tor-relays

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42 participants
4821 discussions

Re: [tor-relays] new relays
by tor＠t-3.net 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

A mechanism which empowers detecting and stopping what you and I consider to be 'evil' could be harnessed and used to target non-evil things, and that's where the problem is. Let's pretend that tomorrow, Tor gained the ability to filter out evil images. Shortly thereafter, governments might start making demands upon the Tor designers to utilize the underlying technical components of that system according to their own designs and demands. Such a scenario could be dangerous for everyone, including the designers personally. What happens to them if/when they refuse a demand like that, or potentially do a Lavabit? What if the existence of such a function can be corrupted and used in a rogue sort of relay to track things it wasn't intended to? Not to mention, at the point where anyone becomes able to note or affect the content, the question of who is in control of and responsible for it comes into play. Assuming Tor could exist in such a state, you may personally choose to filter CP, but then your government or ISP demands that you also filter activists X, Y, and Z, and list of topics A. Your line at 'evil' would be forceably drawn by other people, just like it is on the public internet today. Btw our exit node blocks random unknown ports ('bittorrent') to aid the node's longevity. It wasn't a moral stand. On Tuesday 27/08/2013 at 12:09 pm, Jon Gardner wrote: > On Aug 22, 2013, at 11:56 AM, mick <mbm(a)rlogin.net> wrote: > >> >>> >>> The other thing that I am weighing is just a moral question regarding >>> misuse of the Tor network for despicable things like child porn. I >>> understand that of all the traffic it is a small percentage and that >>> ISPs essentially face the same dilemma, but I wonder if more can be >>> done to make Tor resistant to evil usage. >>> >> Tor is neutral. You and I may agree that certain usage is unwelcome, >> even abhorrent, but we cannot dictate how others may use an >> anonymising >> service we agree to provide. If you have a problem with that, you >> probably should not be running a tor node. > > Then why have exit policies? Exit nodes regularly block "unwelcome" > traffic like bittorrent, and there's only a slight functional > difference between that and using a filter in front of the node to > block things like porn (which, come to think of it, also tends to be a > bandwidth hog like bittorrent--so it doesn't have to be just a moral > question). If someone has a problem with exit nodes blocking things > like porn (or bittorrent, or...), then they probably should not be > using Tor. > > The very idea of Tor is based on moral convictions (e.g., that > personal privacy is a good thing, that human rights violations and > abuse of power are bad things, etc.). So Tor is most definitely not > neutral, nor can it be--because, if it is to exist and flourish, those > moral convictions must remain at its foundation. One cannot on the one > hand claim that human rights violations are "wrong" while on the other > hand claiming that pornography (especially child porn) is "right." If > one wants further proof that Tor has a moral component, one has only > to visit http://www.torproject.org, click the "About Tor" link, and > notice the discussion points. I doubt that anyone could convince the > Tor team to add "...for unfettered access to pornography..." as a > bullet point under "Why we need Tor." > > The Tor devs go to great lengths to try to keep "evil" governments > from using Tor against itself. Why not devote some effort toward > keeping "evil" traffic off of Tor? Given the fact that "we need more > relays" is the common mantra, it seems to me that if the Tor community > could come up with a technical answer to address at least some of the > most egregious abuses of Tor--things like child porn, or even porn in > general, that either have nothing to do with Tor's foundational > mission, or (like child porn) are antithetical to it--the result would > be greater public support for the technology, and a wider deployment > base. > > It's worth discussion. > > Jon > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Re: [tor-relays] Store key files in RAM
by tor＠t-3.net 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

