- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

tor bridges
by Patrick Kelley 07 Aug '14

07 Aug '14

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Exit Nodes under DDoS attacks
by Tyler Durden 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi I just wanted to know from others how often your nodes are being DDoSed? Because this month one of our nodes has been targeted twice. Because DDoS sucks and most providers aren't very happen when this happens often. Greetings virii - enn.lu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iF4EAREIAAYFAlPfgjcACgkQzowS8yos8Rt1LQD/Rj2zZJpdmCyQhCmG3enWL6Z5 J0tbnnG2FS1GelACY74BAKIYRK8EVUt/pYfuuRzlBWWI84kuzcOmOiehqm6iyVjS =/ay4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Nodes under DDOS attacks
by tor＠t-3.net 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

We never had our exit nodes become the targets of DDOS attacks HOWEVER, we occasionally see abuse complaints due to someone abusing Tor to DDOS attack other targets. Perhaps that's what you're seeing?

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Running an AWS bridge on eu-west-1?
by tor-question＠puti.de 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

2 2

Learn Linux free for beginners
by I 02 Aug '14

02 Aug '14

A free online course from The Linux Foundation for beginners begins today. https://www.edx.org/

3 2

'relay early' attack detection at the infrastructure level
by Nusenu 02 Aug '14

02 Aug '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 [moved to tor-relays] Hi relay ops, please consider having a regular look at your logs after upgrading to the latest tor releases to spot relay_early attacks (even if the attack origin is not directly attributable from a relays point of view). searching your logs for 'Received an inbound RELAY_EARLY cell' should do it. https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commitdiff/68a2e4ca4baa595cc4595a511d… >>> It doesn't have to decrypt the stream to see it, because >>> whether a cell is relay or relay_early is a property of the >>> (per hop) link, not a property of the (end-to-end) stream. >> >> Does a patched relay also create a log entry as soon as it >> "kills" the circuit or is logging only happening on tor instances >> acting as clients? > > The patched relay also does a log message, yes. > > But the relay can only see its immediate neighbor in the circuit, > so it will only log that. Whether the attacking relay is that > (adjacent) one, or one farther on the circuit, isn't something your > relay can learn. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT3Bt6AAoJEDcK3SCCSvoensYQAJnuXhPNbhdJF7C6P9L8elG7 elPinCK6vmTbRXCoQam5j1VeL9C3FCBv415s811hfZxA37K17VdiKoS1NXB2kzkW 7WvL5/lH8culr83GTxrca0m7i2x6n0gCPOVPUWI3Go5bzwlsEidZsj7V14h2lfXH Ew8ZavvL0SLnRYJTvcjzqrWf3L8LsfYou6R2Y7yn085rGaGtUyVkQM44G9Zy3TVY 3lS4XqkZekXmmKjP06JjWdFMFdkaQhItbcdn3fF131ptlZlM5hFUaEpZHbpLLcjz fgJOt36jlkfILKRvxGyzcI118wmgrFVJFz9d7fuLVOdekK49aWxKh9Yh2aAekQEn Z3uF/eskL+Txptrc7iEKuWQZVlEkA8WVaQ70F1ADD/irln6ShJ17zrKqJ0qtaYlU V+CNfj/v2R6AgRhbVsNRdq8SWhDz4Nk4WgdYoUvxzgM1jmkAhQamlkC4f6JCqVQE /O0qeuXr/Z02pBwshcZlqKnBmPtuilSZwmlstIEfPAX9Tg6S1a0B/ycp3ByyJHJP QUNKwJ/cHtLpdPmIh2XUOT/5Kf10qmrLP5amYdRtBh304GoeHir3N/zfPmxdLfy7 Spb8W4p2C1HITzRlb9J97OGdKOR/2OOziZHOWZimF5O3fsrzsXQZe3Wlwbt5AxtY LJ5aXCUjNJ/TXe93nSQH =3FwX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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More attack traffic against Tor detected on exit relay
by tor＠t-3.net 01 Aug '14

