- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Advisory: Stack disclosure in hidden services logs when SafeLogging disabled
by Nick Mathewson 18 Sep '17

18 Sep '17

[TROVE-2017-008. CVE-2017-0380. Severity: medium] Hello! We have found a possible problem with the code that reports an error during the construction of an introduction point circuit. Because of this bug, it is possible that some hidden services will sometimes write sensitive information into their logs. This bug can only happen when the SafeLogging option is disabled, and SafeLogging is enabled by default. If you have not disabled SafeLogging, then you should be fine. We are tracking this bug as TROVE-2017-008 and as ticket #23490. It is also CVE-2017-0380. MITIGATION: 1. If you are not running a hidden service, then you don't need to do anything. This bug does not affect you. 2. If you are running 0.2.5.x, this bug does not affect you: it first appeared in 0.2.7.2-alpha. Other bugs do affect you, though: 0.2.5.x is pretty old! (If you are running 0.2.4, or 0.2.6, or 0.2.7, you should just upgrade. We aren't supporting those releases.) 3. Make sure that you did not change the value of the SafeLogging option in your configuration -- or if you did, that you set it to "1". SafeLogging needs to be turned to "0" or "relay" for this bug to occur. 4. If you did disable SafeLogging, re-enable it: Set it to 1, and use a HUP signal to tell Tor to reload its configuration. 5. If you did disable SafeLogging, you should delete any old logs that were generated with SafeLogging disabled. (You should be regularly removing old logs anyway, as a best security practice.) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: We found this when we re-added scan-build's dead assignment checker into the checkers that we run on Tor. Obviously, it's time to make sure that scan-build gets run more frequently. FIX: There are patches for this issue linked from ticket #23490 on our bugtracker. I will be putting out updated releases today. This bug will be fixed in 0.2.8.15, 0.2.9.12, 0.3.0.11, 0.3.1.7, and 0.3.2.1-alpha.

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Tolerant hosting for exit node.
by armenian_priest 17 Sep '17

17 Sep '17

Hello list, I was hoping to get a good suggestion from here for a hosting provider that is tolerant with Tor exit nodes. I went through the mailing list archive a few months back and there weren't any good suggestions on hosting providers. Also, I checked the 'GoodBadISPs' page in the Tor wiki but it is pretty outdated and I already got burned with one provider from there: ITLDC, it was added on 2016-04-23 but they bluntly stated that they DO NOT tolerate exit nodes after 2 abuse complaints, my exit node was running for 1 month there. One of the abuses was handled but with the second one they basically wanted me to block HTTP/S traffic on the VPS. I am not sure who edits and keeps track of the mentioned page but it would be a good idea to remove the mentioned provider from there so other people wont waste their money. Hope to get some recommendations since I want to support the network with an exit node. Thanks in advance! With regards, jack

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Two-step abuse management?
by Moritz Bartl 14 Sep '17

14 Sep '17

Hi! tl;dr: We're thinking about introducing an auto responder to abuse mail which then requires clicking a link or replying to the mail again before the complaint actually reaches a human. What do you think? Can you help us set this up? So far, we do not have any auto responder for abuse mails. I always thought it was important to be friendly and get back to everyone individually, even if at the core we're reusing mail templates. There is a difference if a human gets back to you within a few hours, or you immediately get clearly a auto-sent something that basically tells you there's not much that can be done. But actually, most of what we're seeing is automated notification mail, and lately we also see more and more spam that survives the spamassassin. An ideal system would track used addresses, and only send an auto-response from our end once per sender every few months. We have very limited resources for abuse management, and it would be great to filter out the noise better than we currently do. Did anyone set up an infrastructure like that before? How would you do it? Also, if you just want to help with our abuse management, let me know! We can always use one or two more hands, it's fun, and it teaches you a lot about Tor exit operation. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/

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Launching a Tor relay with Docker in seconds (x86-64, armhf, arm64)
by Rodrigo Martínez 14 Sep '17

