- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

jump in connections
by That Guy 31 Aug '13

31 Aug '13

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 This new Guy has absolutely seen a huge increase in connections but don't have much history to go by but it seems to have doubled several times in a very short span. interested to sit back & hope to see some of the guru's weigh in. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSIS08AAoJEGPr8mk3uIZE3GoQAMMuCT8cByDEKRiOG3sHjUEj iBEJRGjTEsrJ5OehbJvs52muRyyAev7Nn6OQ3e4PsuN0GEiHo1OfsX5Yp16wXSAE VaYCRQ5jb64RQeUlbY4Jci9JJdjsb93FdKbTRnVpR0Ies7eAjpLBxVtk0ihCbtTR inwjHBuDJ+qE1KGsDUUEQYRpeDro6rHbdLqCz5VQllDIJuFVp8EJz+Kdny0H0XLa uU5Tn2aN+PE+DeeOkW+5SXkQHtx8XjMnSw3WtHw/DPrJ6k5Pwlk727Q05iRaK1GG FSPkxvlAjTHzFNJUrz84knE0ChnPuManAZQwec11eJRSi8GXSyAXOZaUsKPxzj26 +AfVH2w/mj238sHZuzYCWhqxHVH4QA/5BbjbeFGnGMTpX9Le+ILg+tC8PvQmNwyX u3czCmLxbMc+WRkNLk6R7MabK+MfSXoquCEc0RlsV+OTwk9vXRefa0mrRj+hjkTe 5F3PAAPLsPKCJPyKHNDcdMCnWgp0uwZDNQ0na1+TfyHoezOuTHktJmdTqVz2tg15 9InOBODLrx29iMW/CfLQhbhxMbnJS7hjTWAyoUV6kGEEYTThaOQXkIIRMSpA8Vzl PcUk1X6CM0WLaRLN4uEKhMSbEUVxG9qz98wdNQ8+a0tVxfMAGNvIWd+luMdnoGhH xEDEjmi4h9swFK5LFDeM =k2t/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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legal issues past and present
by That Guy 31 Aug '13

31 Aug '13

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > I run an exit node off of a residential Verizon connection and I > haven't seen a single threat, legal or otherwise so far, I dunno > why you're having so much trouble. Thank you for the reply but I have not either. My comments come from reading many such issues on the mailing list and the many many experiences documented on the Good/bad ISP lists on the torproject websites. I've had zero trouble with the sigle relay I'm running but as I also try to encourage others to run relays I was curious as I don't want to put OTHERS in a bad situation. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSILw8AAoJEGPr8mk3uIZEYiwQAJ9ARuz2DYx+sjDcri5s79et cOZBK1q+p63gmcv8rnaam3ROq3syzfU4ICW5FhOPwuEcVtmPXjcOFWFQsupK+9Db oUEIndKSLHz0JnAg6kKj7Wsd8EYAnYIiflMVJUfo+noVARMdvidTGdx14epjErhs H22FXkgQu+B5ac2yzC7bEaIZ27UXKt4X1BGFCvC5wXRAb0Kx6JR7RteLD7RWBYAs fxlOHwVopft4iG49y5L4gnjjqtrQUSwBJHyB4OcYyLQ/83mMtlziFaAnYAHB23iA T3NFr4wuohzH9cX0vKhg67JwyTk7vC8ALHtZJVs/mMA2Aa2Wq8Bb5ZdiKRJuNoPV QPWkXQSvL42iE7Xhww5Yasz2A/gWQE5GYzBTIGf3Wr2UBS0dxeXJLXUyxaeMtygM sFXWb3KMkw5wijpFzVHc4wBmqSlLFOzf1he9+FVFvO/9OFZ1Lh5IX+LXs8xZmOC+ CV2r9BqufCNWP8F4Ounbc8ogCHAI5I8SiVHjWMqDwn9qw/oX31rVFUPyLGXXw2yp kxANmPcHFO/WKz1IEQM3gNum89mp2eEEOVAIEZ0RsvzSBctp1BJXseazBKZFwsf7 LegCIe+P/AqUk5XiMi5VWhJXnvFE1a6i0lrAufW8KfRwa069VlioT8kJ+UYmhTtR l+tpY0bjM+NVyFzBD3Qh =PyZa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] huge increase in relay traffic
by tor＠t-3.net 30 Aug '13

