- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Abuse complaints about brute forceing via ssh
by Klaus Layer 02 Jan '12

02 Jan '12

Hi, within two days I received abuse complaints from my ISP that someone used my exit node to brute force ssh accounts of two different ISP. Unfortunately I am forced to block port 22 to avoid shutdown. Anyone else who suffered from such attacks these days? Regards, Klaus

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unplanned outage
by cmeclax-sazri 27 Dec '11

27 Dec '11

I have been off line since noon (17 UTC) Friday when a man with a backhoe cut the thicknet cable that connects me to the Internet. The repairmen just came and patched the cable and I am on line again. cmeclax

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Bandwidth Authority PID Feedback Experiment #2 Starting
by Mike Perry 22 Dec '11

22 Dec '11

Over Thanksgiving and into early this week, we ran an experiment to test a feedback mechanism to attempt to allocate usage of the Tor network such that the measured stream capacities through all relays became equal: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/blob/HEAD:/NetworkScanners/BwAuth… This experiment failed in 3 ways: 1. It drove many relays down to 0 utilization. Scott Bennett noted this in his post to tor-relays, and at least one 10Mbit relay operator also commented on the traffic drop-off of their node in #tor. 2. It only created one PID 'setpoint' for the entire network, even though different types of nodes see different load characteristics, and despite it being impossible to shift load from an Exit node to a Middle node, for example. 3. It kept allocating bandwidth to some relays (especially Middle and non-default-policy Exits) until they hit INT32_MAX in the consensus, and everything finally exploded. We then shut off the feedback by removing the consensus parameters. I've made five major changes to try to address these issues: 1. Don't perform multiple rounds of negative feedback for slow nodes. 2. We now group nodes by their flags into four categories (Guard, Middle, Exit, and Guard+Exit), and compute a different PID setpoint for each class. 2. Circuit failure now counts more. Circuit failure is our CPU overload signal, as nodes that hit CPU overload being dropping onionskins and failing extends. Instead of using the circuit success rate as a multiplier against the pid_error, we now actually compute a circ_error similar to the pid_error, and use it as the pid_error if it is more negative. We also now set FastFirstHopPK 0 to ensure that Guard nodes also get tested for circuit failure. 3. Raised the PID setpoint slightly, which should prevent us from piling quite so much weight onto fast relays. 5. Cap feedback via a consensus parameter. All of these changes are governed by consensus parameters. See: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/blob/HEAD:/NetworkScanners/BwAuth… for more details. The parameters governing feedback are bwauthnsbw=1 and bwauthti. So long as one or both of these are present and non-zero in the consensus parameter list, the feedback experiment is active. We'll probably be running this next experiment for about a week (or perhaps longer if it doesn't explode and seems to improve performance on https://metrics.torproject.org/performance.html) starting tonight or tomorrow. Please keep an eye on your relays and tell us if anything unexpected happens over the next week or so. Thanks! -- Mike Perry

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arm client locale stats on connection page
by Klaus Layer 20 Dec '11

20 Dec '11

Hi, I am using arm to monitor 3 tor nodes running on the same box. On the connection page I get very different results when pressing "c" to get the client locale stats: Node A - nothing happens Node B - the window with the client locale stats is displayed Node C - a message "Usage stats aren't available yet, press any key..." is displayed Under which conditions are the stats available? Regards, Klaus

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bandwidth authority test
by Softail 12 Dec '11

12 Dec '11

I'm also running a guard relay that for some months was pushing 600kBs pretty steadily. In the last couple weeks it's lower and very variable and today it has basically cratered. Is this a likely results of the bandwidth algorithm testing that's going on or might I have other problems? Thanks, Wayne -- A man in chains knows he should have acted sooner... Julian Assange

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ARM crashes on connection tor
by Klaus Layer 10 Dec '11