If you can execute shell commands directly from the ram folder (ssh, sftp) and therefore pull files straight into it with sftp, this seems exactly right. It sounds like you'll only need the secure connection on an occasional/rare basis. Imo don't try for an always-on connection for that such as a vpn. Whichever way you do, you'll want to pay attention to where the important encryption keys reside. At least in general (and maybe even specifically), we know that encrypted data is being snatched off the wire and retained. In the case of sshd, you would want your sshd daemon keys to live on the machine with the more-secure storage medium and use the vserver as the client. For a vpn or similar you'd need to look at exactly how it works and decide if there is a right way and if so, what it is. Hopefully the only thing you feel there is a need to protect from is improper read access. If someone can write to your vserver as root, that would be a Very Bad Thing (TM). Sorry about the strange/disjointed line feeds in my first email btw, not sure why that happens. I'm trying short lines now, seeing if it works better. If you add linefeeds to what I wrote before where it makes sense, it may be easier to read. On Tuesday 27/08/2013 at 12:38 am, Tony Xue wrote: > > > Thanks for the instructions. > So what if I set up an L2TP VPN connection from my server to my > computer at home which stores the keys and I download the file > directly into the RAM folder? > > The purpose is to avoid storing the file or let the file passing > through the local normal storage system on my vserver which could be > extremely insecure in this situation. > > So will any of these techniques you have described or I stated above > let my data passing through the local ROM storage system of the > vserver? > > > >> >> >> Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 00:14:36 -0400 >> From: tor(a)t-3.net >> To: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> >> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Store key files in RAM >> Message-ID: <521c27ac.570.f998d700.49849df(a)t-3.net> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" >> >> IMO cut and paste in the situation you're describing is not the >> perfect way. Better way would be: >> >> Have a secure linux machine running an sshd at your home (or another >> physically-controlled location?). >> Close off iptables and ip6tables for inbound sshd except for your >> vserver's IP >> (hint: "ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_4096_key -b 4096" >> (don't put a password when it asks)) >> and edit sshd_config to point it to the new key. Also in the config, >> force your local sshd >> server to insist upon only using these 2 ciphers ("Ciphers >> aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc"). >> Restart the local sshd (maybe "service sshd restart") and verify that >> you can NOT connect >> from the vserver to the home box using a different cipher (ssh -l >> someuser -c aes128-ctr your.home.ip.here). >> A test ssh connection without the "-c aes128-ctr" should work, the one >> with it should fail. >> >> You would do transfers of important files to and from the vserver via >> an 'sftp' session which you start >> from your vserver, and you are connecting into your home machine (sftp >> someuser(a)your.home.ip.here). >> Don't make the connection in the reverse direction, you can push and >> pull files with the one. And don't >> let anyone steal your ssh_host_rsa_4096_key off the home box. (could >> even shred/delete/regenerate it >> now and then). In general, turn off the home sshd when you aren't >> using it. >> >> The above setup should be pretty good in terms of the network transfer >> if the data hasn't already been >> compromised, of course. The certainty that it hasn't been is not >> necessarily guaranteed if it's already >> been thrown through a network card in a less-solid way, such as the >> contents having been viewed >> via 'cat', 'nano', etc. via a connection in the 'wrong' direction. >> >> If you are deleting files from your vserver's hard drive after copying >> them out for backup, try doing >> "shred" on the file first, and then "rm". It may help do the deletion >> better, depending upon how your vserver >> hosting is set up. >> >> >> >> >> >> On Monday 26/08/2013 at 10:53 pm, Tony Xue wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I have been discovering simple and secure way of protecting the Tor >> > key files recently, in order to achieve the safety of the keys on >> VPS. >>> >> > So I created a folder on Linux called /tor and it is stored in the >> RAM >>> file system. I put my key file into that folder and link it back to >>> the data directory folder of Tor. I also backed up the key files in >> > case my server need to be restarted and the RAM would be cleaned up. >> I >>> left the key in RAM for some undesired failures, errors or >>> configuration which need to restart the Tor software. >>> >> > If the server gets down, I would probably do the simple cut and >> paste >> > in the SSH client to restore my key files. Or in a higher level way >> if >>> cut&paste is not safe enough. >>> >> > I am not sure whether this is a good way to protect my key files on >> a >>> VPS. Does anyone have any comment on that or a better way? >>> >>> >>> Tony >>> _______________________________________________ >>> tor-relays mailing list >>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>> >> > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >

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Re: [tor-relays] What if my favorite online store websiteblacklists all Tor Relay IP addresses?
by tor＠t-3.net 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

