- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Bridge node configurations and where to find them (semi quote)
by Alessandro Greco 30 Aug '24

30 Aug '24

Dear all, In the past, I set up a middle relay node, and today I am looking to experiment with configuring a Bridge node to support the Tor project and its community. Since this is a very sensitive task, I decided to reach out to you to ensure that the setup is correct and that the configuration does not pose any risks to users who connect. First, I will summarize the `torrc` configuration file (I have removed the ports as they differ from the standard ones): ``` BridgeRelay 1 ORPort <port> ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:<port> ExtORPort auto ExitPolicy reject *:* ``` I have set two limits on the connections: ``` BandwidthRate 300 MBytes # I want to determine how much bandwidth I can allocate without impacting my network usage. IPv4Only ``` As for the information settings, I have used the usual `ContactInfo` and `Nickname`. While reading the `torrc` documentation, I discovered the Sandbox feature, which is still in development. In this regard, I would like to ask whether using experimental features like this on Bridge nodes is advisable or not. Personally, I would find a feature like this very useful. Should an anti DDoS system be configured? I wanted to ask how I can further contribute to the Tor Project's research, as I have read that there are "Statistics" features that allow the collection of useful information for the developer community. I have two main questions about this: 1. Is it advisable to use experimental features or those that collect information on a Bridge node (assuming there is a difference between a Bridge, a Guard/Middle relay, and an Exit Node)? 2. If the answer to the first question is yes, what are all the features that I can include in the `torrc` file to passively support research within the Tor Project? Finally, I would like to ask what information should be kept confidential when managing a Bridge. For example, I know for sure that it is important to keep the IP address confidential to avoid the risk of being blacklisted, but are there any other pieces of information that need to be protected? To ensure that a Bridge node can be restarted on a different machine, which files need to be preserved? Are they the same as those for a standard relay (i.e., the private key), or are there additional files that need to be securely stored? Thank you for your support and guidance. Best regards, Aleff --- Browse my WebSite: aleff-gitlab.gitlab.io Use my PGP Public Key: pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x7CFCE404A2168C85 Join to support: - Free Software Foundation! (my.fsf.org/join?referrer=6202114) - Electronic Frontier Foundation! (eff.org) - Tor-Project (torproject.org) - Signal (signal.org)

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Request for Tor to support armhf architecture
by Landon 30 Aug '24

30 Aug '24

I am running a Raspberry Pi Raspbian OS (debian) mini computer. Tor software does not support this hardware without me having to compile it myself for my platform. Which I don't know how to do. My specific APT error message says this: N: Skipping acquire of configured file 'main/binary-armhf/Packages' as repository 'https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org bookworm InRelease' doesn't support architecture 'armhf' The Raspberry Pi is a perfect computer to run Tor because it has 8 GB RAM, is tiny, only uses a max of 25 watts of power and works great as a network server. Plus, I don't have to leave my big power hungry desktop computer on all the time to run Tor. Raspberry Pi info page: https://www.raspberrypi.com/products/raspberry-pi-5/ Landon

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a couple noob questions
by observatory123 27 Aug '24

27 Aug '24

Dear fellow relay operators, I've been hosting a tor relay on a VPS (strato) for a couple days now. I've never done this before, so I have a couple of questions: - Is it normal for my relay to only use up only about 2 MB/s after nearly 5 days of uptime despite bandwidth speed tests done with speedtest-cli generally reporting significantly higher bandwidth? - Is it normal for my relay to advertise 7.37 MiB/s on its relay search page despite bandwidth speed tests done with speedtest-cli generally reporting significantly higher bandwidth? - Do I have to mark somewhere that I'm hosting the tor relay on a VPS (which means technically a company also has control over the relay)? - Is this mailing list a good place to ask these questions? Or am I reaching too many people by doing this? When I say I performed a bandwidth test, I mean I performed a bandwidth test with the speedtest-cli debian package. The test generally tells me I have about 217 MB/s download speed and 113 MB/s upload speed. The nickname of my relay is observatory123 and its fingerprint is: 45431BF8AB66C673942C1E344BB520625CE5F817 Kind regards, observatory123

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Re: [tor-relays] [network-health] help metrics torpoject
by George Hartley 21 Aug '24

21 Aug '24

Hi, don't worry, a relay will be removed from metrics 7 days after you shut it down. Sincerely, George On Sunday, August 18th, 2024 at 8:49 AM, kop kop <a5654505(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Good afternoon. how can I delete an entry in https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/134 > about fargo node? > I didn’t think twice and deployed this relay from my home network and now I’m afraid of persecution from the authorities. I ask for help.

