- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Dynamic upload limit
by Bram L 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

Dear list members, I am running a tor relay, but I have an upload limit (50GB/7 days). This limit usually can't be increased too much, because that might affect other network users. I would like to request my provider (university) for a bandwidth-free connection during the night (or whenever the network is not used very much), and a limited version during the peak times. My idea is that this way I could contribute to the Tor network without disturbing other users of my university network. Before I do so, however, I am curious whether it actually contributes to the Tor network. I noticed it takes time for the bandwidth to increase, and if my daytime upload limit is low (e.g. 80 kb/s) and unlimited (Gb/s) at night, my overall contribution could be very limited due to the time it takes Tor to utilize my available bandwidth. Do you have any insights in this matter? Thanks in advance! PS: currently, I drain the 50GB in about a day unlimited or I run at very slow speeds... Both don't give me the feeling I really contribute.

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Re: [tor-relays] TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Hi Mateusz, 19 days with 1/5 of the default pps value (1000) That would be around 4 days with pps 1000. That's exactly the value estimated in the project faq. Everything seems to be fine. Project site / faq: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#faq Results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Thank you for participating ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman On 13 Feb 2014, at 13:10, Sebastian Urbach wrote: > Dear honorable list members, > Some stats from my side: bash-3.2$ PPS=200 DONTERASE=yes time ./traceroutes.sh 1645980.86 real 28760.92 user 181530.51 sys Started on 27 Jan 2014 00:49 GMT Finished on 15 Feb 2014 02:02 GMT ca. 19 days to complete with scamper on OSX 10.7 Thanks, -mateusz

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TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Dear honorable list members, If anybody has questions regarding his / her submitted results than please include your public ip address in your mail. We can process your requests way faster if we have this essential information and don't have to ask for it. Btw. we are at 88 ip's with at least 1 complete run. Come on, let's make it 100 before the data review in March :-) Thank you very much for your attention ! The project: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html The results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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obfs3 a risk to scramblesuit?
by Delton Barnes 14 Feb '14

14 Feb '14

I am running a bridge with both obfs3 and scramblesuit. obfs3 is vulnerable to active probing. Say someone in China makes the mistake of connecting with obfs3 instead of scramblesuit, and active probing identifies it as a Tor bridge. Wouldn't the bridge IP address then be blacklisted, making it impossible for other people to connect even with scramblesuit? Would it make sense, then, as a bridge operator to elect to only support scramblesuit, even though no one will use it for a while? It seems you are only as good as your weakest transport. Thanks, Delton p.s. Would reply to original thread about scramblesuit, but I only just joined the mailing list, and cannot figure out how to reply to preexisting messages.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Thu, 13 Feb 2014 18:10:38 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > Hm, the "Could not set up listener" error message usually appears when > something is already listening on the port that obfsproxy wants to > bind to (Twisted throws the error.CannotListenError exception). > I managed to avoid the problem by running `killall obfsproxy` before restarting Tor. This time around I registered server transport 'obfs3' and registered server transport 'scramblesuit'. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Wed, 12 Feb 2014 18:29:26 +0000 Matt <matt(a)pagan.io> wrote: > I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing > this message: > > [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the > configuration protocol and will be destroyed. > > That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean? > Here is more from the debug log: Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is complete: 3 steps long Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Looking for firsthop '[redacted IPv4]:443' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Conn open. Delivering first onion skin. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First skin; sending create cell. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(): circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() found nothing for circ_id 2147489864, channel ID 2 (0x2ba73fe349b0) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_deliver_create_cell(): Chosen circID 2147489864. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit active. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First hop: finished sending CREATE cell to '$5A0EF08FC99F236C5E48FB52E649F092088D009C=ganooloonix at [redacted IPv4]' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] pt_configure_remaining_proxies(): Configuring remaining managed proxies (1)! Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (VERSION 1) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (SMETHOD-ERROR obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Server managed proxy encountered a method error. (obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] tor_process_handle_destroy(): Terminated process with PID '30355'. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] mark_my_descriptor_dirty(): Decided to publish new relay descriptor: configured managed proxies Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 17 wants to write. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] flush_chunk_tls(): flushed 1542 bytes, 0 ready to flush, 0 remain. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] connection_handle_write_impl(): After TLS write of 1542: 0 read, 1589 written Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_write_packed_cell(): Writing packed_cell_t 0x2ba7403cb698 to channel 0x2ba73fe349b0 with global ID 2 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(): Made a circuit inactive.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 16:04:56 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Greetings, > > a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit > is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it > at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ > > If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy > to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git > master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will > hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some > testing :) > > After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin > line from: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed to: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed > > This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. > > It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based > pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a > password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't > connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor > will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that > clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random > password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a > torrc line like this: > ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit > password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA > > By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the > beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we > will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. > > Feel free to ask any questions you have! > > Thanks! > > PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, > please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not > hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the > number of obfuscated bridges out there. > > [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing this message: [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean?

