- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Scott Bennett 01 Aug '12

01 Aug '12

On Fri, 27 Jul 2012 01:23:57 -0400 grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> wrote: >>> 4) What exactly do we mean by diversity? >> >> I would look at this almost entirely from a jurisdictional and ISP level. I >> believe the biggest "sudden impact" threats to the tor network are going to >> be from legal changes (jurisdictional, i.e. "save the children, nullroute >> the nodes") and local business policy changes ("sorry tor customers, no more >> tor egress from our DC due to complaints"). > >I'm not sure which thread I mentioned this on so I'll put it here to be sure. >I think one main thing needed is a project to catalog all the current >exits as to their diversity... >Box: ISP/hoster, AS, datacenter, country, upstream AS/Tier-n path, >relay-operator >Relay-operator: country > >Without that, seems like placing nodes amounts to, 'Well, >we don't have any in Iran, let's go there'. If it turns out that >IP is more or less fed as a courtesy from UAE across the >gulf, there's not much gain. Repeat analysis for any of the >above parameters. > >More nodes are probably good, just not all as USA, Equinix, >Level3, with whatever hoster has a rack in all the DC's. I agree completely. But I would also like to add that, aside from Brasil, most of South America is still dark. Central America is not much better either. Many of those states are not especially cooperative with each other, politically speaking, yet they all need the benefits of commerce associated with the Internet. That combination strikes me as beneficial to placement of tor relays in as many of those countries as possible. Much of Africa may be worth closer examination for the same reasons. We really need to keep political diversity in view, especially given the large fractions of the tor network currently concentrated inside a mere handful of politically allied states. The Dictator of the U.S., for example, has already made the threat of shutting down the entire U.S. portion of the Internet, including relaying between other countries, which would certainly have a severely disruptive effect upon tor users all around the globe were it to happen under today's distribution of tor relays. Even more drastic would be if any of, for example, the U.K., France, Germany, or the Netherlands were to follow suit. Having countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador more tor-populated looks to me like a good thing. Another point I'd like to make is that I don't see why having one 100 MB/s relay is somehow better than having ten 10 MB/s relays or 20 5 MB/s relays. The superhigh-speed relays push operating system limits on the number of connections. Due to tor's design, distributing the workload of such relays across multiple CPU cores is problematic. Olaf Selke got around that problem by running four nodes on a quad-core machine with two IP addresses, but that meant that each node usually ran at less than 15 MB/s. For a superfast setup today, it might mean running multiple 25 MB/s nodes in similar fashion to what Olaf did, rather than a single 100 MB/s node. The benefit to tor users would seem to me to be the same either way, but the multinode method would not satisfy the demand of the funding source, as I understood it. Either way, though, the operating system limits may place keep a lid on the actual tor capacity of a very fast setup. From an infrastructure standpoint, I acknowledge that there can be problems in setting up really fast relays in Latin American countries. However, adding a few relays on the order of 500 - 5,000 KB/s in each Latin American country could probably be done, even if it meant they could only be set up in national capitals, which are mostly megalopolises of several million people, and might involve making special arrangements with the ISPs. Other major cities in some countries may also have the infrastructure to make moderately fast relays possible. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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How to protect yourself from network scanning
by amki 01 Aug '12

01 Aug '12

Hiho, I am hosting a 3-5MB/s tor exit relay but as of today my hoster has closed my server because of network scanning. Is there a known proper way to protect yourself from being used as a network scan relay? I've thought about constructing iptables rules to limit the number of SYN packets for the same host per second or such, but I'm not sure if this is allowed or will get me flagged as a bad exit node. My hoster is quite ok with us generating some abuse complaints per month, but does not want to route network scanning traffic since it is a severe load to their routers. Any help would be appreciated Cheers amki -- "Whatever the reason you're on Mars, I'm glad you're there, and I wish I was with you." - Carl Sagan

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Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Steve Snyder 01 Aug '12

01 Aug '12

Roger Dingledine arma at mit.edu Mon Jul 23 18:58:54 UTC 2012 [snip] >At the same time, much of our performance improvement comes from better >load balancing -- that is, concentrating traffic on the relays that can >handle it better. The result though is a direct tradeoff with relay >diversity: on today's network, clients choose one of the fastest 5 exit >relays around 25-30% of the time, and 80% of their choices come from a >pool of 40-50 relays. [snip] From what I see on the TorStatus pages (torstatus.all.de, blutmagie.de) about a third of the roughly 3000 relays listed are at or below 64KB/sec of demonstrated bandwidth. No doubt some of these are soon-to-be-high-bandwidth servers that are just ramping up, and some are nodes having transitory networking problems. It seems reasonable to assume, though, that most of these low-bandwidth nodes are intentionally low-bandwidth, perhaps on the basis of the Tor doc stating a 20KB/sec minimum. With "80% of their choices come from a pool of 40-50 relays" that leaves a 20% chance for the remaining 2950 nodes. A case for low-bandwidth nodes can be made as a means to dissuade anticipated routing (due to pool size), but it seems from the stats quoted above that there is little chance that 2000+ of these 3000 nodes will ever carry Tor traffic, and thus can be ignored for purposes of traffic analysis. Is there any justification for a low-bandwidth Tor node? And if so, what is the practical minimum bandwidth needed to actually see any traffic?

