- ooni-talk - lists.torproject.org

OONI at Cryptorave 2017
by Vasilis 25 Apr '17

25 Apr '17

Hello, Together with Coding rights we are going to have a session about OONI and also host a LATAM (Latin America) specific workshop in order to improve the test-lists (https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists) from different countries at this year's Cryptorave (https://cryptorave.org/) You are more than welcome to join us and bring your comments in real or virtually! The original submission (in Portuguese): ### *Listatona OONI contra a censura na web* *Abstract:*A Coding Rights, em parceria com o Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) / Tor Project, vai promover um encontro para expandirmos juntes a lista de sites a serem testados no Brasil e em outros países da Latinoamérica pelas sondas do OONI, que detectam censura, manipulação de tráfego e sinais de vigilância. Se puder, traga seu computador com o Navegador Tor instalado! *Description:* O Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI, "Observatório Aberto de Interferência na Rede" <https://ooni.torproject.org/>) é um projeto de software livre dentro do Tor Project que busca detectar censura na Internet, manipulação de tráfego e sinais de vigilância ao redor do mundo através da coleta e do processamento de medições na rede. Desde o fim de 2012, o OONI coletou milhões de medidas de rede em mais de 90 países ao redor do mundo, jogando luz em múltiplos casos de interferência na rede. Graças ao projeto OONI temos dados abertos <https://ooni.torproject.org/data/> que mostram (inclusive em uma interface de mapa-mundi <https://explorer.ooni.torproject.org/>) quais páginas estão bloqueadas em um determinado país. Ao escrever essa descrição, por exemplo, a Noruega bloqueia 4 sites relacionados à bittorrent e troca de arquivos, enquanto a China bloqueia dezenas dos sites testados (como avaaz.org, archive.org, savetibet.org e google.com) Com "sondas" fazendo testes diários no Brasil e uma lista de websites abrangente, o OONI torna possível saber em menos de 24h se algum deles vier a ser bloqueado e ter dados concretos para demonstrar o problema e investigá-lo a fundo, além de montar um registro histórico que pode ser usado por jornalistas e pesquisadores(as). Uma parte importante de identificar a censura é determinar /quais/sites testar. As sondas do OONI espalhadas pelo mundo usam listas mantida pelo Citizen Lab, um laboratório multidisciplinar baseado na Universidade de Toronto. As listas permitem às sondas testarem tanto sites de escopo global (facebook.com, google.com, tumblr.com, mozilla.org...) quanto de escopo do país onde a sonda se encontra. A lista é mantida em um repositório git e é aberta a colaborações de quaisquer grupos e organizações interessada em complementá-las, sendo usada não só pelo OONI como por outros projetos de detecção e medição de censura e outros "controles de informação". A atividade será conduzida por Lucas Teixeira, da Coding Rights, e Vasilis Ververis, membro do OONI e desenvolvedor do Lepidopter, distribuição GNU/Linux que permite usar facilmente Raspberry Pis como sondas para o OONI. METODOLOGIA Vasilis fará uma breve introdução ao OONI. Dividiremos então as pessoas participantes em grupos, primeiro por país e em seguida pelas 31 categorias já definidas pelo Citizen Lab para as URLs <https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/00-LEGEND-new_ca…>. A depender do número de pessoas, cada grupo pode pegar N categorias. Buscaremos equilíbrio de gênero dentro dos grupos. Em seguida, cada grupo preparará seu ambiente de pesquisa em um ou mais computadores: - Navegador: para conduzir a pesquisa em motores de busca e abrir os sites para inspecioná-los, o Navegador Tor deve ser usado, especialmente para categorias mais sensíveis (como "Terrorismo e Militantes" ou "Discurso de Ódio"). Para sites menos controversos, por motivos de velocidade ou pelo fato de alguns websites bloquearem ou dificultarem o acesso a usuáries do Tor, um perfil limpo em modo incognito/privado do Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome ou outro navegador atual também poderá ser usado. - Dados: um documento colaborativo hospedado em um EtherCalc (ideal) ou em um Etherpad (software mais estável) vai reunir as categorias, já estruturadas o mais próximo possível do formato final (planilha CSV) que os dados devem ter para que a contribuição seja enviada. Uma vez pronto o ambiente, os grupos passarão a pesquisar e coletar URLs de sites em sua categoria, sempre garantindo que cada URL adicionada na lista está exatamente como aparece em um navegador comum. Se o site se apresenta como HTTPS, então a versão em HTTPS deve estar incluída. Se o site inclui "www" no domínio, também deve constar, etc. Devemos buscar a maior diversidade possível nas URLs para garantir que o viés dos testes seja o mais limitado possível. Assim, dentro de cada categoria devemos buscar URLs que representem o melhor possível toda a gama de websites dentro dela, seja por questões ideológicas, tecnológicas, socioeconômicas, de gênero, etc. Vamos buscar orientar e lembrar os grupos de não se embrenharem muito em cada parte do espectro de sites de uma categoria, como por exemplo encher a categoria "Religião" de sites cristãos evangélicos em detrimento de sites católicos, umbandistas, budistas, ateus e outros. Dito isto, é importante garantir que sites que podem ajudar a contar histórias e montar narrativas interessantes estejam incluídos na lista. É mais útil, por exemplo, otimizar o processo para incluir os sites de grupos de minorias e de dissidentes políticos do que, digamos, pornografia ou jogos de azar. Se um desses últimos for bloqueado, não temos histórias tão interessantes pra contar, mas se sites de minorias forem bloqueados por exemplo há muitas organizações da imprensa e da sociedade civil que gostariam de contar essa história. É claro que é importante incluir sites de pornografia e de jogos de azar também -- porque eles são mais prováveis de serem bloqueados e podem nos ajudar a detectar bloqueios em outros sites -- mas vamos priorizar outras mais relacionadas com direitos humanos e civis. A 20-30minutos do final da atividade, vamos consolidar todas as contribuições dos diferentes grupos e categorias em uma única contribuição coletiva, em nome da CryptoRave 2017, para o repositório git <https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists>. Também faremos um teste local com as contribuições para podermos ver como a sonda conduz os testes sem ter que esperar o ciclo diário de testes das sondas OONI. ### ~Vasilis -- Fingerprint: 8FD5 CF5F 39FC 03EB B382 7470 5FBF 70B1 D126 0162 Pubkey: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5FBF70B1D1260162