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New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by George Kadianakis 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

Greetings, a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some testing :) After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin line from: ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed to: ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a torrc line like this: ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. Feel free to ask any questions you have! Thanks! PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the number of obfuscated bridges out there. [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en

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Trusted Tor Traceroute Scoreboard Link Modified
by Anupam Das 11 Feb '14

11 Feb '14

Hi Relay Operators, We have made some modifications to the way we are running our live scoreboard script. Previously we were running into some problems with handling multiple simultaneous web requests, as the server started a heavy script for each incoming request. Now we are updating a static HTML files every 10 minutes. The link of our scoreboard has changed. Now the scoreboard is available at- http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Sorry for the inconveniences. Thanks Anupam

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Re: [tor-relays] reading the captchas
by eliaz 11 Feb '14

11 Feb '14

On 2/10/2014 9:37:23 AM, Lunar (lunar(a)torproject.org) wrote: > eliaz: > > Would it be possible for someone to change the captcha images at the > URL > > for getting bridges, without of course lessening their effectiveness? > > The present ones are pretty much unreadable, to this human at least. - > eliaz > > The issue is already tracked, see: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809 > -- > Lunar <lunar(a)torproject.org> Thanks for the pointer & your work. I see it's more complicated than I thought. Hope it gets fixed soon, magnifying the screen isn't of much help. I'm reluctant to suggest the page to people as long as reading the captchas is so difficult. --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com

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High speed exit
by Craig C-S 10 Feb '14

10 Feb '14

Hi all, I've been running a few fail relays over the past few years. All relays I run they begin with the prefix "Telos". I've recently come across a really good deal http://www.soyoustart.com/ca/en/ on hosting..., and begun hosting "TelosTor" and "TelosTor2" from 192.99.8.96. I would welcome any comments on security. At the moment I do not have a stable IP to access them, so have defaulted to 1/min IP access for OpenSSH. I would relish the TOR communities feedback in order to further secure my tor exit node. Thanks! Craig

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Relay bandwidth
by Tora Tora Tora 09 Feb '14

09 Feb '14

I have configured Tor with the following (with daily accounting): RelayBandwidthRate 384 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 512 KB I always assumed that the burst bandwidth will set the maximum relay bandwidth. However, by using iftop, I can see individual connections with speeds as high as 2+ Mbps. Even when individual connections are not exceeding burst speeds, adding up bandwidth of all connections would probably exceed allowed relay burst bandwidth. Is this because Tor is using up the bandwidth allowance, since it is well below its long-time average or is this something unexpected that should not be happening?

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using Arm to manage nodes
by jason＠icetor.is 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

Hello all, This is something that's bothered me for quite some time. I often use arm (https://www.torproject.org/projects/arm.html.en) for monitoring my relays and to keep a quick eye on things like overall bandwidth consumed, traffic stats and my favorite client locale statistics. I run it in a screen session and often when I re-attach the session often the keymapping is all messed up and the arrow keys will offer to close arm. Usually it will correct after I shift-m to get to the menu and switch around a few times. Has anyone else experienced this and how did you solve it? -Jason

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Re: [tor-relays] Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

Hi, That's odd, please send us your ip address and we will look into this and get back to you asap. Feel free to send me your ip by private mail if you feel more comfortable. I would suggest that you keep running the script, we will check your submitted data and then we go from there. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman Hi, I've seen this error message twice now within about 12 hours: ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host If I read the script correctly, it tries to upload the data and then deletes it without checking for successful upload. Since the data is probably lost, should I start over? Best regards, Alexander --- PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp On 2014-02-07 22:05, Sebastian Urbach wrote: > Dear list members, > The Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes project is coming closer to the > next data review (03/2014). > Basically every relay (except Bridges) can help to evaluate the Tor > Routes. Please consider that one complete run takes about 4 days with > the default settings. > It's really easy to participate, just download and run the script ! We > are currently at 82 completed runs and i think 100 is a great > milestone :-) > The project website: > http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html > The scoreboard with the results: > http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html > Thank you for your help ! > -- > Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours > Sebastian Urbach > ---------------------------------------------- > Those who would give up essential Liberty, > to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve > neither Liberty nor Safety. > ---------------------------------------------- > Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, > journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Checking a bridge
by Martin Kepplinger 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

When my bridge uses only the same few MBs each day, i guess it isn't used at all right? Is there a simple way to ensure it is in bridgeDB and functioning as it should? thanks, martin

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Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

Dear list members, The Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes project is coming closer to the next data review (03/2014). Basically every relay (except Bridges) can help to evaluate the Tor Routes. Please consider that one complete run takes about 4 days with the default settings. It's really easy to participate, just download and run the script ! We are currently at 82 completed runs and i think 100 is a great milestone :-) The project website: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html The scoreboard with the results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Thank you for your help ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Onion address or clearnet address
by Hang 07 Feb '14

07 Feb '14

Some sites such as RiseUp and DuckDuckGo could be accessed via onion addresses. I would like to know which address (onion address vs clearnet address) should I use when using TBB. I believe both ways are more or less the same in terms of identity protection and communication security (provided that the clearnet addresses are using HTTPS). Perhaps the main difference is using the clearnet addresses adds burden to the exit relays, while using onion addresses only consumes bandwidth of middle relays which is relatives more in supply. Am I right? Do I overlook anything? Or it doesn't matter at all for either way? Best Hang