14 Sep '17

Hi all, This is my humble contribution. There are prebuilt images for launching Tor relays for x86-64, armhf and arm64 architectures in seconds. The repo contains scripts for building those images and for launching a relay (bridge, middle or exit). Default configuration is provided for each type. Contributions are welcome. GitHub repo: https://github.com/brunneis/tor-relay-docker Docker Hub repo: https://hub.docker.com/r/brunneis/tor-relay/tags/ Regards, Rodrigo

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Would you also like to have family-level atlas pages?
by nusenu 14 Sep '17

14 Sep '17

Hi, Iain - the atlas maintainer - asked on twitter if relay operators at the relay operators meetup in Montreal have feature requests for atlas [1]. I suggested family-level pages where an operator of more than one relay can see all the relays of his family including aggregated (stacked) graphs for the graphs that are already available on a per-relay level. Before filing this as a trac ticket - as Iain - suggested, I wanted to ask around if others would find that useful as well because it probably makes only sense to implement it if there are more people actually finding it useful. So let us know if you do. thanks, nusenu [1] https://twitter.com/iainlearmonth/status/907003817434271746 -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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Re: [tor-relays] HOW-TO: Simple DNS resolver for tor exit operators
by jpmvtd261＠laposte.net 13 Sep '17

13 Sep '17

My idea is designed to protect the exit node against a DNS attack from the owner of the DNS server. Not from the ISP or an attacker monitoring the traffic going in and out of the ISP data center. On 12/09/2017 19:38, Ralph Seichter wrote: > On 12.09.17 21:17, jpmvtd261(a)laposte.net wrote: > >> My idea is to make more DNS queries than necessary, in order to hide >> the useful DNS queries among useless DNS queries. > > I'm not sure what you are trying to accomplish. Usually, a DNS query is > followed by an outbound connection to the returned IP address. Your ISP > can always monitor these connections from your exit node, no matter what > additional "query noise" you might introduce. > > This is not fiction. One of my ISPs sends me automated tickets every > once in a while, about network scans that abuse my exit nodes. Not only > are connections recorded, they are analysed for patterns. > > -Ralph

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Re: [tor-relays] HOW-TO: Simple DNS resolver for tor exit operators
by jpmvtd261＠laposte.net 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

On 12/09/2017 20:25, Ralph Seichter wrote: > I'm not certain what you consider a "DNS attack". > > Many exit node operators run a caching DNS resolver on their exits, > which is easily done. Lacking that, you can use the resolvers run by > your ISP, who can monitor all outbound traffic anyway, as I mentioned. > An attacker can try to find what websites a Tor user has visited, by comparing : - the timing of Tor user home connection traffic and - the timing of DNS queries happening on DNS servers controlled by the attacker On this webpage, the author talks about "correlation" attack : https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/10/05/unmasking-tor-users-with-dns/

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Email suggesting to send DNS requests to a specific open DNS
by jpmvtd261＠laposte.net 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

Hello, Recently, I installed a new Tor exit node. A few days later, I received an email on the address given in the node contact information. This email suggests to change the DNS server my node use, and gives me a specific IP address to use. Here is the mail (obfuscated with sharps) : EMAIL BEGIN *********************************** * Sender : info AT backplanedns DOT org * Subject : Your TOR node * Body : ** ** Hello, ** ** I came across your TOR relay on atlas. I run a few relays myself ** along with a bunch of DNS resolvers which are a part of the Open ** Root Server network (ORSN.org) - aimed to fight internet ** censorship and circumvent government surveillance programs ** (ie. prism). ** ** I hope you may be interested in using our anonymous open DNS ** resolvers on your relays. ** ** https://BackplaneDNS.org ** ** Resolver - 172.98.193.4# ** ** Resolver - 162.248.241.9# ** ** ------------------------------------------------------ ** ** Hostmaster@: ** Mr. D##### E#### H##### ** ** Phone: ** +1 (###) ###-#### ** ** E-Mail: ** info AT backplanedns DOT org ** abuse DOT backplanedns DOT org ** ** Linkedin: ** http://linkedin.com/in/d####-######-#########/ *********************************** EMAIL END I think it could be an attack. If this person send this email to every new exit node operators, there may be a small percentage of rookie operators who will make the change. I found this webpage about Tor exit nodes and DNS : https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/10/05/unmasking-tor-users-with-dns/ What do you think about this email ?