10 Dec '11

Hi, I am no longer able to connect with ARM to one of my relays. ARM crashes with the following error: debian-tor@host:/home/user$ arm -i 127.0.0.1:4711 Traceback (most recent call last): File "/usr/share/arm/TorCtl/TorCtl.py", line 710, in _loop isEvent, reply = self._read_reply() File "/usr/share/arm/TorCtl/TorCtl.py", line 885, in _read_reply raise ProtocolError("Badly formatted reply line: unknown type %r"%tp) ProtocolError: Badly formatted reply line: unknown type 'P' Terminated To another instance running on the same machine ARM connects without any problem. Has anyone experienced the same issue or knows how to fix it? Thanks, Klaus

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Logs full of "eventdns: All nameservers have failed"
by Klaus Layer 10 Dec '11

10 Dec '11

Hi, my logs are full of these messages: 05:54:07 [NOTICE] eventdns: Nameserver 127.0.0.1 is back up 05:54:07 [WARN] eventdns: All nameservers have failed At first I thought that the DNS of my ISP sucks, so I changed to Google Public DNS. But the warnings are still there. Google shows some older reports of this warning, where is was supposed to be an error in tor. Are there any news on this? I am wondering if the high bandwidth nodes from torservers and noisebridge also show this kind of messages and how they configured their nodes to get rid of it. For my node they come up every couple of minutes. Between fail and recover is always less than a second. Best regards, Klaus

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Significant relay usage drop down
by Klaus Layer 09 Dec '11

09 Dec '11

Hi, I am running two relays with the fingerprints D223399907113A1F216AAA64997BC1D4CFA8E1AC and 945CBBA599808018749DDC4EBB592168F2858C1B. For the first relay I am observing a significant usage drop down during the last 12 hours. The second runs as usual with a high throughput. I am wondering what the reason for this drop down could be. Are there any changes in the configuration of authorities? Is someone from the core TOR developers doing tests with the load distribution? Best regards, Klaus

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ISP thinks a relay is under attack from other relays
by Daniel Bryg 07 Dec '11