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Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Roger Dingledine 01 Aug '12

01 Aug '12

On Fri, Jul 27, 2012 at 05:49:34AM -0400, Motoko Kusanagi wrote: > I am very interested in running 100 Mbit (maybe even more) exit nodes at 100$/month, however, a question immediately comes to mind: > When we say "100Mbit exit node", do we imply "really unmetered" traffic at 100 Mbit, or do we mean "semi-reasonable traffic limit at 100Mbit speed". > "Really unlimited", in my experience, oftentimes turns out to be somewhat problematic. I don't think we necessarily need to have the 100mbit all to ourselves (see the other discussions here about shared connections), but I think it needs to be able to push a good fraction of 100mbit throughout the month. So something that can handle 20-30TB/mo is in the right ballpark. Note that many of our current 100mbit nodes are actually gbit nodes that try to limit themselves to a long-term average (95th percentile) of 100mbit. > I could arrange for 50-100 100Mbit exit nodes running 24/7, with a >traffic limit somewhere between 1 and 4 terabytes (will need to scrutinize >my current contract and do some math). Arranging for such a number of >"honestly unlimited traffic at 100Mbit speed" would be...significantly >more problematic. 4TB/mo is good for a 10mbit connection, but not good for a 100mbit connection. You'll end up either needing to hibernate for 80% of the month, or rate limit your relays down a lot. That said, we don't need 50-100 100mbit exit relays from any single group. Just 5-10 would be nice. Maybe that makes the capacity issue easier? --Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Negative impact of MaxOnionsPending 250?
by Scott Bennett 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

On Thu, 26 Jul 2012 17:11:17 +0200 Moritz Bartl <moritz(a)torservers.net> wrote: >We sometimes see "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit >creation requests!" on our servers. Scott Bennett suggested to set >MaxOnionsPending to 250 instead of the default of 100, which at least >makes the warnings disappear. [1] > >I am thinking about modifying out torrc template we use as as basis for >all servers. What is the negative impact of setting MaxOnionsPending to >250? Should we instead reduce the bandwidth as suggested in the warning? I don't think so. To the best of my recollection, I've only seen this message in recent versions of tor when it appeared that my node had been chosen for one or more high-volume hidden service operations, where the traffic volume in B/s was still fairly low, yet the number of connections had suddenly climbed to an unusually high level. The data throughput capacity vastly exceeded the actual traffic, but the onionskin-decoding load was sometimes, but probably not continually, very high until the hidden service(s) either shut down or changed their advertised information in the hidden service directory. To lower my node's RelayBandwidth* values would most likely have little impact on the bottleneck. Raising MaxOnionsPending adds a little slack in the queue to handle the occasions where that activity is temporarily backlogged prevents dropped connections and allows operations to proceed normally with only minimal extra delays. Consider a delay of probably no more than a second at the outside and usually less versus the delay of building a new circuit to a hidden service due to a dropped connection. > >[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-May/001352.html Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Zac Lym 30 Jul '12

30 Jul '12

This seems (to me) like an obvious suggestion, so my apologies if it's already been thought up. Why not establish a team/scoreboard system, like those used for distributed computing and BitCoin mining? This elegantly solves a few problems while with minimal resource commitment from the Tor organization. Most importantly, it's a way to pump money into the system without ruining the current atmosphere. Sponsors could easily buy some bandwidth or people can also just donate their own connections and join a particular team. The scoreboard is based on goodwill, not dollars spent. It also eliminates the hassle of setting prices, as teams can compete for dollars and bandwidth provided, essentially setting their own prices. The org could also setup a payment system, like we-pay, that the team admins can configure to deposit funds. It could be set as a proof of work system, paying after the bandwidth has been provided. This also allows a degree of control to prevent abuse from admins trying to juice stats by abusing some network infrastructure, like dummy trial accounts on hosting sites. A group admin could block specific hosts or the Tor project could remove an entire group. Finally, this could allow for the Tor project to create metrics based on things other than speed, akin to how Folding@home scores GPU and CPU contributions differently. Then the project can set anonymity goals for the network (such as location, ISP, backbone provider, etc) and the volunteers will adjust their patterns accordingly. Finally, I would like to strongly suggest taking a cut of all donations to pay for the new infrastructure and Tor research and development. I wouldn't want development to slow on Tor because donations are going to bandwidth instead. Indeed, I would prefer we spend a ton of money on the stenography efforts and usability. Anyway, thanks for the hard work! -Zach Lym

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nickname to fingerprint
by Aichetou Med 28 Jul '12

28 Jul '12

hello tor community my question is : is there an "easy" way to translate relay nickname to fingerprint ? if not is it possible to download descriptors for some specific relays given "Digest" string from consensus file? i mean before launching tor. besides is there a reason for not showing the fingerprint in the consensus. thank you :)

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Script to get top relays, AS and countries weights
by delber 27 Jul '12

27 Jul '12

Hi! Attached is a pretty simple Python script to compute some statistics about relays. Here's the doc: Usage: tor-relays-stats.py <output> [args ...] Where <output> is one of: - countries [FLAGS] relative percentage of the consensus in each countries - as-sets [FLAGS] [COUNTRIES] relative percentage of the consensus in each AS sets - top [COUNT] [FLAGS] [COUNTRIES] top relays according their place in the whole consensus Examples: - To get the top five exit nodes in France: tor-relays-stats.py top 5 Exit fr - To get weights of each AS of all relays in Germany: tor-relays-stats.py as-sets Running de Maybe it has flaws. Maybe it should land in some Git repository. I just felt it might be of interest to other folks. Feel free to comment and hack. -- delber