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Re: [tor-relays] HOW-TO: Simple DNS resolver for tor exit operators
by jpmvtd261＠laposte.net 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

On August 7, 2017 20:07:05 UTC, Igor Mitrofanov <igor.n.mitrofanov at gmail.com> wrote: > The DNS issue is in the "long tail" - rare/unique websites > are unlikely to be cached, yet they likely represent the > most interesting targets. > I do agree that running dnsmasq (or a similar caching resolver) is probably > sufficient to make DNS attacks too unreliable to invest in. I have an idea to improve the efficiency of this solution (DNS cache). My idea is to make more DNS queries than necessary, in order to hide the useful DNS queries among useless DNS queries. What do you think about this ? A basic implementation of that improvement would be a script run as a daemon that fetches the IP of a random domain name at a random time. The domain name being built from random characters or chosen from a list of valid (rarely visited) domain names. The average number of dummy DNS queries per day being equal to the number of useful DNS queries the exit node has to do per day (it doubles the DNS traffic). The list of valid (rarely visited) domain names needs to be changed over time (one entry at a time). A more advanced implementation of that improvement is to only allow the exit node to perform DNS queries by bunch of three. Of the three queries, two are dummy and random, one is useful. The position of the useful query in the bunch (position 1, position 2, or position 3) is chosen randomly.

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Re: [tor-relays] Email suggesting to send DNS requests to a specific open DNS
by jpmvtd261＠laposte.net 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

Thanks. I should have look for previous discussion about this. On 12/09/2017 16:24, Tyler Johnson wrote: > This guy sure is persistent! > > Check out this recent thread: > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-September/012934.html

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Re: [tor-relays] Would you also like to have family-level atlas pages?
by Tyler Johnson 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

I realize now why I don't tend to voice my opinion on these lists... I'm an idiot :( After seeing the below example, I think it's a great idea. Sorry for the noise On Sep 11, 2017 21:37, "John Ricketts" <john(a)quintex.com> wrote: Roger, The kind folks at Nos Oignons gave me the code. I still have it if you can't find it. https://nos-oignons.net/Services/index.en.html is an example. John On Sep 11, 2017, at 20:55, Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> wrote: On Mon, Sep 11, 2017 at 10:10:00PM +0000, nusenu wrote: I suggested family-level pages where an operator of more than one relay can see all the relays of his family including aggregated (stacked) graphs for the graphs that are already available on a per-relay level. Good idea. The Nos Oignons folks had some scripts you can hack together to measure and visualize your group of relays, but I spent a while hunting and I couldn't find it now. While we're doing feature requests, once the "per family" view exists, I would want to use the same view on other groups of relays, like "per country" and "per AS". I can fake some of that with Compass: https://compass.torproject.org/ but it would be great to have it in a site that's maintained. :) Thanks! --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Re: [tor-relays] Would you also like to have family-level atlas pages?
by Tyler Johnson 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

