- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Authdir is rejecting routers in this range
by Tim Semeijn 13 May '15

13 May '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In my venture to find more ISPs to house Tor Exit nodes I have recently set up a node in Switzerland (Private Layer - 179.43.160.41). When running Tor 6 out of 9 Authdirs are rejecting the node: - ---- May 12 20:31:02.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this range.") response from dirserver '86.59.21.38:80'. Please correct. May 12 20:31:02.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this range.") response from dirserver '131.188.40.189:80'. Please correct. May 12 20:31:02.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this range.") response from dirserver '171.25.193.9:443'. Please correct. May 12 20:31:02.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this range.") response from dirserver '208.83.223.34:443'. Please correct. May 12 20:31:02.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this range.") response from dirserver '199.254.238.52:80'. Please correct. May 12 20:32:04.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this range.") response from dirserver '154.35.175.225:80'. Please correct. - ---- I looked through the mailing lists and blog posts to find out if this range was mentioned somewhere to see why it gets rejected but I could not find anything. Can anyone shed some light on why this range would be blocked and if there is any chance it will get accepted again in the near future? Best regards, - -- Tim Semeijn Babylon Network pgp 0x5B8A4DDF -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJVUloCAAoJEIZioqpbik3fc/UQAKWstydq4S2OjRko7jhd1oXS kcde4a39nk1lvB/YtHCZJtHVkyypnLbdjmvPlcVSIk3Qqaj/40lu05caWThq5ZgI y90SEnumUHaWslYtKVUAFmgQAXv7lkAs6Svf3ZxZ9PT+NQMpWhyrrlmJ2hakF01Q /z46NU9YhL2dqCXG/w75gmrP87aYZ/2jOMIEZxi4ZIp6OlJXIGoaI8lCQrYWFstH zuC1JDnPwgGhqnB//JBKilrwEalk/kXZDodWpHvllUDqywvn1OOn/Do2JRETqxuV czVy7Ez/s19fk1ltWZyblDS6xsT0gYowH3c0zYovY/s0G1Y7KD50Jr1MEVpiv19/ 9NBHErEUEec8C+h6UoiSXoDKg5Q999uEtMJNJ0/AzlvyWN3+eXtNc/XmBpxzbIGR gQ+w30vyQNwXJFZkpq0wGIXSbXWpsgKYyxNRnokCNFx/AQpjGFUBauXDj5EcpzXJ m3on4LHH9IYbek3EKjhivJ2MjK5lRfjtINtoBx8nanliOY21Pf9js+bAxDFhorhZ wFdijEVGvoUlu/SWOlEuaQlNSBoVXxqBQQo/MVSgJpMUNRngshQslg9qI42Bd5Pn pxJ44X161/PUdChWc6hQ01dAXLNFR07+1OT/9vnSRBaaHFsstU3gI99hFZ1chhps BK+QwwxupISJchliUZZ1 =nWDs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Port configuration on non-exit relay
by aredocilla＠gmail.com 13 May '15

13 May '15

Hi all, I'm running a non-exit on Amazon EC2. I followed the (out-of-date) docs online (which are no longer online!), which instructed me to open the following inbound ports in the security policy: 52176, 40872, 22, 443. Obviously 22 is for SSH, and 443 seems to be the standard choice for ORPort. What are the other two for? They don't seem to be used; should I disable them? The other thing is: I've enabled obfsproxy with obfs3 and obfs4 bound to different ports on 0.0.0.0: ServerTransportListenAddr obfs3 0.0.0.0:587 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:80 Is that optimal? Presumably also: - I should add additional lines for listening on [::] on the same ports to enable ipv6 obfsproxy connections; - I should also open these ports in the security policy? Best wishes, allicoder -- PGP key available on request

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Hivelocity is not longer serving my needs.
by Geo Rift 11 May '15

11 May '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I've had my exit relay running on a spare Hivelocity server that I had for 17 days now. Even after a reduced exit policy I continued to receive abuse reports. They have now asked that I stop running a tor relay on the server. I'm looking for a decent provider that can suit my needs of running a fast exit node. Does anyone have any recommendations? Thanks, Tim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: Mailvelope v0.13.1 Comment: https://www.mailvelope.com wsFcBAEBCAAQBQJVUM1qCRC8Tq5FO2jmKgAA9aAP/3rWozZ63GiGG28/UsWT Ap4ygekHqXvKPzpbUJz7mwxgk0AzCydgaLKaYHvl4jgEgXuwAXSCfSyZS27E jOd72A6Qk36dtsVSgzBbFFyiT3f30mAZIBc+KCyhZ6fEQ5Rb5v0mJWz1nlyA BfvYjTF6eZgLaLcyPt8RPJoITyV6df+RUbaUAstoqql+cZn7Wnoj9P6rbM3h aSPFD2llWQorGxgRX7vJzuytJqZEIvhLoI/eakClyTKrNi2AosCn2rzKwB4C oTv4wmlbbZnhSXvT8jdqBXzQl1va2XPaSErXTfkREzQ6Pg+LEG1lr+AGTFAE JRMx5MN79YQtX86XnxZsCHxqLD8mqz1Kw2/lr6rNWWcxZH+tmXfKqpmCr6/b 9Jjttd2qUQctOQZEYYoMSsIx1s269km1X6WB4tvYrx8NuBaqsFUuoEndeEpD AvF2mlL5mhUjGxE4q9UERGm7KTVLf1MfqPNdpWjpepxy2eATjaOyo+tnswIZ vM1h7x/Ky2KQG9240k1U6vfiqaRV82FNRvIhbrKgCtiZ3+CrqLNx4UXwcMVt tqGqC86xX5ip4W+iyuVOOApV86V6U047ovPmiRV9XRv+44v8UFgGZA58Zobg sCsFluaLICo857y4WPsiHjXwA5IHy9hI1kVAyJB2Qo9yIApGGlL9RhVhFDBI B4Nm =L3ny -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

