- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Tor-Podcast about Tor-Messaging
by lists＠for-privacy.net 19 Oct '24

19 Oct '24

On Saturday, 19 October 2024 20:17 David Adam wrote: People are crying in the Tor forum that you have to register with an (anonymous) email. Expressions are used like: Tor Project is dictatorship. And then redshit links? OPSEC please, use frontents: https://github.com/libreddit/libreddit-instances/blob/master/instances.md Onion or clearnet + > /r/Spot_On_Encryption/comments1g7ejidtormessaging_introducing_reflectors_exitrelay/ For all the other centralized cloudflared nonsense: https://github.com/mendel5/alternative-front-ends -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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Tor Relay Operator Community Health - Final report (June 2024)
by gus 17 Oct '24

17 Oct '24

Hello, I wanted to share the "Tor Relay Operator Community Health - Final Project report" (June 2024) made by Ana and Victoria. You can access the report via these links: - Main report: https://www.sr2.uk/reports/2024-TorRelayOperatorCommunityHealth.pdf - Mirror: https://gitlab.torproject.org/-/project/60/uploads/846d7d1816aee92fd2ee283b… best, Gus -- The Tor Project Community Team Lead

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[proposal] Framework for running Tor Network Health investigations
by gus 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

Dear Tor relay operators, Inspired by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, Network Health Team and Community Team has developed a framework for conducting Network Health investigations. This proposal provides clear guidelines for conducting ethically sensitive investigations transparently, responsibly, and in a way that upholds the trust of the Tor user base and wider internet freedom community. You can read and comment on this proposal here: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/policies/-/issues/25 Alternatively, you can read the full text below. Gus ``` * Filename: 101-running-network-health-investigations.md * Title: Framework for running Tor Network Health investigations * Author: Gus - gus at torproject.org, GeKo - gk at torproject.org * Created: 2024-10-15 * Status: Draft ``` ## Overview This proposal outlines a framework for conducting open source investigations of Tor Network Health related events and actors that potentially harm Tor users or the Tor network, such as denial-of-service attacks or malicious relay operators. Investigations of other types of network incidents, like censorship events, are out of scope of this proposal, even though they might want to follow the framework outlined here as well. Inspired by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations [1] (hereafter: Berkeley Protocol), but adapted to the needs of the Tor Community, this proposal provides clear guidelines for conducting ethically sensitive investigations transparently, responsibly, and in a way that upholds the trust of the Tor user base and wider internet freedom community. ## Motivation It is easy to contribute to the Tor network by setting up and running relays. While this low threshold is good for growing the network it, unfortunately, makes it easy as well for malicious actors trying to harm Tor users or the network. Using publicly accessible data and open-source resources empowers the Network Health team and open-source investigators to actively protect the Tor network against such malicious actors. However, thus far there are no guidelines on how to do such investigations in an ethical, reliable and reproducible manner which might prevent volunteers from looking closer at the Tor network out of fear they might do something wrong or harm users or the Tor Project. This proposal is meant to resolve that issue, encouraging interested volunteers to stay vigilant and help protecting the Tor network and its users. At the same time, it aims at providing transparency into how we at the Tor Project use publicly available data during network health investigations ourselves, as we follow the framework developed below as well. ## Framework The framework outlined in this proposal is following the open source investigation cycle as developed in Chapter 6 of the Berkeley Protocol, concluding with a section about guidelines for reporting the findings safely to the Tor Project, so we can take action if needed. The individual stages of the investigation process will be adapted to the Tor context while following the methodological, professional, and ethical principles collected in Chapter 2 of the Berkeley Protocol. Those principles are in particular important as advancing human rights is at the core of Tor's mission. The framework below does not address any security or legal concerns that could arise from doing open source investigations into network incidents or actors. In particular, if the planned investigation might result in danger or harm (be it physical, legal, or otherwise) to yourself or a third party, we urge you to additionally consult the legal and security sections of the Berkeley Protocol first for advice and proper planning of the investigation before it starts. Finally, keep in mind that investigators must adhere to the Tor Project's [Community Policies](https://community.torproject.org/policies). For instance, investigators must respect relay operators' human rights and privacy rights conventions as described in the [evalution criteria for solution to combat malicious relays](https://community.torproject.org/policies/relays/evaluation-criteri…. ## Table of Contents 1. Searching and Monitoring 2. Preliminary assessment 3. Collection 4. Preservation 5. Verification 6. Analysis 7. Reporting ### 1. Searching and Monitoring 1.1. When searching for information and monitoring sources, investigators need to be aware of biases, both their own and those inherent in information online, which might taint the results. Developing and deploying several working hypotheses, which are guiding the search and monitoring efforts, is helping with biases but is not a panacea. Ultimately, it's crucial to be aware of potential biases involved in investigative work and countering them e.g. by broadening and diversifying search and monitoring efforts. 