Likely someone was doing credit card fraud/hacking type stuff and choosing Tor as the way to connect for it. That stuff is a pain in the ass for online stores when it happens. Not surprised that outfits handling online payments don't want Tor connections, and I can't blame them tbh. It shouldn't be hard to find a workaround if your purchases are infrequent and anonymity in that particular connection isn't an issue (cell phones have internet these days, 'net from a friend's house, whatever). Not sure where you live but, I read that these days, USA is photographing the fronts of all postal mail. So, mailed merchandise isn't exactly a win on privacy anyway. On Sunday 25/08/2013 at 4:23 pm, David Carlson wrote: > > > On 8/25/2013 2:41 PM, Dave Lahr wrote: > >> >> I'm in the same boat: for example yelp.com and TDBank North >> are blocking us. >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 2:30 PM, David Carlson >> <david.carlson.417(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> It seems that at least two 'normal' online store websites >>> that I visit >>> from time to time have apparently decided to block my IP >>> address which I >>> am also using for a non-exit Tor relay. I have had extended >>> discussions >>> with one of them and they considered unblocking my IP >>> address to be a >>> risk greater than the lost income (US $160/year revenue) was >>> worth. >>> They suggested switching to a different IP address, which >>> was like >>> pulling hens' teeth from my ISP. To do that, I had to have >>> a technician >>> visit my house and install a new modem because they do not >>> have a person >>> who understands tech talk available for ordinary users, and >>> I couldn't >>> get sufficiently elevated in their support hierarchy. The >>> supposedly >>> dynamic IP address that I get from them hardly ever changes, >>> probably >>> because I am buying U-verse television service from them. >>> Now, after a couple of months, the "new" IP address is also >>> blocked. >>> >>> My question is this. What if it becomes common practice for >>> commercial >>> entities such as online stores to block all IP addresses >>> that they find >>> on lists of Tor relays such as <https://www.dan.me.uk/tornodes> >>> or the >>> official Tor metrics data? >>> That list is updated every half hour, includes all nodes, >>> and is not >>> limited to exit nodes. It currently lists 4438 nodes. That >>> is a >>> manageable size for a blacklist, but it could represent tens >>> or hundreds >>> of thousands of clients. >>> >>> Wouldn't this eventually either cripple the Tor network or >>> generally >>> discourage Tor clients that can no longer buy products >>> online from store >>> XYZ through the Tor network? >>> >>> David C >>> _______________________________________________ >>> tor-relays mailing list >>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays In the short term, it is possible to to circumvent these practices by using one or more of several different methods, but informing the online store that they are shooting themselves in the foot is not one of them. After all, they are experts and we are just ignoramuses, even if we know what an IP address is. > Also, client tactics like going to a public hotspot is either not an > option for someone who wants the Tor anonymity, or problematic at > best if all or nearly all Tor node IP addresses are blocked at the > vendor end. > > That is why I asked the general question. > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >

5 4

efficiency and reachability
by That Guy 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

Please excuse any poor wording, networking is not my strong suit;) i understand my ??'s are basic but it wont take me long & I'll be sharing any knowledge I gain here. 1) have 4 extra unused devices, 2 android & 2 older laptops running Xubuntu & Lubuntu that can run full time & my 2 primary machines(android tab and Debian laptop). With only so much bandwidth, what helps best in that situation? a. fewer(1-2) devices offering more BW each, or b. more(4-7) devices each offering less BW to the network. 2) Reachability: The only way I was able to any of the relays I tried to setup to be reachable from the outside was to log into my router(D-link dir-615) & put the device in the DMZ. I don't know how to solve the issue the right way(Port-Forwarding?, etc.) or other means. I'm not worried about my extra devices as I don't use them, but, **I don't know what the security implications are to *users of a relay or bridge sitting in such a vulnerable place & to my network & the box's I do care about. Currently just left one non-exit relay in the DMZ until I can find better solution. Running great. Sorry so long & for anyone who replied to my last post, I had set up a new email and created a new keypair & not paying attention included the wrong key info. thank you all. grep(a)gmx.us -- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) mQINBFIaewoBEADTG92hLWpKPhcScBe8VPqSFd+pKWgJ2318AQW1SVJlAbcEOmj7 /lwIKL5lq+cduNMfsFcVreHqGdGLRKuBEyJU0JJsjP07/qO9Iq9mZqBz8VMrtq1R 7GKabb+G+f2uDob1PQvpJmFrttMLzTQeVG0hNrzziIYACj//VZRaheiv/rh8ZBfC 3T5UgMo+Z8ClYvBrThJBLjrchMuKxu14hptcSiCTGWKK4wl7TPvFVvu1mNxIU2iJ Xp9KT+plp1OFbelRzFFH1LHqoaWcpm6ABjtS/FF1XzDFfOf4zf8WScbGm4jU5rXQ ONO90U6fTCuVjbd7Vq0P4XX4wRdpC1NKGMudpqEPAh+0dYT494EmG/yRDSyUKlrR 7MSW1oz1C14sUb4A82ypfC0yRkcrj8cS7RRSGhVIhrrSPECL+Wdt3gKOMu9EnwHW ls+WOJm5eVVG0SbV0TLgnZ723FdlFFZsZSKEVduxbq9wLZu3aCm8nh9UY+STYM5T whAJL4+v5b9zJWtY+YMcH//YWLmxgQjLrMLOKUERRfRJUsC73DRiCvbnVSMelkZk ZnLfFPkq2C1XcAi8zk5oBI0O+iIcNn/1EK9u49ngz/V1NQXj0qHYTN4EsECCihXz r3bB1KyHZmu7yoRsN5m1UPmEXiCm2amuRLMcDKff1SA20rApCbgBvWSOjQARAQAB 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9tcQkdANJo0rhky387RTrdu6Oyh4Mib1YphkPCb2vnJpmjjOBkMgiBHVt77BhgD6 LmV01hrApV+zGg== =r/sW -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