Re: [tor-relays] RelayBandwidthRate vs AccountingMax
by teor 11 May '15

11 May '15

> Date: Sun, 10 May 2015 23:13:18 +0100 > From: Christopher Baines <mail(a)cbaines.net> > > I run this relay [1], and currently use the following config: > 1: > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/91F4DFA04743755C8551A12F8C4065F79786B… > > RelayBandwidthRate 1.7 MB > RelayBandwidthBurst 20 MB > > This keeps it from using more than ~3TB of bandwidth in a month. > However, I wonder if this is beneficial for the network, over using the > AccountingMax instead? If you use "AccountingMax 3TB" and "AccountingStart month 1 00:00" (or whenever your rollover date is), the relay will go at full speed, use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the month. The next month, it will calculate the maximum start date that it could start at to use all the bandwidth at a similar rate to last month, then wake at a random interval between the start of the month and the calculated date. Note that the AccountingMax quota will make the relay hibernate when either the download or the upload individually hit the quota. If you want the sum of both, use "AccountingRule sum". If you use RelayBandwidthRate, the relay will go at partial speed, and may not use all the quota if there are any quiet periods. Personally, I'd rather have faster relays for part of the month, but others favour stable relays for the entire month. It may also depend on whether your relay is one or more of: * a guard, where stability would be a priority, * a middle (that is, not guard or exit), where there is plenty of bandwidth, and therefore speed would be a priority, and/or * an exit, where speed would again be a priority… as far as I can work it out, anyway. Both stable relays and fast relays are a valuable contribution, please contribute what you think the Tor network needs most. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

1 0

RelayBandwidthRate vs AccountingMax
by Christopher Baines 10 May '15

10 May '15

I run this relay [1], and currently use the following config: RelayBandwidthRate 1.7 MB RelayBandwidthBurst 20 MB This keeps it from using more than ~3TB of bandwidth in a month. However, I wonder if this is beneficial for the network, over using the AccountingMax instead? Thanks, Chris 1: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/91F4DFA04743755C8551A12F8C4065F79786B…

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descriptions still valid?
by tor-server-creator＠use.startmail.com 10 May '15

10 May '15

dear relayoperators, i wonder if descriptions on http://www.torservers.net/wiki/setup/server are still valid for debian jessie dist? particular chmod 700 ~/.ssh and wget https://www.torservers.net/misc/config/sshd_config thanks for helping out. cheers

2 1

send me somerelays and bridges for vidalia
by Sh.F.M 09 May '15

09 May '15

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by Tim 06 May '15

06 May '15

Being fairly new to the tor project I can see where he is getting at with the difficulty of helping out. I can deffinantly see having a single person to contact to try and find things to do would be important. While I agree that volunteers should not be babysat there should be someone that has a bunch of tasks to pass off to those who is interested. I would be more than willing to dedicate time to do something like this, I think it could be seriously useful to newer people in the community. In my mind a volunteer coordinator would not babysit but provide things that may be suited for a particular skill set. Then a little later down the line touch base with person to see if they encountered any issues. Side note: getting a little off track here. Would there be a better place for a discussion like this? Tim <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: Matthew Finkel <matthew.finkel(a)gmail.com> </div><div>Date:06/05/2015 02:14 (GMT+08:00) </div><div>To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org </div><div>Subject: Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control </div><div> </div>On Tue, May 05, 2015 at 01:57:04PM +0000, Speak Freely wrote: > Matthew Finkel, > > It's kind of disingenuous to suggest "If you want to work on something, > then please come work on it, we really are overloaded." > I'm really sorry you interpretted it in that way. It actually was a genuine request for more help. > You have to let us work on it, for us to work on it. Do you understand > the problem? Sure, that is a problem, but what is the problem? It seems this dilemma is reoccurring and not getting solved. Someone says they are willing to help work on something, possibly someone else says "great! we need your help!" then nothing happens. Was it an empty offer or did the offer die because no one followed up with the person? Having a volunteer coordinator might help - I hope it would help - but what's the best way to organize that? Is it the responsibly of some people associated with The Tor Project to follow up on every offer they receive or is it the responsibility of the person who made the offer to follow up and get involved? Maybe both? > > To The Inner Circle (The Tor Project People), > > I am at the very least the third person to mention in this thread that > we have offered to help. No one responded to my offers. I'm pretty sure > at least some of their offers were ignored as well, though I can't be > bothered to double check. :( I don't know. Obviously, not receiving a response sucks. I completely understand that. Tor's work and day-to-day coordination is heavily based around IRC, so the mailing lists are not great places for offering help. This whole situation seems to be less about an inner circle existing, and more about a disconnection between the announcements and discussions on the mailing lists and what happens on IRC. I don't know of a good way to bridge this gap, though. > > I get that you're busy. However, Matthew's attitude to Seth is, in my > most humble of opinions, unwarranted. > We're all busy, it's difficult balancing everything. I'm sorry if my response was unwarranted, and maybe I shouldn't have responded because it was off-topic, in any case. It's frustrating trying to do something and improve a situation, and instead of receiving helpful feedback the thread receives complaints about how Tor is crappy with how it handles volunteers. Maybe this is partially due to miscommunication but I'm at a loss for what to do. > You've got several people who out of their own free will, decided to > offer our additional help, above and beyond what we already do. > > I wonder, how would you feel, if after offering free assistance to a > community that then goes completely, totally, and utterly UNANSWERED, > only to have those very people that we offered to assist, bitch that > they are busy and want our help. How would you feel? > Angry? A little schadenfreude? Or numb? > > I'm a husband, a father, and a business owner. I'm a busy guy, yet I > still offered to help. I can't express how pissed off I am about this, > without going into a obscenity-laced tirade about how your house isn't > in order. > > When I offer assistance to someone, or in Tor's case several people, I > damn well expect a response. "Yes" or "no", "thanks" or "fuck off", > "please" or "tomorrow", "join us!" or "maybe next time". > > Deafening silence is in no way a mechanism that encourages support from > the broader community, but from my perspective that's all you've given. > Thanks. Obviously you're correct, silence is not an answer and not what you deserve as a result of offering your assistance. I don't know why this happened or the context of the offer but, to be blunt, Tor doesn't babysit volunteers. If you want to work on something, then, you must actually follow through and work on it. I learned this personally. A volunteer coordinator would be a great person for helping volunteers become more integrated into the community and work on projects but it is ultimately the person volunteering who decides how, when, and if they help. Tor wants your help, but becoming an active volunteer is your decision. > > Here's a suggestion to The Inner Circle > - Have a volunteer coordinator that actually responds to people. > > This way, when the next person offers to help, they might actually get a > good g*d d@mn f@cking response! > Yes, this sounds like a good idea. Who wants to volunteer to be the volunteer coordinator? Again, that is a genuine question. No one has stepped up to do it. If we had one, at least they would respond to most offers. > > Seeing as how I'm a nobody and my offers aren't worth acknowledging, > please continue to do whatever you'd like, with *all* the success it > brings. Don't forget to smile. > Being a nobody or being a somebody is irrelevant. I'm a nobody too, but I'm trying to do something. I sincerely hope you and the rest of the community will help me and Tor, as a whole, create a better community/network/world. Let's continue this discussion in a new thread. Thanks, Matt _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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HW-Accelerated OpenSSL & Tor not playing nicely.
by 12xBTM 05 May '15