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duplicated log output after SIGHUP
by Scott Bennett 07 Feb '14

07 Feb '14

I made a minor change to my torrc file and sent tor a SIGHUP. The only logging I'm doing is "notice" level to a file. Here's what has been going on since the SIGHUP. Feb 06 22:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 3:00 hours, with 206 circuits open. I've sent 8.22 GB and received 7.72 GB. Feb 06 22:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.286% Feb 06 22:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 12% Feb 06 23:10:33.967 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading config and resetting internal state. Feb 06 23:10:33.967 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc". Feb 06 23:10:33.976 [warn] Skipping obsolete configuration option 'MaxOnionsPending' Feb 06 23:10:33.978 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.20 (git-3cb5c70beec5bf46) opening log file. Feb 06 23:10:33.978 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.20 (git-3cb5c70beec5bf46) opening log file. Feb 06 23:10:34.293 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MYCROFTsOtherChild 023220505A550D6FDF0C20FF7C48E66BA06A49A6' Feb 06 23:10:34.293 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MYCROFTsOtherChild 023220505A550D6FDF0C20FF7C48E66BA06A49A6' Feb 06 23:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2129/2129 TAP, 364/364 NTor. Feb 06 23:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2129/2129 TAP, 364/364 NTor. Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 4:00 hours, with 296 circuits open. I've sent 8.55 GB and received 8.05 GB. Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 4:00 hours, with 296 circuits open. I've sent 8.55 GB and received 8.05 GB. Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.276% Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.276% Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 00:31:59.201 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2781/2781 TAP, 348/348 NTor. Feb 07 00:31:59.201 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2781/2781 TAP, 348/348 NTor. Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 5:00 hours, with 384 circuits open. I've sent 8.62 GB and received 8.11 GB. Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 5:00 hours, with 384 circuits open. I've sent 8.62 GB and received 8.11 GB. Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.264% Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.264% Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 01:31:59.219 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 3469/3469 TAP, 278/278 NTor. Feb 07 01:31:59.219 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 3469/3469 TAP, 278/278 NTor. Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 6:00 hours, with 559 circuits open. I've sent 8.63 GB and received 8.13 GB. Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 6:00 hours, with 559 circuits open. I've sent 8.63 GB and received 8.13 GB. Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.151% Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.151% Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 02:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 4090/4090 TAP, 345/345 NTor. Feb 07 02:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 4090/4090 TAP, 345/345 NTor. Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 7:00 hours, with 540 circuits open. I've sent 8.82 GB and received 8.31 GB. Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 7:00 hours, with 540 circuits open. I've sent 8.82 GB and received 8.31 GB. Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.116% Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.116% Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% And so on. Is the duplication of messages after a reload a known bug? Please note that the double logging I reported earlier has been corrected by commenting out the --Log stuff in /usr/local/etc/rc.d/tor, so the new double logging appears to be a different problem. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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What is more necessary: Bridge or Relay?
by an.to_n-73＠riseup.net 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

Hello List! Since 7/2013 I operate a small Tor Server as internal relay or as obfuscated bridge. What is more necessary: An internal relay to speed up the network, or an obfuscated bridge to help censored users? My ISP gives me dynamic IPs, which change daily. I guess this is good for bridges, because my IP is valid only for one day. Otherwise I've got an upload > 500 kbps and could contribute to the network speed. Actually I've got not clue about the need for anonymous bridges. In addition: I could combine both, because my VPN provider iVPN offers port forwarding. So I could run the RaspberryPi as bridge on my own IP and the 2nd server as internal relay over the VPN. So the public relay runs on another IP. But actually the VPN connection terminates by itself, the relay goes offline and I can fix it the evening. => Has anyone experience with servers listening over VPN? Does anyone know more? Best regards Anton -- an.to_n-73(a)riseup.net Public PGP key fingerprint 5FD2 DE00 1B1A 1970 8D32 A59E 4A25 3CE1 A82F F4C4

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http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/
by K. Besig 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

Why shouldn't I be concerned when, by simply accessing this page, all my actual ip/dns information is readily available to all?

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Middle relay
by Tora Tora Tora 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

I am trying to run a middle relay with no-exit policy. It was my assumption that a middle relay would only communicate with other relays on 9001 port. Yet I see my relay IP address attempting connections to other IP address on ports that are non-9001 (or 9030).

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Bridge or Relay
by Sebastian Urbach 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

Hi, I really wonder why we even bother to have a FAQ: http://torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#RelayOrBridge -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Phishy
by phrag 04 Feb '14

04 Feb '14

FYI: Just got this to my Tor relay mail address, with a zip file attached extracting to a '.scr' win exe. Curiously routed via a .gov.uk mail relay... GB03022014.scr: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5: dba1e52929f6ca9d1a1bf87e4ff469cf GB2546241.zip MD5: fb1141494829b144b0075035022cfbb9 GB03022014.scr Samples available on request. Full mail headers attached. ========== From defeats871(a)richszabo.com Mon Feb 03 14:06:39 2014 Return-path: <defeats871(a)richszabo.com> Received: from [217.109.27.97] (helo=WNACDHPXR) Received: from mail1.bemta14.messagelabs.com by server.justinarcher.net Received: from gateway-102.energis.gsi.gov.uk (HELO mx.hosting-w.gsi.gov.uk) (62.25.106.208) by server-10.tower-205.messagelabs.com X-Env-Sender: gateway.confirmation(a)gateway.gov.uk From: <gateway.confirmation(a)gateway.gov.uk> To: <tor(a)phra.gs> Subject: Your Online Submission for Reference 485/GB2546241 Could not process Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2014 22:16:02 +0100 The submission for reference 485/GB2546241 was successfully received and was not processed. Check attached copy for more information. This is an automatically generated email. Please do not reply as the email address is not monitored for received mail. ==========