Hey everyone, I haven't been a relay operator for very long, so please pardon my ignorance, but doesn't Atlas already link to all family members, where you can click on each and view that relays statistics? I can see the suggested benefit of having all that info on one landing page (so to speak), but I really appreciate the simplicity of the site in its current form. My vote would be for a top 100 (or higher) option in the drop down menu that actually works. Overall, I think the site is great, keep up the great work tor project! Thanks, Tyler On Sep 11, 2017 17:11, "nusenu" <nusenu-lists(a)riseup.net> wrote: Hi, Iain - the atlas maintainer - asked on twitter if relay operators at the relay operators meetup in Montreal have feature requests for atlas [1]. I suggested family-level pages where an operator of more than one relay can see all the relays of his family including aggregated (stacked) graphs for the graphs that are already available on a per-relay level. Before filing this as a trac ticket - as Iain - suggested, I wanted to ask around if others would find that useful as well because it probably makes only sense to implement it if there are more people actually finding it useful. So let us know if you do. thanks, nusenu [1] https://twitter.com/iainlearmonth/status/907003817434271746 -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_ _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Your TOR [sic] node
by Dennis Emory Hannon 10 Sep '17

10 Sep '17

So let me get this straight - Because you don't agree with the way I'm marketing my network I must be malicious and this must be a "social engineering" attack? Seriously guys, put away the tin foil hats. I truly DON'T want to know what people on tor are browsing. If you 'd like to waste your time on baseless assumptions go right ahead. -Dennis

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Fwd: Your TOR [sic] node
by Matt Traudt 09 Sep '17

09 Sep '17

I just got this guy's spam too. It doesn't look like anything anyone said to him last month[0] stuck. His intentions are now very suspicious to me too. I will definitely not be pointing anything at his servers. Matt [0]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-August/012735.html -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Your TOR node Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 21:36:14 -0400 From: Dennis Emory Hannon <info(a)backplanedns.org> To: Dennis Emory Hannon <info(a)backplanedns.org> Hello, I came across your TOR relay on atlas. I run a few relays myself along with a bunch of DNS resolvers which are a part of the Open Root Server network (ORSN.org) - aimed to fight internet censorship and circumvent government surveillance programs (ie. prism). I hope you may be interested in using our anonymous open DNS resolvers on your relays. https://BackplaneDNS.org Resolver - 172.98.193.42 Resolver - 162.248.241.94 ------------------------------------------------------ Hostmaster@: Mr. Dennis Emory Hannon Phone: +1 (716) 348-0064 E-Mail: info(a)backplanedns.org abuse(a)backplanedns.org Linkedin: http://linkedin.com/in/dennis-hannon-52236019/

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Rate setting in tor
by r1610091651 08 Sep '17

08 Sep '17

Hi I've a question regarding the rate setting in torrc and tor honoring it. I've set up a tor relay with following rate settings: RelayBandwidthRate 2048 KBytes RelayBandwidthBurst 2048 KBytes But using arm, I'm seeing that tor is not honoring these settings, with bursts frequently exceeding the value. The average rate control seems to be working fine though. [image: image.png] What am I missing? I'm running 0.3.0.10 on Linux. Thanks

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Force OpenSSL AES-NI usage on a VPS without the AES CPU flag passthrough
by Roman Mamedov 06 Sep '17