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Negative impact of MaxOnionsPending 250?
by Moritz Bartl 26 Jul '12

26 Jul '12

Hi, We sometimes see "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests!" on our servers. Scott Bennett suggested to set MaxOnionsPending to 250 instead of the default of 100, which at least makes the warnings disappear. [1] I am thinking about modifying out torrc template we use as as basis for all servers. What is the negative impact of setting MaxOnionsPending to 250? Should we instead reduce the bandwidth as suggested in the warning? [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-May/001352.html -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/

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High speed Relays/Exit nodes
by Dennis Ljungmark 26 Jul '12

26 Jul '12

Hi, We're currently running 6 different 100-200Mbit relay/guard nodes, and are looking at some issues moving on towards high performant exit nodes. There are some administrative issues ( needing another IP block due to the RIPE registration, our ISP doesn't want their name on the exit nodes that we are responsible for ) which are generally minor ( are being resolved anyhow ) and then the big stumbling block. Right now, with iptables modifications ( raw tables hacks to disable conntrack, bucket increases, following the general best practices ) our firewall is running at high amounts of CPU, but coping. However, once we start introducing Exit Nodes into this equation, things turn sour. So, since we do not want to trust only routing level separation between Exit Nodes and internal networks, we're going to have to invest into new hardware that can cope with this. Before this, we tried Ingate firewalls, and they weren't capable of coping with the load of guard nodes. ( The traditional "linux box in front" doesn't quite cut it due to networking hardware in most cases. ) So, in summary, when you get to the point of actively dealing with 8-900Mbps of Tor traffic ( on top of normal users and others) what hardware is needed to cope with firewalling? Regards, D.S. Ljungmark

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Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Sriakhil Gogineni 26 Jul '12

26 Jul '12

Hello! I saw this posted on slashdot and think this is an excellent way to donate some of our time and expertise, especially considering Internet access has been declared a human right by the UN. We currently colocate with a provider and will be inquiring with them if they are OK with hosting Tor, (the post here: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment was extremely helpful for other just joining and we will be following such advice when we bring it up with our provider). Ball park quotes we got were 99$ / 100 Mbps or $599 / 1000 Mbps for transit for a single 1U... we'll see if we can get something better... Would this be helpful / viable option for a Tor exit node ? I also had just one question: what are the specs required for a Tor node? It does not seem too resource intensive but I have not been able to find any minimum system requirements. Would a current / last-generation quad core with 8GB + would suffice? Best, Sri

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Paid exit nodes
by Brock Tice 25 Jul '12

25 Jul '12

Hi, I saw the story on Slashdot. I currently run an exit node (anfanillc) with a bandwidth limit. I have a decent uplink, though in bandwidth tests I see closer to 40 Mbps than 100 Mbps. I think $100/month would be plenty to defray the costs of removing the bandwidth limit. Maybe even less, I can talk with my ISP. I'm not charged for bandwidth right now, but my DC has to pay the ISP for it. I've already got my IP SWIPed and all that good stuff. Prior to this I've run exit nodes on and off for years without too much trouble, mostly DMCA takedowns. --Brock

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How many PK operations does a typical home-run relay or bridge do in 24 hours?
by Karsten Loesing 18 Jul '12

18 Jul '12

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi relay and bridge operators, want to help us design hardware capabilities of a Torouter device? At the Florence hackfest I was asked for the typical number of RSA operations performed by a relay or bridge, say, per day. We're mostly interested in home-run relays and bridges on DSL lines and similar, because that's where Torouter devices will be deployed, too. So, Amunet and TorServers are out here. :) Tor has a built-in feature to count PK operations. If one sends a USR1 signal to the tor process, it writes a line like this to its log file (though this line comes from a client): Jul 10 18:31:22.904 [info] PK operations: 0 directory objects signed, 0 directory objects verified, 0 routerdescs signed, 2968 routerdescs verified, 216 onionskins encrypted, 0 onionskins decrypted, 30 client-side TLS handshakes, 0 server-side TLS handshakes, 0 rendezvous client operations, 0 rendezvous middle operations, 0 rendezvous server operations. The number we're most interested in is "onionskins decrypted," but maybe there are other high numbers that are worth considering. If you run a relay or bridge at home, run these four steps: 1. Make sure the relay or bridge is running for at least 24 hours (longer is fine, shorter may skew results) 2. Send the process a USR1 signal, e.g., kill -USR1 $pid 3. Look for the log line above 4. Reply to this email with a) the relay's or bridge's nickname, b) the first four hex characters of its fingerprint, c) the log time and timezone, d) the top-3 PK operations by numbers. An example result could be: gabelmoo F204 Jul 10 18:31:22.904 CEST 12345 onionskins decrypted 2968 routerdescs verified 216 onionskins encrypted Thanks for your help! Once I have some results, I'll look up relays and bridges in the descriptor archive and post results to this list. Of course, if someone has more thoughts on measuring how many PK ops a relay or bridge does, please say so! :) Thanks, Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQAAjVAAoJEEk5d4GsWvIjWbMH/ilEf4dQrWqdFuZ5lYlWBnSb PAd/ru2ygGFswW4CeWWNKNnkxVd+Dcd9smVjVcpUIxlrEeMXzrZqsICre992Cjsd RjyXBnKIdwInwdVOi5ZyuWbmozCTbn5Oh3Bd47XFMDLNZIgC9itCdlGkU9Mw6bKB KO7QfbtQCTjlBEe/4mYmpW4/H+NaG5V8b3ByWtuAJz614cxckPgR2UxnEtYQXm7p TCRh/FC2jnc+7MrQZxBd6V6zLrudtdLCNLwdchGt7YBPMV3tyryvV6q/8v9ZY5jP VQTW6pKb5kVH1drL4M7oCJtt7bDnxhOGg76C7uBjWiXoaYUp4zyfeTdc57FkreM= =4Ex+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] SocksPort flags trouble
by Scott Bennett 17 Jul '12