05 May '15

Probably (and hopefully) a very obvious fix for those that aren't newbies to Linux, but I'm trying to get Hardware-Accelerated OpenSSL to work with Tor on Jessie. I've gotten the Hardware-Accelerated OpenSSL part done, but the Tor part is giving me problems. I am able to successfully compile Tor by itself, and I'm able to successfully utilize OpenSSL by itself, but getting them to work together isn't working. So, I'll give a run-down of what I've done, and where I'm stuck: Info: Linux beaglebone 3.14.39-ti-r61 #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri Apr 24 18:32:15 UTC 2015 armv7l GNU/Linux Debian 8 Console Tor 2.6.7 Information Sources: https://superuser.com/questions/881404/beaglebone-black-openssl-crypto-acce… and http://datko.net/2013/10/28/tor_cryptodev/ Step 1: Getting OpenSSL to become Hardware-Accelerated sudo apt-get install linux-image-3.14.39-ti-r61 sudo apt-get install linux-headers-3.14.39-ti-r61 wget http://download.gna.org/cryptodev-linux/cryptodev-linux-1.7.tar.gz tar zxf cryptodev-linux-1.7.tar.gz cd cryptodev-linux-1.7/ sudo make sudo make install sudo depmod -a sudo modprobe cryptodev lsmod sudo sh -c 'echo cryptodev>>/etc/modules' cd ~ wget https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.2a.tar.gz tar zxf openssl-1.0.2a.tar.gz cd openssl-1.0.2a/ ls ./config -DHAVE_CRYPTODEV -DUSE_CRYPTDEV_DIGESTS shared sudo make sudo make install Step 2: Test OpenSSL: /usr/local/ssl/bin/openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc Results confirm hardware acceleration is functional Step 3: Making Tor use OpenSSL Added to /etc/apt/sources.list : deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.2.6.x-jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.2.6.x-jessie main Fixed the key nonsense sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install build-essential fakeroot devscripts sudo apt-get build-dep tor mkdir ~/debian-packages; cd ~/debian-packages sudo apt-get source tor cd tor-* And it's here where I believe the problem lies: sudo nano debian/rules Add the two lines as shown on the "guide" such that mine reads: override_dh_auto_configure: ! [ -e debian/micro-revision.i ] || cp debian/micro-revision.i src/or/micro-revision.i dh_auto_configure -- \ $(confflags) \ --enable-static-openssl \ --with-openssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl \ --prefix=/usr \ --mandir=\$${prefix}/share/man \ --infodir=\$${prefix}/share/info \ --localstatedir=/var \ --sysconfdir=/etc \ --disable-silent-rules \ --enable-gcc-warnings-advisory sudo debuild -rfakeroot -uc -us Error message after 35m: 15/359 TESTS FAILED. (0 skipped) Makefile:6429: recipe for target 'test' failed make[1]: *** [test] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/debian/debian-packages/tor-0.2.6.7/build' dh_auto_test: make -j1 test returned exit code 2 debian/rules:16: recipe for target 'build' failed make: *** [build] Error 2 dpkg-buildpackage: error: debian/rules build gave error exit status 2 debuild: fatal error at line 1376: dpkg-buildpackage -rfakeroot -D -us -uc failed My thoughts: I noticed on the Tor FAQ here: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#RelayMemory That adding the malloc flag it done using the ./configure option, while I used nano. If that's the problem, how do I use configure for adding the other flags such as OPenSSL dir and static openssl. Also, I noticed that the path I add to the configure is not quite the same as the path used to test openssl's functionality. Also, the tor confflag mentions static openssl, but the openssl ./configure talked about being shared. Also, does the ordering other confflags matter? Is it asking for a static openssl prior to learning the directory of the correct library? I'm just trying to brainstorm why I'm getting this one error. Looking at the test log, looks like there's some kind of error in the self-test of the cryptographic engine, yet it works in OpenSSL by itself? Any help would be appreciated, thanks. Super long test log: onion_handshake: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test.c:84: assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)) [onion_handshake FAILED] bad_onion_handshake: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test.c:158: assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)) [bad_onion_handshake FAILED] onion_queues: OK ntor_handshake: OK circuit_timeout: OK rend_fns: OK geoip: OK geoip_with_pt: [forking] OK stats: [forking] OK accounting/bwlimits: [forking] OK addr/basic: OK addr/ip6_helpers: OK addr/parse: OK addr/virtaddr: OK addr/localname: OK addr/dup_ip: OK addr/sockaddr_to_str: OK addr/is_loopback: OK addr/make_null: OK address/get_if_addrs_ifaddrs: [forking] OK address/ifaddrs_to_smartlist: OK address/get_if_addrs_ioctl: [forking] OK address/ifreq_to_smartlist: OK buffer/basic: [forking] OK buffer/copy: [forking] OK buffer/pullup: [forking] OK buffer/ext_or_cmd: [forking] OK buffer/allocation_tracking: [forking] OK buffer/time_tracking: [forking] OK buffer/zlib: [forking] OK buffer/zlib_fin_with_nil: [forking] OK buffer/zlib_fin_at_chunk_end: [forking] OK cellfmt/relay_header: OK cellfmt/begin_cells: OK cellfmt/connected_cells: OK cellfmt/create_cells: OK cellfmt/created_cells: OK cellfmt/extend_cells: OK cellfmt/extended_cells: OK cellfmt/resolved_cells: OK cellfmt/is_destroy: OK cellqueue/basic: [forking] OK cellqueue/circ_n_cells: [forking] OK channel/dumpstats: [forking] OK channel/flush: [forking] OK channel/flushmux: [forking] OK channel/incoming: [forking] OK channel/lifecycle: [forking] OK channel/lifecycle_2: [forking] OK channel/multi: [forking] OK channel/queue_impossible: [forking] OK channel/queue_size: [forking] OK channel/write: [forking] OK channeltls/create: [forking] OK channeltls/num_bytes_queued: [forking] OK channeltls/overhead_estimate: [forking] OK checkdir/perms: [forking] OK circuitlist/maps: [forking] OK circuitlist/rend_token_maps: [forking] OK circuitlist/pick_circid: [forking] OK circuitmux/destroy_cell_queue: [forking] OK config/resolve_my_address: [forking] OK config/addressmap: OK config/parse_bridge_line: OK config/parse_transport_options_line: OK config/parse_transport_plugin_line: [forking] OK config/check_or_create_data_subdir: [forking] OK config/write_to_data_subdir: [forking] OK config/fix_my_family: OK container/smartlist_basic: OK container/smartlist_strings: OK container/smartlist_overlap: OK container/smartlist_digests: OK container/smartlist_join: OK container/smartlist_ints_eq: OK container/bitarray: OK container/digestset: OK container/strmap: OK container/pqueue: OK container/order_functions: OK container/di_map: OK container/fp_pair_map: OK control/bucket_note_empty: OK control/bucket_millis_empty: OK control/sum_up_cell_stats: OK control/append_cell_stats: OK control/format_cell_stats: OK crypto/formats: OK crypto/rng: OK crypto/aes_AES: [forking] OK crypto/aes_EVP: [forking] OK crypto/sha: OK crypto/pk: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_crypto.c:427: assert(128 OP_EQ crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk2, data1, sizeof(data1), "Hello whirled.", 15, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)): 128 vs -1 [pk FAILED] crypto/pk_fingerprints: [forking] OK crypto/digests: OK crypto/dh: OK crypto/aes_iv_AES: [forking] OK crypto/aes_iv_EVP: [forking] OK crypto/base32_decode: OK crypto/kdf_TAP: OK crypto/hkdf_sha256: OK crypto/curve25519_impl: OK crypto/curve25519_impl_hibit: OK crypto/curve25519_wrappers: OK crypto/curve25519_encode: OK crypto/curve25519_persist: OK crypto/ed25519_simple: OK crypto/ed25519_test_vectors: OK crypto/ed25519_encode: OK crypto/ed25519_convert: OK crypto/ed25519_blinding: OK crypto/ed25519_testvectors: OK crypto/siphash: OK dir/nicknames: [forking] OK dir/formats: [forking] OK dir/routerparse_bad: OK dir/extrainfo_parsing: OK dir/parse_router_list: [forking] OK dir/load_routers: [forking] OK dir/load_extrainfo: [forking] OK dir/versions: [forking] OK dir/fp_pairs: [forking] OK dir/split_fps: OK dir/measured_bw_kb: [forking] OK dir/measured_bw_kb_cache: [forking] OK dir/param_voting: [forking] OK dir/v3_networkstatus: [forking] OK dir/random_weighted: OK dir/scale_bw: OK dir/clip_unmeasured_bw_kb: [forking] OK dir/clip_unmeasured_bw_kb_alt: [forking] OK dir/fmt_control_ns: OK dir/http_handling: OK dir/purpose_needs_anonymity: OK dir/fetch_type: OK dir/packages: OK dir/md/cache: [forking] OK dir/md/broken_cache: [forking] OK dir/md/generate: OK dir/md/parse: OK dir/md/reject_cache: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_basic: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_bad_dotexit: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_automap_ipv4: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_automap_ipv6: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_cached_dns_ipv4: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_cached_dns_ipv6: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_unmapped_virtual: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_reject_internal_reverse: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_automap_exit: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_exit: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion2: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion3: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion4: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_is_time_to_retry: [forking] OK entrynodes/choose_random_entry_no_guards: [forking] OK entrynodes/choose_random_entry_one_possibleguard: [forking] OK