September 2012 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Roger Dingledine 09 Jan '13

09 Jan '13

For a few years now, funders have been asking if they can pay Tor to run more relays. I kept telling them their money was better spent on code and design improvements: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-slow https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Tor/Performance since a) network load would just grow to fill whatever new capacity we have, especially if we don't deal with the tiny fraction of users who do bulk downloads, and b) reducing diversity of relay operator control can harm anonymity. But lately the Tor network has become noticeably faster, and I think it has a lot to do with the growing amount of excess relay capacity relative to network load: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2010-06-0… At the same time, much of our performance improvement comes from better load balancing -- that is, concentrating traffic on the relays that can handle it better. The result though is a direct tradeoff with relay diversity: on today's network, clients choose one of the fastest 5 exit relays around 25-30% of the time, and 80% of their choices come from a pool of 40-50 relays. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443 Since extra capacity is clearly good for performance, and since we're not doing particularly well at diversity with the current approach, we're going to try an experiment: we'll connect funding to exit relay operators so they can run bigger and/or better exit relays. If we do it right (make more faster exit relays that aren't the current biggest ones, so there are more to choose from), we will improve the network's diversity as well as being able to handle more users. We've lined up our first funder (BBG, aka http://www.voanews.com/) and they're excited to have us start as soon as we can. They want to sponsor 125+ fast exits. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Open questions we need to decide about: 1) What exactly would we pay for? I think the right way to do it is to offer to reimburse bandwidth/hosting costs -- I don't want to get into the business of paying people to run relays, and I don't want people to be trying to figure out how to "profit". That leads to all sorts of horrible incentive structures. More broadly, we should keep in mind that the primary cost of running an exit relay is effort, not dollars: it takes dedication to find an ISP who will host it, and to hold that ISP's hand when an abuse complaint arrives. Or said another way, hosting costs are in many cases not the biggest barrier to running an exit relay. I think we should aim to constrain ourselves to talking about >=100mbit exits, assuming that turns out to give us enough choices. That said, we don't want to concentrate bandwidth too much in any given relay, so we should limit the amount we'll reimburse per relay. 2) Should we fund existing relays or new ones? The worst failure mode here would be that we screw up the current community of relay operators. That's why it's extra important to keep them involved at each step of this discussion. I think the right answer is probably a balance of reimbursing costs from current exits and encouraging new exits to appear. Before we can get more precise though, we need to get a handle on how many current fast exits there are, and what their constraints are (whether their hosting situation could give them more bandwidth, whether they're paying now or getting a deal through a friend/employer, etc). Even then, there are interesting further questions like: - Should we prefer big collectives like torservers, noisetor, CCC, dfri.se, and riseup (which can get great bulk rates on bandwidth and are big enough to have relationships with local lawyers and ISPs), or should we prefer individuals since they maximize our operator diversity? I think "explore both approaches" is a fine first plan. - For existing relays who pay for hosting, should we prefer that our money go to covering their existing costs (and then we encourage them to save their money for use, say, after this experiment finishes), or should we aim to add additional funding so the relay can use more bandwidth? I'd say it comes down to the preferences of the relay operator. That said, if we have plenty to choose from, we should pick the relays that will make the network grow -- but we should take extra care to avoid situations where operators in the first category say "well, fine" and shut down their relay. More generally, we need to consider sustainability. Our current exit relay funding is for a period of 12 months, and while there's reason to think we will find continued support, the Tor network must not end up addicted to external funding. So long as everybody is running an exit relay because they want to save the world, I think we should be fine. 4) What exactly do we mean by diversity? There's network diversity (AS / upstream network topology), organization and operator diversity, jurisdictional (country) diversity, funding diversity, data-center diversity, and more. We've started to answer some of these questions at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6232 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-netw… but this research topic will need ongoing attention. I'd love to get to the point where our diversity metrics can recommend network locations that best improve the various diversity scores. 