- ooni-talk - lists.torproject.org

New tests included in OONI Probe mobile apps
by Maria Xynou 16 Jan '18

16 Jan '18

Hello Oonitarians, The latest release of the OONI Probe mobile apps includes 3 new tests: 1. WhatsApp test: https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/whatsapp/ 2. Facebook Messenger test: https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/facebook-messenger/ 3. Telegram test: https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/telegram/ These tests are designed to measure the blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Telegram. They were already included in the desktop versions of OONI Probe (Linux and macOS), but now they have also been integrated in the mobile versions as well (Android and iOS). This means that you can easily run these tests with the tap of a button (literally) via the OONI Probe mobile apps! WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are frequently blocked in many countries around the world, while Telegram was recently blocked in Iran. By running these tests, you can collect network measurement data showing which ISPs block these apps, how, when, and where. If you're an Android user, consider enabling the "Run tests automatically" option in the settings for automatic daily testing. You can install the OONI Probe mobile apps via the following links: * Android: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.openobservatory.ooniprobe * iOS: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/id1199566366 Happy to address any questions. Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI in 2018
by Maria Xynou 09 Jan '18

09 Jan '18

Hello friends, Happy new year! Wish you all the very best for 2018 (and all the other years to come). As the end of 2017 approached, we published a blog post summarizing some OONI highlights from 2017: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-in-2017/ Many of these things wouldn't have been possible without the measurements you collect, the test lists you review, the research reports you contribute to, the feedback you provide, and your tireless community engagement efforts. So on behalf of the OONI team, I would like to warmly THANK YOU all for everything! We have exciting things coming up for 2018 and we hope to collaborate with you on them. These are listed in the aforementioned blog post, and include: 1. *New OONI Probe desktop apps for Windows and macOS:* Our aim is to build desktop apps <https://ooni.torproject.org/post/writing-a-modern-cross-platform-desktop-ap…> that are as easy to install and use as popular software, enabling more communities to engage with censorship measurement research. 2. *Censorship Alert System:* We aim aim to disseminate timely alerts of emergent censorship events around the world through the analysis of OONI data. 3. *Internet Blackout Monitoring methodology:* We’ll be creating a methodology <https://ooni.torproject.org/post/examining-internet-blackouts/> for automatically detecting and examining internet blackouts (i.e. when the internet as a whole is rendered inaccessible), supporting #KeepItOn <https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/> and other advocacy efforts. 4. *OONI Probe Orchestration System (OPOS):* Dynamically instrumenting <https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-spec/blob/master/opos/OONI-Probe-Orch…> the collection of OONI Probe measurements from around the world, particularly in response to emergent censorship events. 5. *Revamped OONI Explorer:* We’ll be revamping OONI Explorer <https://explorer.ooni.torproject.org/world/> to improve upon its design and usability, enable the export of CSV files, and to present the top censorship findings per country based on OONI data (which will automatically be updated on an ongoing basis). 6. *Revamped mobile apps:* We’ll be revamping the OONI Probe mobile apps <https://ooni.torproject.org/install/> to improve upon their design and usability, and to include more tests. 7. *Revamped OONI website:* We’ll also be revamping the OONI website <https://ooni.torproject.org/> to improve upon its design and usability and to include more content pages. 8. *Research reports:* We’re eager to work with you to publish more research reports on internet censorship. We'll be reaching out to you for specific feedback and involvement, but for now, I just wanted to share a brief overview. Feedback is always appreciated, and happy to address any questions you may have. Looking forward to an exciting year! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Iran Protests: OONI data confirms censorship events
by Maria Xynou 05 Jan '18