entrynodes/populate_live_entry_guards_1guard: [forking] OK entrynodes/populate_live_entry_guards_3guards: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_guards_parse_state_simple: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_guards_set_from_config: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_is_live: [forking] OK guardfraction/parse_guardfraction_file_bad: [forking] OK guardfraction/parse_guardfraction_file_good: [forking] OK guardfraction/parse_guardfraction_consensus: [forking] OK guardfraction/get_guardfraction_bandwidth: [forking] OK guardfraction/should_apply_guardfraction: [forking] OK extorport/id_map: [forking] OK extorport/write_command: [forking] OK extorport/init_auth: [forking] OK extorport/cookie_auth: [forking] OK extorport/cookie_auth_testvec: [forking] OK extorport/handshake: [forking] OK hs/hs_desc_event: [forking] OK hs/pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node: [forking] OK hs/pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node: [forking] OK introduce/early_parse_v0: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v0 FAILED] introduce/early_parse_v1: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v1 FAILED] introduce/early_parse_v2: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v2 FAILED] introduce/early_parse_v3: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0)cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v3 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v0: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v0 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v1: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v1 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v2: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v2 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v3: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0)cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v3 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v0: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v0 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v1: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v1 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v2: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v2 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v3: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0)cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v3 FAILED] nodelist/node_get_verbose_nickname_by_id_null_node: [forking] OK nodelist/node_get_verbose_nickname_not_named: [forking] OK oom/circbuf: [forking] OK oom/streambuf: [forking] OK options/validate: [forking] OK policy/router_dump_exit_policy_to_string: OK policy/general: OK pt/parsing: OK pt/protocol: OK pt/get_transport_options: [forking] OK pt/get_extrainfo_string: [forking] OK pt/configure_proxy: [forking] OK pt/get_pt_proxy_uri: [forking] OK relay/append_cell_to_circuit_queue: [forking] OK relaycell/resolved: [forking] OK replaycache/alloc: OK replaycache/badalloc: OK replaycache/free_null: OK replaycache/miss: OK replaycache/hit: OK replaycache/age: OK replaycache/elapsed: OK replaycache/noexpire: OK replaycache/scrub: OK replaycache/future: OK replaycache/realtime: OK routerkeys/write_fingerprint: [forking] OK routerlist/initiate_descriptor_downloads: OK routerlist/launch_descriptor_downloads: OK routerset/routerset_new: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_countryname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_is_list: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_needs_geoip: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_is_empty: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__null_set_or_null_set_list: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_null_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_no_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_digest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_no_digest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_null_digest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_addr: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_no_addr: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_null_addr: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__countries_no_geoip: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__countries_geoip: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__only_flag_and_no_ccs: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__creates_set: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__add_unknown: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__add_a1: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_extendinfo: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_router: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_routerstatus: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_node__none: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_node__routerinfo: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_node__routerstatus: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__no_routerset: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__list_with_no_nodes: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__list_flag_not_running: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__list: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__nodelist_with_no_nodes: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__nodelist_flag_not_running: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__geoip_not_loaded: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__no_countries: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__one_valid_country: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__one_invalid_country: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_union__source_bad: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_union__one: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__malformed: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__valid_hexdigest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__valid_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__get_countryname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__policy: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_subtract_nodes: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_subtract_nodes__null_routerset: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_to_string: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__empty_empty: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__empty_not_empty: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__differing_lengths: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__unequal: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__equal: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_free__null_routerset: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_free: [forking] OK scheduler/channel_states: [forking] OK scheduler/compare_channels: [forking] OK scheduler/initfree: [forking] OK scheduler/loop: [forking] OK scheduler/queue_heuristic: [forking] OK socks/4_unsupported_commands: [forking] OK socks/4_supported_commands: [forking] OK socks/5_unsupported_commands: [forking] OK socks/5_supported_commands: [forking] OK socks/5_no_authenticate: [forking] OK socks/5_auth_before_negotiation: [forking] OK socks/5_authenticate: [forking] OK socks/5_authenticate_with_data: [forking] OK socks/5_malformed_commands: [forking] OK status/count_circuits: [forking] OK status/secs_to_uptime: [forking] OK status/bytes_to_usage: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__fails: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__simple: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__not_in_consensus: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__calls_log_accounting: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__packaged_cell_fullness: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__tls_write_overhead: [forking] OK util/time: OK util/parse_http_time: OK util/config_line: OK util/config_line_quotes: OK util/config_line_comment_character: OK util/config_line_escaped_content: OK util/expand_filename: OK util/escape_string_socks: OK util/string_is_key_value: OK util/strmisc: OK util/pow2: OK util/gzip: OK util/datadir: OK util/memarea: OK util/control_formats: OK util/mmap: OK util/sscanf: OK util/format_time_interval: OK util/path_is_relative: OK util/strtok: OK util/di_ops: OK util/round_to_next_multiple_of: OK util/laplace: OK util/strclear: OK util/find_str_at_start_of_line: OK util/string_is_C_identifier: OK util/asprintf: OK util/listdir: OK util/parent_dir: OK util/ftruncate: OK util/exit_status: OK util/fgets_eagain: OK util/format_hex_number: OK util/format_dec_number: OK util/join_win_cmdline: OK util/split_lines: OK util/n_bits_set: OK util/eat_whitespace: OK util/sl_new_from_text_lines: OK util/envnames: OK util/make_environment: OK util/set_env_var_in_sl: OK util/read_file_eof_tiny_limit: OK util/read_file_eof_one_loop_a: OK util/read_file_eof_one_loop_b: OK util/read_file_eof_two_loops: OK util/read_file_eof_two_loops_b: OK util/read_file_eof_zero_bytes: OK util/write_chunks_to_file: OK util/mathlog: OK util/weak_random: OK util/socket: [forking] OK util/socketpair: [forking] OK util/socketpair_ersatz: [forking] OK util/max_mem: OK util/hostname_validation: OK util/ipv4_validation: OK util/logging/sigsafe_err_fds: [forking] OK util/logging/sigsafe_err: [forking] OK util/thread/basic: [forking] OK util/thread/conditionvar: [forking] OK util/thread/conditionvar_timeout: [forking] OK