30 Aug '13

Our relay is a few weeks old and I think it is still in the process of ramping up its utilization to its configured max. Because of that, I find it hard to judge what may be excessive on it. The last log on our server had it at 13,110 circuits open. Yesterday it hit 10,000 once but seemed to be more hanging around 8,000. The server's CPU is around 75% utilization. I don't see any error messages in the logs indicating inability to accommodate circuit requests. Traffic is higher today than yesterday but looking at it in the context of the past week and the steady increase, it's not way out of line. Only odd thing I saw this in the logs was this. I've put in XXXXXXXX to cover the IP address, as I don't know what the log is about. "Aug 30 12:07:02.000 [warn] Received http status code 504 ("Gateway Time-out") from server 'XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX:80' while fetching " And then there is a very long string designating a path which starts with "/tor/server" and then has a whole bunch of 40-digit hexadecimal numbers separated with + signs, and then the whole thing ends with a single ".z". Then the line says "I'll try again soon." . . . On Friday 30/08/2013 at 12:38 pm, Stracci wrote: > I can also confirm that I'm seeing that message on all 4 of my exit's > too. (as well as nearly double the amount of connections). > > -Stracci > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mick" <mbm(a)rlogin.net> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Sent: Friday, August 30, 2013 9:27:12 AM > Subject: [tor-relays] huge increase in relay traffic > > I'm currently seeing more than a doubling of connections (from a mean > of > c. 2000 established connections to just over 5000) on my relay at > 0xbaddad. The log is full of the (expected) messages: > "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation > requests!" > > I guess this is related to the massive jump in connected clients > in the past few days and I assume that everyone else is seeing > something similar. > > Mick > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Mick Morgan > gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312 > http://baldric.net > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Re: [tor-relays] huge increase in relay traffic
by tor＠t-3.net 30 Aug '13

30 Aug '13

Right after I finished sending my first reply to this thread, messages about too many circuit requests became visible in the logs. We'll see if adding cores helps ... On Friday 30/08/2013 at 12:38 pm, Stracci wrote: > I can also confirm that I'm seeing that message on all 4 of my exit's > too. (as well as nearly double the amount of connections). > > -Stracci > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mick" <mbm(a)rlogin.net> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Sent: Friday, August 30, 2013 9:27:12 AM > Subject: [tor-relays] huge increase in relay traffic > > I'm currently seeing more than a doubling of connections (from a mean > of > c. 2000 established connections to just over 5000) on my relay at > 0xbaddad. The log is full of the (expected) messages: > "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation > requests!" > > I guess this is related to the massive jump in connected clients > in the past few days and I assume that everyone else is seeing > something similar. > > Mick > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Mick Morgan > gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312 > http://baldric.net > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Rebooted Relay, Got a Warning
by Samuel Walker 30 Aug '13

30 Aug '13

I just rebooted my relay after reducing the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst parameters. Upon checking the log-file, I see the following messages: Aug 25 13:40:00.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit. Aug 25 13:40:05.000 [warn] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit. (Connection refused; CONNECTREFUSED; count 10; recommendation warn) Aug 25 13:40:05.000 [warn] 9 connections have failed: Aug 25 13:40:05.000 [warn] 9 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object) Aug 25 13:40:05.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working. That's a new message to me, is there any reason to be concerned? It obviously eventually managed to establish a circuit, but it still has me slightly concerned. Many Thanks Samuel Walker PGP/GPG Key ID: B2AD23C1 (Full: 2E72E17CB2AD23C1) http://www.samuelwalker.me.uk/pgpgpg-key/

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How to block IP address on exit node relay
by Piotrkowska 30 Aug '13

30 Aug '13

I am running an exit node under reduced exit policy on a VPS. My provider requested that I block a specific IP address due to spam issues. I'm guessing I should add a line in the torrc file. Can anyone tell me the exact line I have to add to the torrc file to block the address? Something like: "reject 12.34.567.89" ?

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Tor exit notice
by Pascal 30 Aug '13

30 Aug '13

The Tor exit notice at https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/contrib/tor-exit-not… contains the word "server" exactly once. It should probably be changed to "router" to match the rest of the document and avoid the common assumption that servers host data. -Pascal

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tor-bridge life cycle
by Trigger Happy 28 Aug '13

28 Aug '13

Hi list, Greetings from Poland, i have a question about tor bridge life cycle. 1) I'm running a bridge 2) Someone from china gets bridge id 3) Bridge gets banned 4) what now ? do i receive an email about it , so i could change tor-bridge to tor-relay ? or change tor-bride ip ? Thanks in advance -- Trigger Happy jabber: triggerhappy(a)jabber.ccc.de otr: BD0E1860 569B3888 657BC5C1 517532A3 A83EA214

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Hello List
by Kevin C. Krinke 28 Aug '13