05 Jan '18

Hi, OONI just published a report on the analysis of network measurements collected from (7 networks in) Iran over the last week, confirming the blocking of Telegram, Instagram, and Facebook Messenger. This report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/2018-iran-protests/ OONI data shows that Iranian ISPs started blocking access to Telegram and Instagram on 31st December 2017 by means of DNS and TCP blocking. Irancell (AS44244) however only started blocking access to these services on 2nd January 2018. Facebook Messenger was already blocked (by means of DNS tampering), independently from the recent protests. We previously reported on the blocking of Facebook Messenger in our last Iran report: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/ OONI data shows that WhatsApp is accessible in all tested networks in Iran. Tor Metrics show a spike in Tor usage in Iran on 31st December 2017 (most likely in response to the blocking of Telegram and Instagram), but a sudden drop thereafter, indicating an increased blocking of the Tor network. OONI data corroborates Tor Metrics and suggests that Iranian ISPs started throttling access to the Tor network on 31st December. Some ISPs started blocking access to the Tor network on 1st January. But the Tor network appeared to be blocked in all networks (where measurements were collected) in Iran on 2nd January 2018. To circumvent the censorship, we recommend the use of obfs4 bridges (particularly since bridge reachability tests show that they work). We will continue to monitor the situation. If you're interested in reproducing these findings in Iran, you can do so by running OONI Probe: https://ooni.torproject.org/install/ All network measurement data is made publicly available: https://ooni.torproject.org/data/ All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Riesgos: Lo que debes saber antes de ejecutar OONI Probe
by Maria Xynou 13 Dec '17

13 Dec '17

Hello, As you probably already know, OONI Probe is a tool for investigations and may therefore pose some potential risks (depending on your threat model, where you run the software, which tests you run, what you test, etc.). Information about these potential risks is available through our documentation here: https://ooni.torproject.org/about/risks/ Today, thanks to the translation provided by Derechos Digitales, we published the Spanish translation of this documentation: https://ooni.torproject.org/es/about/risks/ All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI at LAVITS and Primavera Hacker
by Maria Xynou 12 Dec '17

12 Dec '17

Hello again :) Earlier this month OONI was presented at two conferences in Chile: LAVITS and Primavera Hacker. Find the slides, and learn all about it here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooni-lavits-phacker-2017/ Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Updated test list documentation
by Maria Xynou 12 Dec '17

12 Dec '17

Hello Oonitarians, Today we published an updated version of our test list documentation, which is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/ As censorship findings are only as interesting as the sites you test, contributing to test lists (i.e. machine-readable CSV files containing URLs tested for censorship) on an ongoing basis is important. Knowing which sites are commonly accessed and likely to be blocked in a country (in light of its political environment) requires local knowledge, which is precisely why test lists are publicly available on GitHub, encouraging community contributions. We hope that you will find the updated test list documentation useful. Happy to address any questions you may have. All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: How Pakistan blocked news outlets, social media sites, and IM apps amidst protests
by Maria Xynou 29 Nov '17

29 Nov '17

Hello Oonitarians, Today, in collaboration with Bytes for All Pakistan, we published a research study titled "How Pakistan blocked news outlets, social media sites, and IM apps amidst protests". Our study is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/how-pakistan-blocked-social-media/ and http://content.bytesforall.pk/node/224 Last weekend, a number of social media sites and news outlets were reportedly blocked in Pakistan during Islamist protests. Through the collection and analysis of OONI network measurements from Pakistan, we confirmed the DNS-based blocking of: * 14 news websites * Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram * Facebook Messenger, Telegram, WhatsApp's web interface (web.whatsapp.com) All of these censorship events were temporarily implemented last weekend (25th & 26th November), and no longer seem to be in place (at least in the networks where tests were/are run). This highlights the need to monitor internet censorship on an ongoing basis around the world. In our previous study with Bytes for All (https://ooni.torproject.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/) Pakistani ISPs appeared to be applying "smart filters", selectively blocking the HTTP versions of certain Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter webpages, rather than blocking access to entire domains. Last weekend, however, these sites were blocked entirely. This is also the first time that we have collected technical evidence on the censorship of news websites in Pakistan. In addition to network measurement findings, our report also include censorship circumvention advice and information on how to reproduce this study (in Pakistan or elsewhere). Thanks for reading! ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI community meeting, tomorrow 28th November
by Maria Xynou 27 Nov '17

27 Nov '17

Hello Oonitarians! The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us**for our *monthly **community meeting tomorrow**, Tuesday 28th November 2017, at 14:00 UTC.* We'd love to hear your thoughts and suggestions on how we can improve our tools and research methodologies. Please join us tomorrow on *https://slack.openobservatory.org* and add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on slack any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Tor meetup at Primavera hacker (Santiago de Chile) [es/en/pt]
by Vasilis 24 Nov '17