3 8

T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by Matthew Finkel 05 May '15

05 May '15

Hi Ops, We recently began responding to t-shirt requests again. Sorry for the long silence. There's been a lot happening around here but not enough time or people to do everything, so the t-shirt requests simply remained untouched. But, despite the overload, t-shirts are important because they are a small token of our thanks and appreciation for making the network what it is today. We responded to around 70 t-shirt requests from relay operators in April, which comprised all requests for which we could verify (within reason) the request came from the person who controlled the qualifying relay. We still have another 20 requests where the requestor is not obviously the owner of the relay. Currently the content of a relay's Contact field is used, but this does not always provide enough (or any) information. For this case, we need an authentication mechanism which proves control of the relay but is something relay operators won't mind running. My currently plan is to ask relay operators to sign the fingerprint file which tor creates. The major disadvantage of this method is that it must be run as root (or a user with access to tor's data directory). The following process is the current plan, but does anyone have a better idea? Does it seem logical? ------------------------------------------------------------ When we receive a t-shirt request from someone who isn't obviously in control of the relay, we ask them to sign their fingerprint file with a unique salt. Assuming the path to their data dir is /var/lib/tor, we ask them to run: $ (echo -n "salt "; cat /var/lib/tor/fingerprint) | openssl sha256 \ -binary | openssl pkeyutl -inkey /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key \ -sign -pkeyopt digest:sha256 -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss \ -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:32 | openssl base64 > signed_fingerprint They send us both /var/lib/tor/fingerprint and signed_fingerprint. When we receive them, we confirm the fingerprint in the fingerprint file matches the qualifying relay. Then we retrieve the relay's public key from its descriptor and convert it into pkcs#8 format using: $ openssl rsa -pubin -in pubkey_pkcs1 -RSAPublicKey_in -out pubkey and then we verify the sig using following commands: $ (echo -n "salt "; cat fingerprint) | openssl sha256 -binary | \ openssl pkeyutl -pubin -verify -inkey pubkey -sigfile \ $(OUT=/tmp/signed_fingerprint_bin; base64 -d signed_fingerprint > \ ${OUT}; echo ${OUT}) -pkeyopt digest:sha256 -pkeyopt \ rsa_padding_mode:pss -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:32; rm \ /tmp/signed_fingerprint_bin; This should yield "Signature Verified Successfully". ------------------------------------------------------------ Another disadvantage of this is PSS wasn't implemented in openssl's apps until 1.0.1. I wonder how many relays are running on servers which are still using openssl 0.9.8 (and 1.0.0?). For these servers we can fallback on pkcs#1 v1.5 signatures. ------------------------------------------------------------ The signature can be created using a command similar to the one above: $ (echo -n "salt "; cat /var/lib/tor/fingerprint) | openssl dgst \ -sha256 | openssl rsautl -inkey /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key \ -sign | openssl base64 > signed_fingerprint Again, they provide /var/lib/tor/fingerprint and signed_fingerprint, and we verify using: $ test "$(openssl base64 -d -in signed_fingerprint | openssl rsautl \ -pubin -verify -inkey pubkey)" = "$((echo -n "salt "; cat \ fingerprint) | openssl dgst -sha256)"; echo $? In addition, again, we confirm the fingerprint in the fingerprint file matches the fingerprint of the qualifying relay. ------------------------------------------------------------ Originally I used a few bashisms which made these simpler, but for this I suspect portability is important. Sorry this is a bit long. Thanks, Matt

11 19

Enabling obfs4 and obfs3 on 80 and 443
by R-one 05 May '15

05 May '15

I have recently set up a bridge and was reading some old emails on the list. I found some instructions from s7r on setting up obfs4 and obfs3: > Sample torrc entry for enabling obfs4 and obfs3: > ExtORPort auto > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy > ServerTransportListenAddr obfs3 [::]:port > ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 [::]:port > > To make the bridge even better, you can bind obfs3 and obfs4 to lower > ports (< 1024), if you have them free, such as obfs3 on 80 and obfs4 > on 443 (for example). This seemed like a good idea (I am not running a web server). I am running tor 0.2.4.27, which does not seem to support ExtORPort. From some other recommended bridge setup I had previously set ORPort to 443. I tried changing my config to: ORPort auto ServerTransportListenAddr obfs3 0.0.0.0:80 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:443 (and doing the capabilities stuff, of course). This didn't work -- obfs4 complained that 443 was in use (is that because I had previously set it for ORPort?). So, for now, I have set obfs4 to a random high port. I will admit to being pretty confused about the recommended bridge setting for ORPort and the obfs ports (and what ExtORPort does differently). Does anyone have a recommendation for what I should do? Do I need to upgrade to tor 0.2.5?

