tor-relays

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4821 discussions

Config question
by r1610091651 11 Jan '21

11 Jan '21

Hi Recently upgraded to 4.4.6 and noticed new (for me) entry in tor logs: Jan 11 09:24:28.000 [notice] While bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: This message gets repeated every 6 hours, while there is little extra info added, as it relates to bootstrap / start-up process. I already have "AvoidDiskWrites 1" active in torrc. Is there a way to disable this extra logging? Thanks

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Some ContactInfo Spec Adoption Stats
by nusenu 06 Jan '21

06 Jan '21

Hi, it is great to see that just 2-3 months after publishing version 2 of the ContactInfo Information Sharing Spec [1] there are already over 100 tor relays (>10% exit probability) making use of it, to allow for automated verification of the url field in the ContactInfo. If you are still using version 1 of the spec I'd encourage you to update to version 2, which usually isn't a big effort. Due to the adoption I also started to add stats for it to OrNetStats, but since the proofs and ContactInfo strings are public, everyone can verify it: https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/#verified-operator-domains Currently it does only consider the well-known URI proofs (the DNS proof will also be added). It is also important to note that a verified domain does not say anything about the intentions of an operator, it just prevents things like [2] where a malicious entity claimed to be some other operator by using their ContactInfo without a good automated method to tell them appart, especially if MyFamily is not properly set. And it will also make things easier when tagging relays as "known" or "unknown" [3], since it allows tagging on an operator level instead of trying to figure out who the real operator behind each and every relay is, by using unverified ContactInfo claims manually. In the near future I'd like to make use of the data to generate operator level time series graphs and overall stacked graphs. If you would like to play with the ContactInfo strings yourself, here is an early parser: https://github.com/erans/torcontactinfoparser In the past we had a small error in the generator (field name "gpg:..." was used instead of "pgp:...") this has been fixed: https://torcontactinfogenerator.netlify.app/ kind regards, nusenu [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-October/019024.html [2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-October/019045.html [3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/metrics/relay-search/-/issues/40001 -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu

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consensus
by Felix 06 Jan '21

06 Jan '21

Hi https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health shows: Consensus was published 2021-01-06 05:00:00 UTC. Unusual Authorities: moria1 Consensus could not be retrieved dizum Consensus could not be retrieved gabelmoo Consensus could not be retrieved maatuska Consensus could not be retrieved faravahar Consensus could not be retrieved longclaw Consensus could not be retrieved bastet Consensus could not be retrieved When I try http://authorityip:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z it's 'failed: Operation timed out' What works is: http://relayip:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z Am I missing something and is everything good? A glitch? -- Cheers, Felix

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Exit node on Contabo
by Nuno Rego 05 Jan '21

05 Jan '21

> Short experience at Contabo. After 10 days, and after the first abuse complaint of. > > " > Dear Mr Rego, > > Thank you for your reply. > > Generally, it is not denied to use TOR nodes on our services. However, in case it cannot be ensured that those services will not be misused, we have to ask to remove the service from our network. We also included a rule in our terms of services, please see here: > > § 10 Limitation regarding content > > (5) The Provider reserves the right to immediately suspend of any server or webspace package on which any kind of proxy service, such as VPN or TOR, is operated, for which the Provider has knowledge of abuse or fraudulent or unlawful use. > > Please come back within given time frame (you still have 18 hours left) and confirm that you have removed the TOR node. After that we can close this abuse case. > > Thank you for your cooperation. > > If you have any questions or need help, please do not hesitate to contact us. > > -- > Best regards / Mit freundlichen Grüßen, > > Anneli Ulfig > Kundenservice / Customer support > > Contabo GmbH > Aschauer Straße 32a > 81549 München > https://contabo.com> " > > Cumprimentos; -- Securely sent with Tutanota. Get your own encrypted, ad-free mailbox: https://tutanota.com

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Info from my ISP about investigation of tor exits
by Olaf Grimm 03 Jan '21

