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14 participants
4852 discussions

Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Bianco Veigel 09 Mar '11

09 Mar '11

Today I got the second abuse mail within two weeks from my hosting provider. They forced me to take down the exit node, otherwise they will shutdown my server. How could I detect such a scan and take counter measures to prevent a network scan through tor? I've thougt about Snort, but I've never used it before. The exit node is running in a Xen-vm, behind a pfSense firewall. I've attached the report from the abuse mail. Does anyone have an idea, what steps should/could be taken? Thanks in advance, Bianco Veigel ----- attachment ----- ########################################################################## # Netscan detected from host 188.40.98.54 # ########################################################################## time protocol src_ip src_port dest_ip dest_port --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Feb 25 06:53:15 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45237 => 138.160.29.194 20019 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27681 => 94.207.140.89 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6869 => 94.207.140.93 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 33258 => 94.207.140.94 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 53464 => 94.207.140.95 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31041 => 94.207.140.96 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6299 => 94.207.140.97 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 40964 => 94.207.140.98 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8703 => 94.207.140.99 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 56759 => 94.207.140.187 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26247 => 94.207.140.227 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26247 => 94.207.140.227 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27847 => 94.207.140.228 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27847 => 94.207.140.228 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1219 => 94.207.140.229 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1219 => 94.207.140.229 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 38929 => 94.207.140.230 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 38929 => 94.207.140.230 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62958 => 94.207.140.235 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 46469 => 94.207.140.236 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 2704 => 94.207.140.237 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17272 => 94.207.141.12 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17272 => 94.207.141.12 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32482 => 94.207.141.13 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32482 => 94.207.141.13 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55860 => 94.207.141.14 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55860 => 94.207.141.14 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43390 => 94.207.141.15 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43390 => 94.207.141.15 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31712 => 94.207.141.16 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31712 => 94.207.141.16 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29316 => 94.207.141.17 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29316 => 94.207.141.17 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5286 => 94.207.141.18 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5286 => 94.207.141.18 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45139 => 94.207.141.19 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45139 => 94.207.141.19 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25311 => 94.207.141.20 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25311 => 94.207.141.20 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3675 => 94.207.141.21 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3675 => 94.207.141.21 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 51753 => 94.207.141.22 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 51753 => 94.207.141.22 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8993 => 94.207.141.23 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8993 => 94.207.141.23 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48305 => 94.207.141.24 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25717 => 94.207.141.25 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 15142 => 94.207.141.26 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24618 => 94.207.141.27 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43060 => 94.207.141.28 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45003 => 94.207.141.45 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 18691 => 94.207.141.48 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48452 => 94.207.141.60 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48452 => 94.207.141.60 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 37237 => 94.207.141.61 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 37237 => 94.207.141.61 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 39153 => 94.207.141.62 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10678 => 94.207.141.63 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 23127 => 94.207.141.64 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10755 => 94.207.141.65 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 13206 => 94.207.141.66 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32657 => 94.207.141.67 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1909 => 94.207.141.68 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3475 => 94.207.141.69 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3475 => 94.207.141.69 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1810 => 94.207.141.70 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1810 => 94.207.141.70 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 52358 => 94.207.141.71 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3828 => 94.207.141.72 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 46151 => 94.207.141.73 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17930 => 94.207.141.74 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4025 => 94.207.141.103 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4025 => 94.207.141.103 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48216 => 94.207.141.104 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48216 => 94.207.141.104 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61033 => 94.207.141.105 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61033 => 94.207.141.105 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 35460 => 94.207.141.106 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 35460 => 94.207.141.106 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34686 => 94.207.141.107 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34686 => 94.207.141.107 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8517 => 94.207.141.108 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8517 => 94.207.141.108 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34989 => 94.207.141.109 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 16795 => 94.207.141.110 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 54679 => 94.207.141.111 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 36103 => 94.207.141.112 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 59119 => 94.207.141.113 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29831 => 94.207.141.114 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24490 => 94.207.141.115 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8880 => 94.207.141.116 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43624 => 94.207.141.117 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31266 => 94.207.141.118 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 33438 => 94.207.141.119 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43359 => 94.207.141.120 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8168 => 94.207.141.121 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 36716 => 94.207.141.122 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5648 => 94.207.141.123 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 57277 => 94.207.141.124 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 20586 => 94.207.141.134 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 20586 => 94.207.141.134 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29953 => 94.207.141.135 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29953 => 94.207.141.135 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10770 => 94.207.141.136 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10770 => 94.207.141.136 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4466 => 94.207.141.137 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4466 => 94.207.141.137 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27801 => 94.207.141.138 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27801 => 94.207.141.138 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 14288 => 94.207.141.139 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 14288 => 94.207.141.139 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 11846 => 94.207.141.140 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 11846 => 94.207.141.140 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 42636 => 94.207.141.141 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 42636 => 94.207.141.141 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 7837 => 94.207.141.142 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 7837 => 94.207.141.142 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62271 => 94.207.141.143 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62271 => 94.207.141.143 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6908 => 94.207.141.144 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6908 => 94.207.141.144 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29951 => 94.207.141.145 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29951 => 94.207.141.145 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10582 => 94.207.141.146 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10582 => 94.207.141.146 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61463 => 94.207.141.147 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61463 => 94.207.141.147 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32072 => 94.207.141.148 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32072 => 94.207.141.148 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31807 => 94.207.141.149 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 41404 => 94.207.141.152 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6669 => 94.207.141.153 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24449 => 94.207.141.172 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24449 => 94.207.141.172 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 19439 => 94.207.141.173 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 19439 => 94.207.141.173 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55637 => 94.207.141.174 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55637 => 94.207.141.174 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 22382 => 94.207.141.175 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25961 => 94.207.141.176 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 49493 => 94.207.141.177 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10996 => 94.207.141.178 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 52247 => 94.207.141.179 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26122 => 94.207.141.180 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 44654 => 94.207.141.181 80