2 1

Tor Relays Network Survey
by Zoe White 04 May '15

04 May '15

Hello everyone, I am doing a research project called “Understanding Anonymous Network” conducted at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The purpose of this project is to investigate what motivates people to participate in Tor project and to run the relay nodes. We also want to know what obstacles may hinder people to run relay(s). Our aim is to increase people’s participation in Tor network through understanding motivation. Your participation will help us have a better understanding about this issue. This survey will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. If you run Tor nodes and are willing to participate in this research project, please click the following link and start the survey! *https://uiuc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9GkkX5zGEkjQhx3* <https://uiuc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9GkkX5zGEkjQhx3> Thank you very much!!

4 6

Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by teor 04 May '15

04 May '15

> Date: Mon, 04 May 2015 13:06:51 +0200 > From: Markus Hitter <mah(a)jump-ing.de> … > > The more demanding part of this is to collect the addresses, especially the software to do so. An application which formats them ready for printing, calculates the stamp required, perhaps also prints some customs stickers depending on destination. Here volunteers can easily help and there's no need to hide such discussions, because such software doesn't require the real data, can be written/tested with dummy data instead. All the trusted person (you) has to do is to run this software on the real data and hit the "print" button. Your post office or shipping company might have software like this already - and if it's done using their software, getting the stamps and stickers right is their responsibility, not yours. Of course, this software might not be free, in either sense of the word. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

2 1

Determining geographical locations for a new exit relay would help most
by Seth 04 May '15

04 May '15

I'm standing up a new exit relay on the VULTR network. How would a person go about determining which location is in most need of additional exit relay capacity? Available locations: https://www.vultr.com/locations/ * Miami, Florida * Chicago, Illinois * New York / New Jersey * Dallas, Texas * Seattle, Washington * Atlanta, Georgia * Los Angeles, California * Silicon Valley, California * (AU) Sydney, Australia * (Asia) Tokyo, Japan * (EU) Amsterdam, NL * (EU) London, UK * (EU) Paris, France * (EU) Frankfurt, DE Also, curious to hear people's thoughts on any potential jurisdictional arbitrage benefits to be gleaned by choosing a location other than ones country of residence or citizenship. For the sake of argument, consider a VULTR account opened by U.S. citizen residing in the U.S. Choopa LLC (VULTR parent company) is also a US based company. http://start.cortera.com/company/research/k5o8lvm2j/choopa-llc/

4 12

Why can't I see authorities bandwith stats
by Dedalo 04 May '15

04 May '15

Hi, I was making some changes in my relay configuration and I made some queries in GLOBE and ATLAS and something happened. I noticed that all authorities are not showing bandwidth stats from the last week and I was wondering why. Regards, Dedalo. -- twitter: @SeguridadBlanca Github: Dedal0 Blog: https://blog.dedalo.in

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by JovianMallard 04 May '15

04 May '15

Matt, Inspired by the options to confirm domain ownership with Google, Could you ask the relay operator to include a randomly generated (by you) token in their contact field? It may take a while to propagate and it requires action on the operator's part, but it's not difficult and I expect it provides the assurance you need. > On 05/03/2015 04:20 PM, Matthew Finkel wrote: >> On Sun, May 03, 2015 at 12:05:49PM -0700, Aaron Hopkins wrote: >>> On Sun, 3 May 2015, Matthew Finkel wrote: > >>> Or as Robert suggests, just send verification mail to the listed contact >>> address of the relay. If they don't list one on their config, find an >>> alternate verification mechanism like e-mailing whois contacts for the IP or >>> domain name, or refuse the request. >> >> I'd prefer not denying them a t-shirt because they don't want to publish >> an email address publically, but using whois seems like a stretch and >> usually ends at the hosting provider instead of the operator. >

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by teor 04 May '15

04 May '15

> Date: Sun, 3 May 2015 17:44:39 +0000 > From: Matthew Finkel <Matthew.Finkel(a)gmail.com> > … > > Another disadvantage of this is PSS wasn't implemented in openssl's > apps until 1.0.1. I wonder how many relays are running on servers which > are still using openssl 0.9.8 (and 1.0.0?). For these servers we can > fallback on pkcs#1 v1.5 signatures. OS X still ships with OpenSSL 0.9.8 by default. But Darwin is such a small fraction of the network, and it's less likely that a Darwin server would push enough data to get a t-shirt unless it had an OpenSSL version with aes-ni. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

1 0

Drop in relay count
by Linus Nordberg 03 May '15

03 May '15

Hi, Looking at the graphs showing the number of relays in the network it seems like we've lost about 500 (-7%) relays since the beginning of this year. https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html?graph=networksize&start=201… https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html?graph=networksize&start=201… Looking at the graphs showing the total relay bandwidth of the network it seems like the advertised bandwidth has increased with about 25 Mbps (+23%). https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2015-01… https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2012-01… Seems a bit contradictory at first sight. A guess would be that a lower number of fast relays have replaced a higher number of slow ones but I haven't looked into it more. Anyone who's looked into this? And can back up their theory with some numbers. Thanks, Linus

4 5

Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 52, Issue 1
by aredocilla＠gmail.com 02 May '15

02 May '15

> Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 15:52:07 +0800 > From: Geo Rift <tim.cochrane.laptop(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Determining geographical locations for a new > exit relay would help most > Message-ID: > <CAO3ZnMfdf9Q6FUHXhZtYAy1orS607DA_SYDuQi08p9Z7YKJVgQ(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > I would love to see some more nodes in Australia. I'm located in Perth > and the speed of the network it horrible. Not usable for day to day > internet which is unfortunate, hopefully it will pick up soon. Unless you've been really messing with your configuration, you're likely to end up hopping out of your home country at least once per circuit anyway. And if the network is slow, you'd want your traffic to get out of there as soon as possible; no/little sense adding a relay in a slow network area. Exit relay positioning is more dependent on filtering and network diversity rather than geographical proximity; I can only see that being helpful for guard relays. That said, if we're low on Australian relays it'd be good to get more there. I believe both UK and Australia keep bouncing around ideas for legally-required net filtering; that's the only thing I'd keep in mind other than speed when choosing between them. -- PGP key available on request