17 Jul '12

On Tue, 17 Jul 2012 09:34:08 -0400 Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> wrote: >On Tue, Jul 17, 2012 at 12:07 AM, Scott Bennett <bennett(a)cs.niu.edu> wrote: >> On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 11:33:52 -0400 Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> >> wrote: >>>On Sun, Jul 8, 2012 at 4:19 AM, Scott Bennett <bennett(a)cs.niu.edu> wrote: >>>> While testing my torrc with 0.2.3.18-rc, I tried adding the >>>> IsolateDestAddr flag to the SocksPort line, as in >>>> >>>> SocksPort 9050 IsolateDestAddr >>>> >>>> A "tor --verify-config" claimed that I was trying to specify more >>>> than one port on that line, which would be an error. Are the SocksPort >>>> flags listed in the tor man page for 0.2.3.18-rc not yet implemented? >>> >>>Just tried it with 0.2.3.18-rc (as tagged in git), using only that >>>option. It worked for me. Could you have had some other tor in your >>>path as "tor", or something like that? >>> >> No. Here's sample output. >> >> Script started on Mon Jul 16 22:56:43 2012 >> >> [hellas] 74 % sudo -u _tor tor --verify-config >> Jul 16 22:57:03.186 [notice] Tor v0.2.3.18-rc running on FreeBSD. >> Jul 16 22:57:03.187 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning >> Jul 16 22:57:03.211 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc". >> Jul 16 22:57:03.256 [warn] SocksListenAddress can only be used with a single SocksPort with value "auto" or 1-65535. >> Jul 16 22:57:03.256 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Invalid SocksPort/SocksListenAddress configuration >> Jul 16 22:57:03.256 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. >> [hellas] 75 % exit >> exit >> >> Script done on Mon Jul 16 22:57:42 2012 >> >> Lines in torrc beginning with "Socks" are as follows. >> >> SocksPort 9050 IsolateDestAddr # what port to open for local application connections >> SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost >> SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1:* >> SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16:* >> SocksPolicy reject *:* >> > >The problem with that is nothing about the SocksPort: it's about the >SocksListenAddress. You can't use SocksListenAddress with the new >SocksPort format. Instead you would need to say: > >SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9050 IsolateDestAddr > Okay. Thanks for that. However, the message probably ought to be changed to avoid confusion. After all, I did have only one port specified, and it (9050) was in the range of 1-65535, which the message implies was untrue. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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Re: [tor-relays] SocksPort flags trouble
by Scott Bennett 17 Jul '12

17 Jul '12

Hi Nick, On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 11:33:52 -0400 Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> wrote: >On Sun, Jul 8, 2012 at 4:19 AM, Scott Bennett <bennett(a)cs.niu.edu> wrote: >> While testing my torrc with 0.2.3.18-rc, I tried adding the >> IsolateDestAddr flag to the SocksPort line, as in >> >> SocksPort 9050 IsolateDestAddr >> >> A "tor --verify-config" claimed that I was trying to specify more >> than one port on that line, which would be an error. Are the SocksPort >> flags listed in the tor man page for 0.2.3.18-rc not yet implemented? > >Just tried it with 0.2.3.18-rc (as tagged in git), using only that >option. It worked for me. Could you have had some other tor in your >path as "tor", or something like that? > No. Here's sample output. Script started on Mon Jul 16 22:56:43 2012 [hellas] 74 % sudo -u _tor tor --verify-config Jul 16 22:57:03.186 [notice] Tor v0.2.3.18-rc running on FreeBSD. Jul 16 22:57:03.187 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning Jul 16 22:57:03.211 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc". Jul 16 22:57:03.256 [warn] SocksListenAddress can only be used with a single SocksPort with value "auto" or 1-65535. Jul 16 22:57:03.256 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Invalid SocksPort/SocksListenAddress configuration Jul 16 22:57:03.256 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. [hellas] 75 % exit exit Script done on Mon Jul 16 22:57:42 2012 Lines in torrc beginning with "Socks" are as follows. SocksPort 9050 IsolateDestAddr # what port to open for local application connections SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1:* SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16:* SocksPolicy reject *:* Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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How to Run Torservers.net
by Moritz Bartl 12 Jul '12