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Re: [tor-relays] DDOS alerts from my provider
by eff_03675549＠posteo.se 20 Aug '24

20 Aug '24

Hi Rafo, My apologies for the late reply in your request for the code on banning tor exits into *GUARDS or middle-relays* * * * * rm ../../etc/cron.d/updateSSHkey echo "0 0 * * * root wget -P /root/scriptsremote/ https://check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist" > ../../etc/cron.d/blacklistTORexits echo "1 1 * * * root sed 's/^/-A ufw-before-input -s /; s/$/ -j DROP/' /root/scriptsremote/torbulkexitlist" >> ../../etc/cron.d/blacklistTORexits echo "2 1 * * * root sed -i '/# End required lines/r /root/scriptsremote/torbulkexitlist' /etc/ufw/before.rules" >> ../../etc/cron.d/blacklistTORexits echo "3 1 * * * root rm /root/scriptsremote/torbulkexitlist" >> ../../etc/cron.d/blacklistTORexits apt install -y fail2ban rm ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf touch ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "[sshd]" > ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "enabled = true" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "port = 11218" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "filter = sshd" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "logpath = /var/log/auth.log" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "maxretry = 5" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "bantime = 24h" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "bantime.increment = true" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "bantime.factor = 24" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf echo "bantime.maxtime = 52w" >> ../../etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd.conf Here I hope this is well received, Carlos. On 7/10/24 1:19 AM, god-gave-you-mouth-ears-eyes-so-enjoy(a)posteo.net wrote: > > Hi Rafo, > > > I have a pre-defined fail2ban (jail) script that does all the job of > banning any tor-EXIT -dynamically updated via cron- from attempting > access when this helps. > > This is meant for Debian, > > the synthax could do with fedora (perhaps a few code adaptation). > > let me know when this is of interest. > > > Carlos. > > On 7/8/24 7:34 PM, Rafo (r4fo.com) via tor-relays wrote: >> Hi, >> I have been running a relay for a few months now without any >> problems. But this week I’ve received 2 DDoS alerts from my provider >> (Netcup), both are ~3 gigabits. They seem to be coming from other Tor >> relays. >> I’m running an Invidious like instance on my server (which uses >> around 600 megabits) but I have a 2.5 gigabit port. So I configured >> my Tor relay to use 300-400 megabits. >> I’m not sure where that 3 gigabit of data comes from. >> I have lowered my advertised bandwidth to 100 megabits, would that be >> enough to prevent these kind of issues? >> >> >> Kind regards, >> Rafo >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > -- > Updated every second week. > > -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- > > xjMEZfy9NxYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAManzdqpnuQkafKwGP49famHD40TRuz3tlk2S > 6x9w7afNP0d1c3QgT09ITlRFUiA8Z29kLWdhdmUteW91LW1vdXRoLWVhcnMtZXll > cy1zby1lbmpveUBwb3N0ZW8ubmV0PsKPBBMWCAA3FiEEEAD7hg5vFuAk80AxAZJk > LcbaZlUFAmX8vTcFCQATxoACGwMECwkIBwUVCAkKCwUWAgMBAAAKCRABkmQtxtpm > VRErAQDPkO6rew8L0fv+YkObGBGL58dxZtWbELZqDjICDi5A6QD/QC4978BycOFq > ZAx/N9ihgNLRm6Sg1EUupAoaVMcDVA7OOARl/L04EgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdA0Xrh > XPXwikKTr7amFdFv57VCWtansLWJCnYqFAVWYmADAQgHwn4EGBYIACYWIQQQAPuG > Dm8W4CTzQDEBkmQtxtpmVQUCZfy9OAUJABPGgAIbDAAKCRABkmQtxtpmVfxdAQDL > TRwNnIeZ//Y4kahWP+WWS7qb6EmM1mCtjRc3IadSDgD+Nh1xGFt00AQtG+oMKF/J > GwnLbMda6bMdvCIXN+U1LQw= > =z8PX > -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- PGP updated every second week : please actualize our communication every time.