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OONI community meeting tomorrow, 25th April
by Maria Xynou 24 Apr '17

24 Apr '17

Hello! The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us *tomorrow, 25th April 2017 at 16:00 UTC, for our monthly **community meeting**.* We'd love to hear your thoughts and suggestions on how to improve research on internet censorship! Please join us on *https://slack.openobservatory.org* and add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us tomorrow, please feel encouraged to join us on slack any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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False positives how to correct?
by Stijn Jonker 23 Apr '17

23 Apr '17

Hi Talk & Operator lists, First of all apologies for cross posting, I would assume this better firsts the operators list; however that seems such a low volume list, I thought maybe talk would be better. When the ooniprobe app was released for IOS I decided to run it, but the manual triggering made my participation somewhat low. However despite no RPM's being available, I decided to add ooniprobe to my Tor relay as well. It was a little tricky getting it to work with the Tor running. But now I'm faced with some false positives on the reports and no clear way where to look or check for fixes as they are not actually blocked or filtered. For the Tor check itself I get: "Evidence of possible censorship / Tor version 0.2.9.10 appears to be blocked." But when I check the Tor "tcp connect" then it's about 50% hit / miss ratio. Even the normal "Web connectivity" fails for https://mail.yahoo.com but when I'm checking manually; > [root@tornode ~]# curl https://mail.yahoo.com > <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> It seems just fine. Maybe it's all due to the fact I'm not running ooniprobe as root but as an unprivileged user. This kind of brings me to the next thing. Documentation, I have found the wiki, tickets on Tor's Trac and Issues on github, but it's not clear to me where to find more documentation. The installation guide on the ooni portal doesn't mention whether one should be running as root, or actually suggests not to. Please advice. Thanks, Stijn Info about platform: - Centos7 X86_64 - No NAT, Dualstack IPv4/IPv6 - Runs Tor as Relay version 0.2.9.10 - Ooniprobe 2.2.0 installed via pip install github.com/<..>/master.zip - Ooniprobe (and Tor) run each as unprivileged users (other accounts) - Host performs no other tasks/functions - IPtables active, rule based on user: allow all outbound - No oddities in messages,secure,audit etc. - Not sure how to get usefull bits out of measurements.njson; -- happy to be pointed at someplace. As maybe this has where things go wrong.

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Reminder for weekly OONI IRC meeting: Monday 2017-04-10, 16:00 UTC in #ooni
by Vasilis 10 Apr '17

10 Apr '17

Hello everyone, This is a reminder for today's weekly OONI IRC meeting. It will happen as usual on the #ooni IRC channel (irc.oftc.net) at 16:00 UTC. Meeting times around the world: https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?iso=20170410T16 In case that you have no IRC client you can join via the web from: https://kiwiirc.com/client/irc.oftc.net/ooni Everybody is welcome to join us and bring their questions and feedback. Please use the meeting agenda pad if you want to propose any topics: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-irc-pad You can always find previous meeting logs at: http://meetbot.debian.net/ooni/ ~Vasilis -- Fingerprint: 8FD5 CF5F 39FC 03EB B382 7470 5FBF 70B1 D126 0162 Pubkey: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5FBF70B1D1260162