12 Jul '12

Hi! In regular intervals, people ask me what it takes to run a large number of exit relays. Let me try to document a few steps that I think you need to take to become a Large Tor Operator (TM). 1) Think about registering a (non-profit) association. At least in Germany this helps with liability, and in general it helps to appear bigger than you are (and less likely to get raided). What we did was try and find a lawyer who would agree to "host" us inside his office. We succeeded, and now are a non-profit registered inside a lawyers office. How cool is that? :) 2) Register a fax number. At least law enforcement in Germany regularly uses the fax number present in IP records. We use a free German fax-to-email service, www.call-manager.de. 3) Register a phone number. The IP records should contain a phone number for abuse reports, and you don't want that to be your personal phone number. We use Sipgate One, a German VoIP service that redirects calls to cellphones and Skype for free. 4) Create handles for your organization at ARIN and/or RIPE. Example record: https://apps.db.ripe.net/whois/lookup/ripe/person-role/MB22990-RIPE.html With RIPE, it works far better, most abuse reports will hit you and not that of your upstream. Having your own IP records is a key element for abuse handling. 5) Find a good ISP. This is going to be a hard one. But not too hard. Go through forums and sites where ISPs posts their latest deals, and contact them about Tor hosting. We usually divide it into a two-step process: We first ask if they were okay with a Tor exit, and with reassignment of the IP range - no details in the first mail! When they come back positively, or somewhat worried, you can still explain that you are a non-profit superb large organization filled with security professionals, and that all will be good. The two step process usually helps in elevating your request to higher levels of support staff and without scaring them off to early. See also https://www.torservers.net/wiki/hoster/inquiry 5a) Still find a good ISP. A good ISP is one that offers cheap bandwidth and is not being used by other members of the Tor community. 6) Be quick in answering abuse. We receive a very small number of complaints, given that we run high bandwith nodes. I am actually still surprised how few complaints we get. Roughly 80% are automated reports, which we ignore, and for the rest it is usually good enough to send our default template. See https://www.torservers.net/wiki/abuse/templates and https://www.torservers.net/wiki/abuse/dmca For police inquiries, we usually give them a one-liner (something like "As a German organization, we fully comply with Telemediengesetz §15 (the German telemedia law), which prohibits to log any user identifiable data or usage data unless required for billing purposes."). We get one policy inquiry per quarter on average. What did I forget? -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/

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SocksPort flags trouble
by Scott Bennett 11 Jul '12

11 Jul '12

While testing my torrc with 0.2.3.18-rc, I tried adding the IsolateDestAddr flag to the SocksPort line, as in SocksPort 9050 IsolateDestAddr A "tor --verify-config" claimed that I was trying to specify more than one port on that line, which would be an error. Are the SocksPort flags listed in the tor man page for 0.2.3.18-rc not yet implemented? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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Mike gong has forwarded a page to you from The Tor Blog
by shallangong＠hotmail.com 07 Jul '12

07 Jul '12

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'help'
by Mikegong 07 Jul '12

07 Jul '12

Hello, I would like to invite any Chinese speaking person interested in setting up and supporting Tor relays to help me to become a non-exit man. https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/tor-relays-fr This is meant to be a localized companion to this very list. Let's also exchange ideas about specific local abuses and legal issues in french speaking countries. some trouble like this:Your DNS provider gave an answer for "nykqypf34.net", which is not supposed to exist. Apparently they are hijacking DNS failures. Trying to correct for this. We've noticed 1 possibly bad address so far. How to set? and give me the map example. thankyou. TorReader

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[ANNOUNCE] tor-relays-fr mailing-list
by delber 05 Jul '12

05 Jul '12

Hello, I would like to invite any french speaking person interested in setting up and supporting Tor relays to join to a new mailing-list at: https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/tor-relays-fr This is meant to be a localized companion to this very list. Let's also exchange ideas about specific local abuses and legal issues in french speaking countries. Hope to see you there, -- delber

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Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 2
by Christian 04 Jul '12