5) How much "should" an exit relay cost? Since we're aiming for diversity, we can't send all our volunteers to the same cut-rate German VPS provider. After all, much of the work in setting up an exit relay is finding a good provider that doesn't already host a bunch of Tor relays. But if we declare that we'll reimburse $50/month for 100mbit, we're going to attract a different set of volunteers -- and a different set of network locations -- than if we reimburse $100/month for 100mbit. We need to learn about current bandwidth pricing: I know there are 10 cheap hosting places that will tolerate exit relays, but are there 200? And do all of those 200 turn out to overlap diversity-wise? Initial guesses appreciated. I'm inclined toward the $100 number to give our volunteers more flexibility. If we want to reimburse on a monthly basis, how do we handle situations where the ISP wants a longer-term contract? I think the answer will come down to how many choices we have. 6) How exactly should we choose which exit relay operators to reimburse? It might be premature to speculate until we better understand what choices are available to us. But I think the answer must include doing it in a way that encourages continued growth of the relay operator _community_. People who are active in the Tor community, and well-known to many other people, should be part of the answer. At the same time, we should be willing to put some of the money into trying out new places and people, especially if they're in good locations diversity-wise. The broader answer is that we as a community need to figure out a good answer here. I definitely don't want it to be "Roger picks people in an opaque way". But I also don't want the answer to be "anybody on the Internet who offers to take our money". Maybe we should put together a consortium of current Tor activists who run fast exits? 7) How do we audit / track the sponsored relays? How should we check that your 100mbit relay is really working? What do we measure to confirm its capacity? To a first approximation I'm fine assuming that nobody is going to try to cheat (say, by colluding with an ISP to write legit-looking invoices but then just split the money). But as the plan scales, we need good ways to track statistics on how many relays are being sponsored and how much bandwidth they're providing (so funders can see how effective their money is), and what fraction of the overall network these sponsored relays are (to keep an eye on the diversity questions). 8) Legal questions? Tor exit relays raise plenty of legal questions already, especially when you consider jurisdiction variety. But reimbursing relays introduces even more excitement, such as: - Does such a relay operator end up in a different situation legally? - Does the overall Tor network change legal categories in some country, e.g. becoming a telecommunications service when it wasn't before? - Does The Tor Project Inc incur new liabilities for offering this money? Tor has a history of creating fascinating new challenges for legal scholars, and this exit relay funding experiment will be no exception. I believe if we position it correctly, we won't really change the legal context. But I encourage people to investigate these questions for their jurisdiction. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Next steps: I'm going to do a short blog post pointing to this thread, since many interested parties aren't on tor-relays yet. Then I'll send individual emails to exit relay operators pointing them to it and asking for their feedback (on the list or private, whichever they prefer). I'll also try to get some sense of how much their hosting costs, whether they'd want to participate in our experiment, whether they're in a position to ramp up to a faster connection, etc. Once we have some concrete facts about how many current exit relays want to participate, how many new volunteers want to help, and how many ISPs could handle more exit relays and at what prices, we'll be in a better position to decide how to proceed. --Roger