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DMARC helps prevent Tor-exit from being abused for email SPAM.
by boldsuck 20 Aug '24

20 Aug '24

Hi @all, I thought DMARC was unimportant for a small domain, but I played around with it a few days ago. There are some DMARC monitor sites that you can use for free & I was surprised when I saw that in 2-3 days about 1500 emails were sent via my exit subdomains. Then I set DKIM and SPF to strict adkim=s; aspf=s; and DMARC subdomain policy to reject sp=reject; Since then, emails about Tor-exits have dropped to 0 ;-) -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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DDOS alerts from my provider
by Rafo (r4fo.com) 20 Aug '24

20 Aug '24

Hi,I have been running a relay for a few months now without any problems. But this week I’ve received 2 DDoS alerts from my provider (Netcup), both are ~3 gigabits. They seem to be coming from other Tor relays.I’m running an Invidious like instance on my server (which uses around 600 megabits) but I have a 2.5 gigabit port. So I configured my Tor relay to use 300-400 megabits.I’m not sure where that 3 gigabit of data comes from.I have lowered my advertised bandwidth to 100 megabits, would that be enough to prevent these kind of issues?Kind regards,Rafo

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An Internet backbone blocklisted my Tor server!
by Landon 20 Aug '24

20 Aug '24

TL;DR... Write down your Tor server's GATEWAY IP address. if your server goes offline, try tracerouting to your Tor server's gateway IP address as well as your Tor server's IP address! You might be surprised by what you see! And also install MTR... It is helpful!! Here's the detailed explanation on how you can perform MTR command on your computer and server https://support.gcore.com/hc/en-us/articles/19864311353105-How-to-run-MTR-o… Okay, here is what happened... Late last night I tried to log into my VPS where I am running my Tor bridge server. I was unable to connect. It seemed like my server was offline so I filed a ticket with my service provider which is GCore Labs ( https://hosting.gcorelabs.com/ ) (I've been running my Tor bridge on their server for 4 years.) However, I discovered that my server was not actually down. I was able to login to my server using VNC in the control panel. I did some network diagnostics to diagnose my network connectivity problem. Even though my server was running, it was essentially offline. I could not ping or traceroute from my server to 8.8.8.8 or 1.1.1.1. It looked like there was a network outage. I used some looking glass servers to see what was going on as well. Here was what I discovered... From the Internet, I could ping and traceroute my VPS server's gateway (which is one hop away from my server) but if I tried to ping or traceroute using my server's actual IP address then this is where it stopped working. The culprit was Cogent Communications' routers! [AS174] As soon as packets destined for my server's IP address reached Cogent's routers, they were dropped!! However, packets destined for my server's gateway went through! >From what I understand, my server's gateway is the physical machine running my VPS. How can a packet reach my server's gateway, but not reach my server? It's not like the packet was not making it from my gateway to my server. The packets were being dropped at the edge of Cogent's network [AS174]. I also ran a traceroute on Cogents own looking glass server ( https://cogentco.com/en/looking-glass ) and when I used my server's IP, it showed nothing but when I used my gateway IP it worked! Tell me how that is possible if Cogent was not blocking my server's IP address? I sent Cogent an email asking why they were blocking my server's IP address in their routers. By the time they got back to me, my server was back online and was not being blocked. They sent me an email saying that packets going to my server were routing through their network, which by that time they were. What is so interesting about my Tor server that a major network backbone blocks my IP? If you look at my Tor server's usage graphs, you can see where it is periodically offline. Look at the 6 month graph for the average number of connected clients and you will see places where it is not online. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/4A0B065DB3CF807C6910DFEF6D9C… I bet the reason that my server periodically goes offline is because it is being blocked and not because it is actually offline! Have you ever had this happen to your server? Landon

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Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Fwd: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes
by George Hartley 19 Aug '24