2 1

(no subject)
by Bruno Kitzis 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

Hello, Can you remove my email adress from your contact list? Thanks in advance.

2 1

Indiegogo campaign: 3771 Euro for Exits and Bridges!
by Moritz Bartl 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

Hi! The torservers.net Indiegogo campaign has ended today, and yields 3771.84 Euro to be spread equally across our current seven organizations. Each organization can hand in receipts and get reimbursed, or, alternatively, we can transfer their share up front. I will mail out stickers and posters today and tomorrow to everyone who donated. Within the week, I'll put up the donation website that lists everyone who donated and wanted to be publicly mentioned. Thank you! [ http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/tor-anti-censorship-and-anonymity-infrast… ] -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/

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Re: [tor-relays] Store key files in RAM
by Tony Xue 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

Thanks for the instructions. So what if I set up an L2TP VPN connection from my server to my computer at home which stores the keys and I download the file directly into the RAM folder? The purpose is to avoid storing the file or let the file passing through the local normal storage system on my vserver which could be extremely insecure in this situation. So will any of these techniques you have described or I stated above let my data passing through the local ROM storage system of the vserver? > Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 00:14:36 -0400 > From: tor(a)t-3.net > To: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Store key files in RAM > Message-ID: <521c27ac.570.f998d700.49849df(a)t-3.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" > > IMO cut and paste in the situation you're describing is not the > perfect way. Better way would be: > > Have a secure linux machine running an sshd at your home (or another > physically-controlled location?). > Close off iptables and ip6tables for inbound sshd except for your > vserver's IP > (hint: "ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_4096_key -b 4096" > (don't put a password when it asks)) > and edit sshd_config to point it to the new key. Also in the config, > force your local sshd > server to insist upon only using these 2 ciphers ("Ciphers > aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc"). > Restart the local sshd (maybe "service sshd restart") and verify that > you can NOT connect > from the vserver to the home box using a different cipher (ssh -l > someuser -c aes128-ctr your.home.ip.here). > A test ssh connection without the "-c aes128-ctr" should work, the one > with it should fail. > > You would do transfers of important files to and from the vserver via > an 'sftp' session which you start > from your vserver, and you are connecting into your home machine (sftp > someuser(a)your.home.ip.here). > Don't make the connection in the reverse direction, you can push and > pull files with the one. And don't > let anyone steal your ssh_host_rsa_4096_key off the home box. (could > even shred/delete/regenerate it > now and then). In general, turn off the home sshd when you aren't > using it. > > The above setup should be pretty good in terms of the network transfer > if the data hasn't already been > compromised, of course. The certainty that it hasn't been is not > necessarily guaranteed if it's already > been thrown through a network card in a less-solid way, such as the > contents having been viewed > via 'cat', 'nano', etc. via a connection in the 'wrong' direction. > > If you are deleting files from your vserver's hard drive after copying > them out for backup, try doing > "shred" on the file first, and then "rm". It may help do the deletion > better, depending upon how your vserver > hosting is set up. > > > > > > On Monday 26/08/2013 at 10:53 pm, Tony Xue wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > I have been discovering simple and secure way of protecting the Tor > > key files recently, in order to achieve the safety of the keys on VPS. > > > > So I created a folder on Linux called /tor and it is stored in the RAM > > file system. I put my key file into that folder and link it back to > > the data directory folder of Tor. I also backed up the key files in > > case my server need to be restarted and the RAM would be cleaned up. I > > left the key in RAM for some undesired failures, errors or > > configuration which need to restart the Tor software. > > > > If the server gets down, I would probably do the simple cut and paste > > in the SSH client to restore my key files. Or in a higher level way if > > cut&paste is not safe enough. > > > > I am not sure whether this is a good way to protect my key files on a > > VPS. Does anyone have any comment on that or a better way? > > > > > > Tony > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > >

