- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

what to expect with baby exitnodes?
by stinkyonion＠sigaint.org 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

well the subject sums it up really I couldn't find a solid explanation. I believe it was ARMA that explained the life cycle of a relay, so I'm curious does this apply for exit nodes? thanks for the clarification

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Speed up of reconnections after IP Address change
by balbea16 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi There,I only have a dynamic IP address and my ISP changes it almost every time after 24 hours. It is somehow sad to see 1.400 connections drop to almost none. After the change it takes 20 minutes until my OR notices this (our IP Address has changed from ...). It than takes another hour until the connections start to actualy rebuild. This means it takes more than an hour (every per day) to reach the normal operating Mode. Is there any way to speed up this process? Could adjust the torrc script for instance? TNX Mike

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Re: [tor-relays] Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP
by balbea16 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi There I evaluated some relays with newly assigned (red) guard flags. All of them had already the stable flag assigned. And (so far I could see) all of them had (almost) static IP addresses. In my case, this may be the reason why I don't get a guard flag. My ISP changes it every 24 hours. However, I'd be fine with "just" operating a fast middle node. I will keep an eye on this. Mike

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_AceLewis tor relays: please specify 'MyFamily' in your torrc
by nusenu 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi Lewis, thanks for adding your 6 tor relays to the network! Please do not forget to set the MyFamily parameter in your torrc configuration to tell clients your relays belong to a single operator. If you need help with the MyFamily option let us know. thanks, nusenu +------------+-----------+-----------------+----------------+ | first_seen | nickname | IP | eMyFamilyCount | +------------+-----------+-----------------+----------------+ | 2016-12-27 | acelewis4 | 138.197.131.213 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis | 188.226.129.48 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis3 | 207.154.205.226 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis5 | 139.59.160.33 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis6 | 139.59.42.48 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis2 | 139.59.252.170 | NULL | +------------+-----------+-----------------+----------------+

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Re: [tor-relays] Grizzly Steppe
by rush23＠gmx.net 02 Jan '17

02 Jan '17

By the way Jerry Gamblin checked the list against the tor exit nodes and found 191 that have been used in this hacking... There you can find his thread with the whole listing.. https://twitter.com/JGamblin/status/814627227656683521 Regards 0x23 Am 2. Januar 2017 09:39:50 MEZ schrieb tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: >Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > >To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > >You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > >When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > >Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Grizzly Steppe (Rana) > > >---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Message: 1 >Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 10:39:40 +0200 >From: "Rana" <ranaventures(a)gmail.com> >To: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> >Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Grizzly Steppe >Message-ID: <03ed01d264d3$c4700b40$4d5021c0$(a)gmail.com> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > >My bet is that the recorded IP address dates back to the days when your >node >was an exit. Naturally the Russian hackers have used Tor, probably in >tandem >with a VPN - it would have been stupid of them not to, and stupid they >are >not. > >And you are right - now the US government will blame Tor exit operators >for >the sheer stupidity of email operators in political shops such as DNC >that >do not force their users to encrypt email end to end. PGP is too much >trouble for them. > >If I am right there is nothing you can do now, you have already closed >the >exit. If they pressure you, migrate your relay to another IP. > >Rana > >From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On >Behalf >Of Dr Gerard Bulger >Sent: Monday, January 02, 2017 10:15 AM >To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >Subject: [tor-relays] Grizzly Steppe > >I ran an exit node, but gave up after too many abuse reports that >annoyed my >ISP. So I turned al exit ports off, and reports stopped as a rely. >After >months and many terabytes of data I get an abuse complaint that my tor >IP >has been used for espionage. > >"NCSC have been made aware of a report and associated malicious >indicators >released by the United States Government relating to malicious cyber >activity. A copy if the report and indicators can be found at the >following >link:- >https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/GRIZZLY-STEPPE-Russian-Malicio >us-Cyber-Activity >Details within this report indicate network assets which may have been >compromised or associated with malicious activity. We have identified >the >following IP address from this report as x.x.x.x As a minimum, it is >recommended that you check systems and any available logs concerned >with the >above addresses for indications of malicious activity" > >There are no other details as to HOW my tor relay is being used. The >espionage seems to relay on the stupidity of recipients on receiving >emails >asking for passwords. I am not sure HOW ISP or relay service can stop >that. >Or is it that my relay was being used to transfer the data? > >I assume my IP was found by way of a DNS leak which I need to look >into. >There is nothing else I can do as a relay to stop this or is there? > >Gerry > > > >

