- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 38, Issue 27
by Oliver Schönefeld 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

Am 22.03.2014 um 21:04 schrieb tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > Today's Topics: > > 1. new fingerprint after update (Oliver Sch?nefeld) > 2. Re: new fingerprint after update (Alexander Dietrich) > 3. Re: new fingerprint after update (I) > 4. Re: Relay configuration for FreedomBox (James Valleroy) > 5. Re: new fingerprint after update (Roger Dingledine) > 6. Re: Relay configuration for FreedomBox (Lunar) > 7. Re: Relay configuration for FreedomBox (Lance Hathaway) > > Von: Oliver Schönefeld <oliver.schoenefeld(a)me.com> > Betreff: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 15:26:07 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Hi guys, > > i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday and the relay fingerprint changed to 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. > > Is there any way to get the new version working with the old fingerprint? > I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the torrc file, which looks as the following: > DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT > > But then Tor doesn't start. > > I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, but it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. > > > So thanks for your help in advance and have a nice weekend everybody! > > Oli > > > > Von: Alexander Dietrich <alexander(a)dietrich.cx> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 15:47:29 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Is it possible that either the "DataDirectory" setting changed due to the update or the directory content? > yes, because vidalia isn't part of the game anymore - yes i'm a little late with the update :( > Best regards, > Alexander > --- > PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp > > On 2014-03-22 15:26, Oliver Schönefeld wrote: >> Hi guys, >> i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay >> 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday >> and the relay fingerprint changed to >> 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. >> Is there any way to get the new version working with the old >> fingerprint? >> I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the >> torrc file, which looks as the following: >> DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT >> But then Tor doesn't start. >> I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, but >> it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. >> So thanks for your help in advance and have a nice weekend everybody! >> Oli >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > Von: I <beatthebastards(a)inbox.com> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 17:58:58 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > ...and the t-shirt counter at Atlas.torproject.org resets > there are worse things than that - but thanks for the reminder to claim it ;) > > Von: James Valleroy <james.valleroy(a)gmail.com> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox > Datum: 22 .März 2014 19:56:12 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 9:25 AM, Lance Hathaway <qhltx(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> If you're going to be running these as bridges, it seems to make sense >> to include obfsproxy support, probably with obfs3 and scramblesuit [0] >> enabled right off the bat. > > Thanks for the information. Is it likely that obfs3 and scramblesuit > will be usable in the long-term? Or will they need to be deprecated at > some point like obfs2? > > Also, if obfs3 or scramblesuit were deprecated, but some FreedomBoxes > continued to run those transports, what would be the result? Would the > worst case be that the bridge is no longer usable by some, as in [0]? > > The reason that I'm asking is that FreedomBox is currently working > within Debian "testing" but our target is Debian "stable". Once our > packaged configuration is frozen for the next stable release, it will > be more difficult for us to push changes other than security fixes. > > [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > > > > > Von: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 19:57:50 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 03:26:07PM +0100, Oliver Schönefeld wrote: >> i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday and the relay fingerprint changed to 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#UpgradeOrMove > >> I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the torrc file, which looks as the following: >> DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT >> >> But then Tor doesn't start. > > Yeah, that's not at all what DirAuthority is for. Can you help us > understand what made you think this was a good idea to try, so we can > fix it in the man page? :) > >> I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, >> but it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. > > Hopefully the above faq entry helps. > > Thanks for running a relay! > --Roger > > thank you so much, roger! i copied the old /keys folder and it's working like a charm. i basically ctrl+f'ed "fingerprint" in the stable manual and the DirAuthority property was the only one that made sense, since i don't run a bridge. but i have to admit that i didn't read the NOTE section... shame on my head. thank y'all! > > > > Von: Lunar <lunar(a)torproject.org> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox > Datum: 22 .März 2014 20:23:49 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > James Valleroy: >> The reason that I'm asking is that FreedomBox is currently working >> within Debian "testing" but our target is Debian "stable". Once our >> packaged configuration is frozen for the next stable release, it will >> be more difficult for us to push changes other than security fixes. > > (Debian hat on:) I try to keep Debian backports as up-to-date as possible. > Are official backports out of your set of allowed packages as well? > > -- > Lunar <lunar(a)torproject.org> > > > > Von: Lance Hathaway <qhltx(a)yahoo.com> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox > Datum: 22 .März 2014 21:03:43 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Signierter PGP Teil > On 22/03/2014 11:56 AM, James Valleroy wrote: > > Thanks for the information. Is it likely that obfs3 and > > scramblesuit will be usable in the long-term? Or will they need to > > be deprecated at some point like obfs2? > > > > Also, if obfs3 or scramblesuit were deprecated, but some > > FreedomBoxes continued to run those transports, what would be the > > result? Would the worst case be that the bridge is no longer usable > > by some, as in [0]? > > > > The reason that I'm asking is that FreedomBox is currently working > > within Debian "testing" but our target is Debian "stable". Once > > our packaged configuration is frozen for the next stable release, > > it will be more difficult for us to push changes other than > > security fixes. > > > > [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > > I can't speak to whether more pluggable transports will be deprecated > in future, but I'll go out on a limb here and say "probably." The > nature of things ensures that the capabilities of censors continue to > advance. And as they do, new approaches will be found and deployed to > bypass those advancing attempts to block the network. > > When bridges were first deployed, the fact that they weren't all > openly listed in a public directory made them more difficult to block. > Now, most plain bridges are very easy to block. When obfs2 was first > deployed, it was a solid protocol (I have no doubt). These days, China > is actively hunting down and blocking obfs2. There is very little > point to deploying either a plain bridge or an obfs2 pluggable > transport these days, especially on a mass scale. > > On the plus side, obfs3 is still pretty strong, and it's one of the > common pluggable transports right now. Scramblesuit is not live in the > official bundles yet (AFAIK), but it just released and has some pretty > robust-looking defenses against active probing and other attacks. If > you're working on something new to deploy, these should be included, > without a doubt. They may indeed be deprecated in future, and in the > worst case may become unusable or make the bridge more susceptible to > being blocked. But if you go with a plain bridge or obfs2, you're > already in your worst-case scenario. You have nothing to lose and > everything to gain by enabling the newest pluggable transports. > > I would highly recommend adding the Tor package repository to the > FreedomBoxes. As explained in [0], this won't always give you the > latest version of tor, but it will provide security fixes. My hunch is > that it will almost always also be a little fresher than Debian > stable. And given that network censors and network developers are > always going to be in an escalating arms race, enabling new releases > of Tor (and obfsproxy) directly from the project is going to make the > FreedomBox much more useful in the long term. > > -Lance > > [0] https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian > > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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"Invalid length on ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS."
by Tora Tora Tora 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