19 Aug '24

Hello, > Similar to Briar, even developers of such clients above tell the loss of messages and low reliability of the hidden to hidden path. Some of you might know, that there were use cases with missing messages in a range of 35-45 %. Sorry, but this is just not the case from my experience - it may take a while to fetch the descriptor of the hidden service, but once a TCP connection is established, aka. the ACK packet has been received, there should be no problems with packet-loss, this is one of the core features of TCP: Retransmission on various conditions. I also hosted a hidden IRC server, as well as a Tor hidden service on my grandmothers laptop, to be able to SSH in through Tor and troubleshoot problems. Experienced no packet loss, unless a relay in the circuit suddenly went offline. If you want, I can measure packet loss from various locations (Northern Europe, East Europe, and New York, USA). Also, to improve latency and throughput, you could make the server a one hop hidden server by enabling: > HiddenServiceSingleHopMode This way the looking up the server is faster, but clients remain anonymous using a normal 3-hop circuit. I don't think we need extra code for this, you could just build your app using the programming language of your desire and use the existing network. That's what I was doing with my ~200 user IRC server, and it worked fine, even while being hosted at home at a limited uplink of 15 Mbps, which now got upgraded to 30 Mbps. Unfortunately fiber is not an option, so we have to rely on 60+ years old copper wires maintained by Telecom, I have a quite fancy industrial router with modem software and capabilities, and we still use VDSL2 17a G.Vector (ITU G.993.5). I do however own a virtual machine machine on my friends colocated server at DataWagon, they are very exit friendly, zero abuse so far, I believe they just redirect abuse mails to /dev/null or something.. lol. Anyway, point is that I never encountered packet loss, and even if, the protocol would compensate for it. This became kind of a rant while I'm at work, so if it's not that useful, Im sorry. Regards, George On Wednesday, August 14th, 2024 at 9:12 AM, Sam <alleestrasse100(a)gmail.com> wrote: > System wrote via Tor Project <noreply(a)forum.torproject.org>: > ============================================================ > > Feedback: Please submit the proposal also to tor-dev: tor-dev Info Page > ======================================================================= > > Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes > > ============================================================================================================================================= > > https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1e4te8m/introducing_discussing_reflec… > > ============================================================================================ > > > > ======================== > > ============================================================== > ============================================================== > > Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | Tor & Echo | Adding Entry-Relays as Reflec-Tor to Exit-Nodes > ============================================================================================================================================ > > > > Tor-Messaging: Introducing & Discussing "Reflec-Tor"s as concept | Exit-Relay as Entry-Relay | > > Hello, > > I think this belongs to this core, general, relay topic-forum, as it is also a development & community issue, request and efford, I post it here into the reddit forum for your core discussion: > > The idea is to add next to Bridges, Relays and Exit-Nodes also "Entry-Nodes" as "Reflec-Tor"(s) to the point of Exit-Nodes. Hence: Exit-Nodes are developed futher to be also an Entry-Node. > > Some may remember when gnutella got hybrid with edonkey and then also with torrent, Mike Stokes from Shareaza did that. > > The idea today, 20 years later, is to add some Echo-capabilities to Tor in regard of the servers for Exit and Entry. > > Vision: Every (updated) Exit-Node is an Echo-Server - For a better Tor-Messaging. > > What does that mean? > > An Echo-Server is a server for chat-messaging to send an incomming message packet again out to all connected clients at the moment. Ping-in and Ping-Out to all. That simple, that's why it is called the Echo. Like a shout in front of a forrest, all connected users can hear and get the (encrypted) shout or message or packet back from the tree wall. > > There are 3 software applications for Echo-Servers: > > - https://github.com/textbrowser/spot-on (Desktop, sercer in the Listener Tab) > > - https://github.com/textbrowser/smokestack (java for Android) > > - https://github.com/textbrowser/spot-on-lite (headless deamon for Linux) > > > Now, the Listener function with ping in and ping out should be implemented within a Tor-Exit-Node. > > When it comes to Tor-Messaging, there are some pathes possible: > > `A) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Tor - Internet - Echo-Server - Internet - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (Tor-proxied Chat-Server, which only accepts encrypted packets)` > > `B) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Echo - Tor - Tor - Echo - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (Echo Tor-tunneled)` > > `C) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Echo-Server - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob (direct connection to Echo-Server with only encypted packets)` > > The request here is to build and develop option A. > > That is just right now also possible, by an Exit-Node of Tor running the Echo-Server-Software on the same machine in parallel. Just the port is different. > > This is an idea for some might be new, but thinking Tor Messaging a bit, it comes quickly to this ideas and better soluttion. > > The way to connect > > `D) Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Hidden Onion Server v3 - Tor - Tor - Hidden Onion Server v3 - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob` > > is the current given way for clientes like RicoChet Refresh, Quiet or Cwtch. > > Similar to Briar, even developers of such clients above tell the loss of messages and low reliability of the hidden to hidden path. Some of you might know, that there were use cases with missing messages in a range of 35-45 %. Don't quote me on that, but as core developers and community members you might be in contact with those who experience this. > > Furthermore