01 Aug '14

IPTables rule involved: -A INPUT -p tcp -m string --hex-string "|00002800390038008800870035008400160013000a00330032009a009900450044002f00960041000500ff020100000400230000|" --algo kmp -j LOG --log-prefix "IPTables-GFC-new " -A INPUT -p tcp -m string --hex-string "|00002800390038008800870035008400160013000a00330032009a009900450044002f00960041000500ff020100000400230000|" --algo kmp -j DROP Logs generated Wednesday from hits against these rules: Jul 30 13:44:38 Libero2-vserver kernel: IPTables-GFC-new IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:21:6d:34:00:21:d8:25:c0:20:08:00 SRC=1.50.250.198 DST=64.113.44.206 LEN=147 TOS=0x08 PREC=0x20 TTL=44 ID=21838 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=13717 DPT=9001 WINDOW=46 RES=0x00 ACK PSH FIN URGP=0 Jul 30 13:44:59 Libero2-vserver kernel: IPTables-GFC-new IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:21:6d:34:00:21:d8:25:c0:20:08:00 SRC=175.152.3.46 DST=64.113.44.206 LEN=147 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=50 ID=21839 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=49229 DPT=9001 WINDOW=46 RES=0x00 ACK PSH FIN URGP=0 Jul 30 13:45:41 Libero2-vserver kernel: IPTables-GFC-new IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:21:6d:34:00:21:d8:25:c0:20:08:00 SRC=124.90.49.99 DST=64.113.44.206 LEN=147 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=49 ID=21840 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=10200 DPT=9001 WINDOW=46 RES=0x00 ACK PSH FIN URGP=0

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don't worry (to much) if your relay is loosing the guard flag
by Nusenu 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I guess it makes sense to make this change a bit more visible on the tor-relays mailing list since relay ops will notice the change eventually and not everyone is reading changelogs closely. A lot of relays will loose their guard flag (and probably see less traffic?) once enough dir auths [1] upgraded to 0.2.5.6-alpha. For the background see the changelog [2]: >> o Minor features: - Authorities now assign the Guard flag to the >> fastest 25% of the network (it used to be the fastest 50%). Also >> raise the consensus weight that guarantees the Guard flag from >> 250 to 2000. For the current network, this results in about 1100 >> guards, down from 2500. This step paves the way for moving the >> number of entry guards down to 1 (proposal 236) while still >> providing reasonable expected performance for most users. >> Implements ticket 12690. It will be interesting to follow the metrics graphs during that transition. I.e. will the guard bw history go down or will the remaining relays handle the same amount of traffic without any difference? (and similar questions) https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html#bandwidth-flags [1] https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#authorityversions [2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034180.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJT2rO6AAoJEDcK3SCCSvoeh4sP/iH6DKlOLtCo1ZoBYKsZx+EJ jir+Lk4urwU+3MeM5Ikbb/XTCXY9Y3RCX8tTG65tn+NoLKNJP/fUGuz8A87Vrc48 ismcoSPrjpgX358VMLy7gO9i1tZGLGDd6qNuh0hLws1Z1JVMBACQKv6ZJrSuaoy6 gM/+htBawyRy8KC9Lsw4C6RZsu8b5Kintn9D6MmcWwVIDY8voB3wyypeZZLWaFzI N9sfyT9M4GC+i2CyWsYNdXB/x6z+IEsq0FE0XMdaLr0W17vh8pef0X3XH06h+MUf GsqK86MkjiYfQ0KfMkA/XfYCA3AWTdMSn63L40cDtLqBEHILlvpY/awWX0G78cnU D6cyhRs/R9rUlzvxMxtEF2mMrhvMAkWhz3JrqoEh0o6eOOF9QsOB700rovNsNufw tCYw/PfDD8PVj/J38jcidxo4VBtLcIrdnSInFuLezyZtvKvlCgzMomu8fOdSLxgf gXmKLY6MzduQFAqgYOg5eu33zMSqiTckC2mWPJXWiJ8m5uRbgw57I+7DjTalB4lD KTBTbtjLf+jbZOYn+E8bmoi8hQFPfhjkMMaqSIXeooqDa2xTbYlmEgPy4VmW5rLf cJd1rM2irw9yMKIYMMcI/aLG5uWZJ5pYAw0zWNA1aBzp33mgJ1yFbdhk9BMA+3/G rqNAV1pSC4brVzn4nF++ =02Sf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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tor daemon problem with obfsproxy
by Fereydoon Sepehri 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