04 Jul '12

Hi again, so I tried every imho sensitive configuration of ORPorts with different Ports through my router, IPv4Only and without and vice versa and again. No success. What intrigues me is that client functionality is also NOT working and that should be independent from the advertised ports, as far as I know. A time ago, I read about an issue preventing 20 % of the network talking to itself. Could this be related? I mean, as my node stopped talking in gerneral... So I have to wait for better times or an inspiration from your side to get my bridge out of troubled water over it again. Greetings and thanks to everyone considering to think about the issue. And Roger, great work so far. I came to hear concerned people talk about personal implications of societies and politics so different from what I'm used to... It was quite impressing. Greetings christian > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 1 (Christian) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 01 Jul 2012 16:50:08 +0200 > From: Christian <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 1 > Message-ID: <1341154208.2712.9.camel(a)delusions.local> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > Hi Roger, > > > > Who owns that socket file? > /var/run/tor/control is owned by debian-tor. > > > > Anything else in that other default config file? > The tor-service-defaults-torrc file contains: > > DataDirectory /var/lib/tor > PidFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid > RunAsDaemon 1 > User debian-tor > > ControlSocket /var/run/tor/control > ControlSocketsGroupWritable 1 > > CookieAuthentication 1 > CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 > CookieAuthFile /var/run/tor/control.authcookie > > Log notice file /var/log/tor/log > > > > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > > > ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise > > > > > > Is this ipv6 bind attempt the one causing problems? > > > > > > > The ipv6 bind attempt was a try to solve the problem. > Problem persists with and without ipv6 bind attempt. > > Thanks a lot! > > christian > > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of the > > listener ports (Christian) > > 2. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > > the listener ports (Roger Dingledine) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sun, 01 Jul 2012 06:14:19 +0200 > > From: Christian <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> > > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > Subject: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind > > one of the listener ports > > Message-ID: <1341116059.2767.42.camel(a)delusions.local> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > > > Hi Nick, hi Jean, > > > > thanks a lot for your fast reaction. I was at my parents' place for a > > week, that's why I'm a little late. > > > > First, I tried port 9001, but in fact it is a port forwarding on the > > router from 443 to 9090. > > > > Following, I post the terminal output when using the given torrc and the > > torrc file itself. > > Really, no logs are created, independent of the logging options. > > The socket unlink issue happens since I use tor and that's for a while > > now - it never affected functionality. > > Yes, I'm into psychiatric symptoms. A friend of mine uses monsters' > > names from films. ;-) > > > > Again, thanks a lot for your help! > > > > Thankfully > > > > christian > > > > ca@delusions:~$ sudo service tor restart > > [sudo] password for ca: > > * Stopping tor daemon... > > [ OK ] > > * Starting tor > > daemon... > > Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [warn] Could not unlink /var/run/tor/control: > > Permission denied > > Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to > > bind one of the listener ports. > > Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. > > > > [fail] > > ca@delusions:~$ > > > > > > > > The torrc (complete to prevent me from confusing, but slightly spoiled > > by my mail client with line breaks - RunAsDeamon is set by another > > default config file): > > > > > > ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user > > ## Last updated 22 April 2012 for Tor 0.2.3.14-alpha. > > ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) > > ## > > ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines > > ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them > > ## by removing the "#" symbol. > > ## > > ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, > > ## for more options you can use in this file. > > ## > > ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: > > ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc > > > > ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't > > ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only > > ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. > > #SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. > > #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this adddress:port too. > > > > ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. > > ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept > > ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who > > ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections > > ## you make. > > #SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16 > > #SocksPolicy reject * > > > > ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something > > ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as > > ## you want. > > ## > > ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose > > ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the > > logs. > > ## > > ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher > > to /var/log/tor/notices.log > > #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log > > ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log > > Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log > > ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles > > #Log notice syslog > > ## To send all messages to stderr: > > #Log debug stderr > > > > ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use > > ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; > > ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. > > #RunAsDaemon 1 > > > > ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store > > ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. > > #DataDirectory /var/lib/tor > > > > ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor > > ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. > > #ControlPort 9051 > > ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these > > ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. > > #HashedControlPassword > > 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C > > #CookieAuthentication 1 > > > > ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### > > > > ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the > > ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address > > ## to tell people. > > ## > > ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the > > ## address y:z. > > > > #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ > > #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 > > > > #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ > > #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 > > #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 > > > > ################ This section is just for relays ##################### > > # > > ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. > > > > ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. > > #ORPort 443 > > ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in > > ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as > > ## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding > > ## yourself to make this work. > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise > > > > ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your > > ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. > > #Address noname.example.com > > > > ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for > > ## outgoing traffic to use. > > # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 > > > > ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. > > Nickname BrightSideDarkSide > > > > ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your > > ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must > > ## be at least 20 KB. > > ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not > > bits > > ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, > > etc. > > #RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) > > #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps) > > > > ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. > > ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received > > bytes, > > ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before > > ## hibernating. > > ## > > ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. > > #AccountingMax 4 GB > > ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) > > #AccountingStart day 00:00 > > ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax > > ## is per month) > > #AccountingStart month 3 15:00 > > > > ## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you > > ## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google > > ## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. > > ContactInfo Sides of the moon <brightsidedarkside AT t-online dot de> > > ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: > > #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> > > > > ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do > > ## if you have enough bandwidth. > > #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections > > ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in > > ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as > > ## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port > > ## forwarding yourself to make this work. > > #DirPort 80 NoListen > > #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise > > ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now > > you > > ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is > > ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source > > ## distribution for a sample. > > #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html > > > > ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the > > identity > > ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on > > ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid > > ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See > > ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays > > ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it > > would > > ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. > > #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... > > > > ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first > > ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ > > ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an > > ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the > > ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which > > is > > ## described in the man page or at > > ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html > > ## > > ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses > > ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. > > ## > > ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your > > firewall, > > ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor > > ## users will be told that those destinations are down. > > ## > > ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) > > ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry > > ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". > > ## > > #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more > > #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy > > ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed > > > > ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the > > ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even > > an > > ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably > > ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat > > you > > ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can > > ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! > > BridgeRelay 1 > > ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various > > ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run > > ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge > > ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: > > #PublishServerDescriptor 0 > > > > User debian-tor > > > > > > > > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > > > 1. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > > > the listener ports (Nick Mathewson) > > > 2. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > > > the listener ports (Jean Trolleur) > > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > Message: 1 > > > Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 11:59:22 -0400 > > > From: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> > > > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > > > bind one of the listener ports > > > Message-ID: > > > <CAKDKvuyeEBDEO6rrbqVQSZcOy_cbeuGWMX2gisUjjETk0VgJEw(a)mail.gmail.com> > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Christian > > > <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> wrote: > > > > Hi dear fellows, > > > > > > > > I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, > > > > Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. > > > > > > > > I can't find any solution on the web. > > > > When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: > > > > failed to bind one of the listener ports". > > > > > > Hm. It really should be saying something more than that on startup; > > > there should be a message right before that about *why* it couldn't > > > parse or validate the ports. > > > > > > I just tried the ORPort combination you listed there, and it seemed to > > > work out okay for me. It might be easier to diagnose if you could > > > upload your entire torrc, and the entire output of starting Tor up to > > > the point where it says "failed to parse/validate config:" > > > > > > hth, > > > -- > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > > > Message: 2 > > > Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 15:18:42 -0500 > > > From: Jean Trolleur <sigtstp(a)gmail.com> > > > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > > > bind one of the listener ports > > > Message-ID: > > > <CAPN5qOdaMr==8D-kTz01cAZDHrDXSGuh5T+3DVfscJLx8jLgZA(a)mail.gmail.com> > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > > > Try: > > > > > > ORPort 443 > > > ORListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9001 > > > > > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Christian > > > <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> wrote: > > > > Hi dear fellows, > > > > > > > > I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, > > > > Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. > > > > > > > > I can't find any solution on the web. > > > > When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: > > > > failed to bind one of the listener ports". > > > > > > > > Furthermore, there are only empty logfiles, independent of the > > > > configuration of the logs option "notice". > > > > > > > > Has anyone else this kind of problem? > > > > > > > > This is my ORPort section: > > > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > > > > > > > I even can't make a control port accessible for e.g. arm running on the > > > > same machine, although I didn't use it before. > > > > > > > > Client functionality is not working either. No connections through tor. > > > > > > > > Tor is configured as a bridge, my OS is Ubuntu lucid 10.04 and Tor's > > > > version is 2.3.17-beta-1~lucid+1. > > > > > > > > It just worked until the upgrade to the new version through torproject's > > > > repository. > > > > > > > > I really do have forwarded external port 443 to port 9090 on my machine. > > > > > > > > It nearly has me left in broken state dying. > > > > > > > > I checked for new requests concerning apparmor allowance, but there were > > > > only the ability to chown and access to /sys/devices/system/cpu/ which I > > > > granted both. > > > > > > > > I'm not so really competent with computers and therefore grateful for > > > > any help. > > > > Strange. No error logs, no function, no topic on the web.. > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > christian > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > tor-relays mailing list > > > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > tor-relays mailing list > > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > > > > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 17, Issue 8 > > > ***************************************** > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2012 05:14:22 -0400 > > From: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> > > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > > bind one of the listener ports > > Message-ID: <20120701091422.GB8804(a)moria.seul.org> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > > On Sun, Jul 01, 2012 at 06:14:19AM +0200, Christian wrote: > > > Really, no logs are created, independent of the logging options. > > > > That's expected -- it's because logs are parsed in the same step as > > binding the sockets, and it never gets to the 'setting up the logs' part. > > > > > The socket unlink issue happens since I use tor and that's for a while > > > now - it never affected functionality. > > > > Who owns that socket file? > > > > > The torrc (complete to prevent me from confusing, but slightly spoiled > > > by my mail client with line breaks - RunAsDeamon is set by another > > > default config file): > > > > Anything else in that other default config file? > > > > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > > ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise > > > > Is this ipv6 bind attempt the one causing problems? > > > > --Roger > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 1 > > ***************************************** > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 18, Issue 2 > *****************************************