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Re: [tor-relays] Phishy
by Jesse Victors 03 Feb '14

03 Feb '14

> FYI: Just got this to my Tor relay mail address, with a zip file > attached extracting to a '.scr' win exe. Curiously routed via a .gov.uk > mail relay... > > GB03022014.scr: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows > > MD5: dba1e52929f6ca9d1a1bf87e4ff469cf GB2546241.zip > MD5: fb1141494829b144b0075035022cfbb9 GB03022014.scr > > Samples available on request. Full mail headers attached. I read Jurre's analysis, but I disagree. I could be mixing this up with something else, but if I recall correctly, that screensaver Trojan Horse trick was one method by which the government was de-anonymizing Tor users, though I don't recall the exact name of this attack vector. Your IP of your relay is public of course, but if you opened that a location/identity that you wanted to stay hidden, in my opinion I would consider that to be compromised. Thanks for the report.

1 0

New GPG key for Runa A. Sandvik
by Runa A. Sandvik 02 Feb '14

02 Feb '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi everyone, Tomorrow is my first day as a staff technologist at the Center for Democracy and Technology in Washington, D.C. I will continue to contribute to the Tor Project in one way or another. This new key will be used to sign email from me going forward. The new key is attached and is also available on the keyservers (with a signature from my old key) at: http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x094D46E2898DB6D5 Here's the fingerprint and current subkey information for reference: pub 4096R/898DB6D5 2014-02-02 Key fingerprint = BEBA DB46 6778 5EF9 B00E D141 094D 46E2 898D B6D5 uid Runa A. Sandvik (offline long term identity key) <runa.sandvik(a)gmail.com> uid Runa A. Sandvik (offline long term identity key) <runa(a)cdt.org> uid Runa A. Sandvik (offline long term identity key) <runa(a)torproject.org> sub 3072R/AC8C6CF6 2014-02-02 [expires: 2015-02-02] sub 3072R/FC71640D 2014-02-02 [expires: 2015-02-02] - -- Runa A. Sandvik -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGcBAEBCgAGBQJS7qvsAAoJECgKOvb8cWQNT1UL/joI4P1++EIUPmudw179o+j3 4FxEV32snfYNwW9NTaQNwGODglu7EMZRQ4V1UhytXUb9P7taT0eDgiJxPIvC8Okw xZ7jmk5UnV+R37rMLuhcX1Ifwg3Z+tG0qAwJAbFhO/zZX3yTx+ZJoQBjZ4pX5SFQ qE5G7IeLUrWEAIZfm6mLp3M/kh/+8+e5MPsxrdywo9iLi3Y2IB9mO5VVb94qA5Ul l0ETWilusa9PNRD70jtWhQL6EjPS1tkKVbMFk04naDLr+74gwFAta38tJcnZtPId jZXhqpfqcxD0muaEwyvGtV2qfAxbDuDPDxVJofMeK5S5GESOe4AqLyrkMf4MPz4Z ifKFguKpYAiA4Hz9+v4AoZPhX1Zu33AV/4gfE/Q4ZHq3DtqzEkcyzvvEw9kL0pk+ lJC7+R58dJiJ7pGedG9ZCyJugyp6pujiD34RppPL90JxnP5s3V11VkBiv5ZEnB+k kvBq94TkyFD8bUncFhmh4ilkloPDOrqMcfYGl1VjGg== =KZvl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Ubuntu is killing tor when getting low memory
by toxi roxi 02 Feb '14

02 Feb '14

Hi Folks, im running many relays which are doing a nice job. But i have also some smaller relays outside which have just 256mb. They are performing quite quell - but on one relay im facing issues which i think you may help me. this relay seems to ran out of memory from time to time (2 to 5 days) and i found out via dmesg, that ubuntu itself is killing the process to free up memory. the swap is used, but far away from full. as this stops tor immediately its bit annoying that i need to restart the releay without any reason. is there any way to tell ubuntu or to prevent that the tor process is killed for freeing up memory? i dont care about other processes as this machine is for tor purposes only. thanks for your expertise! Geri

2 3

Tails 0.22.1~rc1
by K. Besig 31 Jan '14

31 Jan '14

Is anyone having luck setting up a mid-relay within the latest Tails build? I'm finding no joy..