Hi All, I install and configure tor to set up a obfs3 bridge. If I use command "tor", everything is fine and clients could connect to server buf if I use "service tor start", the connection will be refused. I checked the log file. the problem is: [warn] The communication stream of managed proxy '/usr/bin/obfsproxy' is > 'closed'. Most probably the managed proxy stopped running. This might be a > bug of the managed proxy, a bug of Tor, or a misconfiguration. Please > enable logging on your managed proxy and check the logs for errors. > Jul 31 20:55:56.000 [notice] Failed to terminate process with PID '28836' > ('No such process'). the question is why "tor" command could run the obfsproxy but "service tor start"could not. I change the permission of "obfsproxy" from "root" to "debian-tor" but it did not solve the problem. Best Regards Fereydoon

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Re: [tor-relays] obfsproxy issue
by Mike Patton 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

On 01/08/2014 3:00 am, Fereydoon Sepehri <fereydoonsepehri(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Dear All, > > I want to set up tor Bridge. the bridge is up and working normally. > I decided to use obfsproxy to set up obfs3 bridge. > > I installed Python, python-pip and obfsproxy. > the obfsproxy is in "/usr/bin/" directory. The "obfsproxy which" command did not show this directory but this: > -bash: /usr/local/bin/obfsproxy: No such file or directory > > could you please advise me on this issue. > > Best Regards > Fereydoon As a suggestion, perhaps take the error meager as instructive? Try putting obfsproxy in /use/local/bin instead of /use/bin. M.

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obfsproxy issue
by Fereydoon Sepehri 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

Dear All, I want to set up tor Bridge. the bridge is up and working normally. I decided to use obfsproxy to set up obfs3 bridge. I installed Python, python-pip and obfsproxy. the obfsproxy is in "/usr/bin/" directory. The "obfsproxy which" command did not show this directory but this: -bash: /usr/local/bin/obfsproxy: No such file or directory could you please advise me on this issue. Best Regards Fereydoon

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Auto Response
by bbzxrmy wowman 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

1 0

how sensitive is relay 'state' file?
by starlight.2014q3＠binnacle.cx 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

Can anyone comment on how sensitive the information in the relay 'state' is? In particular, if entry guards are recorded in the file should one be concerned about protecting the file via a) encrypting the file system where it resides b) making a point of not backing up the file I suppose it comes down to how likely it is that an adversary can use entry guard information for correlation attacks against past and present tor-client traffic originating from a targeted client-relay.

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Finding relay Sybils / Groups [re: relay_early/blackhat]
by grarpamp 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

As a project then to production development, someone should go back through the entire history of descriptors and look for groups coming online... dates, IP's, contacts, tor/OS versions, nicknames, ISP's, geoip, numbers coming online over sliding timeframes, correlation to 'news events', etc. There may be more questionable relays to be found. We were talking about such influxes around july 4 09, ironically, or not.

2 1

German company Webtropia: Terminated contract without notice because of abuse
by tor＠t-3.net 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

You somewhat made a mistake here - you've got to have an exit policy that (minimally) rejects ports 25 and 465, or else your relay becomes a giant abuse tool for spammers, scammers, and phishers instead of what you intended it to be (which was a standard-functioning Tor relay). You might try telling your ISP that you made a mistake in your configuration which allowed spam email to go out, and you're willing to correct that error and move forward. ExitPolicy reject *:25 ExitPolicy reject *:465

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0.2.4.23 availability on trusty armhf?
by trash eighty 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

I am running a pretty active relay, using Ubuntu Trusty on armhf. I see 0.2.4.23 for Intel architecture in the repositories, but not on Trusty/armhf. Didn't know if this was an oversight, or if it's still coming down the pipe. Thanks, Trash80

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Re: [tor-relays] German company Webtropia: Terminated contract without notice because of abuse
by tor＠t-3.net 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

Let's not confuse two things, here. The customer wanting to host a Tor exit relay is a different service request than wanting to run a wide-open SMTP relay. No reputable ISP would agree to host an open SMTP relay and I'm sure this one did not knowingly do so. It would be unfortunate for ISPs to come under the incorrect impression that hosting Tor is equal to hosting open SMTP. ISPs which might have been Tor-friendly at the outset would do a 180 and unnecessarily adopt a No-Tor service policy. On 07/30/2014 03:39 PM, Lunar wrote: > tor(a)t-3.net: >> You somewhat made a mistake here - you've got to have an exit policy that >> (minimally) rejects ports 25 and 465, or else your relay becomes a giant >> abuse tool for spammers, scammers, and phishers instead of what you intended >> it to be (which was a standard-functioning Tor relay). > > Please don't blame the victim. If this ISP acted differently than what > they initially promised, then they are the problem. >

