- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Possible tor usage by Dragonfly aka Energetic Bear
by manuel＠myops.de 29 Jul '14

29 Jul '14

Hi, today I received a registered mail by the BKA, the german federal police, alerting me that some stuff related to the Dragonfly aka Energetic Bear backdoor Oldrea/Havex could be traced back to one of my ips. The ip in questions is the one with which I run my tor exit node. I phoned the BKA and asked if they would be aware that Dragonfly uses the tor network to connect to their C&C servers. At least the BKA-person at the phone wasn't aware. Just thought to let you know. Regards, M.

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providers with AES-NI?
by Michael Ball 25 Jul '14

25 Jul '14

hey folks does anyone here know of any decent (and somewhat cheap) dedicated server providers that offer AES-NI crypto acceleration? the only decent and affordable one i've found so far is this from online.net: http://www.online.net/en/dedicated-server/dedibox-xc the bandwidth seems a bit low for the price... i assume what you're paying for is the processor and the memory. hit me up with all the providers you guys know of. thanks. michael ball

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Speed of my relay not correct on global list
by B00ze/Empire 23 Jul '14

23 Jul '14

Good day. I hope this is the correct mailing list for this. I run a small relay, alias "Empire64" (I tried an exit once, but my IP was then banned at several places, so back to only a relay) on Win Xp. It is very small (bandwidth 80k, burst 160k) but it used to be smaller (64k). Back when it was 64k, I still had a lot of traffic, and in Vidalia's "View the network" list of relays, I was listed as a 64k node. Now that I have increased bandwidth and would like to increase it more depending on how much traffic this creates, I see that no one uses my relay, I have practically no traffic. I think this is because in the "View the network" list, I am listed as a 10k node! I know that Tor has changed since I ran the relay at 64k. If I understand correctly, the Tor network now TESTS for bandwidth before accepting the declared bandwidth in the torRC file. Well obviously, this testing is not working for me. I have "attached" a screenshot of one of the rare times when I do have traffic - as you can see, my node DOES run @ 80k. But, see the other "attached" pic, I am showing in the list as a 10k node. Also, the Atlas shows me as UNNAMMED, I don't understand why, I am the only one with that alias... Tor80k screenshot: <https://unsee.cc/sumipoge/> (it needs javascript) Tor10k screenshot: <https://unsee.cc/deguzoba/> Can you guys help me with this? I'd like to contribute to the network but its not working for me now, and besides, the more traffic goes through me, the better it hides my own traffic; I want more :-) My uptime (from the Atlas): 22 days 3 hours 23 minutes and 16 seconds Fingerprint: E1DFC86060848E0FDCC7B0F072FA9EBAC639DA66 Platform: Tor 0.2.4.21 on Windows XP (updated to 2.4.22 just now) Thank you. Best Regards, -- ' _\|/_ Sylvain / B00ze64(a)hotmail.com ' (o o) Member-+-David-Suzuki-Foundation-+-Planetary-Society- oO-( )-Oo Pentium of Borg: Division's futile; You will be approximated.

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Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies
by grarpamp 22 Jul '14

22 Jul '14

On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 6:34 PM, Mike Hearn <mike(a)plan99.net> wrote: > Hello, > > As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate things > (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also sometimes > get used by botnets and other problematic things. > > Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic they > consider to be unwanted or abusive. In this way a kind of international > group consensus emerges about what is and is not acceptable usage of Tor. > For instance, SMTP out is widely restricted. > > Has there been any discussion of implementing similar controls for hidden > services, where relays would refuse to act as introduction points for hidden > services that match certain criteria e.g. have a particular key, or whose > key appears in a list downloaded occasionally via Tor itself. In this way > relay operators could avoid their resources being used for establishing > communication with botnet CnC servers. > > Obviously such a scheme would require a protocol and client upgrade to avoid > nodes building circuits to relays that then refuse to introduce. > > The downside is additional complexity. The upside is potentially recruiting > new relay operators. HS's will just change their HS keys out from under your list. Then it becomes whack a mole. And you'll also be taking out shared services with the bathwater. Are you funding maintenance of that list? Ready to be called a censor when you exceed your noble intent as all have done before? And to be ignored by those operators who don't care to subscribe to your censor list thus nullifying your efforts (not least of why because it may be illegal for them to look at services on the list to verify it, or to look at and make decisions regarding content of traffic that transits them). And ignored by botnet ops who will surely run their own relays and internal pathing.

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Fwd: [Abuse[...]] GameoverZeus-Infektionen
by Ch'Gans 20 Jul '14