I am testing 0.2.5.2-alpha for non-exit relay and seeing lots of "Invalid length on ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS" errors. Any cause for concern?

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Best price/efficiency ratio
by Trigger Happy 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi list, I'm running tor-relay (middle) on VPS from statnet.pl (reseller form Hetzner) https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/C528972A915EEADE37F5B11A7AB7B571C89F46… Now i'm in top 50 of all relays for only 8,3 euro/month i think it's a good deal . Do You know better options ? - -- Trigger Happy jabber: triggerhappy(a)jabber.ccc.de torchat: xruq34bnhbqlkjtn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTLfftAAoJEEtm9wC9fGLFFJsP/RADCmlr3/8aTUrdefsOEgk8 CeDCQGasCuQ/iPNdJRCpILkiz7s+SM2FBzMLQVpDUiM5A9VD8aLOfnvhNGjKo4eo uaJUc7t1GrDlhDBzd4C7kV5o48hMeqP/61iDFR0eEO3sH5EIheV3io1fEzQc3XmW hGpgRR0SnfS0VDeQp4FhKXtxfiw4Dp7UMgRS9wQbI7TbFhdETkFjn4YvDIi1AfXg 8xH1xMUhfpJo4wa4RY1+UG+aa7X90HbF278QWlUnMdHiOr1VK3dgbRiV5cvYRF1U XZ6Jr+hDBWScn0dxxKWnebCqRIdh2mmn3G2aF9MdZ9WEaNwoNMzd+NAhUQy43vFr M3w3HZ3NJbVHA2WwQRFfVlg675Z4/PI+Uh60SGMHZoTXRVM2AFYQwUk9r4Mwbfwi qU8jj7pa228gwk5HYBgnOQMRFX/mpqe/Ww82qf/c1YispX+6JvevlfOKe2BF5X0t 66XIMNPJ+639h70XOcFJJyoe/mvbw21N0FZoShrFjAnoIDXyZek5LY1rGkdm4g5j 6w4F6RMQkEuK61eSFTC1lPhpUrUwkkCrBoU+Gg0rAFiqSYytT/rvSgtdlfbhcOlu SoMPY8rR6sG6b6Ib1YumiMXNc+fpT+9QbBxoaVxbORyLtvvb78dH8PcpQdwj79KK 9M0CeGy7A6Ex6tvcDVOf =h07G -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Relay configuration for FreedomBox
by James Valleroy 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