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German company Webtropia: Terminated contract without notice because of abuse
by uf＠riseup.net 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

Hi all, I've been running two exit relays, [1] and [2], at the German company Webtropia [3] for the past two weeks. Things went quite nice and smoothly, the speed of the server was decent and the network great, pushing quite some terabyte. Before renting the server, I told them what I wanted to do, if the would forward abuse etc. They said there were fine with this and forwarding would be no problem, given that I would deal with such mails in a timely manner. So I decided to rent the server, maybe naive? Yesterday (29th) they stopped routing/switching traffic to the server, so it wasn't accessible anymore. They sent me a mail, the subject read "termination without notice", claiming they did this because I didn't pay the invoice. I replied that I doubt this and sent them the transaction details. Their reply claimed that my contract wasn't quited because of this, but instead of abuse: They wrote that they got "52 mails" the day before (28th) dealing with phishing mails, bittorent downloads, ddos, etc. I told them once again that this server is housing tor exit nodes, and I'm not responsible for the traffic. However, I asked if we could find an agreement and "meet in the middle": Closing some ports (25 for example) and forward the mails to me, so I would take care of these and they could lie back and think "not our department" (actually as spoken about beforehand). Sadly there wasn't any negotiation possible, the denied me (up until now at least) even a refund of the money I already paid (is this legal?). Just to inform you about this. Stay away of them - they don't keep their words. Cheers, uf [1] https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/94CB5C820BF97391BFDCAF8DD1B3176A452E8F… [2] https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/55A463CAB24AFB91073C6D6D7CC6CA741A1430… [3] https://www.webtropia.com/en/

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Re: [tor-relays] German company Webtropia: Terminated contract without notice because of abuse
by tor＠t-3.net 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

IMO, even relaying SMTP-like for the email which typically requires auth first isn't a great idea if there is any concern about an upstream getting abuse complaints about a relay (such as a leased box). A frequent way that spammers get their garbage out these days is to compromise a user account, I say this as a mail server admin who has to deal with the mess regularly. Oftentimes they guess the PW via dictionary attacks, but sometimes they keylog the user's box to get the email login. If the spammer has compromised an account and is forced to use webmail to dump the spam instead of an SMTP-like means, your relay doesn't show up in the email headers in the same way and may even be obfuscated. The differences are good things if you want to minimize abuse complaints of this sort. Also the SMTP-like sending seems to get more spam out the door faster than something which must use webmail instead. On 07/30/2014 03:08 PM, krishna e bera wrote: > On 14-07-30 05:11 AM, tor(a)t-3.net wrote: >> >> You somewhat made a mistake here - you've got to have an exit policy >> that (minimally) rejects ports 25 and 465, or else your relay becomes a >> giant abuse tool for spammers, scammers, and phishers instead of what >> you intended it to be (which was a standard-functioning Tor relay). >> >> You might try telling your ISP that you made a mistake in your >> configuration which allowed spam email to go out, and you're willing to >> correct that error and move forward. >> >> >> ExitPolicy reject *:25 >> ExitPolicy reject *:465 > > Most SMTP servers i have seen listening on port 465 and 587 require > authentication, so it shouldnt be necessary to block those ports. Can > anyone name some that dont need authentication to send email? > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Re: [tor-relays] Relay not on Atlas or Globe?
by Mike Patton 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

Yes is there now. Very strange. I restarted it today because of a Tor update and a few hours later it was fine. M. On 30/07/2014 9:48 pm, Neuman1812 <neuman1812(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Its there... > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/527ACFA6E729CF1CF3203444BA7E5E6CA6CE7… > > > On 07/29/2014 07:58 PM, Michael Patton wrote: >> >> Hello all, >> >> I have started a new exit relay recently (NetFreedomTest3 - 527ACFA6E729CF1CF3203444BA7E5E6CA6CE7F89) and it has been up over 5 days now. It has started seeing some decent traffic lately too. However I can't find the relay in Atlas or Globe? >> >> Any ideas? >> >> M. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> tor-relays mailing list >> >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> >

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Relay not on Atlas or Globe?
by Michael Patton 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

Hello all, I have started a new exit relay recently (NetFreedomTest3 - 527ACFA6E729CF1CF3203444BA7E5E6CA6CE7F89) and it has been up over 5 days now. It has started seeing some decent traffic lately too. However I can't find the relay in Atlas or Globe? Any ideas? M.