1 0

Effectively donating bandwidth
by Curtis Gagliardi 30 Apr '15

30 Apr '15

I'm running a relay with the extra bandwidth on my VPS, but I'm unsure if it's optimally configured. I have 2.5TB of bandwidth I want to use every month. Given that, how do I configure my relay in the most helpful way? The docs mention dividing my bandwidth by 30 and setting an accounting max of 1 day. It also suggests "You might also consider rate limiting to spread your usefulness over more of the day". What not use an accouting period of a month and spread it out over the full month? Spreading it out feels like the right thing to do, but is it actually the most helpful? Maybe burning my bandwidth is faster bursts is more helpful. If spreading it over the month using a low bandwidth rate and a monthly accounting period is ideal, is there a better way to configure it than busting out a calculator and coverting TB/month to KB/s? How should I determine my BandwidthBurstRate? I understand what it is, but should it be defined in relation to my bandwidth rate? Thanks in advance, Curtis Gagliardi

2 2

Re: [tor-relays] running multiple bridges on one machine?
by teor 29 Apr '15

29 Apr '15

> On 29 Apr 2015, at 22:00 , tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > > Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:45:44 +0200 > From: yl <tor(a)yl.ms> > > Am 28.04.2015 um 03:30 schrieb syndikal: >> let's begin: is it possible to run 5 bridges on one low-end VPS? each >> bridge would be hosted on a different IP address from five different /24 >> IP blocks, so that's not an issue. would i have to use multiple Tor >> processes, and would 5 processes be too much for a 2-core VPS with >> 256mb memory? >> >> also, how much bandwidth does a bridge normally burn through per month? >> on said VPS, the economical choice is to provide 200gb bandwidth per >> month. if that is not sufficient, the offer isn't financially feasible. > > I run a tor relay on some Atom processor, the bottleneck is the missing > AES-NI I think, however on 100MBit/s it only makes 35MBit/s with one CPU > core being loaded 100% and the other 3 at ~10%. My relay makes a few > TB/month like that, so I guess it is still good to keep it running. yl, have you tried running a second tor instance on another pair of ports? (onion / directory) The second instance would be able to use another of the processors on your multiprocessor machine. (Unfortunately, tor multithreading only offloads some of the work.) There is currently a limit of two instances per IP address, but if you have 2 IP addresses, you could potentially run 4 instances, one instance per processor. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

1 0

running multiple bridges on one machine?
by syndikal 28 Apr '15

28 Apr '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 hello relay operators! i've asked this question on IRC once or twice, but it seems the right people aren't online/active when i am. i think i might be able to get a better audience to answer my questions here on the mailing lists. let's begin: is it possible to run 5 bridges on one low-end VPS? each bridge would be hosted on a different IP address from five different /24 IP blocks, so that's not an issue. would i have to use multiple Tor processes, and would 5 processes be too much for a 2-core VPS with 256mb memory? also, how much bandwidth does a bridge normally burn through per month? on said VPS, the economical choice is to provide 200gb bandwidth per month. if that is not sufficient, the offer isn't financially feasible. thanks for all you do! - -- @syndikal A9FF 2FE3 A171 FE53 AEC3 A0F9 72B5 44E0 4417 11B2 twitter.com/syndikal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVPuKmAAoJEHK1ROBEFxGyfUQP/irH1HzKPCe+t9TFSMignsRq oX5tK6YfInQ7vmfdhpPyHodM6DneeC1uBVdY6+qyJ6g3Ef5JXblSua+2zqJe8mlI rlwL9ll+i4tYSquqpaht3dWU1xY/UoqnlwCSO8+xaCz0zYBmOafib1MHI8nCDblp Y1PXMVWs3nhaXP/ev8JS3y8HuVeVy03lRF8pAaxKJmFI5YZJpNqHO/gVXTwU0O6M OrlqPT/YPmN/cD00TrnT5k+dVEHIPzEt7vK20NlUfCTS7vLOZync+jwRBYPzS6es fFq7C/gTP3oxyx6RIGLXpHEtKmvUwQeC89GKrgrDfb0EynX7bZ+jcvzXBCq5TPFz rgz19ogAbDZ167FshkVhMc+twfhkaq1FN2ADIHF7iIFLd6z93Img3IVMk+i2nijy lb4CtfHFqhJKSxuAfUYVFHx5GnC2u37gOCKdF+ZOCtpOAyP7ozrSwVYLY+OjsPf2 7F9dq22x8QxOdSccyK4lrmyl0SZpliMDCIoJk4IvJT2elqStntwH/Ecur2I48mWv UvPcwUEbsUhZg/u3xDkuvhB5zcVYB01gqbFSr8N7nYgMgx9Ww7lVVMmj+2ADQS9e ttOHmck50ewjz/EVN/xbWcemdGyiNl1M0aPyoysWgn/8TZ12TLhAL1jgJxOJFE99 7K8kTak9an5FOf+RbpY6 =eeGb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Cloud/AWS relay set up but no Tor installed
by aredocilla＠gmail.com 28 Apr '15