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Re: [tor-relays] Store key files in RAM
by tor＠t-3.net 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

IMO cut and paste in the situation you're describing is not the perfect way. Better way would be: Have a secure linux machine running an sshd at your home (or another physically-controlled location?). Close off iptables and ip6tables for inbound sshd except for your vserver's IP (hint: "ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_4096_key -b 4096" (don't put a password when it asks)) and edit sshd_config to point it to the new key. Also in the config, force your local sshd server to insist upon only using these 2 ciphers ("Ciphers aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc"). Restart the local sshd (maybe "service sshd restart") and verify that you can NOT connect from the vserver to the home box using a different cipher (ssh -l someuser -c aes128-ctr your.home.ip.here). A test ssh connection without the "-c aes128-ctr" should work, the one with it should fail. You would do transfers of important files to and from the vserver via an 'sftp' session which you start from your vserver, and you are connecting into your home machine (sftp someuser(a)your.home.ip.here). Don't make the connection in the reverse direction, you can push and pull files with the one. And don't let anyone steal your ssh_host_rsa_4096_key off the home box. (could even shred/delete/regenerate it now and then). In general, turn off the home sshd when you aren't using it. The above setup should be pretty good in terms of the network transfer if the data hasn't already been compromised, of course. The certainty that it hasn't been is not necessarily guaranteed if it's already been thrown through a network card in a less-solid way, such as the contents having been viewed via 'cat', 'nano', etc. via a connection in the 'wrong' direction. If you are deleting files from your vserver's hard drive after copying them out for backup, try doing "shred" on the file first, and then "rm". It may help do the deletion better, depending upon how your vserver hosting is set up. On Monday 26/08/2013 at 10:53 pm, Tony Xue wrote: > > > > > > > Hi, > > I have been discovering simple and secure way of protecting the Tor > key files recently, in order to achieve the safety of the keys on VPS. > > So I created a folder on Linux called /tor and it is stored in the RAM > file system. I put my key file into that folder and link it back to > the data directory folder of Tor. I also backed up the key files in > case my server need to be restarted and the RAM would be cleaned up. I > left the key in RAM for some undesired failures, errors or > configuration which need to restart the Tor software. > > If the server gets down, I would probably do the simple cut and paste > in the SSH client to restore my key files. Or in a higher level way if > cut&paste is not safe enough. > > I am not sure whether this is a good way to protect my key files on a > VPS. Does anyone have any comment on that or a better way? > > > Tony > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >

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Store key files in RAM
by Tony Xue 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

Hi, I have been discovering simple and secure way of protecting the Tor key files recently, in order to achieve the safety of the keys on VPS. So I created a folder on Linux called /tor and it is stored in the RAM file system. I put my key file into that folder and link it back to the data directory folder of Tor. I also backed up the key files in case my server need to be restarted and the RAM would be cleaned up. I left the key in RAM for some undesired failures, errors or configuration which need to restart the Tor software. If the server gets down, I would probably do the simple cut and paste in the SSH client to restore my key files. Or in a higher level way if cut&paste is not safe enough. I am not sure whether this is a good way to protect my key files on a VPS. Does anyone have any comment on that or a better way? Tony

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What if my favorite online store website blacklists all Tor Relay IP addresses?
by David Carlson 25 Aug '13

25 Aug '13

It seems that at least two 'normal' online store websites that I visit from time to time have apparently decided to block my IP address which I am also using for a non-exit Tor relay. I have had extended discussions with one of them and they considered unblocking my IP address to be a risk greater than the lost income (US $160/year revenue) was worth. They suggested switching to a different IP address, which was like pulling hens' teeth from my ISP. To do that, I had to have a technician visit my house and install a new modem because they do not have a person who understands tech talk available for ordinary users, and I couldn't get sufficiently elevated in their support hierarchy. The supposedly dynamic IP address that I get from them hardly ever changes, probably because I am buying U-verse television service from them. Now, after a couple of months, the "new" IP address is also blocked. My question is this. What if it becomes common practice for commercial entities such as online stores to block all IP addresses that they find on lists of Tor relays such as <https://www.dan.me.uk/tornodes> or the official Tor metrics data? That list is updated every half hour, includes all nodes, and is not limited to exit nodes. It currently lists 4438 nodes. That is a manageable size for a blacklist, but it could represent tens or hundreds of thousands of clients. Wouldn't this eventually either cripple the Tor network or generally discourage Tor clients that can no longer buy products online from store XYZ through the Tor network? David C

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