For my node they come up every couple of minutes. Between fail and recover is always less than a second. Best regards, Klaus

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Significant relay usage drop down
by Klaus Layer 09 Dec '11

09 Dec '11

Hi, I am running two relays with the fingerprints D223399907113A1F216AAA64997BC1D4CFA8E1AC and 945CBBA599808018749DDC4EBB592168F2858C1B. For the first relay I am observing a significant usage drop down during the last 12 hours. The second runs as usual with a high throughput. I am wondering what the reason for this drop down could be. Are there any changes in the configuration of authorities? Is someone from the core TOR developers doing tests with the load distribution? Best regards, Klaus

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ISP thinks a relay is under attack from other relays
by Daniel Bryg 07 Dec '11

07 Dec '11

Hi, This is mostly just an interesting anecdote but there are also a few questions. Hetzner informed us (see below) about an attack on our relay (not an exit). It looks like it's just normal traffic from other relays so all is good, but the switch sees incoming activity almost 3x higher than what comes in on the server's interface (90Mbit/s, 13k packets/s). If most of packets are dropped, it must affect the performance of Tor connections. Is this because the Tor network is overwhelmed with traffic and are all relays subject to much higher requested traffic than their limits? Thanks, Daniel. Direction IN Threshold Traffic 200 MBit/s Sum 8,828 GByte/300s (241 MBit/s), 9.436.000 packets/300s (31.453 packets/s), 317 flows/300s (1 flows/s) External 109.236.85.157, 0,444 GByte/300s (12 MBit/s), 341.000 packets/300s (1.136 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 93.114.44.37, 0,435 GByte/300s (11 MBit/s), 321.000 packets/300s (1.070 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 46.165.196.73, 0,373 GByte/300s (10 MBit/s), 287.000 packets/300s (956 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 91.208.34.12, 0,260 GByte/300s (7 MBit/s), 217.000 packets/300s (723 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 212.117.161.80, 0,256 GByte/300s (6 MBit/s), 191.000 packets/300s (636 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 212.26.1.109, 0,241 GByte/300s (6 MBit/s), 363.000 packets/300s (1.210 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 174.140.167.122, 0,238 GByte/300s (6 MBit/s), 177.000 packets/300s (590 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 109.163.225.203, 0,182 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 142.000 packets/300s (473 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 94.23.164.42, 0,174 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 137.000 packets/300s (456 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 137.56.163.64, 0,170 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 157.000 packets/300s (523 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 173.254.192.38, 0,166 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 143.000 packets/300s (476 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.165.26.254, 0,163 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 134.000 packets/300s (446 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 217.115.137.222, 0,156 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 123.000 packets/300s (410 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 94.23.168.39, 0,149 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 133.000 packets/300s (443 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 216.24.174.245, 0,147 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 106.000 packets/300s (353 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.163, 0,138 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 123.000 packets/300s (410 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 85.214.75.110, 0,137 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 117.000 packets/300s (390 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 204.45.133.189, 0,135 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 131.000 packets/300s (436 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 94.23.174.3, 0,131 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 112.000 packets/300s (373 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 85.31.186.116, 0,130 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 104.000 packets/300s (346 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 178.32.52.72, 0,118 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 104.000 packets/300s (346 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 46.165.196.182, 0,112 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 134.000 packets/300s (446 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.164, 0,106 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 89.000 packets/300s (296 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.162, 0,104 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 95.000 packets/300s (316 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 146.185.23.179, 0,103 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 96.000 packets/300s (320 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 87.98.180.247, 0,101 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 95.000 packets/300s (316 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 199.48.147.35, 0,095 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 93.000 packets/300s (310 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 62.220.136.253, 0,092 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 110.000 packets/300s (366 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 89.248.168.118, 0,092 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 79.000 packets/300s (263 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 199.48.147.45, 0,089 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 75.000 packets/300s (250 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.120.245.249, 0,088 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 75.000 packets/300s (250 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 212.95.43.222, 0,087 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 72.000 packets/300s (240 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 74.109.126.29, 0,082 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 71.000 packets/300s (236 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 91.121.166.158, 0,081 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 71.000 packets/300s (236 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.165, 0,079 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 80.000 packets/300s (266 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 146.185.23.180, 0,078 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 74.000 packets/300s (246 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 91.121.85.130, 0,078 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 68.000 packets/300s (226 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 93.182.132.100, 0,075 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 65.000 packets/300s (216 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 46.73.164.123, 0,074 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 63.000 packets/300s (210 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 194.204.30.253, 0,067 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 101.000 packets/300s (336 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 79.172.193.89, 0,065 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 58.000 packets/300s (193 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 62.116.251.71, 0,065 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 51.000 packets/300s (170 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.245.18.28, 0,064 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 47.000 packets/300s (156 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 173.254.216.69, 0,064 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 60.000 packets/300s (200 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.72.225.172, 0,061 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 60.000 packets/300s (200 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 93.115.241.2, 0,061 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 53.000 packets/300s (176 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 173.254.192.36, 0,059 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 50.000 packets/300s (166 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.165.24.70, 0,057 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 58.000 packets/300s (193 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 85.223.49.156, 0,053 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 43.000 packets/300s (143 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 131.130.199.36, 0,052 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 45.000 packets/300s (150 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s)

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Re: [tor-relays] new (to me, at any rate) message
by Scott Bennett 05 Dec '11