1.2. Besides useful external tools, like regular search engines or specialized ones (e.g., https://shodan.io/) investigators can deploy a collection of tools developed and maintained by the Tor Project to look into network anomalies and bad relay behavior. These tools can be found on the [Network Health GitLab repository](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/). It is recommended to avoid rewriting tools that already exist, for example, a Tor exit scanner to spot machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Instead please contribute to the code that's actively developed. In case you're working on innovative open-source methods to detect malicious actors and publishing them could tip attackers, please contact bad-relays(a)lists.torproject.org so we can think about ways to use those methods while not giving attackers an even larger advantage in the bad relay arms race.[2] 1.3. Running scanners is important to keep the network healthy, but be mindful that this is putting strain on the network and the data you are looking for might already be available by other means. 1.4. As a public network, the Tor network already provides relay information such as relays IP addresses, ISPs, operating systems, fingerprints, Tor versions, and more. Investigators can query or consult this data as long as it does not disrupt relay operations or compromise the privacy of Tor users. Such publicly accessible network information is available via Tor Metrics and Onionoo. To learn more, refer to the Onionoo[3] and Tor Metrics sources[4] documentation. Moreover, there are tools available as well, like OrNetStats[5], that build upon those sources providing further insight into the network and its relays. 1.5. Moreover, as a transparent and open source project we provide public analyses and investigations of a lot of previous and current incidents in our [bug tracker](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo). Please consult that issue tracker as well to avoid duplicated work or false positives. For instance, sometimes there are some DNS resolution issues at exit nodes preventing users from reaching a website. We are aware of that as we are continuously scanning for that problem and dealing with affected exit nodes on a regular basis. 1.6. It must be acknowledged that legit investigations into malicious activities and bad relays may extend beyond using open-source data. Other methodologies and strategies for gathering information, like whistleblowing or using a relay's MetricsPort[6], are out of scope of this framework. 1.7. Finally, it is important to highlight that running modified Tor software or deploying offensive hacking techniques against relays or the Tor network which could harm users, relay operators and the Tor network itself won't be considered part of an open-source investigation under this framework. Rather, those actions will be considered a malicious activity. ### 2. Preliminary assessment 2.1. As searching and monitoring efforts lead to more and more results it is important to make a preliminary assessment of them early on to avoid over-collection. Over-collection is not just problematic because it will make the analysis process slower and more difficult: there are more results to analyze, more storage used and needed, etc. The risks of leaking information or infringing on rights to privacy of individuals are rising as well. 2.2. Similarly to the search and monitoring efforts, assessing the results through the lens of hypotheses is important as they help to focus on the evidence and avoid speculation. 2.3. During the assessment of results make sure they are relevant, reliable and safe to collect. If there is no risk of results being removed from the internet then their collection is not needed either. ### 3. Collection 3.1. Data collected close to the event under investigation may produce better results. For example, tracking IP addresses involved in a DDoS attacks might not be useful after a long period of time as the attackers' infrastructure might have been reassigned to a new customer. 3.2. As the investigation progresses and new evidence shows up, older, previously collected data might not be needed anymore. Please consider deleting it for the same reasons as stated in section 2.1. above. 