14 27

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 08 Mar '11

08 Mar '11

I wrote: > On Sat, 26 Feb 2011 12:13:53 -0800 Chris Palmer <chris(a)eff.org> wrote: >>On Feb 26, 2011, at 9:53 AM, mick wrote: >> >>> No reputable security researcher would a) scan a network without that >>> network owner's explicit permission, nor b) use tor for that scan. >> >>Lots of reputable security researchers who scan the entire internet without getting permission. You can't get permission from every operator in the world, but you still need to do good and interesting research. Examples of reputable researchers who have scanned the whole internet include Dan Bernstein, Dan Kaminsky, and EFF. (At least I think we're reputable. :) ) I don't know for sure, but I can't imagine Arbor, CAIDA, and Renesys can do their jobs without scanning the internet. > > Well, as I've just finished describing in another topic here, I treat >scanning of my system as attempted security breaches. Such scans will not >elicit any apparent response from my system, except that the scanner's >IP address will shortly be added to my "block" file, which will deny all future >access to my tor node's ORPort and DirPort. >> >>Using Tor to scan the internet is a good way to see how the internet looks from different perspectives at once, which can be quite valuable. >> > I disagree and, as noted above, treat that as a cracking attempt. tor >nodes that you abuse in such fashion will continue to function by the means >described below, provided they are listed in the current consensus document. >My current procedures are described in the next two paragraphs. However, ^^^ Sigh. I added another paragraph ahead of those two and then missed changing the "two" to "three" above. Nothing of real consequence here, but I point my mistake out in case it was confusing to anyone before. >your implication quoted above that EFF has/does/will abuse tor exits in this >manner suggests I may have to modify my treatment of tor exits from which >your scans emerge, given the increased likelihood that the offenses did not >originate from the exit node's system and that the exit node was instead >a victim as well. Nevertheless, your scans will not get responses from my >system, except for connection attempts to the ORPort or the DirPort. > First, I have set the sysctl variable called net.inet.tcp.blackhole to 2, >which causes the kernel to drop all incoming packets addressed to closed ports. > The IP addresses of tor nodes, including exit nodes, listed in the >cached-consensus file on my system are placed into a "pass" file every 30 >minutes, which temporarily exempts them from being checked against the >"block" file. It is temporary in that the exemption lasts for 30 minutes >only, although it will be exempted for another 30 minutes whenever the >address exists in the cached-consensus file at the time the "pass" file is >rebuilt. > Anyone who may be concerned that their IP address or address range might >be listed in my "block" file is welcome to write to me to inquire about it. >If it is, then I will offer to remove the block on an indefinitely >probationary basis. However, if I encounter the same IP address in my pf log >again, then I will block the address permanently. > Frankly, I think it's appalling that a previous sponsor organization for >the tor project should turn on the tor network in the fashion you've confessed >here that it has. I'm tempted to dig out all of the EFF IP address ranges >and block them permanently, just as a matter of principle, although it would >obviously have little real effect upon your organization. No wonder so many >of us have run afoul of our ISPs when trying to run exit nodes when even EFF >is trying to spoil the tor network for us. Who needs enemies with "friends" >like EFF? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 08 Mar '11