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Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of the listener ports
by Christian 01 Jul '12

01 Jul '12

Hi Nick, hi Jean, thanks a lot for your fast reaction. I was at my parents' place for a week, that's why I'm a little late. First, I tried port 9001, but in fact it is a port forwarding on the router from 443 to 9090. Following, I post the terminal output when using the given torrc and the torrc file itself. Really, no logs are created, independent of the logging options. The socket unlink issue happens since I use tor and that's for a while now - it never affected functionality. Yes, I'm into psychiatric symptoms. A friend of mine uses monsters' names from films. ;-) Again, thanks a lot for your help! Thankfully christian ca@delusions:~$ sudo service tor restart [sudo] password for ca: * Stopping tor daemon... [ OK ] * Starting tor daemon... Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [warn] Could not unlink /var/run/tor/control: Permission denied Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind one of the listener ports. Jul 01 06:00:13.321 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. [fail] ca@delusions:~$ The torrc (complete to prevent me from confusing, but slightly spoiled by my mail client with line breaks - RunAsDeamon is set by another default config file): ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user ## Last updated 22 April 2012 for Tor 0.2.3.14-alpha. ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) ## ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them ## by removing the "#" symbol. ## ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, ## for more options you can use in this file. ## ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. #SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this adddress:port too. ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections ## you make. #SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16 #SocksPolicy reject * ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as ## you want. ## ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. ## ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles #Log notice syslog ## To send all messages to stderr: #Log debug stderr ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. #RunAsDaemon 1 ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. #DataDirectory /var/lib/tor ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. #ControlPort 9051 ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. #HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C #CookieAuthentication 1 ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address ## to tell people. ## ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the ## address y:z. #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 ################ This section is just for relays ##################### # ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. #ORPort 443 ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as ## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding ## yourself to make this work. ORPort 443 NoListen ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise ORPort [::]:9090 IPv6Only NoAdvertise ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. #Address noname.example.com ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for ## outgoing traffic to use. # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. Nickname BrightSideDarkSide ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must ## be at least 20 KB. ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc. #RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps) ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes, ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before ## hibernating. ## ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. #AccountingMax 4 GB ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) #AccountingStart day 00:00 ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax ## is per month) #AccountingStart month 3 15:00 ## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you ## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google ## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. ContactInfo Sides of the moon <brightsidedarkside AT t-online dot de> ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do ## if you have enough bandwidth. #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as ## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port ## forwarding yourself to make this work. #DirPort 80 NoListen #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source ## distribution for a sample. #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is ## described in the man page or at ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html ## ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. ## ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall, ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor ## users will be told that those destinations are down. ## ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". ## #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! BridgeRelay 1 ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: #PublishServerDescriptor 0 User debian-tor tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > the listener ports (Nick Mathewson) > 2. Re: Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of > the listener ports (Jean Trolleur) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 11:59:22 -0400 > From: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > bind one of the listener ports > Message-ID: > <CAKDKvuyeEBDEO6rrbqVQSZcOy_cbeuGWMX2gisUjjETk0VgJEw(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Christian > <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> wrote: > > Hi dear fellows, > > > > I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, > > Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. > > > > I can't find any solution on the web. > > When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: > > failed to bind one of the listener ports". > > Hm. It really should be saying something more than that on startup; > there should be a message right before that about *why* it couldn't > parse or validate the ports. > > I just tried the ORPort combination you listed there, and it seemed to > work out okay for me. It might be easier to diagnose if you could > upload your entire torrc, and the entire output of starting Tor up to > the point where it says "failed to parse/validate config:" > > hth, > -- > Nick > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 15:18:42 -0500 > From: Jean Trolleur <sigtstp(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Failed to parse/validate config: failed to > bind one of the listener ports > Message-ID: > <CAPN5qOdaMr==8D-kTz01cAZDHrDXSGuh5T+3DVfscJLx8jLgZA(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > Try: > > ORPort 443 > ORListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9001 > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Christian > <brightsidedarkside(a)t-online.de> wrote: > > Hi dear fellows, > > > > I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, > > Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. > > > > I can't find any solution on the web. > > When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: > > failed to bind one of the listener ports". > > > > Furthermore, there are only empty logfiles, independent of the > > configuration of the logs option "notice". > > > > Has anyone else this kind of problem? > > > > This is my ORPort section: > > ORPort 443 NoListen > > ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise > > > > I even can't make a control port accessible for e.g. arm running on the > > same machine, although I didn't use it before. > > > > Client functionality is not working either. No connections through tor. > > > > Tor is configured as a bridge, my OS is Ubuntu lucid 10.04 and Tor's > > version is 2.3.17-beta-1~lucid+1. > > > > It just worked until the upgrade to the new version through torproject's > > repository. > > > > I really do have forwarded external port 443 to port 9090 on my machine. > > > > It nearly has me left in broken state dying. > > > > I checked for new requests concerning apparmor allowance, but there were > > only the ability to chown and access to /sys/devices/system/cpu/ which I > > granted both. > > > > I'm not so really competent with computers and therefore grateful for > > any help. > > Strange. No error logs, no function, no topic on the web.. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > christian > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 17, Issue 8 > *****************************************