28 Apr '15

Hi there, After a long month of not having time for this, I've got it working thanks to Sina's help. I've attached patches to the ec2-prep.sh script that should make it work again (nothing extensive, basically just what Sina pointed out plus something about ExtORPort I saw it complaining about in the log. Bridge is now up. :) Best wishes, allicoder On Sun, Mar 22, 2015 at 10:51:42AM +0000, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: IPv6 HiddenServicePort (teor) > 2. Tor Cloud/AWS relay set up but no Tor installed > (aredocilla(a)gmail.com) > 3. Re: Tor Cloud/AWS relay set up but no Tor installed (SiNA Rabbani) > 4. Tor-Tshirts (Nchinda Nchinda) > 5. Re: Tor-Tshirts (Roger Dingledine) > > Message: 2 > Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 03:10:53 +0000 > From: aredocilla(a)gmail.com > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: [tor-relays] Tor Cloud/AWS relay set up but no Tor installed > Message-ID: <20150322031053.GB5948@MadHatter> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Hello, > > I've been trying to set up a tor relay on AWS using the free tier using the > instructions in various places (e.g. https://cloud.torproject.org/, > https://www.fak3r.com/2012/08/11/howto-run-a-tor-node-in-the-cloud-for-free/) > But sshing in from my PC shows clearly that not only is tor not running, it's > not even installed! > > ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-207:~$ aptitude show tor > Package: tor > State: not installed > Version: 0.2.5.11-1~precise+1 > Priority: optional > Section: net > ... > > ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-207:~$ ps -ely | grep tor > ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-207:~$ ls /var/log > alternatives.log auth.log btmp dist-upgrade dmesg.0 dmesg.2.gz fsck landscape mail.err news udev unattended-upgrades wtmp > apt boot.log cloud-init.log dmesg dmesg.1.gz dpkg.log kern.log lastlog mail.log syslog ufw.log upstart > > Has something changed, and the images no longer include tor on start-up (I made > sure I followed the gist of the cloud.torproject.org steps, given that the > interface has changed significantly; even went to the previous page from the > linked one to check that the AMI thing mentioned tor)? I've noticed various > people have posted online saying it's not safe to run Tor on cloud services - > has the image been deleted because of this? I wanted to try it anyway because > the main torproject website still says in several places that running a relay > on AWS is A Good Thing. > > Or did I just do something wrong? > > Best wishes, > allicoder. > > -- > PGP key available on request > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 04:52:34 +0000 (UTC) > From: SiNA Rabbani <sina(a)redteam.net> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Tor Cloud/AWS relay set up but no Tor > installed > Message-ID: > <1101716784.98280.1426999954497.JavaMail.zimbra(a)redteam.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > Hi allicoder, > > The images on Tor Cloud website have not been updated for a while. The project is lacking someone > that can keep it up to date. I tried to take on the responsibility but so far I have failed to dedicate > the necessary time. Sorry for the bad experience. > > As far as the specific problem with the Cloud image itself, there is a script that is supposed to install the relay > on first boot. See /etc/rc.local. > > You can also find that script here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-cloud.git/plain/ec2-prep.sh > > There are a couple of issues with the script itself that I noticed immediately: > 1) the harcoded pgp key is expired > 2) the debian experimental repository is returning a 404 > W: Failed to fetch http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/experimental-precise/main/bi… 404 Not Found [IP: 38.229.72.16 80] > > If you wish to do some trouble-shooting, try to get these commands to run without any errors: > sudo apt-get -y update > sudo apt-get -y upgrade > sudo bash /etc/ec2-prep.sh bridge > > Finally, now that you have a running image and ssh access, you can just follow the Tor relay installations here: > https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en > > I apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for running a relay. > > All the best, > Sina > > > > > "Be the change that you wish to see in the world." - Mahatma Gandhi > > ----- On Mar 21, 2015, at 11:10 PM, aredocilla(a)gmail.com wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > I've been trying to set up a tor relay on AWS using the free tier using the > > instructions in various places (e.g. https://cloud.torproject.org/, > > https://www.fak3r.com/2012/08/11/howto-run-a-tor-node-in-the-cloud-for-free/) > > But sshing in from my PC shows clearly that not only is tor not running, it's > > not even installed! > > > > ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-207:~$ aptitude show tor > > Package: tor > > State: not installed > > Version: 0.2.5.11-1~precise+1 > > Priority: optional > > Section: net > > ... > > > > ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-207:~$ ps -ely | grep tor > > ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-207:~$ ls /var/log > > alternatives.log auth.log btmp dist-upgrade dmesg.0 dmesg.2.gz > > fsck landscape mail.err news udev unattended-upgrades wtmp > > apt boot.log cloud-init.log dmesg dmesg.1.gz dpkg.log > > kern.log lastlog mail.log syslog ufw.log upstart > > > > Has something changed, and the images no longer include tor on start-up (I made > > sure I followed the gist of the cloud.torproject.org steps, given that the > > interface has changed significantly; even went to the previous page from the > > linked one to check that the AMI thing mentioned tor)? I've noticed various > > people have posted online saying it's not safe to run Tor on cloud services - > > has the image been deleted because of this? I wanted to try it anyway because > > the main torproject website still says in several places that running a relay > > on AWS is A Good Thing. > > > > Or did I just do something wrong? > > > > Best wishes, > > allicoder. > > > > -- > > PGP key available on request > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > ------------------------------ > > End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 50, Issue 31 > ****************************************** -- PGP key available on request

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Installing obfs4 on Raspberry Pi bridge
by jchase 25 Apr '15

25 Apr '15

Hello, Thanks, everyone, for all the help. Obfs4proxy is up and running on a Pi2. Although the information on the subject is scattered across several issues on this list, I hope others can use it to build some bridges! http://www.zipplet.co.uk/index.php/content/raspberrypi_golang was a useful page on getting go 1.2 or higher installed on a Pi2. Thanks again, J Chase > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 20:42:42 +0000 > From: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Installing obfs4 on Raspberry Pi bridge > Message-ID: <20150423204242.65bed2f9(a)schwanenlied.me> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > On Thu, 23 Apr 2015 19:53:55 +0000 > jchase <jchase(a)riseup.net> wrote: >> Hello, >> When I run >> >> $ go get git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git/obfs4proxy >> $ sudo cp $GOPATH/bin/obfs4proxy /usr/local/bin >> >> on a laptop running linuxmint/ubuntu it produces a nice binary >> executable. Unfortunately it doesn't work to copy it to the Pi2, >> because it's not an ARM binary. >> When I run the same script on the Pi2 I get the following error >> messages: >> >> go get git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git/obfs4proxy >> # git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git/common/ntor >> /usr/lib/go/src/pkg/git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfs4.git/common/ntor/ntor.go:272: >> undefined: sha256.Sum256 >> >> [snip] >> >> Any idea how I can get it cleanly on a Pi2? > > This is covered in the README.md: >> * Go 1.2.0 or later. Prior versions of Go (Eg: 1.0.2) are missing >> certain important parts of the runtime library like a SHA256 >> implementation. > > Go 1.2 was released on December 1, 2013, so I'm not particularly > inclined to support older versions, especially since it means > re-implementing parts of the standard runtime library. > > Regards, >

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Subpoena received
by Tyler Durden 24 Apr '15

24 Apr '15

Hi I just wanted to let you know that Washington sent us a subpoena regarding one of our exit nodes in Romania. They want to know the real IP behind the Tor Network. I mailed them what Tor is and why I can't help them in identifying this person. Nevertheless I will give you the link to the full subpoena. Maybe you guys find it interesting. I will forward the subpoena to our lawyer as well. https://mega.co.nz/#!ilIjlZSb!-deirKharWaDtp_UMxhev58E14zeouyoWUbzxeWPvEQ Greetings -- Sam Grüneisen - President Frënn vun der Ënn A.S.B.L. enn.lu

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