3.3. Apart from collecting relevant content itself, it is important to save associated metadata as well in order for other investigators to more easily reproduce the investigation's findings and double-check used source material: URLs of the content, the time when it was accessed, source of a website in question, and anything else that helps to explain the context of the capture/collection should be stored, too. 3.4. In cases where malicious content, such as injected JavaScript, is identified during the scanning of exit nodes, it is crucial to capture and archive the website’s source code for both analysis and as evidence of a bad exit relay. ### 4. Preservation 4.1. Preserving the collected content is essential in network health investigations because the information can change, disappear, or be altered over time, making it unreliable and unusable for the investigation. To ensure the integrity of the data, network health investigators must follow preservation principles, based on archivist standards, as outlined in the Berkeley Protocol (section 6D). These principles include authenticity, availability, identity (keeping track of the origin and nature of the evidence), persistence, renderability, and understandability. 4.2. The decentralized and dynamic nature of the Tor network makes collecting and preserving public relay information a significant challenge. The network changes as relays join or leave, making historical data collection and preservation essential for investigations. For example, relay information is only available on the Tor Metrics website for one week before it is archived and removed from the relay search portal. To ensure access to historical relay information, investigators need to download relay descriptors from [CollecTor](https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html). 4.3. Tools like archive.today and the Internet Archive (web.archive.org) are useful for capturing and publicly preserving snapshots of digital content, such as relay information, websites, social media content, and other online information that needs to be collected during an investigation. For a private archive collection, see the [ArchiveBox project](https://github.com/ArchiveBox/ArchiveBox). 4.4. When using open source tools to monitor the network, it is important to preserve the results. This includes maintaining logs with metadata such as timestamps, relay fingerprints, targeted URLs and other information like errors. Trusted services like archive.today or the Internet Archive should be used to preserve the original version of the website. 4.5. Investigators must maintain both evidentiary and working copies of collected digital content. An evidentiary copy is a preserved, unaltered version of the original evidence, used to maintain the authenticity of the original content. Working copies can be created for analysis, allowing changes in format or structure without compromising the integrity of the original data. 4.6. Investigators should regularly back up both evidentiary and working copies to secure storage systems, ensuring that data is not lost or corrupted during the investigation process. Please note that while relay descriptors are important for verification and analysis, they can be re-downloaded from the Tor Metrics website, so backing up this data is not needed. ### 5. Verification 5.1. Verification is a process to ensure the accuracy and validity of information collected during network health investigations. Verification can be done using closed and confidential sources or based exclusively on open sources. Without using a verification method, the information collected may be invalid or unreliable for detecting and removing bad relays. (Verification can be split into three key methods: source analysis, technical and investigative analysis.) 5.2. Investigators must evaluate the credibility and impartiality of the source from which the evidence originates. This includes verifying whether the output from open source tools, social media or websites are reliable. 5.3. Information should be cross-verified by consulting other sources to avoid relying on non validated, manipulated, biased or outdated data. Please be aware that some relay information displayed on the Tor Metrics website are not validated, for example, operator's contact information. 5.4. When verifying collected information, network health investigators should begin by looking for unique or distinguishing features. Such features might include groups of relays joining or leaving the network from a particular Autonomous System (AS), new relay operating in an obscure or popular AS, similarities and other patterns. These identification methods rely on searching and monitoring the Tor network activity. 5.5. While geolocation can be a useful tool in network health investigations and analysis, it is important to remember that the geolocation of Tor relays is often inaccurate. This data must be cross-verified with other IP geolocation databases to ensure reliability. 5.6. Investigators should evaluate the information collected for internal consistency during the verification process. This helps determine whether the information is consistent and coherent, and aligns with itself, ensuring its credibility on its own terms. ### 6. Analysis 6.1. Be mindful that a network health analysis might find false-positives. There are a number of possible reasons for that. Among other things: - the data from Tor Metrics isn't always reliable, and what could initially appear as an action of a malicious actor could actually be the result of a glitch in the Metrics database or other network events, like a denial-of-service attack or a major Tor version upgrade. Please double check if Tor Metrics services (Metrics website, relay-search, Onionoo, etc) status are/were healthy and accurate at the time of the incident. - properly analyzing scanning results can be tricky. During an anomaly investigation, you may discover new and intriguing censorship facts, where exit nodes seem to mess with user traffic resulting in blocked websites. Yet, the underlying problem is that they are just using [the DNS resolvers of their ISP](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/92) or the blocking of websites is done even further upstream. - Tor has location-biases that might impact the analysis. For instance, when investigating bandwidth related anomalies in the network or outright attacks it might just look like some relays are involved based on bandwidth scanner data. However, that might in fact be related to the still existing location-dependency of our bandwidth scanning efforts instead. 