- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Hello
by Conrad Rockenhaus 04 Apr '19

04 Apr '19

Hi Tor-Relays, I apologize that I just disappeared, I wound up with a massive stroke last year which was more significant than the last one and was hospitalized longer for recovery and rehabilitation. Things just kind of fell to the wayside since it's kind of hard to computer when you can't computer :P. Anyway, I've been home for the past few weeks and starting to get back into my old hobbies again. I brought two new exit relays up in NYC, one Linux, and one FreeBSD on 1 Gb/s Links. I have another FreeBSD box in NYC on a 1 Gb/s link that I'm trying to think if I should make an exit relay or just a regular relay. Relay names - greyponyitnyc001 and greyponyitnyc002. I hope everyone is having a good day! -- Conrad Rockenhaus https://www.rockenhaus.com Cell: (254) 292-3350 Fax: (254) 875-0459

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Spamcop question
by ylms 04 Apr '19

04 Apr '19

Hello fellow Tor-Exit operators, today I got the following Abuse message: //Start [ SpamCop V5.0.0 ] This message is brief for your comfort. Please use links below for details. Email from 5.199.130.188 / Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:20:30 +0000 https://www.spamcop.net/w3m?i=.....(removed) 5.199.130.188 is open proxy, see: https://www.spamcop.net/mky-proxies.html [ Offending message ] Return-Path: <admin(a)abc.gr> X-Original-To: bingobongo69(a)cd.ru Delivered-To: bingobongo69(a)cd.ru Received: from 31.184.255.247 (unknown [5.199.130.188]) by relay (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7cqntswbr6frkskj for <bingobongo69(a)cd.ru>; Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:20:30 +0000 Message-ID: <EAAACECBFAFDDACFCAEABBBEC(a)abc.gr> From: <admin(a)abc.gr> To: <bingobongo69(a)cd.ru> Subject: smtp:>>smtp.efg.es,587,test(a)efg.es,123456>> Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 13:20:18 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1251"; Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit smtp:>>smtp.efg.es,587,test(a)efg.es,123456>> veblcshgtpwfdonxkebdghrwf pboqjycmmdslmliomafclayaheiuft uybveafdbnsuydqvbgyukf zsszifpadkpaufibjosuk //End I wasn't sure what to remove from the abuse message so I removed all the domains to protect the owners of these hosts/addresses, I hope I didn't miss any. My question, what did I miss in in the exit policy, I have used the following in the torrc. Maybe I did not miss anything at all. Thanks for helping me to understand how the spammer could use the the exit for spamming. I assume with the reduced exit policy spammers should not be enabled to use the exit. // torrc # Reduced Exit policy according to: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy ExitPolicy accept *:20-21 # FTP ExitPolicy accept *:22 # SSH ExitPolicy accept *:23 # Telnet ExitPolicy accept *:43 # WHOIS ExitPolicy accept *:53 # DNS ExitPolicy accept *:79 # finger ExitPolicy accept *:80-81 # HTTP ExitPolicy accept *:88 # kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:110 # POP3 ExitPolicy accept *:143 # IMAP ExitPolicy accept *:194 # IRC ExitPolicy accept *:220 # IMAP3 ExitPolicy accept *:389 # LDAP ExitPolicy accept *:443 # HTTPS ExitPolicy accept *:464 # kpasswd ExitPolicy accept *:465 # URD for SSM (more often: an alternative SUBMISSION port, see 587) ExitPolicy accept *:531 # IRC/AIM ExitPolicy accept *:543-544 # Kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:554 # RTSP ExitPolicy accept *:563 # NNTP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:587 # SUBMISSION (authenticated clients [MUA's like Thunderbird] send mail over STARTTLS SMTP here) ExitPolicy accept *:636 # LDAP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:706 # SILC ExitPolicy accept *:749 # kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:853 # DNS over TLS ExitPolicy accept *:873 # rsync ExitPolicy accept *:902-904 # VMware ExitPolicy accept *:981 # Remote HTTPS management for firewall ExitPolicy accept *:989-990 # FTP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:991 # Netnews Administration System ExitPolicy accept *:992 # TELNETS ExitPolicy accept *:993 # IMAP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:994 # IRCS ExitPolicy accept *:995 # POP3 over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:1194 # OpenVPN ExitPolicy accept *:1220 # QT Server Admin ExitPolicy accept *:1293 # PKT-KRB-IPSec ExitPolicy accept *:1500 # VLSI License Manager ExitPolicy accept *:1533 # Sametime ExitPolicy accept *:1677 # GroupWise ExitPolicy accept *:1723 # PPTP ExitPolicy accept *:1755 # RTSP ExitPolicy accept *:1863 # MSNP ExitPolicy accept *:2082 # Infowave Mobility Server ExitPolicy accept *:2083 # Secure Radius Service (radsec) ExitPolicy accept *:2086-2087 # GNUnet, ELI ExitPolicy accept *:2095-2096 # NBX ExitPolicy accept *:2102-2104 # Zephyr ExitPolicy accept *:3128 # SQUID ExitPolicy accept *:3389 # MS WBT ExitPolicy accept *:3690 # SVN ExitPolicy accept *:4321 # RWHOIS ExitPolicy accept *:4643 # Virtuozzo ExitPolicy accept *:5050 # MMCC ExitPolicy accept *:5190 # ICQ ExitPolicy accept *:5222-5223 # XMPP, XMPP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:5228 # Android Market ExitPolicy accept *:5900 # VNC ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6669 # IRC ExitPolicy accept *:6679 # IRC SSL ExitPolicy accept *:6697 # IRC SSL ExitPolicy accept *:8000 # iRDMI ExitPolicy accept *:8008 # HTTP alternate ExitPolicy accept *:8074 # Gadu-Gadu ExitPolicy accept *:8080 # HTTP Proxies ExitPolicy accept *:8082 # HTTPS Electrum Bitcoin port ExitPolicy accept *:64738 # Mumble ExitPolicy reject *:* Regards yl