08 Mar '11

On Fri, 25 Feb 2011 18:28:24 -0500 cmeclax-sazri <cmeclax-sazri(a)ixazon.dynip.com> wrote: >On Friday 25 February 2011 11:45:04 Bianco Veigel wrote: >> Today I got the second abuse mail within two weeks from my hosting >> provider. They forced me to take down the exit node, otherwise they will >> shutdown my server. >> >> How could I detect such a scan and take counter measures to prevent a >> network scan through tor? I've thougt about Snort, but I've never used >> it before. The exit node is running in a Xen-vm, behind a pfSense firewall. >> >> I've attached the report from the abuse mail. Does anyone have an idea, >> what steps should/could be taken? > >It may be possible to detect a scan by looking for RST packets coming back >from computers that have the port closed. I saw something about that on >snort.org, I wouldn't trust Snort to do the right thing in the case of >someone portscanning through Tor. I suggest closing the circuit, and only Tor Not only that, but some systems offer the option of not returning the RST packets. For example, on my system (FreeBSD 7.4-STABLE), I have a line in /etc/sysctl.conf, net.inet.tcp.blackhole=2 which takes effect during system startup. Its effect is to cause the kernel to discard and otherwise ignore ALL inbound TCP packets for closed TCP ports. Because the scanner receives no RST, it will likely be delayed until the timeout occurs for the expected ACK/RST that will never arrive. I also have two applicable rules for my packet filter (pf): block drop in log on bge0 proto tcp from any to bge0 flags S/S block drop in log on bge0 proto udp from any to bge0 where bge0 is my Internet-facing network interface. The former drops without returning an RST any SYN that arrives for a closed TCP port. This happens *before* the SYN can encounter the kernel blackhole code, so that I can have a log entry for the attempt. The latter does the same for any unexpected inbound UDP packets. (pf keeps the equivalent of state information for UDP, too, so that UDP responses to requests from my system (e.g., DNS queries) are recognized and allowed in without being subjected to the rule shown above.) I add the addresses logged by the rules above to my file of blocked addresses and address ranges. At present, the only open TCP ports I have are my relay's ORPort and DirPort, so having one's IP address in my "blocked" file can only cause grief to people attempting to connect to/probe my node directly from their tor clients. However, in the event that I might ever offer other services of any kind, all of those creeps will be denied access to those services as well. (N.B. that I have other pf rules that allow IP addresses of relays in the latest cached-consensus file on my node to connect to both of tor's ports. The cached-consensus file is converted every thirty minutes to a "pass" file for just those ports, so no tor user whose client happens to choose a route through a relay in my "block" file will be stopped from building and using a circuit through both the offending node and my node.) My "block" file is currently 10,177 lines long, each line bearing one IP address or address/mask range. >knows what the circuit is, so if an exit node notices several connection >attempts in a row on the same circuit fail, it could close the circuit >because it looks like a portscan. > However, by that time, the target may also have noticed the same series of attempts and will eventually complain to the OP's ISP. :-( Many of the scanning attempts I've seen in my log have involved just a single try on each of a handful of ports. Sometimes they repeat the sequence a few minutes later, a trick that would likely evade the tactic you propose. BTW, something I've noticed moderately frequently in recent weeks is the arrival of unsolicited UDP packets for the UDP port number that matches my (TCP) ORPort number. This usually involves only a single UDP packet so addressed from any given source address. This has me rather mystified regarding what it might be intended to accomplish. If anyone has an idea what it might be about, please let me know. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

1 0

500 TB since last reboot
by Olaf Selke 07 Mar '11

07 Mar '11

anonymizer2:~# ifconfig eth0 | grep bytes RX bytes:556140680407980 (505.8 TiB) TX bytes:575306739180987 (523.2 TiB) anonymizer2:~# uptime 20:14:25 up 123 days, 21:04, 1 user, load average: 1.62, 1.70, 1.60

1 0

Are friends family?
by cmeclax-sazri 03 Mar '11

03 Mar '11

A friend of mine is interested in Tor. If I set up Tor on her box, and I have root access, should I list her relay in my relay's family, or should I list my relay in her relay's family? cmeclax

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] Advice for high throughput Tor node
by Mike Perry 02 Mar '11