Hello, The FreedomBox project [1] is planning to include Tor in the upcoming 0.2 release. FreedomBox is intended to be used as an always-on server, so its Tor node has been configured as a bridge relay. There is also a need for FreedomBoxes to be able to find each other regardless of location or restrictive firewall. This feature is not yet completely implemented for FreedomBox, but it will likely involve each box running a Tor hidden service, and making the initial connection to other boxes over the Tor network. Here is the configuration that we are currently using in /etc/tor/torrc: ORPort 4431 BridgeRelay 1 Exitpolicy reject *:* It is based on example configuration for bridge relays given in the Tor documentation [2] but modified to still allow SOCKS connections. Do you see any vulnerabilities, attacks, or risks with the current configuration, and are there any changes that you would recommend? [1] https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox [2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges#RunningABridge Thanks

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new fingerprint after update
by Oliver Schönefeld 22 Mar '14

22 Mar '14

Hi guys, i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday and the relay fingerprint changed to 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. Is there any way to get the new version working with the old fingerprint? I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the torrc file, which looks as the following: DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT But then Tor doesn't start. I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, but it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. So thanks for your help in advance and have a nice weekend everybody! Oli

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Exit node re-writing PKI certificates?
by Iggy 21 Mar '14

21 Mar '14

Hey all, I use an email account from riseup.net, which I usually access via Thunderbird, running on a linux machine. My Thunderbird is configured to check mail via TOR. Earlier tonight I got a certificate warning message from thunderbird, saying that mail.riseup.net:465 was presenting a certificate that had been issued to cab.cabinethardwareparts.com on 03-01-2014, and expiring on 03-01-2015. Oddity among oddities, this does not match the issue dates of the other certificate reported below. Whois returns no match for cabinethardwareparts.com When I mentioned this on a Riseup IRC channel, I was told that there had previously (02-28-2014) been a help ticket from a riseup mail user, accessing their account via TOR, who had a certificate error involving a certificate issued to the same domain. So, I guess I just wanted to alert you all to the fact that this is happening. I'm not sure what it means. Is the exit node in question pointing my traffic at somewhere other than mail.riseup.net:465? Is the exit node re-writing the traffic to include the bad certificate? If so, why? If part of a MITM scheme, why not use a certificate issued to mall.riseup.net or mail.riseop.net, or something else less obvious than cab.cabinethardwareparts.com? I am more curious than anything, and any thoughts are appreciated. I'll paste the details from the previous help ticket below, since they actually captured more details about the bad certificate than I did. Kind Regards, -Iggy =-=-=-=-==-=-==-=- PASTED TEXT BEGINS =-=-==-=-=-=-=--=- Hi there wonderful riseup birds, Today I was attempting to sent a GPGd email to another riseup.net user but thunderbird flagged that a suspicious certificate was being served whose address did not match riseup.net. Its common name was: cab.cabinethardwareparts.com Serial 01:E3:94:E1:BD issued on: 05/03/13 expires: 05/03/14 organization: unknown The key was: Modulus (2048 bits): ba 29 4e f5 89 c8 4c 61 76 4c 08 fe 2e d9 4d af 8f 47 20 2b cb ee 00 56 d3 9b 4c 47 8c ee 75 f5 94 f8 65 f3 83 71 12 ed 32 ef 92 4e 25 90 ac df 4c 82 e6 6e 4e df b2 a9 48 f0 2a 7a 21 bd 10 01 7d fc 31 b4 93 ca ec ec 99 b2 91 e1 04 a7 5c 39 72 55 1f ee 74 49 4c e7 75 fe 84 67 a9 ff 81 74 e5 1e 35 db 2b 93 e1 f5 74 96 6b 19 3a 54 a3 0d 90 b1 8f 0c 2f e2 4f f1 13 5a ad c5 37 4e b5 93 54 70 54 7f 04 6b 30 58 fc f8 c8 15 04 c7 f6 90 25 9f 45 4b 38 9e 28 e8 ec df 7d 06 d4 0f d1 9c 2e 6c 9d ad 90 65 ce e4 de a0 5a 8a 14 fc b4 32 26 c9 2d 7e 91 fc c3 90 1c 52 9d 93 f0 47 38 d3 b1 66 27 38 0a 2f 2a 08 31 7c ea 62 fa 66 1d f2 90 4d 0f 8b 42 78 7b 69 00 c8 4a b3 84 4c c6 e0 a3 0d ce 91 b2 e7 75 6a c1 34 76 22 4e e4 df 85 1c d2 19 d5 2e ca 91 71 be 4e fd d3 81 2e e5 83 Exponent (24 bits): 65537 =-=-=-=-==-=-==-=- PASTED TEXT ENDS =-=-==-=-=-=-=--=-