28 Aug '13

Hi Everyone, I've just gone through most of the steps outlined in https://blog.torproject.org/running-exit-node over the last week, though I couldn't get the SWIP setup I did manage to get the reverse DNS configured for me by my ISP. It's taken me a while to decide to run a Tor Exit Node and part of the reason for hesitation is that I wanted to research it well and do it right. So, there's basically a few things: First, I'd like to say that my ISP is TekSavvy (Ontario, Canada); they are absolutely great and have been immensely helpful throughout this whole process. I would highly highly recommend their VDSL service to anyone in Ontario, Canada who's looking for an ISP that does all it can to protect the privacy of it's subscribers. Not to mention that they do offer unlimited bandwidth plans. Second, my Tor Exit Node is permanently located at tor-proxy-readme.onest8.ca (206.248.189.157). That's a static IP and I plan on running this service for as long as I possibly can. Pretty much the only reason I'd shut it down is if either A) TekSavvy changes their AUP and requests that I shut it down (highly unlikely) or B) I'm forced by legal means (again unlikely because I've followed the Tor guide and use the recommended Exit Policies). Third, and probably the most relevant part of this email for the list… I want to help more. What services (other than Tor) can I host? What else is needed in the general community? Thanks! My best, Kevin

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Re: [tor-relays] new relays
by tor＠t-3.net 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

A mechanism which empowers detecting and stopping what you and I consider to be 'evil' could be harnessed and used to target non-evil things, and that's where the problem is. Let's pretend that tomorrow, Tor gained the ability to filter out evil images. Shortly thereafter, governments might start making demands upon the Tor designers to utilize the underlying technical components of that system according to their own designs and demands. Such a scenario could be dangerous for everyone, including the designers personally. What happens to them if/when they refuse a demand like that, or potentially do a Lavabit? What if the existence of such a function can be corrupted and used in a rogue sort of relay to track things it wasn't intended to? Not to mention, at the point where anyone becomes able to note or affect the content, the question of who is in control of and responsible for it comes into play. Assuming Tor could exist in such a state, you may personally choose to filter CP, but then your government or ISP demands that you also filter activists X, Y, and Z, and list of topics A. Your line at 'evil' would be forceably drawn by other people, just like it is on the public internet today. Btw our exit node blocks random unknown ports ('bittorrent') to aid the node's longevity. It wasn't a moral stand. On Tuesday 27/08/2013 at 12:09 pm, Jon Gardner wrote: > On Aug 22, 2013, at 11:56 AM, mick <mbm(a)rlogin.net> wrote: > >> >>> >>> The other thing that I am weighing is just a moral question regarding >>> misuse of the Tor network for despicable things like child porn. I >>> understand that of all the traffic it is a small percentage and that >>> ISPs essentially face the same dilemma, but I wonder if more can be >>> done to make Tor resistant to evil usage. >>> >> Tor is neutral. You and I may agree that certain usage is unwelcome, >> even abhorrent, but we cannot dictate how others may use an >> anonymising >> service we agree to provide. If you have a problem with that, you >> probably should not be running a tor node. > > Then why have exit policies? Exit nodes regularly block "unwelcome" > traffic like bittorrent, and there's only a slight functional > difference between that and using a filter in front of the node to > block things like porn (which, come to think of it, also tends to be a > bandwidth hog like bittorrent--so it doesn't have to be just a moral > question). If someone has a problem with exit nodes blocking things > like porn (or bittorrent, or...), then they probably should not be > using Tor. > > The very idea of Tor is based on moral convictions (e.g., that > personal privacy is a good thing, that human rights violations and > abuse of power are bad things, etc.). So Tor is most definitely not > neutral, nor can it be--because, if it is to exist and flourish, those > moral convictions must remain at its foundation. One cannot on the one > hand claim that human rights violations are "wrong" while on the other > hand claiming that pornography (especially child porn) is "right." If > one wants further proof that Tor has a moral component, one has only > to visit http://www.torproject.org, click the "About Tor" link, and > notice the discussion points. I doubt that anyone could convince the > Tor team to add "...for unfettered access to pornography..." as a > bullet point under "Why we need Tor." > > The Tor devs go to great lengths to try to keep "evil" governments > from using Tor against itself. Why not devote some effort toward > keeping "evil" traffic off of Tor? Given the fact that "we need more > relays" is the common mantra, it seems to me that if the Tor community > could come up with a technical answer to address at least some of the > most egregious abuses of Tor--things like child porn, or even porn in > general, that either have nothing to do with Tor's foundational > mission, or (like child porn) are antithetical to it--the result would > be greater public support for the technology, and a wider deployment > base. > > It's worth discussion. > > Jon > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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