02 Mar '11

This discussion is better suited for tor-relays(a)torproject.org. Also, for reference, here is the previous tor-relays thread on the technical aspects of this topic: http://archives.seul.org/or/relays/Aug-2010/msg00034.html And also the social side: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment We really need to work on condensing that tor-relays thread into a single document like the blog post. We've still got a lot of mystery and voodoo to unravel in terms of utilizing all spare Tor capcity, though. Thus spake Mitar (mmitar(a)gmail.com): > Hi! > > We are planning a high throughput Tor node, we are hoping for 1 Gbit/s > node. But as I read there are some issues attaining that. So I would > like some suggestions what should we use for hardware and > configuration to attain it. So CPU, ethernet card, etc. As I > understood it is necessary to run multiple Tor instances, but that > then ethernet card's IRQ affinity is still problematic? Would it be > better to have multiple ethernet cards? How much CPU is needed for 1 > Gbit/s throughput? RAM? > > And it is probably also necessary to have multiple IPs to be able to > have more than 65k connections? > > The problem is that we will probably not be able to experiment much, > what we will buy we will have. So I am hoping to get it right. > > We are targeting a fully open exit node policy so some advice on how > to arrange things with ISP would also be good. We have good experience > with one local ISP, but not on this scale. So probably it would be > good to request a SWIP and abuse handle to our e-mail? Anything else? > Is there any software developed which would handle automatic abuse > e-mails with automatic replies? > > I am sorry if all this is already somewhere written. ;-) > > (And all this is still just in a planning stage, we will have to see > if the budget will support it.) > > > Mitar > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs

3 6

tor-relays archives now available
by Andrew Lewman 01 Mar '11

01 Mar '11

Sorry for the delay, but the archives are now available at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/. -- Andrew pgp 0x74ED336B

1 0

Blocked SYN floods?
by Michael Millspaugh 26 Feb '11

26 Feb '11

I've noticed that pretty regularly my firewall is blocking what it's calling SYN-FLOODS, 50 at a time, originating from my tor relay: 02-26-2011 09:09:41 Daemon.Debug ROUTER kernel: [2011 Feb 26 09:09:33] FVS338 SYN-FLOOD IN=LAN OUT=WAN SRC=192.168.1.5(FALCON) DST=85.78.242.156(unresolved) PROTO=TCP SPT=63848 DPT=23 02-26-2011 09:09:41 Daemon.Debug ROUTER kernel: [2011 Feb 26 09:09:33] FVS338 SYN-FLOOD IN=LAN OUT=WAN SRC=192.168.1.5(FALCON) DST=31.92.154.101(unresolved) PROTO=TCP SPT=63820 DPT=443 02-26-2011 09:09:41 Daemon.Debug ROUTER kernel: [2011 Feb 26 09:09:33] FVS338 SYN-FLOOD IN=LAN OUT=WAN SRC=192.168.1.5(FALCON) DST=188.88.159.200(unresolved) PROTO=TCP SPT=63839 DPT=5060 Most of them are on port 23 or 443, some are on 5060 and the rest are on random ports. I have read that port 23 is for MIRC, and that "syn-floods" are part of the way it operates - could that be causing these errors? Is it removing some functionality of mirc that is important to it's operation? I'd feel better knowing my firewall is stopping these syn-floods before my ISP can see them, and knowing that the relay is still working optimally. -Mike -- TERMS OF USE. By reading this e-mail, you agree, on behalf of your employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, terms-of-use, licenses, terms-of-service, shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer.

1 0

Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Bianco Veigel 25 Feb '11

25 Feb '11

3 2

Lawsuit threat over (unlikely?) SYN flood
by Formless Networking 25 Feb '11

25 Feb '11

Just as a heads up, I got a curt, vague lawsuit threat the other day out of the blue. The guy claimed my node IP took down his (unmentioned) e-commerce sites for some unspecified period of time through a SYN flood. The sites that I could find associated with his email address appeared still up and functional. Since SYN floods can be spoofed, and since Tor nodes don't really have the resource amplification that typically makes them effective, I'm assuming it's probably just someone who forgot to take their meds for a while and/or who is just making things up to try to chill our tor node off line. Just in case, here is what I sent in response. If anyone else hears from this guy, feel free to copy and paste. ---------------------------- It seems very unlikely that what you pasted here is due to our Tor router (unless it has been compromised?). Our node is not capable of transmitting SYN packets on behalf of users fast enough to actually do damage. It is rather expensive for a tor client to generate this type of traffic, and a couple forms of protection mechanisms are built in to the tor router flow control that slow this down. We would be very surprised if this attack actually came through our node, and actually brought down any of your services. Unlike more direct attacks on your server at the application layer, SYN floods are possible to spoof. This packet could actually be coming from anywhere... However, in either case, this attack should be simple to block. You can prevent the entire Tor network (not just our router) from sending you traffic by using this exported IP list to generate firewall rules to drop SYN packets: https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=1.2.3.4&port=80 If this is in fact a SYN flood attack, they may just switch spoofed source IPs on you, though, so an IP block is probably not what you want. There are plenty of documents online that describe server parameters to help reduce the impact of this attack on your services, depending on your server OS. We recommend looking into them to better protect yourself and your customers. Thanks

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