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ooniprobe 2.2.0 is out!
by Arturo Filastò 05 Apr '17

05 Apr '17

Hello Oonitarians! We are excited to announce the release of the latest version of ooniprobe! Some of the features that are part of this new release include: * Major improvements to the web user interface * Support Spanish, French, Italian, English and Hindi * Addition of a new Instant Messaging test for Telegram * Progress indicator for ongoing measurements You can find the full changelog here: https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe/releases/tag/v2.2.0 Currently the 2.2.0 can be found in pypi and installed with pip by running: $ pip install ooniprobe We are also in the process of updating homebrew and debian packages and we will let you know when those are out with instructions on how to upgrade. Happy probing! ~ Arturo

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Report: The State of Internet Censorship in Myanmar
by Maria Xynou 29 Mar '17

29 Mar '17

Hi, Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), in collaboration with Sinar Project and Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO), published a report on *The State of Internet Censorship in Myanmar*. You can read our report here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/myanmar-report/ As part of our study, OONI software tests were run across 6 local vantage points in Myanmar between 25th October 2016 and 28th February 2017. These tests are designed to measure: - Blocking of websites; - Blocking of Whatsapp and Facebook Messenger; - Blocking of Tor; - Presence of middle boxes (i.e. systems that could be responsible for censorship or surveillance). Upon analysis of thousands of network measurements, we did not detect any block pages that could confirm any cases of internet censorship. Five sites, however, including those of the U.S. embassy in Myanmar and of the Organization of American States (OAS) presented signs of TCP/IP and HTTP blocking. While OONI software tests detected the presence of Blue Coat software (some types of which can potentially be used for internet censorship and surveillance) in Myanmar back in 2012, we did not detect the presence of this software in any of the 6 networks where tests were performed. On another positive note, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and the Tor Network were found to be accessible in all 6 networks in Myanmar throughout the testing period. Please contact us with any questions or feedback you may have. All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Examining internet shutdowns through public data sources
by Maria Xynou 28 Mar '17

28 Mar '17

Hi, Today we (the OONI team) released a post which explains our methodology when examining internet blackouts through public data sources. You can find the post here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/examining-internet-blackouts/ This also includes an ipython network which shows how to automatically analyze Google traffic data with the aim of identifying internet blackouts. We hope you find this useful! Please contact us with any questions or suggestions you may have (while bearing in mind that we're attending RightsCon this week and may be slow in replies). All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Reminder: OONI community meeting tomorrow
by Maria Xynou 20 Mar '17

20 Mar '17

Hello, I am sending this email as a reminder that *tomorrow, 21st March*, we will be having the *OONI community meeting* at *12:00 UTC* on *https://slack.openobservatory.org*. We hope you can join us for a discussion around internet censorship! Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting in the following pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Looking forward to connecting with you tomorrow! ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: The State of Internet Censorship in Thailand
by Maria Xynou 20 Mar '17

20 Mar '17

Hello, Today, in collaboration with Sinar Project and the Thai Netizen Network, the OONI project published a research report on "*The State of Internet Censorship in Thailand*". You can view our joint report here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/ Over the last 4 months, ooniprobe was run across 16 local vantage points in Thailand, through which we collected and analyzed thousands of network measurements with the aim of examining and uncovering recent censorship events in the country. Our study also includes an examination of Thailand's legal environment and network landscape. The key findings of our study *confirm the blocking of 13 websites* in Thailand across 6 different ISPs, including the following types of sites: - *News outlets* (*nypost.com* and *dailymail.co.uk*) - *wikileaks.org* - *Circumvention tool sites* (such as hotspotshield.com) - Pornography Thai ISPs appear to primarily be implementing censorship through *DNS hijacking* and through the use of *middle boxes* (HTTP transparent proxies) which serve block pages. Since sites were not found to be blocked across all networks, /Thai ISPs appear to be blocking websites at their own discretion. // /On a positive note, the Tor network, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger were found to be accessible across all 16 networks in Thailand where tests were run during the testing period (6th November 2016 - 27th February 2017). Given the limited transparency around information controls in Thailand and their potential for abuse, we encourage public debate based on the findings of this study. Finally, we thank the OTF and Access Now for funding this research. We also thank all the anonymous and brave volunteers in Thailand who have run and continue to run ooniprobe, thus making this research possible. Please contact us with any questions you may have! Feedback is always welcome. ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI community meeting
by Maria Xynou 16 Mar '17

16 Mar '17

Hello! The OONI team warmly welcomes all those interested in censorship research to join us for a *community meeting next Tuesday, 21st March 2017 at 12:00 UTC*. We'd love to hear your thoughts and suggestions on how to improve research on internet censorship! Please join us on *https://slack.openobservatory.org* and add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on slack any other day! We are around everyday and happy to engage in discussions with you. :) Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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