05 Dec '11

On Sun, 4 Dec 2011 17:47:30 +0100 Sebastian Hahn <mail(a)sebastianhahn.net> wrote: >On Dec 4, 2011, at 12:40 PM, Scott Bennett wrote: > >> About an hour and a half ago, my node issued the following message. >> >> Dec 04 04:03:56.685 [warn] Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR or non-edge circuit. >> >> What does it mean? And what triggers it? Is it attempting to use a relay >> listed in the directory and consensus, but finding that that relay's status >> has changed since the consensus? > >This is a message frequently seen on relays for a while now, due to a >bug in hidden service usage in 0.2.3.x clients. See >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4171 for what we know >about it. Basically, it doesn't indicate a problem with the relay, but >rather the Tor client that uses the relay. Thus, we will soon go ahead Yes, I had gathered that much. >and stop logging this at default log levels, and also fix it on the >client side. > Urrgh... It looks like you and Robert have a good handle on it, so I won't worry about it if I see it again. Thanks much, Sebastian! Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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new (to me, at any rate) message
by Scott Bennett 04 Dec '11

04 Dec '11

About an hour and a half ago, my node issued the following message. Dec 04 04:03:56.685 [warn] Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR or non-edge circuit. What does it mean? And what triggers it? Is it attempting to use a relay listed in the directory and consensus, but finding that that relay's status has changed since the consensus? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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Re: [tor-relays] new (to me, at any rate) message
by Scott Bennett 04 Dec '11

04 Dec '11

On Sun, 04 Dec 2011 07:02:03 -0500 Justin Aplin <japlin(a)gmail.com> wrote: >On 12/4/2011 6:40 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: >> About an hour and a half ago, my node issued the following message. >> >> Dec 04 04:03:56.685 [warn] Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR or non-edge circuit. >> >> What does it mean? And what triggers it? Is it attempting to use a relay >> listed in the directory and consensus, but finding that that relay's status >> has changed since the consensus? > >No idea what it means, but I got the same error at nearly the exact same >time on one of my relays. Odd. > Well, maybe that is interesting. I'm on CST, which is GMT-6hrs. Do the times still match? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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Re: [tor-relays] consensus "Bandwidth=" values
by Scott Bennett 02 Dec '11

02 Dec '11

On Thu, 1 Dec 2011 04:55:06 -0500 Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> wrote: >On Wed, Nov 30, 2011 at 05:51:13PM -0600, Scott Bennett wrote: >> Something new appears to be happening in the authorities' assignments >> of "Bandwidth=" values in the consensus documents over the past few days. >> Here are some statistics from the recent consensus with the following valid >> times: >[snip] >> The top ten in the above list account for 814 relays or 32.73% of all relays >> in the consensus, yet they will get little or no traffic because of the >> assigned "Bandwidth=" values. My relay's traffic went from around 55% - 60% >> of what I had hoped to contribute down to almost nothing in the course of >> about three days, and the "Bandwidth=" value assigned to it in the consensus >> is 1. For a long time, it had typically been in the high 20s to high 30s >> with occasional excursions from slightly lower to somewhere in the 50s. >> So is this sudden, massive reassignment of loads due to a bug in the >> newest tor version(s)? Or is it an intended change by the developers? > >Mike Perry is trying out more network rebalancing ideas. See > >https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/blob/HEAD:/NetworkScanners/BwAuth… >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1976 >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4425 Thanks for those. I'll probably get a chance to take a look at them later today. > >The "bandwidth authority" scripts do active bandwidth measurements, >and adjust the bandwidth weights they vote about based on how a relay >performs compared to its peers. Last week "peers" were characterized >based on the self-advertised bandwidth, that is, the bandwidth in the >relay descriptor. With the new PID design, "peers" are now a function >of the weight in the consensus. Okay, but that bring in again the old problem of flailing values reported due to the feedback. If you're going to include those reported values, then tor needs to be fixed first, so that it never reports a lesser value than it has previously reported since initialization except in "unusual" circumstances, where "unusual" might be defined as something like a current value that were less than half of the value in the last descriptor published. IOW, the value should ordinarily approach the true capacity asymptotically over successive descriptor publications. If this fix isn't made, then randomly occurring slow traffic period for a given relay will result in less traffic being sent to it in the future, which would not reflect the actual capacity of the relay. Another problem is that, as I understood from earlier links you provided, Mike's testers were measuring latency, where latency referred not to end-to-end nor to round-trip packet travel times, but rather to circuit construction times. (BTW, I'm interested in the equations/matrices used to invert the data collected for multi-hop circuits to yield values for each individual node. Is there a page on your web servers that shows them?) Circuit construction, of course, requires different resources from those required simply to pass data along already created circuits, so the latency times and the data rate capacities really are not comparable types of measurements. (What is a typical correlation coefficient between them? I would expect some positive correlation, but not necessarily close to 1.) > >In theory this feedback loop should drive even more traffic toward relays >that can handle it, and even less traffic toward relays that can't, >until we reach an equilibrium. > >In practice, it drives super-fast relays to a weight of infinity, and >all the rest to a weight of zero. > >Mike thought he'd gotten things (more) right this time, but it would >appear that has hasn't: >https://metrics.torproject.org/performance.html#torperf > >Sorry for the disturbance. I think we should probably turn the experiment >off soon. But the little dip you see in the torperf graph before the >spike makes me think there *is* a point here that is better, even if we >haven't found it yet. :) > Are you sure that little dip isn't just an artifact of the T-Day holiday weekend in the U.S.? (Cool graph, BTW.:-) Anyway, thanks much for the explanations, Roger. Glad to know that 2.3.8-alpha isn't at fault. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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