25 59

Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 20, Issue 24
by Mike Edwards 01 Oct '12

01 Oct '12

Hi, thanks all. It looks like the port forwarding is not working. I get the message below when I try the test suggested. I guess it must be something to do with the modem router and when I get a chance I'll try testing if I can get any incoming traffic - not sure how best to do this though...maybe set up an FTP server and try to access it! I'm also thinking of using a proxy. My friend suggested hidemyass.com any other suggestions would be really gratefully received. Thanks again, all really helpful replies. Cheers, M The requested resource could not be loaded. libcurl returned the error: couldn't connect to host

1 0

Directory Port Reachability Test Failed?
by Mike Edwards 29 Sep '12

29 Sep '12

Hi There, I have been keeping a causal eye on Tor for quite a few years now and have been getting more and more worried about the data/meta data that is being collected and the known and unknown micro and macro ways in which it can be used to harm/manipulate individuals, groups and societies. Anyway, last week I got a new Android phone and installed Orbot and then happened to watched the latest Juiced Media Rap News which prompted me to set up Tor on my Linux laptop. Since then I have (for the last few days) been trying to set up a Tor relay to help the community but haven't managed. I have read quite a few guides including the one on the TorProject site (https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay.html.en) I'm pretty stuck and hoping someone might be able to help? My hardware set up is: Boradband phone line into > modem router (no wireless and only 1 out going Ethernet port - I have tried login into this box but can't!) plugged in via Eithernet into > Netgear wireless router which communicates over wireless with my > Thinkpad laptop running Ubuntu 12.04 (see a photo my modem router and wireless router set-up here: http://flossnotes.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/tor-relay.html ) I have Tor set up as a relay as per the configuration guide (see screenshots of the "Sharing tab (everything else is default)*. I have set up port forwarding on the Netgear wireless router for ports 9001 and 9030 (see screenshot*). I have stopped my Laptops fire wall using Fire Starter. And, in desperation I have even set-up my laptops IP in the DMZ settings on the Netgear wireless router (see screenshot*) *photos and screen shots here: http://flossnotes.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/tor-relay.html Again in more detail... 1) I have Tor running and my internet traffic from Firefox is going through it. I know this because when I visit: https://check.torproject.org/ I'm met with the message "Congratulations. Your browser is configured to use Tor" and I get these messages in the Tor message log "[Fri Sep 28 14:22:32 2012] The Tor Software is Running - You are currently running version "0.2.3.22-rc (git-4a0c70a817797420)" of the Tor software." "[Fri Sep 28 14:23:28 2012] External IP Address Changed - Tor has determined your relay's public IP address is currently xx.xxx.xx.106. If that is not correct, please consider setting the 'Address' option in your relay's configuration." "[Fri Sep 28 14:23:38 2012] Connected to the Tor Network - We were able to successfully establish a connection to the Tor network. You can now configure your applications to use the Internet anonymously." 2) I have followed the configuring Tor relay guide and get these messages, "[Fri Sep 28 14:23:38 2012] Checking Server Port Reachability - Tor is trying to determine if your relay's server port is reachable from the Tor network by connecting to itself at xx.xxx.xx.106:9001. This test could take several minutes." "[Fri Sep 28 14:43:28 2012] Server Port Reachability Test Failed - Your relay's server port is not reachable by other Tor clients. This can happen if you are behind a router or firewall that requires you to set up port forwarding. If xx.xxx.xx.106:9001 is not your correct IP address and server port, please check your relay's configuration." (I get the same message for port 9030 - Directory) 3) I have configured my Netgear router to forward ports 9001 and 9030 asa per the instructions here: http://portforward.com/english/routers/port_forwarding/Dlink/DIR-655/ 4) I have stopped my laptops firewall. 5) On the Netgear router I have set up my laptops IP to sit outside of the firewall in the "DMZ" so as far as I understand, it should be exposed to all external requests! Sorry for such a long first post. I'm pretty frustrated! Any help would be much appreciated. Cheers, Mike

3 2

Re: [tor-relays] Directory Port Reachability Test Failed?
by eliaz 28 Sep '12

28 Sep '12

This link may be relevant: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6979 It relates to what seems to be the same problem, occurring on the latest version (ver .39, TBB for windows). - eli On 9/28/2012 12:48 PM, Mike Edwards wrote: [snip] > "[Fri Sep 28 14:23:28 2012] External IP Address Changed - Tor has > determined your relay's public IP address is currently xx.xxx.xx.106. If > that is not correct, please consider setting the 'Address' option in > your relay's configuration." [snip] > 2) I have followed the configuring Tor relay guide and get these messages, > > "[Fri Sep 28 14:23:38 2012] Checking Server Port Reachability - Tor is > trying to determine if your relay's server port is reachable from the > Tor network by connecting to itself at xx.xxx.xx.106:9001. This test > could take several minutes." > > "[Fri Sep 28 14:43:28 2012] Server Port Reachability Test Failed - Your > relay's server port is not reachable by other Tor clients. This can > happen if you are behind a router or firewall that requires you to set > up port forwarding. If xx.xxx.xx.106:9001 is not your correct IP address > and server port, please check your relay's configuration." > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [snip]

1 0

about setting up a tor exit node
by esolve esolve 27 Sep '12

27 Sep '12

Hi, I installed tor browser bundle and I want to use vidalia to set up a tor exit node with my computer. However, I have problem in port forwarding, my computer is inside an institute, and I'm not clear about the firewall setting. Is there any method for me to check the firewall setting and make a hole on it? thanks!