3 3

Re: [tor-relays] Considering setting up an exit, need advice
by Jesse Victors 31 Jan '14

31 Jan '14

> Have you set AccountingMax in your torrc, by chance? > > Also, you sure are restarting the relay a lot. You should learn how to > use 'service reload' rather than 'service restart'. :) No, I don't have AccountingMax enabled, which is one of the reasons why I was puzzled by the hibernation flag. Thanks for the tips on the service, I should have known better. I was restarting often because I was making adjustments to the DirPort and the hosted webpage (that .png thumbnail never loaded when it was offered locally, so I just linked to the hosted one on torproject.org) and it took a few tries before things were working right. Well, at least I won't be restarting Tor frequently going forward. Thanks. >> 3) There are mysterious warnings in the log: >> >> Jan 30 23:07:29.000 [warn] EXTEND cell received, but not via >> RELAY_EARLY. Dropping. [4 similar message(s) suppressed in last 3600 >> seconds] >> Jan 30 23:07:29.000 [warn] (We have dropped 95.24% of all EXTEND cells >> for this reason) > You don't happen to have set "ProtocolWarnings 1" in your torrc, have you? > >> I'm familiar with the meaning of the "EXTEND" cell, but I'm not sure >> what RELAY_EARLY is > See > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/110-avoid-in… > as motivated by > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#congestion-longpaths > > My guess is that these are unofficial Tor clients you're seeing, and > you're seeing them more because all official Tor clients are ignoring > your relay until it gets out of 'phase one' (from the blog post). Yes, I had ProtocolWarnings enabled, good eyes there. I had it on because I thought that it would help me see Tor-level security threats, but I think it's better with it off at least for now. Thanks for the help. Jesse

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Considering setting up an exit, need advice
by Jesse Victors 31 Jan '14

31 Jan '14

Thanks again guys for the help. "usuexit" is now online, and should be functioning properly, but there seem to be a few mystifying issues: 1) TorStatus marks it as "hibernating" which it clearly isn't; it's online and accepting connections. I'm not sure what made TorStatus think it was offline. 2) For the first nine hours it has moved about 12 MB of data. I would think it would be more than that, especially for an exit. There's a blog post outlining the growth rate for guards, but how about for exits? 3) There are mysterious warnings in the log: Jan 30 21:57:36.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 50/50 NTor. Jan 30 22:57:36.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 31/31 NTor. Jan 30 23:07:29.000 [warn] EXTEND cell received, but not via RELAY_EARLY. Dropping. [4 similar message(s) suppressed in last 3600 seconds] Jan 30 23:07:29.000 [warn] (We have dropped 95.24% of all EXTEND cells for this reason) Jan 30 23:57:36.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 39/39 NTor. Jan 31 00:01:41.000 [warn] Got headers "HEAD / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" with unknown command. Closing. Jan 31 00:57:36.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2/2 TAP, 41/41 NTor. Jan 31 01:04:46.000 [warn] EXTEND cell received, but not via RELAY_EARLY. Dropping. Jan 31 01:04:46.000 [warn] (We have dropped 95.45% of all EXTEND cells for this reason) I'm familiar with the meaning of the "EXTEND" cell, but I'm not sure what RELAY_EARLY is, nor do I know what this warning means. If the relay has an exit policy, why are circuits being extended beyond it? Hidden services, maybe? Basically the log has more warnings in it than it should (at least based on my experience with regular relays) and I'm not sure why. I tried restarting Tor, but the warnings still appeared. Any ideas on what I can do about them, if anything? Thanks, Jesse

2 1

Using syslog for monitoring bridges
by Andreas Fritzel 30 Jan '14

30 Jan '14

Hey all, In two different countries I run 3 Tor bridges for a while now. For monitoring, I want to quit using the local filesystem for storing files, filled by syslog and be able to store the syslog info on a remote system. This is done easily with rsyslog[1], but I want to store it at home without the link between the three bridges and my home IP. So, I was thinking about sending it with rsyslog over TCP to a Tor Hidden Service. Is there anyone who can help me out with this? I was thinking about using SOCKS, but it didn't work out :(. Andreas [1] http://www.rsyslog.com/doc/manual.html

6 5

Problems with domestic ISP blocking publicly listed relays
by Paul Blakeman 28 Jan '14

28 Jan '14

Hi all Wondered if anybody could help out/advise as to what’s happened here… I’m based in UK and have domestic internet with Virgin Media. This service is fibre optic based - config: 30Mbps d/l & 2Mbps u/l [mine is the SLOWEST package!] Last year I finally configured a Dell server (running Debian 7.3 - wheezy) to run a Tor relay (0.2.3.25) Everything has been running fine except for the last few weeks I’ve noticed a few irregularities. The first one has been Tor itself where I have noticed (using Arm to monitor) that it has been downloading far more data than uploading. A ratio of say 5:1 — it hasn’t always been this way! The other is my general difficulty in accessing certain web sites online (that once worked) e.g. Access to lovefim.com this weekend has now resulted in no longer able to stream and watch films. I can log onto system but if I try and stream I get the error message “INVALID LOCATION. Sorry, but the requested content is not available in your current location.” Opened a service desk ticket but the response was “you are trying to stream from outside the UK” WTF????? My IP provided by my ISP has been the same all this time (82.42.215.16) I have spoken with them I would have to switch off for 48hrs and MAY NOT (in fact I was told “probably not”) be assigned a different one! SO… Can using a Tor relay result in your IP getting a “bad” flag? Is there anyway of running a relay where you “hide” your IP? Any advise would be greatly appreciated. Best wishes, Paul

