tor-relays

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38 participants
4819 discussions

Connections from UNKNOWN relays
by Rana 10 Dec '16

10 Dec '16

Arm shows that my middle relay has incoming connections from UNKNOWN relays (no consensus data on them at all except locale). Are these bridges? There is also one outgoing connection to UNKNOWN but the address of that is 0.0.0.0:0

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Re: [tor-relays] torworld relays in entry and exit position
by nusenu 10 Dec '16

10 Dec '16

Security TorWorld wrote (2016-11-14): > We believe that next month on the 1st of December would be a good time > to add this feature. What is the current state on this? You are still on the top of this list: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ornetstats/stats/master/o/potentially_dan…

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0.2.8.11 bridge + hidden service, restart loop
by Petrusko 10 Dec '16

10 Dec '16

Hey, Compiled current 0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) on a RPi, set up as a bridge + hidden service (http) Before update, everything was fine. Now, it's starting only fine when only bridge is enabled.... If hidden service is enabled in torrc, some problems : - restart loop - /var/log/tor/notices.log is not used. but can watch log in /var/log/syslog file... Custom hostname + private_key in hidden_service, it was nice before... Thx for your help :) Dec 9 23:48:06 XXX systemd[1]: Starting Anonymizing overlay network for TCP... Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.336 [notice] Tor v0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t and Zlib 1.2.8. Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.342 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.343 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc". Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.343 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.399 [warn] Tor is currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. That's not very secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a separate Tor process, at least -- see https://trac.torproject.org/8742 Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Dec 09 23:48:08.405 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 361 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand. Dec 9 23:48:08 XXX tor[3935]: Configuration was valid Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.088 [notice] Tor v0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t and Zlib 1.2.8. Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.093 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.093 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc". Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.094 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.151 [warn] Tor is currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. That's not very secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a separate Tor process, at least -- see https://trac.torproject.org/8742 Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.157 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 361 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand. *Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: tor(a)default.service: main process exited, code=exited, status=1/FAILURE** **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [warn] Directory /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ cannot be read: Permission denied** **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to configure rendezvous options. See logs for details.** **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above.** **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Failed to start Anonymizing overlay network for TCP.** **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Unit tor(a)default.service entered failed state.** **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: tor(a)default.service holdoff time over, scheduling restart.* Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Stopping Anonymizing overlay network for TCP... Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX systemd[1]: Starting Anonymizing overlay network for TCP... -- Petrusko EBE23AE5

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Exit Node Geographical Location
by Chris Adams 09 Dec '16

09 Dec '16

Hello, I want to start up another exit node. I have a few choices for which country it's in. I currently live in a country with quite a high exit node/population density. Are there any advantages to distributing nodes around the globe in terms of performance/privacy? Are there some countries where you definitely shouldn't run exit nodes? (Censored internet is an obvious example) C

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Belarus (finally) bans Tor
by Rana 09 Dec '16

09 Dec '16

https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/

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Re: [tor-relays] Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP
by Rana 09 Dec '16

09 Dec '16

-----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of pa011 Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2016 1:24 AM To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP > I would like to hear about ONE Raspi Tor operator who was allowed by DirAuths (or bwauths or whatever) to come even near 1 mbit/s bandwidth utilization > let me tell: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/AA44C4BE3C90DCAAC09E5CD26150710AAA80D… https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/CA9A5D5C4688F04EEC1AF810B0FD348109FA1… are sharing the same dynamic IP on a Rasp2 -cut every 24 hours day rx | tx | total | avg. rate ------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------- 05.12.2016 27,20 GiB | 28,39 GiB | 55,59 GiB | 5,40 Mbit/s that is slight above 1 Mbit/s :-) Best regards Paul ---------------------------- Wow nice bandwidth you are pushing through Paul! You mean two Raspi 2's sharing an Internet connection, each relaying 27 Gbytes per day at 5.4 Mbit/s on the average?? Total 10.8 Mbit/s?? Or 2.7 Mbit/s each? Definitely refutes the previously claimed 1 Mbit/s Tor limit on Raspi, and means that Raspi has nothing to do with the ridiculously low utilization of my relay, just as I thought. As a matter of fact this means that whoever is NOT running a relay on a Raspi (or two, or four of them) is wasting money, unless he has a computer lying about with nothing better to do. Also, what's the max memory and CPU utilization on your Raspi (I have read somewhere that Tor is only capable of utilizing 2 of the 4 CPU cores), and what kind of Internet connection do you have? BTW the $35 Raspi 3 has 33% more CPU power than your Raspi 2 and the same amount of memory. Rana

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Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt
by Dakota Hourie 09 Dec '16

09 Dec '16

Also been looking for a T-shirt. I would even be willing to buy it! How do I contact Jon? - Dakota Hourie Outfall Exits Operator

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Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
by Rana 09 Dec '16

09 Dec '16

I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.

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Creanova hosting Finland
by Sec INT 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

Hi Please dont use this group if you are planning to - although they apparently support Tor they dont. I was running a reduced reduced exit policy with spamhaus listings and only got 2 complaints from security bots but they suspended the vps both times with no warning - now its offline altogether with no warning or email at all. Not to mention they are rude and over reactedto the most minor abuse reports (no dmca etc due to reduced exit policy) Support person emails like he used to be in the NKVD Cheers Mark B

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Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
by myflyrybr 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

Trying to hide exit nodes would have little effect on censorship. I believe a more effective approach would be just do the same the vpngate guys did to beat the chinese firewall. Just mix in the published list some essential or high popularity IPs (ex. DNS servers...) as if they were relays. That would send the censors in a goose-chase when a lot of people start complaining about the block. The cost to censor is raised considerably. They would have to check every relay address before adding it to a blacklist, or risk breaking popular services. It's just not worth the trouble.

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