06 Sep '17

Hello, Today I found that it is possible to force OpenSSL enable the use of CPU AES acceleration even if it doesn't detect the "aes" CPU flag. Many VPS hosts configure their hypervisors in a way that does not have the flag passed through into VPSes, even though all their host nodes surely have CPUs with support for AES-NI. In my experience hosts have not been forthcoming in reconfiguring their systems to include that flag passthrough. But it turns out we can force OpenSSL to believe AES is supported, even if the CPU does not report it. This can be done with the "OPENSSL_ia32cap" environment variable. Searching around, all I found was scenarios to use it for disabling AES-NI (for testing), e.g.: https://mjanja.ch/2013/11/disabling-aes-ni-on-linux-openssl/ I believe the syntax used there applies "xor" over the real flag values, e.g. OPENSSL_ia32cap="~0x200000200000000" to disable AES. But what if you need to force-enable it. Turns out the syntax working for that is simply: OPENSSL_ia32cap="+0x200000200000000" Let's take one VPS box with the aforementioned problem. # cat /proc/cpuinfo processor : 0 vendor_id : GenuineIntel cpu family : 6 model : 13 model name : QEMU Virtual CPU version 1.5.3 stepping : 3 microcode : 0x1 cpu MHz : 1695.729 cache size : 4096 KB physical id : 0 siblings : 1 core id : 0 cpu cores : 1 apicid : 0 initial apicid : 0 fpu : yes fpu_exception : yes cpuid level : 4 wp : yes flags : fpu de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr pge mca cmov pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 syscall nx lm rep_good nopl eagerfpu pni cx16 hypervisor lahf_lm bugs : bogomips : 3391.45 clflush size : 64 cache_alignment : 64 address sizes : 46 bits physical, 48 bits virtual power management: As you can see "aes" is not present. Testing OpenSSL speed in the default configuration. # openssl speed -elapsed -evp aes-128-gcm ... type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes 16384 bytes aes-128-gcm 32332.17k 40365.80k 42265.77k 42376.19k 43196.42k 43401.22k And now we force AES hardware acceleration usage: # OPENSSL_ia32cap="+0x200000200000000" openssl speed -elapsed -evp aes-128-gcm ... type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes 16384 bytes aes-128-gcm 59047.07k 104467.39k 141712.21k 151093.93k 158321.32k 156827.65k Almost 4 times faster! For Tor this leads to higher bandwidth utilization and lower CPU usage (which will actually make your VPS host happier :) But how to apply that to Tor? Well, for some initial testing I just chose to add the following line to /etc/init.d/tor (not using systemd here), right after "#! /bin/bash": export OPENSSL_ia32cap="+0x200000200000000" (but this will get overwritten and removed by the next Tor version upgrade). Seems to work just fine, my CPU usage is half of what it was before, at similar bandwidth levels. So now it has headroom to ramp up further. A word of caution, firstly always test as shown above to verify that it works. I believe if the underlying CPU actually doesn't support AES, all programs trying to use it, including "openssl speed", will crash outright, with an incorrect instruction error, or somesuch. So there is no risk to jeopardize encryption strength or security of Tor. Also even if it works now, it may stop working down the line if the host migrates your VPS to a node with older CPU, one which doesn't support AES. But migrations of customers between do not happen very often, and in fact all CPUs used today in a hosting environment should support AES, as that's been implemented in server (and even desktop) CPUs a very very long time ago. (Apologies for double-post, I realized tor-relays should have been the better place to post). -- With respect, Roman

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Re: [tor-relays] Any IP allocations available out there?
by Paul Templeton 05 Sep '17

05 Sep '17

> If you're interested in becoming your own ISP (obtaining your own ASN, > IPv6 and IPv4 scopes), you'll need to apply via APNIC, as I did in the > US with ARIN. Here is an example: Would if I could - but here in AU you have to log all metadata for two years if you are an ISP. I either listen to what others have stated and host overseas or host overseas... I might be able to get a 20/20Mbs fibre for AU$250 - Just waiting to find out if they have data caps or not. Thanx all for your input. Paul PS - whats more important - More bandwidth for exit nodes or a faster presence in AU???

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Tor-arm failure
by Arisbe 03 Sep '17

03 Sep '17

Hello people, I'm not a python programmer so I need some help with a problem. I have a number of Tor nodes and some bridges. Occasionally, when I install tor_arm I get a divide by zero message as follows: Exception in thread Thread-69: Traceback (most recent call last): File "/usr/lib/python2.7/threading.py", line 801, in __bootstrap_inner selt.run() File "/usr/share/arm/util/sysTools.py", line 517, in runnewValues["cpuAvg"] = total CpuTime / uptime ZeroDivisionError: integer division or modulo by zero Exception in thread Thread-70 ...... I'm running debian jessie in this most recent example. 2 G memory, 20 G hdd. This is a bridge with only some daily use but typically 10-12 circuits. Does someone have experience debugging this problem? Thanks!