6 7

which browser for BSD systems?
by Scott Bennett 28 Jan '14

28 Jan '14

I'm about a year behind on reading this list, so in the event that my question has been addressed during that time, please forgive me for skipping ahead to the present. In the past week, I have *finally* managed to upgrade from FreeBSD 8.2 to 9.2 and am now slogging through the rebuilding of all my installed ports. The ancient version of firefox that I had been stuck with due to later versions' memory allocation bugs now no longer works. For the moment, I have built firefox 26, but because there is no longer a version of torbutton to be found for love or money from anywhere I'd trust, I'd really like to install something safer than just firefox with NoScript, AdblockPlus, Better Privacy, and a couple of other add-ons. The tor project's web site still has no browser available for the {Dragonfly,Free,Net,Open}BSD, so what I'd like to know is which browser and security add-ons can the tor community recommend for use with tor? Thanks in advance for any clues. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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TTTT scoreboard
by Sebastian Urbach 28 Jan '14

28 Jan '14

Dear list members, The scoreboard mentioned above is now displaying the data from the first transmission ever made and from the last one ever made. Until a few hours ago it was just the data from the first run no matter what was done afterwards. This was a problem from the "we never expected multiple runs" era. It's kind of great that bugs are occurring because you are submitting data from multiple runs ;-) ! Please feel free to check it out: http://128.174.241.211:443/relay_scoreboard This is a project were literally every run counts. If you want to help, visit the project site and join us: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html It seems that there will be a data review in 03/2014, so it would be great to have enough data to actually draw some conclusions this time. Thanks for your support ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman

1 0

0.2.4.20 logging duplicate messages
by Scott Bennett 28 Jan '14

28 Jan '14

Along with my recent OS upgrade I have also updated my tor relay from 0.2.4.3-alpha to 0.2.4.20. The latter version write two identical copies of every message to the log file. I have only one uncommented "Log " line in my torrc, which is Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log but every single message is getting written to the file twice. Jan 27 19:31:58.213 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.20 (git-3cb5c70beec5bf46) opening log file. Jan 27 19:31:58.214 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.20 (git-3cb5c70beec5bf46) opening log file. Jan 27 19:31:58.220 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/local/share/tor/geoip. Jan 27 19:31:58.220 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/local/share/tor/geoip. Jan 27 19:31:58.325 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/local/share/tor/geoip6. Jan 27 19:31:58.325 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/local/share/tor/geoip6. Jan 27 19:31:58.360 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. Jan 27 19:31:58.360 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. Jan 27 19:31:58.513 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MYCROFTsOtherChild 023220505A550D6FDF0C20FF7C48E66BA06A49A6' Jan 27 19:31:58.513 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MYCROFTsOtherChild 023220505A550D6FDF0C20FF7C48E66BA06A49A6' Jan 27 19:32:00.387 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits. Jan 27 19:32:00.387 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits. Jan 27 19:32:00.388 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network. Jan 27 19:32:00.388 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network. Jan 27 19:32:01.399 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 0/0 NTor. Jan 27 19:32:01.399 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 0/0 NTor. Jan 27 19:32:01.815 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop. Jan 27 19:32:01.815 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop. Jan 27 19:32:02.287 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit. Jan 27 19:32:02.287 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit. Jan 27 19:32:03.671 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working. Jan 27 19:32:03.671 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working. Jan 27 19:32:03.672 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done. Jan 27 19:32:03.672 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done. Jan 27 19:32:03.672 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 67.175.219.175:32323 and DirPort 67.175.219.175:32326 are reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success) Jan 27 19:32:03.672 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 67.175.219.175:32323 and DirPort 67.175.219.175:32326 are reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success) Jan 27 19:32:06.509 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. Jan 27 19:32:06.509 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. Jan 27 19:32:07.093 [notice] Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Jan 27 19:32:07.093 [notice] Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Jan 27 19:32:25.752 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done. Jan 27 19:32:25.752 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done. Jan 27 19:33:02.567 [notice] We'd like to launch a circuit to handle a connection, but we already have 32 general-purpose client circuits pending. Waiting until some finish. Jan 27 19:33:02.567 [notice] We'd like to launch a circuit to handle a connection, but we already have 32 general-purpose client circuits pending. Waiting until some finish. Jan 27 20:32:01.397 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 1:00 hours, with 7 circuits open. I've sent 2.93 MB and received 7.98 MB. Jan 27 20:32:01.397 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 1:00 hours, with 7 circuits open. I've sent 2.93 MB and received 7.98 MB. Jan 27 20:32:01.397 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 87.404% Jan 27 20:32:01.397 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 87.404% Jan 27 20:32:01.397 [notice] TLS write overhead: 9% Jan 27 20:32:01.397 [notice] TLS write overhead: 9% Jan 27 20:32:02.394 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 25/25 TAP, 13/13 NTor. Jan 27 20:32:02.394 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 25/25 TAP, 13/13 NTor. ...and so on. Is there some way to stop this behavior and get only a single copy of each message? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

4 4

Considering setting up an exit, need advice
by Jesse Victors 28 Jan '14

28 Jan '14

Hello everyone, I'm thinking about setting up an exit here at my university here in the US. My ISP has no problem with Tor relays on the fast connections, but I haven't inquired about exits. I'd be running the exit on a surplus computer that I have control over in a lab in one of the main buildings. How do I ask my ISP about it? I'll be doing some research as to what ports I can open to contribute yet avoid being flooded by complaints, but if anyone has any tips I'd appreciate it. Would it be a good idea to copy the exit policy of the node at MIT? Is there a way to configure the Linux firewall so that only Tor has Internet access, in order to help show that I wasn't behind anything that comes out of the exit? I'm basically just looking to get started here if this is feasible, and looking for advice.