6.2. When starting the analysis keep in mind that it might be useful to translate, aggregate or reformat collected material so that it's easier to process with tools planned to be deployed. For instance, it is not uncommon to change the format of collected information to make it more easily searchable. 6.3. If any of your collected data is at risk of getting altered, lost or destroyed during an analysis it is advisable to use a working copy instead. That way it is possible to re-do the analysis with the same data later on, for instance with a different set of tools that might produce better results. See items 4.5. and 4.6. 6.4. There are many open source tools and services available to assist with your data analysis. As the Network Health Team needs to verify findings without the need to buy or purchase any product, it is important to prioritize platforms and/or products that do not require the purchase of a license to access the results. 6.5. Shifting the focus from 'who' to 'how' an anomaly or attack is happening may yield more valuable insights. In general, attackers have a _modus operandi_. Making a profile of a potential attacker, including their resources and techniques, can significantly help and support your analysis. 6.6. During the analysis investigators may be able to identify attacks such as Sybil, MITM, (distributed) denial-of-service, impersonation of relay operators, DNS poisoning, and social engineering (for example, Tor relay MyFamily evasion) attacks. A list of harmful behaviors can be found in [Criteria for rejecting bad relays](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Crite… and also on [Network Health blog posts](https://blog.torproject.org/malicious-relays-health-tor-network/). ### 7. Reporting 7.1. As said in 6.6, the canonical definition and criteria for bad relays in the Tor network are established and followed by the [Criteria for rejecting bad relays](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Crite… document. However, if you've observed a behavior that you may consider malicious and can cause harm to Tor users or to the network, but is not covered by the criteria, please file a ticket on [GitLab](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team). Make sure the ticket is confidential[7] if there is a risk of tipping off an attacker (see 7.7.). 7.2. If investigators detect relays with one of the described issues or behaviors from the Criteria for rejecting bad relays, please report them with a detailed description to our bad relays mailing list (bad-relays(a)lists.torproject.org) including: - The relay's IP address or fingerprint. The fingerprint is a forty-character hex string such as 203933ED4E55EF8A3C3518427D1A1ED6A4CC285E. - What kind of behavior did you see and when? - Any additional information we'll need to reproduce the issue. 7.3. It is better to report attacks earlier than later, as attackers might turn them on and off to avoid the risk of detection. Waiting too long before getting back to us might make it therefore harder or outright impossible to replicate your findings. 7.4. Without replicable findings, the Network Health Team is unable to reject relays. However, we'd like to hear your results nevertheless, as we might have additional information or did our own investigation already that could help reproducing them. 7.5. When reporting to us, investigators don't need to identify themselves by their legal names. Pseudonyms and anonymous tips are welcome. 7.6. Writing a blog post or a research paper about your findings is very much welcomed. However, please coordinate the disclosure part with us first, so that the risk and potential harm to our users is minimized. 7.7. Don't tip off the attacker. While much of the data on suspicious relay activity is public, putting together all the pieces of an investigation should be done discretely. Revealing publicly an investigation result could inadvertently inform the attacker, helping them to evade future detection. 7.8. Additionally in the case of bridges, investigators must be careful on not publicly revealing the bridges' IP addresses. Revealing publicly the IP addresses of bridges without consulting the Network Health Team might be considered as malicious intent. ## References [1] Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations (2022) - https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publication… [2] [tor-talk] Why make bad-relays a closed mailing list? (2014) - https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html [3] Onionoo documentation - https://metrics.torproject.org/onionoo.html [4] Metrics sources documentation - https://metrics.torproject.org/sources.html [5] OrNetStats - https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/ [6] MetricsPort - https://support.torproject.org/glossary/metrics-port/ [7] Confidential issues in GitLab - https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/issues/confidential_issues.html -- The Tor Project Community Team Lead

