tor-relays

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36 participants
4815 discussions

Cloudflare Onions Beta and Network Stability
by Nathaniel Suchy 29 Aug '18

29 Aug '18

As some of you may have heard, Cloudflare is beta testing opportunistic onions. This of course is going to create more Tor traffic. Cloudflare has several concerns about running their own relays and says they won’t at this time. That said if every Cloudflare website becomes an Onion Service overnight how would that affect network stability and what can we as relay operators do to prepare for it?

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The truth about Greypony
by Tor Professional 29 Aug '18

29 Aug '18

The truth must come out eventually about the menace known as Greypony. Now that people are beginning to realize what a menace to our network Greypony really is maybe this information will finally get us to banish him once and for all. Greypony has no real customers. You will not find a legitimate customer because they do not exist. They are all one Conrad Rockenhaus. Just so you know. Do you know any of the people that are bragging about using Greypony? Are they true professionals that use Tor? I do not think so. Find one person that you can legitimately trust that has used Greypony or that has dealt with Rockenhaus legitimately and you will not find one because such a person does not exist. Greypony lies about their bandwidth numbers. Those numbers are impossible. How are they eclipsing some of the fastest tor exits on the Internet? How are they operating the fastest exits in Canada? By lying about their numbers and cheating. What are Rockenhaus' motives for doing this? He says he wants to help Tor but we all know that he is full of it. Why would someone like him want to help us? We do not need someone like him. We can do better. We are better. Let us apply a little chemotherapy to the cancer and kill off Greypony.

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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold
by Paul Templeton 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

> About finding sponsors for high speed exits, it could be nice > to gather ideas. Can I ask what is a high speed/capacity exit? For me it would be >10MiB/s am I correct? Paul

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[release] ExoneraTor 3.0.1
by Karsten Loesing 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

Hi relay operators, today we released ExoneraTor 3.0.1 which fixes links to IP addresses in the same /24 or /48 IP network (#27266). This is also the first release after making several code improvements, which ideally should not affect operation. But just in case something breaks that was previously working, this could be the reason. Please direct any comments or questions to the (public) metrics-team mailing list: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/metrics-team All the best, Karsten

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Protecting Tor Circuit path selection from correlation attacks by an autonomous system
by Nathaniel Suchy 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

This thread continues the broader discussion of Tor Circuit path selection discussed at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-August/015994.html regarding possible correlation attacks by an autonomous system. *Current measures include:* * Preventing two relays from the same /16 in IPv4 and /32 in IPv6 networks, from being in the same Tor circuit. CIDR is helpful, but is it enough? * The MyFamily directive, this does rely on relay operators being honest and we shouldn't rely on this as the sole indicator. * Others things that I am not aware of? *Some measures worth considering include:* * Preventing two relays in the same ASN from being in a circuit. * Maybe prevent two relays in the same ASN from being Guard and Exit, excluding the middle relay from this calculation. * Bridges could be a challenge when implementing this, although it's not impossible. * Looking at relays with same/similar names, heuristics maybe? It's really guesswork but hey it might work. * Looking at relays with same/similar contact info * Looking at relays in the same geographic regions and avoiding them * Relays with the same non-standard ports - excluding 9001, 9030, 80, 443 (anything else that's super common?) * On device models looking at the above data to make decisions of which relays are most likely run by the same entity, use machine learning to make an informed decision based on all factors maybe? *Papers worth reviewing:* * AS-awareness in Tor Path Selection https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/DBLP:conf/ccs/EdmanS09.pdf * Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries https://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf * Moving Tor Circuits Towards Multiple-Path: Anonymity and Performance Considerations https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aa94/7dd4762bd0f6531bacfeac9d29ef1e1d4cd6.… * Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor’s Security with Trust-Aware Path Selection https://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/sites/www.nrl.navy.mil.itd.chacs/files/p… *Outside the scope:* * In AS-es where Virtual Machines are sold, and Physical Machines are not. It's quite possible that the provider may steal relay keys. Little research exists where you could successfully protect against such an adversary who isn't playing nice. Legislation (For example, GDPR) in the EU exists where such activity may violate local laws. This may or may not be enough. Certainly not against a government actor, but against an AS doing it per their only devices maybe. * An AS hosting a Tor relay who logs or watches network traffic will always be able to learn something about the circuit, but perhaps we can prevent them from learning everything about the circuit most of the time. Everyone on the list has a had very insightful and helpful thoughts on this discussion so far and I'm looking forward to getting more discussion of the broader issue. Cordially, Nathaniel Suchy

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Avoiding Off-Topic Posts
by teor 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

Hi, A healthy, robust, and growing tor network needs a lot of different ways to run tor relays. Focusing on one or two models creates single points of failure. So we encourage individual volunteers, organisations, donations, paid services, and researchers: as long as they operate ethically and prioritise user safety. That said, this list is for "support and questions about running Tor relays". In future, please: * keep on topic, we are here to help each other run Tor relays * make sure each post contains new, useful information. You can search the archives before posting: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/ * avoid promoting or criticising the same providers more than once a month * deal with commercial / payment issues off-list But you should feel free to ask questions about operating relays at any time. T -- teor Please reply @torproject.org New subkeys 1 July 2018 PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Issues regarding 185.125.33.114 relay
by Nathaniel Suchy 27 Aug '18

27 Aug '18

Can the operator of the relay 185.125.33.114 please reach out to me? There is not any contact information available on Tor Metrics for the relay. Cordially, Nathaniel Suchy

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Congrats to Nullvoid
by Conrad Rockenhaus 27 Aug '18

27 Aug '18

I just wanted to say congratulations to Nullvoid, who is currently running the second fastest exit in France in my colo in Europe. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/51420DFB2047A33803A9A6E456D6… Also, go FreeBSD! Thanks, Conrad

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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold
by livak 25 Aug '18

25 Aug '18

Hi ! In a an older thread I read: > Like Teor mentioned, it's important for operators to increase capacity > and stability, while still meaningfully supporting diversity. Emerald > Onion is not going to surpass 10% of exit capacity without first > helping ~10 other groups set up and manage their own 1%+ relays. As > more and more high-capacity groups come online, I think orgs like > Quintex and Emerald Onion can slowly increase capacity but stick > around the 10% line. Is there any help for setting up new high capacity exit relays ? Livak Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Yay, Complaints
by Conrad Rockenhaus 25 Aug '18

25 Aug '18

So, new equipment gets plugged into a colo…. I’m a dude that was looking to increase AS diversity on Tor and well, decided to add a new colo to the mix. Two exit relays are brought online on properly SWIPed IP addresses. These exit relays have only been online for about 24 hours. An organization, known as Irdeto Intelligence, ignores the fact that the IP addresses are SWIPed and sends abuse complaints to my upstream providers asking them to straighten me out, because I’m a pox on society because people are torrenting via Tor. They have sent over 40 emails in the last 12 hours. Some dude-man, who calls himself a “Network Security Administrator” who asked me to explain what Tor is……….because he’s a Network Security Administrator……..has told me that due to the volume of complaints I need to block the offending applications from their network. I told him that I spoke with them prior to bringing this stuff online, explained what Tor was, explained what a Tor exit was, explained that it will generate complaints, explained the DCMA liability, explained the whole thing…..and was told that they were okay with it. I’m sorry for the bitching and moaning…it’s just another case of doing everything right and now I’m quite worried that they’ll not only pull the plug, that I’ll have to fight to get my Cisco UCS blade server back (and other assorted equipment) which is totally not going to be cool. Conrad

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