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Mail from a few minutes ago
by Sebastian Urbach 18 Mar '14

18 Mar '14

Hi, My last mail should have been sent to Moritz not to the list, my apologies. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Spiegel Online Artikel
by Sebastian Urbach 18 Mar '14

18 Mar '14

Hi Moritz, Ich hatte Andrew im Januar auf diesen Artikel aufmerksam gemacht und da er deutschsprachig ist hattest du dem Kollegen Böhm dazu was geschrieben (ich war CC oder BCC) Wenn ich das richtig erinnere dann sagte er das er die Spiegel Kollegen in HH um Änderung des Bildes gebeten habe. Als bitteres Fazit bleibt: 1. Bild wurde nicht geändert. 2. Er hat weder seinen eigenen Text korrigiert noch hat er wenigstens ein Update hinzugefügt um klarzustellen das sein Artikel Schrott war. 3. Von "Uns" gibt es afaik kein Statement zu dieser Sache die in verschiedenen Ländern u.a. USA gleichernassen falsch berichtet wurde. Deshalb meine Frage, war das alles oder sollte man Ihn vielleicht noch zu einer Richtigstellung auffordern ? Oder akzeptieren wir einfach jede Berichterstattung weil es zu viel Arbeit wäre dagegen anzugehen ? Das Ganze hat doch am Ruf gekratzt finde ich. http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/e-mails-fbi-hat-die-daten-der-anonym-die…

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New tor relay, some questions
by Tobias Markus 17 Mar '14

17 Mar '14

Hi, I've been running a new tor relay for about a week now and I've got some questions. 1) I plan on running other services than tor on my server, including a (private) mail system. Other than the general possibility of tor having security holes and my server (and its IP address) being public and thus possibly target of attacks, are there security implications I should consider? 2) I would be interested to eventually run a directory/bandwith authority, so I read about them in [1] and [2], but the places seemed a bit odd (hidserv-perf branch in tor svn/torflow repo) so I thought I better ask here: Would I really just have to follow the steps in [1] to become a dirauth? Is there currently a need for auths, would contribution be welcomed? Thanks for your answers! Regards Tobias [1] https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/branches/hidserv-perf/doc/v3-authority-h… [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/blob/HEAD:/NetworkScanners/BwAuth…

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Re: [tor-relays] Setting up Tor Bridge
by Sebastian Urbach 17 Mar '14