24 Nov '17

[ES][EN][PT]¡Encuentro Tor en la Primavera Hacker! ¡Ven! ======================================================== [ES] ¡Encuentro Tor en la Primavera Hacker! ¡Ven! [EN] Tor Meetup at Primavera Hacker! Join us! [PT] Encontro Tor na Primavera Hacker! Venha! [ES] ¡Encuentro Tor en la Primavera Hacker! ¡Ven! ------------------------------------------------- ¡Hola! La Primavera Hacker está por llegar. Durante los días 2 y 3 de diciembre, hackers, activistas, tecnólogos, feministas y demás fauna se darán cita en Santiago de Chile. Esta es una invitación para todos los interesadas e interesados en colaborar con la comunidad Tor. Tor es software libre, estructurado alrededor de una red de servidores mantenidos por voluntarias y voluntarios a lo largo del globo para proteger el anonimato en línea y evadir la censura en Internet. Durante los dos días, miembros de la comunidad Tor estarán presentes en la Primavera Hacker con agenda abierta, dispuestos a conversar, intercambiar experiencias, aprender y enseñar respecto a las tecnologías contra la vigilancia y, principalmente, discutir sobre cómo colaborar con Tor. Tendremos también una mesa llena de stickers y regalitos de Tor Encuentro Tor ------------- La red Tor está compuesta por más de 6 mil computadoras alrededor del mundo. Sin embargo, América Latina tiene una participación muy pequeña. Actualmente en Chile hay solamente 2 nodos en funcionamiento. En Brasil, apenas 25. ¡Necesitamos aumentar la diversidad de la red más allá de los Estados Unidos y Europa! Ven y participa del Encuentro Tor, y aprende como ser parte de la comunidad. Durante los dos días del festival, nuestra idea es cubrir los siguientes temas: - Como funciona Tor, por qué Tor tiene problemas con los VPNs y con los servicios proxy de un salto (1-hop) - Install fest: ¡Instala Tor Browser y Orbot con nosotros! - Como colaborar con la traducción de la documentación al castellano. - Como instalar, configurar y administrar su nodo de Tor. - Como ser voluntario más allá de mantener nodos. - Como usar OONI para detectar la censura en redes. - Como usar herramientas como onion-share. - Tor en universidades y buenas prácticas de investigación. - Tor y la ley, ajustar la legislación sobre Tor en Latinoamérica. - Mejorar la metodología de pruebas para OONI -- Listas de URLs de prueba (https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/) - OONI y bloqueos: Cómo analizar los datos de OONI (https://api.ooni.lo) Si no puedes llegar al encuentro, puedes hablar por el canal: IRC: irc.oftc.net #tor-south Por la lista de correo: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/global-south/ Y el Wiki (Trac) para la documentación, eventos y otras cosas: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Proje… Primavera Hacker: https://phacker.org - http://u5ed42u6sbzq7xzs.onion Un abrazo, =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- [EN] Tor Meetup at Primavera Hacker! Join us! Hi! Primavera Hacker (Hacker Spring) is coming. During December 2 and 3, hackers, activists, technologists, feminists and related people will meet in Santiago de Chile. This is an invitation for all people interested in collaborating with the Tor community. Tor is free software, structured around a network of volunteer-run servers, spread all around the world to anonymity online and circumvent Internet censorship. During the two days of the meeting, Tor community members will be present at Primavera Hacker with an open schedule, eager to tealk, exchange experiences, learn and teach about technologies against surveillance and, mainly, discuss how to collaborate with Tor. We will also have a table full of stickers and other Tor swag Tor Meetup ---------- The Tor network is formed by over 6 thousand computers around the world. However, Latin America hosts a very small share of it. Nowadays, in Chile there are only 2 working servers. In Brasil, just 25. We need to increase the diversity of the network beyond the United States and Europe! Come and be a part of the Tor Meetup, and learn how to engage in the Tor community. During the two days of primavera hacker we will cover the following topics: - How does Tor work, why does Tor have problems with VPNs and 1-hop proxy services. - Install fest: Install Tor Browser and Orbot with us! - How to collaborate translating documentation into Spanish. - How to install, configure and administer your Tor relay. - How to use OONI to detect network censorship. - How to use tools such