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Re: [tor-relays] DIR Port. and NATO
by Dr Gerard Bulger 30 Aug '17

30 Aug '17

Roger, thank for the answer. Reason of no DIR port will be Accounting Max Enabled, although every unlikely I would reach the max I set, I use those settings to give me instant total usage within ARM While searching for some suitable wording if I ever get abuse complaints again, and searching the legal risks within Europe of Exits, I was rather surprised found NATO published a detailed appraisal of Tor. I thought it rather good, not very technical, and fair although it may be getting out of date. https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/TOR_Anonymity_Network… Gerry -----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Roger Dingledine Sent: 30 August 2017 16:36 To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] DIR Port On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 01:39:34PM +0100, Dr Gerard Bulger wrote: > DIR port on my relay and mini exit as being there on Atlas. > > The DIR port is open, indeed the DirPortFrontPage can be seen. > > Bandwidth is ???fast??? > > The exit is very limited in scope to avoid abuse claims, so few ports forwarded such as 443, but not 80. Is that the reason not showing? Check out your logs as the relay starts. Look for a log message like log_notice(LD_DIR, "Not advertising Dir%s (Reason: %s)", dir_port ? "Port" : "ectory Service support", reason); Common reasons include "AccountingMax enabled" and "BandwidthRate under 50KB". In general, it's fine for Tor to decide not to advertise your DirPort. Everything else is still working fine. Thanks for running a relay! --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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DIR Port
by Dr Gerard Bulger 30 Aug '17

30 Aug '17

DIR port on my relay and mini exit as being there on Atlas. The DIR port is open, indeed the DirPortFrontPage can be seen. Bandwidth is “fast” The exit is very limited in scope to avoid abuse claims, so few ports forwarded such as 443, but not 80. Is that the reason not showing? Gerry

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Tor relay making normal internet unusable
by W Howard 30 Aug '17

30 Aug '17

Dear Group, I have some spare bandwidth and want to run an exit relay buy when I do the normal internet is so slow and I have to fill out so many captcha that it makes it unusable! Any ideas why? I think google etc block by default tor exit nodes. I was thinking about spinning up a vm and running tor on that. When I run as a bridge I don't see much traffic. Any ideas? Cheers!

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IP Forwarding ON - on the host with tor relay - any risk ?
by Muppet96 28 Aug '17

28 Aug '17

Hi, on the one of my servers where tor relay is running I would like to configure openvpn server. In that case IP Forwarding needs to be enabled (ubuntu). Is there any security risk if this feature will be enabled on the tor-relay host ? Thanks Muppet96 Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Fallback directory mirror DFRI7 is dead
by Linus Nordberg 26 Aug '17

26 Aug '17

Hi teor, Fallback directory mirror DFRI7 [0] is down, due to multiple disk krashes, since about 30h and will not come alive with the same key. [0] 171.25.193.131:80 orport=443 id=79861CF8522FC637EF046F7688F5289E49D94576 A new DFRI7 will appear on the same address and port within a couple of days. Should I simply update fallback_dirs.inc?

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Tor Install Error
by Kurt Besig 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

While using apt-get to update my tor relay to a 'recommended' version I keep encountering this error: W: An error occurred during the signature verification. The repository is not updated and the previous index files will be used. GPG error: http://deb.torproject.org trusty InRelease: The following signatures couldn't be verified because the public key is not available: NO_PUBKEY 74A941BA219EC810 W: Failed to fetch http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/trusty/InRelease I've read several approaches to remedying this error, however I'm wondering what would be the 'most widely accepted as correct' method of dealing with the error? Thanks

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OR banned?
by Marcus Danilo Leite Rodrigues 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

Hello. I was running a Tor Relay for the past month (fingerprint 71BEBB61D0D35234D57087D035F12971FA315168) at my university and it seems that it got banned somehow. I got messages on my log like the following: http status 400 ("Fingerprint is marked rejected -- please contact us?") response from dirserver '171.25.193.9:443'. Please correct. I was hoping to get some information regarding this ban and how I could correct whatever was done wrong in order to get my relay up and running again. Best wishes, Marcus Rodrigues.

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