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Decommissioning a FallbackDir node (punki)
by Osservatorio Nessuno 09 Oct '24

09 Oct '24

Hi there, sadly after almost 6 years of good and honest service, our exit node punki[1] will be turned off. The provider is powering off the infrastructure where it is hosted, and has offered no viable alternative. We are writing this email in advance, since the node is in the FallbackDir list and embedded in Tor. The cluster will be powered off on 25th November. punki E43244684E0C924EC082B8ECC735FAF2F8CF1C45 Cheers Giulio [1] - https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/E43244684E0C924EC082B8ECC735…

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay not in consensus
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 05 Oct '24

05 Oct '24

I tried changing the exit and OR ports, I tried setting CircuitBuildTimeout to 300, and my ISP keep assuring me they don't block any port, ever. Some DirAuth still cannot connect with me. I have about 20 exit relays spread across 11 ISPs, including 4 with this ISP (each in a different country). They are all built with the same setup. This particular Tor instance has been working fine for months now. I don't understand what more I can do. Everything is OK on my side, except for an "It seems like we are not in the cached consensus." line appearing in the log once in a while. It's the DirAuth that somehow cannot reach me, apparently blocked by some proxy server in the middle. What more can I do? Do I just abandon this server and IP address because it is somehow blacklisted by I don't know who? Denny On 2024-10-03 13:06, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote: On Wednesday, 2 October 2024 21:24 Sebastian Hahn wrote: On 2. Oct 2024, at 09:05, George Hartley via tor-relays <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> wrote: It could be that your provider has throttled you temporarily. I don't think so, I get that message on a dedicated 10 GbE link with little to no use except for the exit relay on it. Also, if his relay publishes it's descriptor, then why Metrics won't reflect that? It should show it as online, as you don't need IPv6 to be reachable to get the online flag. it looks like your upstream is maliciously messing with your traffic. I am noticing a distinct difference between two traces, one directly from my diraut's IPv4, another from a different host on the same network: A few years ago, Roger emailed me that he could not reach a service @ mit.edu (ASN3) via my exit. I had 2 exits at the same provider with same torrc, network config, IPtables, etc. One had "mystery null routes between Tor relays." https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40357 I then switched to a different exit port and the problem was solved. -- â°_â¯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom! _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay not in consensus
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 03 Oct '24

03 Oct '24

Before my last restart 6 hours ago you get a series of messages like these: ``` Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 81 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 341 v4 connections; initiated 38535 and received 87986 v5 connections. Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus. Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 2 days 18:00 hours, with 185 circuits open. I've sent 41.52 GB and received 55.06 GB. I've received 105529 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. I've made 46384 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6. While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 53988798 (server descriptor fetch); 11748 (server descriptor upload); 3201890 (consensus network-status fetch); 548826 (microdescriptor fetch) Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 2/2 NTor. ``` After my last restart I have: ``` Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc". Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 4440 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand. Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051 Opened Control listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9051 Opening OR listener on 156.67.111.146:443 Opened OR listener connection (ready) on 156.67.111.146:443 [...] Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay Opening Control listener on /run/tor/control Opened Control listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/control Self-testing indicates your ORPort 156.67.111.146:443 is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Your network connection speed appears to have changed. Resetting timeout to 60000ms after 18 timeouts and 1000 buildtimes. Performing bandwidth self-test...done. ``` I can confirm that the IPv6 address is not reachable for an unknown reason. The IPv6 address and flag have been removed from the torrc file to correct the problem and don't appear in the log at restart, as shown above. IPv6 should be completely ignored by the DirAuth. Denny On 2024-10-01 08:06, George Hartley via tor-relays wrote: Hi, looks like the DirAuth's think that your relay is unreachable, and so your descriptor isn't published, so your flags are not updated, this would explain the lack of change in flags. Port 443 on 156.67.111.146 is open for me, can't test IPv6 as I have disabled it through my modem and kernel command line. Can you attach your tor log file? You can also adjust the log verbosity of certain "domains" within Tor like so: [1]https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#Log Please let us know what you find. Thanks, George On Tuesday, October 1st, 2024 at 1:40 PM, denny.obreham(a)a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net <denny.obreham(a)a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net> wrote: My exit relay which has been running for months without a problem has not been in the cached consensus for days now. https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html?#7BDDE 0E7607A5F49578768F44CD721793FA2D7AE After investigating, I thought the reason was that the IPv6 wasn't reachable anymore. It happened once before with another relay. Seems to be a problem with my ISP. Anyway, I just remove the ORPort IPv6 address and IPv6Exit flag from the torrc file and everything should return to normal. It has been days and it doesn't. Reloaded and restarted more than once since then. What I don't understand is that the OR IPv6 address and the ReachableIPv6 flag are still listed in the metrics. h ttps://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/7BDDE0E7607A5F49578768 F44CD721793FA2D7AE Any help would be appreciated. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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turning off BridgeDB and the future of moat bridges
by meskio 03 Oct '24