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Possible tor usage by Dragonfly aka Energetic Bear
by manuel＠myops.de 29 Jul '14

29 Jul '14

Hi, today I received a registered mail by the BKA, the german federal police, alerting me that some stuff related to the Dragonfly aka Energetic Bear backdoor Oldrea/Havex could be traced back to one of my ips. The ip in questions is the one with which I run my tor exit node. I phoned the BKA and asked if they would be aware that Dragonfly uses the tor network to connect to their C&C servers. At least the BKA-person at the phone wasn't aware. Just thought to let you know. Regards, M.

3 2

providers with AES-NI?
by Michael Ball 26 Jul '14

26 Jul '14

hey folks does anyone here know of any decent (and somewhat cheap) dedicated server providers that offer AES-NI crypto acceleration? the only decent and affordable one i've found so far is this from online.net: http://www.online.net/en/dedicated-server/dedibox-xc the bandwidth seems a bit low for the price... i assume what you're paying for is the processor and the memory. hit me up with all the providers you guys know of. thanks. michael ball

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Speed of my relay not correct on global list
by B00ze/Empire 23 Jul '14

23 Jul '14

Good day. I hope this is the correct mailing list for this. I run a small relay, alias "Empire64" (I tried an exit once, but my IP was then banned at several places, so back to only a relay) on Win Xp. It is very small (bandwidth 80k, burst 160k) but it used to be smaller (64k). Back when it was 64k, I still had a lot of traffic, and in Vidalia's "View the network" list of relays, I was listed as a 64k node. Now that I have increased bandwidth and would like to increase it more depending on how much traffic this creates, I see that no one uses my relay, I have practically no traffic. I think this is because in the "View the network" list, I am listed as a 10k node! I know that Tor has changed since I ran the relay at 64k. If I understand correctly, the Tor network now TESTS for bandwidth before accepting the declared bandwidth in the torRC file. Well obviously, this testing is not working for me. I have "attached" a screenshot of one of the rare times when I do have traffic - as you can see, my node DOES run @ 80k. But, see the other "attached" pic, I am showing in the list as a 10k node. Also, the Atlas shows me as UNNAMMED, I don't understand why, I am the only one with that alias... Tor80k screenshot: <https://unsee.cc/sumipoge/> (it needs javascript) Tor10k screenshot: <https://unsee.cc/deguzoba/> Can you guys help me with this? I'd like to contribute to the network but its not working for me now, and besides, the more traffic goes through me, the better it hides my own traffic; I want more :-) My uptime (from the Atlas): 22 days 3 hours 23 minutes and 16 seconds Fingerprint: E1DFC86060848E0FDCC7B0F072FA9EBAC639DA66 Platform: Tor 0.2.4.21 on Windows XP (updated to 2.4.22 just now) Thank you. Best Regards, -- ' _\|/_ Sylvain / B00ze64(a)hotmail.com ' (o o) Member-+-David-Suzuki-Foundation-+-Planetary-Society- oO-( )-Oo Pentium of Borg: Division's futile; You will be approximated.

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Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies
by grarpamp 22 Jul '14

22 Jul '14

On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 6:34 PM, Mike Hearn <mike(a)plan99.net> wrote: > Hello, > > As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate things > (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also sometimes > get used by botnets and other problematic things. > > Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic they > consider to be unwanted or abusive. In this way a kind of international > group consensus emerges about what is and is not acceptable usage of Tor. > For instance, SMTP out is widely restricted. > > Has there been any discussion of implementing similar controls for hidden > services, where relays would refuse to act as introduction points for hidden > services that match certain criteria e.g. have a particular key, or whose > key appears in a list downloaded occasionally via Tor itself. In this way > relay operators could avoid their resources being used for establishing > communication with botnet CnC servers. > > Obviously such a scheme would require a protocol and client upgrade to avoid > nodes building circuits to relays that then refuse to introduce. > > The downside is additional complexity. The upside is potentially recruiting > new relay operators. HS's will just change their HS keys out from under your list. Then it becomes whack a mole. And you'll also be taking out shared services with the bathwater. Are you funding maintenance of that list? Ready to be called a censor when you exceed your noble intent as all have done before? And to be ignored by those operators who don't care to subscribe to your censor list thus nullifying your efforts (not least of why because it may be illegal for them to look at services on the list to verify it, or to look at and make decisions regarding content of traffic that transits them). And ignored by botnet ops who will surely run their own relays and internal pathing.

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