03 Jan '21

Here is the original of mail (in copy) from my provider Mail copy: "Hello, Unfortunately your traffic type is full of unwanted events not compatible with our company ethic. Since the first date of activity we've received many abuse reports regarding bruteforce, layer7 attacks, hacking and many others. Currently there is a police investigation regarding one of the 2 servers related to hacking activity against an european country security. The access and content is in interpol custody and we have a restriction on reactivation. Kind regards, George Oprea 24/7 Technical Support Zetservers.com /Romania" --> My answer: Thank you for your information. Good luck. I change my other servers to less trouble. (Change Exits to Relay) Olaf

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Should I worry about sudden swings in connection numbers to my relay?
by torix＠protonmail.com 03 Jan '21

03 Jan '21

Dear List, One of my exits, which has been up for 6 months now with an average of 2000 to 4000 connections, since yesterday has been jumping up to 10,000, 8,000, then back to 3500 or so. My history is a simple test file of date and connection numbers taken every 5 minutes: Sun Jan 3 07:20:00 MSK 2021 3233 Sun Jan 3 07:25:00 MSK 2021 3342 Sun Jan 3 07:30:00 MSK 2021 9679 Sun Jan 3 07:35:00 MSK 2021 3455 Sun Jan 3 07:40:00 MSK 2021 6800 Sun Jan 3 07:45:00 MSK 2021 3402 Sun Jan 3 07:50:00 MSK 2021 3346 Sun Jan 3 07:55:00 MSK 2021 3355 Sun Jan 3 08:00:00 MSK 2021 3358 Sun Jan 3 08:05:00 MSK 2021 10067 Sun Jan 3 08:10:00 MSK 2021 3343 ----------------- TIA, --Torix Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Info from my ISP about investigation of tor exits - Update
by Olaf Grimm 03 Jan '21

03 Jan '21

Exit-IPs: Please block these Exits /Relays 89.34.27.149, active 89.34.27.43 , "supended" in panel, but active. Warning! 89.34.27.48, active 89.34.27.49, active (89.34.27.59 since some days terminated) (89.34.27.37 since some week terminated)

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event.reasons for ORStatus.CLOSED
by Toralf Förster 01 Jan '21

01 Jan '21

I wrote a small Pythons script [1] to catch the event.reasons for ORStatus.CLOSED. The output is something like this: orstatus.py --ctrlport 9051 DONE FAF3236D37B0B18D8438C46317940F642E296924 IOERROR 917A0A924DA50B46CD740924AB42B237A831E182 DONE DCEA2A6D8034E164A4FFDD8AFF997E2F6FB2ECF8 50.7.179.202 443 v4 0.4.4.5 IOERROR CDE4149F0DC65A7BE1AE440340BE1C7A18135E29 192.250.236.130 80 v4 0.4.4.6 DONE 24E2F139121D4394C54B5BCC368B3B411857C413 204.13.164.118 443 v4 0.4.4.6 DONE 24E2F139121D4394C54B5BCC368B3B411857C413 204.13.164.118 443 v4 0.4.4.6 IOERROR 8A51DC1ACBBC411E3B4D124F44A98F5ADC6A8984 IOERROR 57C799B990D61FB49E22E792670F5B28FE2E7FEA A stat over a day or so showed that the majority of systems have 0-10 IOERRORS whereas there're few dozen systems failing all the time and having 100x more IOERRORS in the same time frame. I do wonder however whether such a statistics is capable to give a senseful answer if a relay itself behaves well or not? [1] https://github.com/toralf/torutils/blob/master/orstatus.py -- Toralf

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attacks from problematic tor exit relays
by BRBfGWMz 31 Dec '20

31 Dec '20

I am trying to guess what kind of target attacks are possible through problematic relays. Suppose the network relay is controlled by the enemy. How do they determine the original IP address of the outbound traffic? Correlation attacks are possible, but they seem very difficult and probably require a lot of resources. Also, changing the route stops this. If I assume that they determine what traffic flow is mine, and that I always use the same route, what attacks are possible? Are there any good posts or videos? \-- Sent using MsgSafe.io's Free Plan Private, encrypted, online communication For everyone. https://www.msgsafe.io

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Relay operators meetup @ rC3
by Stefan Leibfarth 31 Dec '20

31 Dec '20

Hello Tor friends and relay operators, I haven't heard of a relay operators meetup at the ongoing rC3. Are there any plans? If not, who of you is interested? It would be my pleasure arrange a session. Please get back to me. Cheers Leibi

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