03 Oct '24

Hello, tl;rd: moat bridges are not distributed anymore. Don't shut them down as they are still used but don't create new bridges with "BridgeDistribution moat". BridgeDB has being our bridge distribution system since 2007. For years we have being developed a replacement of BridgeDB[0] called rdsys[1]. And finally yesterday we replaced the last distributors missing in rdsys (email, https and moat) and turned off BridgeDB. The only visible difference is that captchas has disappeared from https://bridges.torproject.org and requesting bridges in Tor Browser gives you a static captcha and doesn't even verify if the answer is correct (until we have the time to update TB to don't request the captcha[2]. The mayor difference for bridge operators is that we don't distribute "moat" bridges anymore. We have merged circumvention settings and moat and now is one distributor handing over "settings" bridges. For now we are going to keep the existing "moat" bridges assigned to "moat" and don't distribute them, so users that have one of those bridges can keep using them without risk of censors finding it. New bridges will not be assigned automatically the moat distributor, only existing bridges or bridges with "BridgeDistribution moat" will stay in this distributor. We plan to watch the usage of moat bridges and evaluate moving them to another distributor depending on the usage[3]. Thank you for running bridges. [0] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/bridgedb/ [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/rdsys/ [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42086 [3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/rdsys/-/issues/233 -- meskio | https://meskio.net/ -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- My contact info: https://meskio.net/crypto.txt -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Nos vamos a Croatan.

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Docker Snowflake Proxy Multiple IPs
by admin＠likogan.dev 02 Oct '24

02 Oct '24

Hello, I'm writing because I want to run a snowflake proxy in a docker container on a server with two IP addresses; the primary public IP I want the snowflake proxy hosted on, and a public anycast IP that's shared between other servers. I'm concerned the snowflake proxy may try listening on the anycast IP, which will cause problems as this IP is shared between a few servers! >From my understanding, a snowflake proxy should use the "host" network option with docker. How can I specify which IP address to use with this option? Thanks, Likogan

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Exit relay not in consensus
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 01 Oct '24

01 Oct '24

My exit relay which has been running for months without a problem has not been in the cached consensus for days now. https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html?#7BDDE0E7 607A5F49578768F44CD721793FA2D7AE After investigating, I thought the reason was that the IPv6 wasn't reachable anymore. It happened once before with another relay. Seems to be a problem with my ISP. Anyway, I just remove the ORPort IPv6 address and IPv6Exit flag from the torrc file and everything should return to normal. It has been days and it doesn't. Reloaded and restarted more than once since then. What I don't understand is that the OR IPv6 address and the ReachableIPv6 flag are still listed in the metrics. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/7BDDE0E7607A5F49578768F4 4CD721793FA2D7AE Any help would be appreciated.

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relays and CUPS vulnerabilities
by George 30 Sep '24

30 Sep '24

There are some very significant recent CVEs out for CUPS, the unix printing system. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=cups It's an ideal moment to remind relay operators that a Tor node, relay or bridge, should be a single-purpose internet server. Running alternate internet services is a bad idea. The node should have the minimum packages installed for the purpose of running a node. More packages means more possible vulnerabilities. Needless to say, a CUPS server listening on 631/tcp or 631/udp while providing Tor access is a bad idea. g -- 43C2 85B0 41B6 4AC1 0E02 2767 7092 AEB3 40B0 C804

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