6 6

NTor handshake
by Sebastian Urbach 27 Jan '14

27 Jan '14

Hi, May i ask when the NTor handshake is going to be recommended by the majority of the directory authorities ? It's probably not a surprise that i prefer NTor handshake as a relay operator. I checked constantly since the switch to 0.2.4.20 and the values are pretty constant. (35k TAP / 700 NTor). I didn't notice any complaints so i assume that it should be possible to push forward. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman

2 1

Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 27 Jan '14

27 Jan '14

Hi, Thanks Anupam for digging deep into the numbers. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman

1 0

Here,s my problem.
by kattamann＠sbcglobal.net 27 Jan '14

27 Jan '14

To anyone whom might give a suggestion or answer. Just set up tor browser and relay package wanted to volunteer my computer and connection to those in parts of the world who don't have as much freedom of accesses as us.Question if I just set my computer to not go into sleep mode is that all that is needed to let people use my connection when I am not using it.Specs home built as-rock 787 pro3 8gig of ram dsl connect low speed att offers.

3 4

Re: [tor-relays] Scoreboard enhancements / Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 27 Jan '14

27 Jan '14

Hi Renke, Do you care to elaborate ? If you need assistance we can talk via private mail as well ... Bandwidth consumption is very low as you possible read on the project site. Do you run the test with scamper and or did you turn down the scanning speed ? The question remains why did many relay ops canceled the test before completion. As the scoreboard shows most of them would have completed the test in the estimated lowest time frame (around 4 days). The estimated max. time is about 24 days not 96 if you choose to run with traceroute and the default values instead of scamper. My best guess is that even 4 days was too long. After the test was started they wondered how long it would take and checked back with the faq, then decided to quit. Call it a hunch ;-) My system, as an example, took about 2 days and 23 hours to complete the run. I use scamper with the default settings. You can also turn up the pps value and finish even faster. How long will this take?: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#q-howlong How much bandwidth, disk space, RAM, and CPU will this consume?: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#q-howmanyresourc… -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman > I am wondering why only 68 out of 283 completed the traceroute. Can someone > explain please? > probably because the estimated time is between 4 and 96 days: https://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#q-howlong my (low-bandwith) relay is trace-routing since 4 days and completed a mere 15 % of all checks :) Renke

5 7

Scoreboard enhancements
by Sebastian Urbach 26 Jan '14

26 Jan '14

-- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman

2 1

Scoreboard enhancements / Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 26 Jan '14

26 Jan '14

Dear list members, Sorry for the completely empty mail a few minutes ago. What can i say, it's sunday and i had way less sleep than i should. But here the good news. The live scoreboard was modified. There is now a new column which shows the number of completed runs per IP and also at the bottom a value which displays the total sum of systems who completed at least 1 run. The board: http://128.174.241.211:443/relay_scoreboard Thanks for your attention. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman

3 2

A little bedtime story about relays and OVH
by tor＠gmx.info 25 Jan '14

25 Jan '14

3 3

How effective is "NumCPUs"?
by Alexander Dietrich 25 Jan '14

25 Jan '14

Hello, a relay I'm running is currently at about 0.80 load average. It has a dual-core CPU and I have configured "NumCPUs 2". I'm still in the process of finding the bandwidth limit. Should I keep increasing "RelayBandwidthRate" on the single Tor process, or is it a better idea to start a second process? (Also, does a second process need its own identity, or can it use the existing one?) Best regards, Alexander -- PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp

8 8

Re: [tor-relays] Would be good if Tor were more multithreaded.
by tor＠t-3.net 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

I've added "numCPUs 2" to torrc and restarted via the init script. It does not seem to have made a difference. I presume that's where/how it should have been added? The FAQ says it doesn't do multi-core well. Seems unfortunate - multi-core is everywhere, now. On 01/24/2014 07:41 PM, Sebastian Urbach wrote:> Hi, > > Did you consider the numCPUs option ? > -- > Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours > > Sebastian Urbach > > ---------------------------------------------- > Those who would give up essential Liberty, > to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve > neither Liberty nor Safety. > ---------------------------------------------- > Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, > journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman > > > > Here's where top hangs out on Libero. Seems it would be a better situation > if Tor would actually use the second core. > > top - 12:05:07 up 5 days, 21:35, 1 user, load average: 0.33, 0.43, 0.34 > Tasks: 130 total, 2 running, 128 sleeping, 0 stopped, 0 zombie > Cpu0 : 47.2%us, 21.0%sy, 0.0%ni, 17.6%id, 0.0%wa, 0.0%hi, 13.8%si, 0.3%st > Cpu1 : 0.0%us, 0.3%sy, 0.0%ni, 99.7%id, 0.0%wa, 0.0%hi, 0.0%si, 0.0%st > Mem: 1914136k total, 718704k used, 1195432k free, 139588k buffers > Swap: 3981304k total, 0k used, 3981304k free, 116320k cached > > PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND > 1340 _tor 20 0 566m 224m 36m R 71.7 12.0 6168:37 tor > 9887 nobody 20 0 21644 13m 892 S 7.3 0.7 0:31.85 scamper > 9889 root 20 0 102m 916 772 S 0.7 0.0 0:02.80 sed > 9921 root 20 0 15028 1312 992 R 0.3 0.1 0:00.19 top > 1 root 20 0 19232 1480 1212 S 0.0 0.1 0:00.27 init > 2 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 0.0 0.0 0:00.00 kthreadd > > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > >

1 0

Would be good if Tor were more multithreaded.
by tor＠t-3.net 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

Here's where top hangs out on Libero. Seems it would be a better situation if Tor would actually use the second core. top - 12:05:07 up 5 days, 21:35, 1 user, load average: 0.33, 0.43, 0.34 Tasks: 130 total, 2 running, 128 sleeping, 0 stopped, 0 zombie Cpu0 : 47.2%us, 21.0%sy, 0.0%ni, 17.6%id, 0.0%wa, 0.0%hi, 13.8%si, 0.3%st Cpu1 : 0.0%us, 0.3%sy, 0.0%ni, 99.7%id, 0.0%wa, 0.0%hi, 0.0%si, 0.0%st Mem: 1914136k total, 718704k used, 1195432k free, 139588k buffers Swap: 3981304k total, 0k used, 3981304k free, 116320k cached PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND 1340 _tor 20 0 566m 224m 36m R 71.7 12.0 6168:37 tor 9887 nobody 20 0 21644 13m 892 S 7.3 0.7 0:31.85 scamper 9889 root 20 0 102m 916 772 S 0.7 0.0 0:02.80 sed 9921 root 20 0 15028 1312 992 R 0.3 0.1 0:00.19 top 1 root 20 0 19232 1480 1212 S 0.0 0.1 0:00.27 init 2 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 0.0 0.0 0:00.00 kthreadd

3 2

Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

Dear list members, Some relay operators asked if it would be useful to run the script multiple times on the same system. The short answer is yes. It was unclear if enough operators would be willing to help with the script even one time. No one expected that there would be operators who like to do more than one run :-) Thats awesome ! Multiple runs could show temporal routing changes and therefore valuable new information. The value for multiple runs will be implemented into the live scoreboard within reasonable time. Thank you very much for participating ! You want to help ? Visit the project: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman

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How effective is "NumCPUs"?
by Sebastian Urbach 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

Hi Alexander A Tor daemon running with numCPU2s is better than a single daermon on each core because there is less "overhead". You can also get a great boost by enabling AES-NI hardware encryption if you don't have it already ... This is the best docu available afaik: https://www.torservers.net/wiki/setup/server#aes-ni_crypto_acceleration -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat, and statesman Hello, a relay I'm running is currently at about 0.80 load average. It has a dual-core CPU and I have configured "NumCPUs 2". I'm still in the process of finding the bandwidth limit. Should I keep increasing "RelayBandwidthRate" on the single Tor process, or is it a better idea to start a second process? (Also, does a second process need its own identity, or can it use the existing one?) Best regards, Alexander -- PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Starting deep browsing
by Gints Gabalins 23 Jan '14

23 Jan '14

So I just started using Tor and I`m getting "The connection has timed out" It doesnt look like I can set up a relay,any hints would be awesome.Thanks in advance.

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[Question] Onion router's bandwidth
by hyoseok Lee 23 Jan '14

23 Jan '14

Hi I am junior student in Sungkyunkwan University,South Korea I am studying Tor for my paper In my research, onion router has to report its bandwidth by sending descriptor to authority directory. and then authority directory verifies onion router's bandwidth [Question 1] I hope to know the way how authority directory verifies bandwidth which came from onion router. I was told that authority directory had bandwidth verifying tool called bandwidth scanner. How can I get source code of bandwidth scanner ? [Question 2] I made my own onion router, I configured my onion router's bandwidth 100kB/s But, In updated cached-microdesc-consensus file, My onion router's bandwidth was estimated at 20kB/s and there is "unmeasured=1" It means my onion router's bandwidth had not been estimated. what is difference between measured router and unmeasured router ? Thank you for reading my question

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Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Anupam Das 22 Jan '14

22 Jan '14

Dear Tor relay operators, We have recently received a good rate of participation by relay operators to our measurement project. To give everyone an idea of the current participation rate we have hosted a live scoreboard of all our participants, available at http://128.174.241.211:443/relay_scoreboard The live scoreboard highlights all the IPs from which we received traceroute results along with the current status of the script running in their machine. The live scorebaord also summarizes the participation by the top Tor Families and the top guard and exit relays. We thank all the relay operators who have participated and hope more relay operators will participate soon. Thanks Anupam

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