as onion-share. - Tor for universities and good research practices. - Tor and the law, adjust legislation about Tor in Latin America. - Improve the OONI testing methodology -- List of test URLs (https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/) - OONI and blocking: How to analyze OONI data (https://api.ooni.lo) If you cannot make it to the meeting, you can talk with the participants on the following channel: IRC: irc.oftc.net #tor-south On our mailing list: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/global-south/ And the Wiki (Trac) for documentation, events and other things: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Proje… Primavera Hacker: https://phacker.org - http://u5ed42u6sbzq7xzs.onion hugs, ==== Encontro Tor na Primavera Hacker! Venha! ======================================== Hola! A Primavera Hacker está chegando! Nos dias 2 e 3 de dezembro, hackers, ativistas, tecnologistas, feministas se encontrarão em Santiago, no Chile. Este é um convite para todos interessados e interessadas em colaborar com a comunidade Tor. O Tor é um software livre rodado por uma rede de servidores voluntários distribuída pelo mundo para garantir o anonimato online e contornar a censura na Internet. Durante os dois dias membros da comunidade Tor estarão presentes na Primavera Hacker com a agenda aberta para conversar, trocar experiências, aprender e ensinar as tecnologias anti vigilância e, principalmente, discutir sobre como colaborar com o Tor. Teremos uma mesa cheia de adesivos e brindes do Tor Encontro Tor ------------- A rede Tor é composta por mais de 6 mil computadores ao redor do mundo. No entanto, a América Latina tem uma participação muito pequena. Atualmente, no Chile há apenas 2 servidores em funcionamento. E no Brasil apenas 25. Nós precisamos aumentar a diversidade da rede além dos Estados Unidos e Europa! Venha participar do Encuentro Tor e saiba como se engajar na comunidade Tor. Durante os dois dias a nossa ideia é ensinar: - Como funciona o Tor, porque Tor, os problemas com as VPNs e serviços proxy de 1-hop. - Install fest: instale Tor browser & Orbot com a gente! - Como colaborar na tradução da documentação em ES/PT. - Como instalar, configurar e gerenciar o seu relay do Tor. - Como usar o OONI para detectar a censura na rede. - Como usar ferramentas como onion-share. - Como ser voluntário além da hospedagem de servidores. - Tor em universidades e boas práticas de pesquisa. - Tor e a lei: ajustar as leis para o Tor na América Latina. - OONI melhorar a metodologia testada -- listas de URL de testes (https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/) - OONI e bloqueios, como analisar OONI data (https://api.ooni.io) Se você não puder comparecer no Encontro, você pode falar com a gente por esse canal: IRC: irc.oftc.net #tor-south E pela lista de email: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/global-south/ E wiki (Trac) para documentacao, eventos e outras coisas: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Proje… Primavera Hacker: https://phacker.org - http://u5ed42u6sbzq7xzs.onion um abraço, -- ilv, gus, vasilis, gwolf

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New report: Identifying cases of DNS misconfiguration
by Maria Xynou 24 Nov '17

24 Nov '17

Hello Oonitarians, Sometimes what may look like DNS blocking may in fact be a case of DNS misconfiguration (which is not intentional censorship). Such cases were observed in Brazil with the help of Coding Rights, and through the analysis of OONI and RIPE network measurements. Today, OONI's Leonid and Vasilis published a new report examining cases of DNS misconfiguration, which is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/not-quite-network-censorship/ https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/934068462422577152 More specifically, this study draws upon the case of pernambuco.com, a Brazilian news outlet that has reportedly been inaccessible in many networks across Brazil. Following investigations, it was determined that this site was not blocked by means of DNS tampering but rather, inaccessible due to DNS misconfiguration. Similarly, many other international domains were found to be inaccessible for the same reason. OONI's latest study explains how to detect such cases, and offers advice on possible solutions, to improve the accessibility of sites around the world! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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