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IRC relay operator meetup - April 4th
by Colin Childs 02 Apr '19

02 Apr '19

Hi everyone, This is the announcement that we will be holding the April IRC relay operator meetup this Thursday, April 4th, at 22:00UTC in #tor-meeting on irc.oftc.net. As usual, please add any agenda items to the pad below that you would like to discuss! https://storm.torproject.org/shared/_595igXmpGkxq4FdyusPOI-6zzbvwzcodMl4hl2… <https://storm.torproject.org/shared/_595igXmpGkxq4FdyusPOI-6zzbvwzcodMl4hl2…>

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Protecting the bridge port from active probes
by Marek Szuba 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

Hello, I run a private obfuscated Tor bridge for myself and some friends. All in all it has worked fine so far but having recently run some security scans on the bridge host, I now wonder how resistant to active probing my bridge is. Apologies if this has already been asked, I have yet to find a searchable archive of this list. Anyway, here is my logic. In order to operate properly, my bridge must have its ORPort reachable from the Internet. I have chosen a port to be used for this purpose at random but these days, scanning all 64k TCP ports on a host takes mere minutes. The X.509 server certificate offered on the ORPort is rather suspicious, if only because of the randomly generated name; I suspect there might be other peculiarities as well. Therefore, I strongly suspect that it wouldn't take more than a few minutes for any attacker employing active probing to detect my bridge and block access to it. Does this make sense? And in any case, is there anything else I could do to protect my bridge against active probing? The best I could come up with is to make the bridge host periodically change the ORPort, I reckon wouldn't really help because if I had to restart tor on the bridge every few minutes the it wouldn't be of much use connectivity-wise. Having the border firewall block or slow down suspected port scans might perhaps make it possible to change the ORPort less frequently but alas, I have no control over the border firewall beyond being able to ask to open or close specific ports on my host. Thank you in advance for your time. -- MS

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Tor website overhaul -- who deserves punishment?
by Ralph Seichter 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

Not sure if this is the right place to vent, but here goes: Whoever changed the Tor website's design seems to a) have a serious vision impairment and b) done his utmost to hide access to the Tor source code. I think the site feels dumbed down to cater only to those with the shortest attention spans (and bad eyesight) now. Also, as a relay and exit operator, I care most about the source code and documentation, not some management summary. Was there no QA process involved before rolling out the new website? Annoyed, Ralph

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New TOR
by TERRY McKINNEY 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

Say what you like.Tor was great.Now it isn’t.I don’t know code.I do know function. terryGmckinney 201-8725 Oak st Vancouver,BC.Canada V6P4B4 (604)2639203

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Relay without OpenSSL
by Alexander Nasonov 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

I recently tried updating one of my relays to Tor 0.4.0.1 compiled with NSS (and without OpenSSL) but it failed to start, see the logs below. I wonder if this configuration is supported at all and whether I should try running a brand new relay instead of updating? Alex [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [notice] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done [notice] Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits [notice] Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake fininshed with a relay to build circuits [notice] Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [notice] Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha ) -- Alex

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Relay operators meetup Valencia (28.03.2019)
by Vasilis 28 Mar '19

28 Mar '19

Dear Tor friends and relay operators, Tomorrow (28.03.2019) a relay operators meetup will take place at HackerspaceVLC. When: Thursday, March 28th, 2019 Time: 18:30 Where: Hackerspace Valencia Calle Francisco Martínez, 19, Bajo CP 46020, Valencia (Benimaclet), España Map coordinates: https://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=39.48828&mlon=-0.35839#map=19/39.48828/… Event link: https://blog.torproject.org/events/tor-meetup-valencia Hope to see many of you there! Cheers, ~Vasilis

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(no subject)
by Ahmed Ahmed 22 Mar '19

22 Mar '19

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(no subject)
by Ahmed Ahmed 22 Mar '19

22 Mar '19

Aboskenaa(a)gmail.com

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