the Messaging clients are not advanced in functionality, nor advanced in strong encryption. > > It would be third a long development way to got that route. > > It is cost effective and needs cappable developers. > > Some project have stamped on and made a workable client, but does that unite all our power in the sense of Tor-Messaging? > > Messaging needs a Vision and Statement from the Tor-Core-Developer team with a discussion in the community in that regard with honor to the individual projects and also with support for their chosen path (Model D). At the same time we have to state that it is as it is, a HTTP-Server in the middle like in Model A is faster than Model D. > > In the graph-path the Echo-Server in the middle handles only encrypted traffic, so it is just like another Relay. We can call it "Reflec-Tor". The only sense it to multiply incomming encrypted packets from one node to all connected nodes. > > With that Idea, the Messenger Spot-On could be used as a Tor-Messenger. > > This Messenger has stong encryption and is full of feature for messaging and also cryptography. > > it is like adding Firefox to Tor-Browsing, when Spot-On is added to Tor-Messaging. > > Something to read at the community forum: > > https://www.reddit.com/r/Spot_On_Encryption/ > > Also there is a Mobile Client for Android, which also connects to Reflec-Tors, find "Smoke" Messenger at F-Droid.org. > > Please, get this right, it is not about a technical view on slow and failing chat-packets to hidden servers, and it is not about those start-up clients using this inside technology, some do a good project. It is about the idea, that an Reflec-Tor mirroring and pinging back packets on the Exit-Node this hop within the path of tor is not outside, it is always fully encryted for the messaging packets and should be seen as one Tor-Path, especially if the Listener-Ping-Back function (the Echo capabilities) is build in the Exit-Node-Tor Software. > > Spot-On is already a Tor-Messenger - as it uses also HTTPs and it sends only encrypted packets. > > A test is easy to make: > > `(1) Start the Tor-Browser, which has always the Port 9051 to Tor, Tor is running.` > > `Next to Surfing with Tor-Browser Firefox the Chat with Tor-Messenger Spot-On can start.` > > `(2) Start Spot-On on a webserver and create in the Listeners Tab a Listener on Port 4710.` > > `(3) Start two Spot-On Instances Alice and Bob on two Laptops, in the Neighbors Tab you connect the Webserver via Tor: Add the IP and Port 4710 to the neighbor and choose Proxy:` 127.0.0.1 `Port 4710.` > > You get the the Path: > > `Tor-Chat-Client-Alice - Tor - Internet - Echo-Server - Internet - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Bob` > > The idea is now to integrate this a bit more: > > `Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Alice - Tor - [Tor-Exit-Node also Reflec-Tor (Echo-Server)] - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Bob` > > You see, the way stays all within the Tor-Family. > > For sure, in case Alice does not want to use Tor, she also can message to Bob, who is behind Tor. > > `Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Alice --> [Tor-Exit-Node as Entry-Node also Reflec-Tor (Echo-Server)] - Tor - Tor-Chat-Client-Spot-On-Bob` > > The IP of an Entry-Node is shown in the Tor-Browser and can get a port added. Then two user can simply cata over that node. > > We need in times of surveillance, data retention, chat control and for sake of the needs of whistleblowser and people who want to chat privat and anonymously more decentral and open source chat server. > > The mission is: Every Tor-Exit Node is an Entry-Node for Chat. > > It should be not a lot of code to be added to the ports of an Exit-Node and displaying the Port of the Exit-Node in the Tor-Browser path icon. > > This makes sense in several effects to be discussed and developed further: > > - Taking the next Development Step for Tor-Messaging: BTW, A Forum about Tor-Messaging could be made as a category here in the forum please. > > - directly support Tor-based Messaging for the Spot-On Messaging client > > > To be developed and discussed is, if this infra-structure could help to > > - support bootstrapping of Tor > > - support Censorship circumvention of Tor Reflec-Tors as SnowFlakes over the Messenger with EPKS > > - Accept, that some routing to an HTTPS internet server at the Tor-Node is faster than to an hidden onion server at the Tor Node. > > > Well, to add some "ping-in-and-out" for an packet is what every netcat and socat under linux can do. It is a small development step to make each Tor-Exit node a free chat server for messaging, which is a big step for mankind to have a network of free messaging chat servers. > > Lets also see, how users and community will test and develop this messaging. So it is not only a discussion for developers, it is also a step forward the needs of the communities for a free internet: > > - for chat and their discussions. > > > A few code lines to exit nodes make them a Reflec-Tor and messaging over Tor can start really decentral and open source and free. > > What do you think? does this privacy-concept bring more privacy and reliability in packet delivery to messaging with Tor? > > Regards

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Question on bridge hibernation
by Keifer Bly 18 Aug '24

18 Aug '24

Hi, So for my bridge at https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/4D6E3CA2110FC36D3106C86940A1… Is set to hibernate once it reaches a certain traffic level (this is to prevent massive charges to my VPS). Now that is in hibernation, when will it start again, and how would this effect how it's distributed? Are bridges that are hibernating removed from relay search? Mew to hibernation, thanks. May 14 18:49:39.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. May 14 18:49:39.000 [warn] You are running Tor as root. You don't need to, and you probably shouldn't. May 14 18:49:39.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting May 14 18:49:47.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default" May 14 18:49:47.000 [notice] Registered server transport 'obfs4' at '[::]:8081' May 14 18:49:48.000 [notice] Bandwidth soft limit reached; commencing hibernation. No new connections will be accepted May 14 18:49:48.000 [notice] Going dormant. Blowing away remaining connections. May 14 18:49:48.000 [notice] Delaying directory fetches: We are hibernating or shutting down. --Keifer

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