17 Mar '14

Hi, First things first. 0.2.2 is quite old, you should consider 0.2.4 if possible. Next thing is that you have multiple SocksPort entries in your torrc. You just need one, remove the others. Is it just ServerTransportPlugin without any further specification ? On March 17, 2014 7:02:30 PM Eric Giannini <eric.giannini(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Hi I would like to set up a Tor Bridge but I have run into a few problems. > Can anyone give me a few recommendations on what to do? Raising maximum > number of filedescriptors (ulimit -n) to 32768. > Starting tor daemon: tor... > ABORTED: Tor configuration invalid: > Mar 17 10:56:35.546 [notice] Tor v0.2.2.35 (git-73ff13ab3cc9570d). This is > experimental software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity. (Running on > Linux i686) > Mar 17 10:56:35.548 [warn] Option 'SocksPort' used more than once; all but > the last value will be ignored. > Mar 17 10:56:35.548 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option > 'ServerTransportPlugin'. Failing. > Mar 17 10:56:35.548 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. > > > > > ________________________________ > От: Tobias Markus <tobias(a)markus-regensburg.de> > Кому: Sebastian Urbach <sebastian(a)urbach.org> Копия: > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Отправлено: понедельник, 17 марта 2014 10:37 > Тема: Re: [tor-relays] New tor relay, some questions > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hi Sebastian, > > now that you say it -- yes, it seems we both choose the same quote :D > (Really, I didn't copy you. I've read it somewhere else a while ago > and adopted it because I liked it. But really, you didn't read > hundreds of quote books just to suddenly stumble on Franklin's quote, > did you?) > > But another thing: Do you still need participating relays for TTTT? > > Tobias > > Am 17.03.2014 16:24, schrieb Sebastian Urbach: > > Hi, > > Great that it finally worked out, welcome to thd > > brother/sisterhood. And btw. what are you doing with my mail > > signature ? That seems to be the more important issue to me ;-))) > > > Hi, > > just wanted to inform you that I could resolve the issue simply by > deleting the tor data folder (thus getting a new fingerprint). > > PS: I actually replied to Bryan, but forgot to CC tor-relays. Sadly > > I can't find the message anymore, otherwise I would have resent > > it. > > On 03/13/2014 11:08 PM, Tobias Markus wrote: > >> Hi, sorry for replying rather late! In response to 1): Thinking > >> about it, I think the main (possible) problem is that my MTA is > >> rejected by SMTP servers it connects to because of a Tor > >> blacklist. Is this probable? Has someone got experience running a > >> complete mail system and a (public) Tor relay on the same > >> host/IP? About 2): That is indeed very unfortunate, but at the > >> same time a reason to start contributing to Tor! (Sadly, I am > >> presently occupied by various other projects, but I think Tor is > >> definitely worth a 'visit'.) Now about something else. I recently > >> had to restart my server for unrelated reasons. (The relay had > >> the Guard and Stable flag at that time.) I sadly forgot to add > >> the Tor service to the default runlevel, so it was not started at > >> boot time. I went to bed thinking everything was OK and was only > >> able to start Tor about 12 hours later. Unfortunately, my relay > >> got no flags since then -- not even "Running"! The Tor consensus > >> website confirms this: Three Auths voted for all previous/normal > >> flags except Guard, the others only for Valid and V2Dir leading > >> to my relay getting no flags! I cannot really explain this to myself. > What is going on here? Tobias On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at > >> 07:32:17PM +0100, Moritz Bartl wrote: > >>> On 03/02/2014 04:06 PM, Tobias Markus wrote: > >>>> I've been running a new tor relay for about a week now > >>> Great. Thank you! > >>> >>>> 1) I plan on running other services than tor on my server, > >>>> including a (private) mail system. Other than the general > >>>> possibility of tor having security holes and my server (and > >>>> its IP address) being public and thus possibly target of > >>>> attacks, are there security implications I should consider? > >>> Unfortunately, many sites block Tor relay IPs regardless of > >>> their exit policy. So, if you share one IP between the relay > >>> and other services, your might be impacted. This is especially > >>> true for exit relays. > >>> >>>> 2) I would be interested to eventually run a > >>>> directory/bandwith authority, so I read about them in [1] and > >>>> [2], but the places seemed a bit odd (hidserv-perf branch in > >>>> tor svn/torflow repo) so I thought I better ask here: Would I > >>>> really just have to follow the steps in [1] to become a > >>>> dirauth? Is there currently a need for auths, would contribution be > welcomed? > >>> The offer is well appreciated. In the current design, > >>> directory authorities and bandwidth authorities play a very > >>> special role. There are several ideas on how to improve the > >>> situation and then open participation to the broader community, > >>> but for the time being, authorities can only be run by people > >>> very close to the core dev team. > > - -- Tobias Markus > > "They who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little > temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." > -- Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) > > iEYEARECAAYFAlMnMtoACgkQAO6N0EYmC9a66QCfSE+zXecw9aFJpOx7NNwnBnhZ > imoAn0rbxsbu+NeiiJnxz82TUFe3vlWg > =ZBIk > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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