07 Dec '11

Hi, This is mostly just an interesting anecdote but there are also a few questions. Hetzner informed us (see below) about an attack on our relay (not an exit). It looks like it's just normal traffic from other relays so all is good, but the switch sees incoming activity almost 3x higher than what comes in on the server's interface (90Mbit/s, 13k packets/s). If most of packets are dropped, it must affect the performance of Tor connections. Is this because the Tor network is overwhelmed with traffic and are all relays subject to much higher requested traffic than their limits? Thanks, Daniel. Direction IN Threshold Traffic 200 MBit/s Sum 8,828 GByte/300s (241 MBit/s), 9.436.000 packets/300s (31.453 packets/s), 317 flows/300s (1 flows/s) External 109.236.85.157, 0,444 GByte/300s (12 MBit/s), 341.000 packets/300s (1.136 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 93.114.44.37, 0,435 GByte/300s (11 MBit/s), 321.000 packets/300s (1.070 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 46.165.196.73, 0,373 GByte/300s (10 MBit/s), 287.000 packets/300s (956 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 91.208.34.12, 0,260 GByte/300s (7 MBit/s), 217.000 packets/300s (723 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 212.117.161.80, 0,256 GByte/300s (6 MBit/s), 191.000 packets/300s (636 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 212.26.1.109, 0,241 GByte/300s (6 MBit/s), 363.000 packets/300s (1.210 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 174.140.167.122, 0,238 GByte/300s (6 MBit/s), 177.000 packets/300s (590 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 109.163.225.203, 0,182 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 142.000 packets/300s (473 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 94.23.164.42, 0,174 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 137.000 packets/300s (456 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 137.56.163.64, 0,170 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 157.000 packets/300s (523 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 173.254.192.38, 0,166 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 143.000 packets/300s (476 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.165.26.254, 0,163 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 134.000 packets/300s (446 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 217.115.137.222, 0,156 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 123.000 packets/300s (410 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 94.23.168.39, 0,149 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 133.000 packets/300s (443 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 216.24.174.245, 0,147 GByte/300s (4 MBit/s), 106.000 packets/300s (353 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.163, 0,138 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 123.000 packets/300s (410 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 85.214.75.110, 0,137 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 117.000 packets/300s (390 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 204.45.133.189, 0,135 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 131.000 packets/300s (436 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 94.23.174.3, 0,131 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 112.000 packets/300s (373 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 85.31.186.116, 0,130 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 104.000 packets/300s (346 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 178.32.52.72, 0,118 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 104.000 packets/300s (346 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 46.165.196.182, 0,112 GByte/300s (3 MBit/s), 134.000 packets/300s (446 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.164, 0,106 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 89.000 packets/300s (296 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.162, 0,104 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 95.000 packets/300s (316 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 146.185.23.179, 0,103 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 96.000 packets/300s (320 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 87.98.180.247, 0,101 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 95.000 packets/300s (316 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 199.48.147.35, 0,095 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 93.000 packets/300s (310 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 62.220.136.253, 0,092 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 110.000 packets/300s (366 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 89.248.168.118, 0,092 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 79.000 packets/300s (263 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 199.48.147.45, 0,089 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 75.000 packets/300s (250 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.120.245.249, 0,088 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 75.000 packets/300s (250 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 212.95.43.222, 0,087 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 72.000 packets/300s (240 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 74.109.126.29, 0,082 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 71.000 packets/300s (236 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 91.121.166.158, 0,081 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 71.000 packets/300s (236 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.247.181.165, 0,079 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 80.000 packets/300s (266 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 146.185.23.180, 0,078 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 74.000 packets/300s (246 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 91.121.85.130, 0,078 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 68.000 packets/300s (226 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 93.182.132.100, 0,075 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 65.000 packets/300s (216 packets/s), 2 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 46.73.164.123, 0,074 GByte/300s (2 MBit/s), 63.000 packets/300s (210 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 194.204.30.253, 0,067 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 101.000 packets/300s (336 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 79.172.193.89, 0,065 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 58.000 packets/300s (193 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 62.116.251.71, 0,065 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 51.000 packets/300s (170 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 77.245.18.28, 0,064 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 47.000 packets/300s (156 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 173.254.216.69, 0,064 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 60.000 packets/300s (200 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.72.225.172, 0,061 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 60.000 packets/300s (200 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 93.115.241.2, 0,061 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 53.000 packets/300s (176 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 173.254.192.36, 0,059 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 50.000 packets/300s (166 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 188.165.24.70, 0,057 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 58.000 packets/300s (193 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 85.223.49.156, 0,053 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 43.000 packets/300s (143 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s) External 131.130.199.36, 0,052 GByte/300s (1 MBit/s), 45.000 packets/300s (150 packets/s), 1 flows/300s (0 flows/s)

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Re: [tor-relays] new (to me, at any rate) message
by Scott Bennett 05 Dec '11

05 Dec '11

On Sun, 4 Dec 2011 17:47:30 +0100 Sebastian Hahn <mail(a)sebastianhahn.net> wrote: >On Dec 4, 2011, at 12:40 PM, Scott Bennett wrote: > >> About an hour and a half ago, my node issued the following message. >> >> Dec 04 04:03:56.685 [warn] Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR or non-edge circuit. >> >> What does it mean? And what triggers it? Is it attempting to use a relay >> listed in the directory and consensus, but finding that that relay's status >> has changed since the consensus? > >This is a message frequently seen on relays for a while now, due to a >bug in hidden service usage in 0.2.3.x clients. See >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4171 for what we know >about it. Basically, it doesn't indicate a problem with the relay, but >rather the Tor client that uses the relay. Thus, we will soon go ahead Yes, I had gathered that much. >and stop logging this at default log levels, and also fix it on the >client side. > Urrgh... It looks like you and Robert have a good handle on it, so I won't worry about it if I see it again. Thanks much, Sebastian! Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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