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Guidance on 0.2.2-to-0.2.3 migration?
by Steve Snyder 30 Jun '12

30 Jun '12

Attention Tor developers: Now that v0.2.3 is at Release Candidate status, can we get get some guidance for those relay operators that have not kept up with development? What changes can/should be made to a working v0.2.2 torrc for best 0.2.3 operation? What are the major changes (SMP? IPv6? memory/CPU requirements?) that should be considered when establishing a new relay? Thanks.

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Tor and firewall output rules
by Anton Korec 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

Hi, I'm new to this list, so I apologise when my problem has been solved already. I'm runing new tor router as a non-exit relay, with ORPort 443 and DirPort 80. Server is running on Debian stable and tor version is 0.2.2.35. Tor is running under debian-tor user. I have restrictive iptables firewall rules (in both directions, INPUT and OUTPUT). I do not like fw rules of type "all outgoing is allowed". So I set fw up as found somewhere on torproject.org wiki, with "-m owner --uid-owner debian-tor": IPTABLES -P INPUT DROP IPTABLES -P OUTPUT DROP IPTABLES -P FORWARD DROP ... ... IPTABLES -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -s 0.0.0.0/0 --sport 1024: -d ${MYIP} --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -m owner --uid-owner debian-tor -j ACCEPT In such configuration fw has been dropping large numbers of packets with uid 0 and packets with no uid set. And it seems that there was almost no tor traffic on relay. So I changed OUTPUT rule to: IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT and everything worked fine. I tried to use 0.2.2.37, 0.2.3.17-beta precompiled deb packages, tried to compile from source downloaded from torproject.org, but packet dropping was the same on every version of tor. Last thing I did, was update fw rules to: IPTABLES -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -s 0.0.0.0/0 --sport 1024: -d ${MYIP} --dport 443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -m owner --uid-owner debian-tor -j ACCEPT IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT to count packets traversing each OUTPUT rule (with and without uid to "debian- tor" set). 22% of all packets (it is 11% of bytes of that traffic) sent by tor relay was uid not set to "debian-tor". Why is tor sending packets with uid not set to "debian-tor"? Regards Tony

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Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of the listener ports
by Christian 26 Jun '12

26 Jun '12

Hi dear fellows, I'm sorry to use again this way of addressing my problem as in Vol 17, Issue 5. It will be the last time. Promise. I can't find any solution on the web. When starting tor, it always reads "Failed to parse/validate config: failed to bind one of the listener ports". Furthermore, there are only empty logfiles, independent of the configuration of the logs option "notice". Has anyone else this kind of problem? This is my ORPort section: ORPort 443 NoListen ORPort 0.0.0.0:9090 NoAdvertise I even can't make a control port accessible for e.g. arm running on the same machine, although I didn't use it before. Client functionality is not working either. No connections through tor. Tor is configured as a bridge, my OS is Ubuntu lucid 10.04 and Tor's version is 2.3.17-beta-1~lucid+1. It just worked until the upgrade to the new version through torproject's repository. I really do have forwarded external port 443 to port 9090 on my machine. It nearly has me left in broken state dying. I checked for new requests concerning apparmor allowance, but there were only the ability to chown and access to /sys/devices/system/cpu/ which I granted both. I'm not so really competent with computers and therefore grateful for any help. Strange. No error logs, no function, no topic on the web.. Kind regards, christian

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