2 3

Re: [tor-relays] some questions
by eliaz 26 Sep '12

26 Sep '12

I can't answer your questions, but to help with problems I've been having, can you say which version of the TBB you're running, & on what OS? - eli On 9/24/2012 1:37 PM, esolve esolve wrote: > Hi, all: > > I'm newbee here. I have some questions: > > I'm using tor with vidallia as a TOR client and I use > wireshark/tcpdump to capture the packets, I notice that in vidalia, when > I select "view the network" and in the "connection status" window, I can > see many hosts, I think they are entry nodes which my tor client is > connecting to, so it means there are many circuits established for my > tor client. But the Tor web browser shows that my ip address appears to > be 80.237.226.73, so this is the only exit nodes. So how can I know > which entry node (or circuit) I'm actually using with this exit node? > > The tcp stream between the tor client and the entry node should be > TLS-encrypted, but when I open a web page, I noticed that the stream is > actually TCP not TLS, is there anything wrong? > > > > Beisides, I want to use my computer as an exit node and I use > vidalia to enable it, however, I noticed on the "connection status" > window that many nodes failed to connect to my computer, are there > anything that should be taken care of in setting up an exit node? > > thanks! > > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > -- gpg: 0x3E346824

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Bridge relay: conversing with the message log
by eliaz 26 Sep '12

26 Sep '12

Well, I'm glad I didn't listen. TBB ver 0.2.2.39 gave me a hell of a time before a recognizable bug msg came thru in the log. Had to roll back to ver .38 in order to get the bridge reliably online again. - eli On 9/22/2012 7:57 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 08:25:05AM -0400, eliaz wrote: >> Despite these info lines Tor finally claims success. Does this mean >> that I can ignore the previous info lines? Or are they telling me that >> I have to do something? As far as I can tell my bridge is working fine. > > Tor logs at log-level notice by default for a reason -- we don't expect > you to look at, or understand, info or debug logs. > > Or said another way, if Tor isn't complaining to you with notice, warn, > or err messages, you can assume everything is going smoothly. > > See also > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#Whatloglevelshould… > > --Roger > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > -- gpg: 0x3E346824

1 0

some questions
by esolve esolve 24 Sep '12

24 Sep '12

Hi, all: I'm newbee here. I have some questions: I'm using tor with vidallia as a TOR client and I use wireshark/tcpdump to capture the packets, I notice that in vidalia, when I select "view the network" and in the "connection status" window, I can see many hosts, I think they are entry nodes which my tor client is connecting to, so it means there are many circuits established for my tor client. But the Tor web browser shows that my ip address appears to be 80.237.226.73, so this is the only exit nodes. So how can I know which entry node (or circuit) I'm actually using with this exit node? The tcp stream between the tor client and the entry node should be TLS-encrypted, but when I open a web page, I noticed that the stream is actually TCP not TLS, is there anything wrong? Beisides, I want to use my computer as an exit node and I use vidalia to enable it, however, I noticed on the "connection status" window that many nodes failed to connect to my computer, are there anything that should be taken care of in setting up an exit node? thanks!

1 0

Tor Weather Statistics
by tagnaq 23 Sep '12

23 Sep '12

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi Torproject, would you mind publishing a few Tor Weather statistics? (I assume publishing this information is safe) How many relays have at least one Tor Weather subscription? How many subscriptions did tick the checkbox for: 'Email me when the router's Tor version is out of date'? How many 'Node Out of Date!' emails did you send out today? :) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iF4EAREKAAYFAlBfZgsACgkQyM26BSNOM7ZmgwD8CEj9H64NF0lePd+Cr65ECcLW 1CvFTbZau/m/3m7Ef9kA/3S+cGJfcS6xPtHcNZbnRa9FC8QXlP6P9QAgkhXhny2b =3lHr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

'critical' security update: Tor 0.2.2.39
by tagnaq 23 Sep '12

23 Sep '12

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 It is quite sad that one has to find out about 'critical' security updates [0] via an unrelated thread on tor-talk [1] or the blog [2] instead of getting an announcement on tor-announce [3] - where relay operators are probably expecting such information. Are tor versions 0.2.3.x and 0.2.4.x affected too? [0] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/release-0.2.2:/ReleaseNotes https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6811 [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-September/025525.html [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-bundles-security-release [3] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iF4EAREKAAYFAlBUV7cACgkQyM26BSNOM7ZeyAEArFSwM5Z0fhtXV6q7pdK9CqXV coEuuHUFrm6gjzkQ+p8A/2z2e+x4sYuJzKhlvFKnwCURw93FSqWEt5MCFRpkd6rV =FkRi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 3