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Grizzly Steppe
by Dr Gerard Bulger 02 Jan '17

02 Jan '17

I ran an exit node, but gave up after too many abuse reports that annoyed my ISP. So I turned al exit ports off, and reports stopped as a rely. After months and many terabytes of data I get an abuse complaint that my tor IP has been used for espionage. "NCSC have been made aware of a report and associated malicious indicators released by the United States Government relating to malicious cyber activity. A copy if the report and indicators can be found at the following link:- https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/GRIZZLY-STEPPE-Russian-Malicio us-Cyber-Activity Details within this report indicate network assets which may have been compromised or associated with malicious activity. We have identified the following IP address from this report as x.x.x.x As a minimum, it is recommended that you check systems and any available logs concerned with the above addresses for indications of malicious activity" There are no other details as to HOW my tor relay is being used. The espionage seems to relay on the stupidity of recipients on receiving emails asking for passwords. I am not sure HOW ISP or relay service can stop that. Or is it that my relay was being used to transfer the data? I assume my IP was found by way of a DNS leak which I need to look into. There is nothing else I can do as a relay to stop this or is there? Gerry

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How can we trust the guards?
by Rana 01 Jan '17

01 Jan '17

Sorry for the naïve question, but we have a total of about 7000 relays, many of them residential and thus practically unused or very lightly used. So the actual number of relays that carry most of the traffic is rather small, and many of them are middle relays, leaving an even smaller number of guard relays. This means that an adversary with a rather modest budget can easily take over half the guards. Whats the trust mechanism (if any) to ensure that the majority of guards are not hijacked by adversaries?

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Re: [tor-relays] [Crypto-practicum] Open-source cooperative security using low-cost HSMs?
by grarpamp 31 Dec '16

31 Dec '16

On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 10:36 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek(a)gmail.com> wrote: > One problem is shills. IIUC, TOR has a problem where an attacker can create > a ton of nodes that collude. > TOR could be > 50% shills and we would not know. Is this something that could > be implemented effectively with the dreaded web of trust? Yes. It has been repeatedly brought up among tor that relay operators, being globally spread and relatively physically mobile for the purpose of keysigning, can cross sign their node keys with gpg keys, have their gpg keys signed in person under proof of relay ownership as usual, dump the fingerprints into the consensus and sks, then build relay selection algorithms that download and verify the wot into user run tools that then build their circuits in the controller. Users can elect to use variant levels of trust present in the wot, anon / nym / context signing, ID signing, photo signing, multisig assertions, etc. Beyond just the wot, all sorts of other external metrics, even subscriptions to third party metrics services, could be applied to such a relay selection process. 7000 relays, even at low 10% shill and 1:1 would require 700 unique persons of the adversary that pass the smell test of other operators and principals, that has real costs. Or your allies just supply the number of validated nodes needed to prevent network saturation and users simply decline to route anything but CNN and gerbil pr0n through the 700 unvalidated nodes. Pretty simple really, needs nothing more than one structured comment field in the consensus and some external tools, but nobody has rolled it out or even developed concept further yet.

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"Graceful" Restart of Tor-Relay ?
by mistral.relay＠posteo.net 30 Dec '16

30 Dec '16

Hello all, a newbie question: assuming that I want to shut down and restart a running tor-relay (for whatever reason; e.g. a linux reboot is required) - is it fine to just shut down the relay or is there a nicer, more tor-user friendly way so circuits don't drop for them unexpectedly? I was thinking about a command to tell tor to complete whatever is ongoing, but to not accept any new circuits or other requests and then stop working. Would setting the BandwidthBurst to 0 followed by a tor-reload do this over some time (checking with e.g. arm what is still ongoing)? Many thanks!

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I am in with 4 exits
by niftybunny 30 Dec '16

30 Dec '16

https://twitter.com/JGamblin/status/814627227656683521 <https://twitter.com/JGamblin/status/814627227656683521> anyone can beat this? Markus

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