20 Jul '14

Hi there, I'm here to look for advice or comments on how to handle abuse reports when you run a TOR relay exit on a "server for the mass". I'm running the TOR exit node 18B6EBAF10814335242ECA5705A04AAD29774078 on Hetzner netowrk (50E/month, this is my contribution to the TOR project) So far I had to deal with few "easy" abuse reports (ssh scan, forum insults, spams, ...), I think i performed pretty well so far (thanks to Hetzner cooperation?) But today I just received this botnet related one. I do take this report seriously, I know that malware are more and more using the TOR network as an anonymous covert, I don't like malware, I don't like malicious botnet and I don't like spammers. Still I end up being identify as one of them. I knew from day one that it was a risky business to run an exit TOR node, but I want to stand up and fight. If only I can convince people of my right doing. First of all I am quite surprised that cert-bund.de (the complainant) didn't notice that I am a TOR exit node, so my first question (for people familiar with these guys) is: - How legit are these guys? Do they run for the German government? Are their simply trying to scare the shit out of me by citing europol.europa.eu, and us-cert.gov? (see redacted forwarded message below, my own opinion is "Yes") Then - Do they simply spam hosting company each time they have a probe sensing something somewhere (I know it's vague, but I can use that as a "this complainant is a spammer" kind of argument) Any other thoughts/remarks/comment on that matter? Regards, Chris Thought of the day: Nowadays it looks like server administrator tend to send abuse report each time they receive an illegal ping request! Testimony of the day: Last time I received an "SSH scan" abuse report, I sent back my SSH honeypot logs, which contains more than 5k login attempts per day. -------- Original Message -------- [..] ----- attachment ----- Dear Sir or Madam "Gameover Zeus" is malicious software which is primarily used by cybercriminals to carry out online banking fraud and to spy out login credentials for online services on infected PCs. It can also be used to install further malicious software (including blackmailing trojans such as "CryptoLocker" ransomware) on PCs or to carry out DDoS attacks. In a joint international campaign since the end of May 2014, law enforcement agencies, with the support of private sector partners, have taken action against the "Gameover Zeus" botnet [1]. As part of this campaign, it has now been possible to identify the IP addresses of systems infected with "Gameover Zeus" [2]. We are sending you a list of infected systems in your net area. Would you please examine the situation thoroughly and take appropriate measures to cleanse the systems. Sources: [1] Europol: International action against 'Gameover Zeus' botnet and 'CryptoLocker' ransomware <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/international-action-against- gameover-zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-ransomware> [2] ShadowServer: Gameover Zeus & Cryptolocker <http://blog.shadowserver.org/2014/06/08/gameover-zeus-cryptolocker/> [3] US-CERT: GameOver Zeus P2P Malware <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-150A> A list of infected systems in your net area: [...] Kind regards, Team CERT-Bund

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Busted links on Tor Relay standard web page
by mick 15 Jul '14

15 Jul '14

My apologies if this has been discussed before and I have missed it. I have been reviewing the web page on my relay (which is based on the standard Tor explanation page) and have noticed that several links are now broken following update of the Tor site itself (e.g. https://www.torproject.org/torusers.html.en no longer exists) I also notice that https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/tor/trunk/contrib/exitlist cannot be reached at all and the same page over http seems not to exist. If other operators are similarly using a page based on the old template, they may wish to update. Best Mick --------------------------------------------------------------------- Mick Morgan gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312 http://baldric.net ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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badexit D9B6E8F3DC60095F25252A1986E90932454C24D3
by grarpamp 15 Jul '14

15 Jul '14

Breaks TLS on check.torproject.org, etc.

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Reminder: Pre-PETS event Tuesday
by Moritz Bartl 15 Jul '14

15 Jul '14

Everyone in Amsterdam should come. And bring friends! :) https://blog.torproject.org/events/researchers-practitioners-meetup-pets-am… -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/

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Oubound Ports
by Greg Moss 11 Jul '14

11 Jul '14

Newbie to Tor but have a Debian server up and running as a relay. Do I need to filter outbound traffic from the tor server on my firewall. If yes what ports would I need to open. I am also have a good look a Tails any suggestions would be helpful. Thanks - gm

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Exits behind a next-gen firewall? Opinions please
by Jesse Victors 11 Jul '14

11 Jul '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hey guys, I've been running some exit nodes for some time now, and they're doing well. They've burned through many terabytes of bandwidth, and thanks to Tor's recommended reduced exit policy, complaints have been minimal. Clearly the vast majority of the Tor traffic is not malicious, but I have received some reports from other companies and from my ISP of hacking attempts: SQL Injection, XSS, botnet C&C, basic things like that. My ISP now tells me that they could reduce the reports even further by routing the exits through a "next-generation firewall" which apparently can detect an obvious clearnet attack and drop that connection a few milliseconds after the attack occurs. I don't know how the firewall works in detail, perhaps it has the ability to drop a specific connection rather than drop all access to the destination IP for a while, nor do I know how it would interact with Tor's traffic patterns out of an exit. I'm posting here for opinions. My question is, is this a good idea, and if so, any advice? Does anyone have any experience with such a setup? - -- Jesse V. /PGP 0xC20BEC80/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJTvyBdXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQxMjgyMjhENjEyODQ1OTU1NzBCMjgwRkFB RDk3MzY0RkMyMEJFQzgwAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yAbrcH/2IG+Z6jVNhj9j5EpvHkzl0V XXn1Fbkw7EV8P+cRfQwgmouGQZ4IhuD9QP21ql7wvAIHIkIeaKNtXDb1jELL6F3z b1r8IRm2ePOJNl3X3m/5NIbqbz2utdaRqLglo9vhmr26zx+VMJBfzE5AvVLUhq9B CzBYjJujJcASH9KWN08hhjxu81mS0xUmUnFJIfoV7sJto2y3EmJuCQXauMBsxDsf 1rNQFcoxfKS1YI1v1MdBA/xHNO+UaLUShFQR1mw7RIW8jaPNLTGE157nPXMq9xiX nTzOjkgZ3RI+qrmhcjwJEcV9BAAO86C6HXJvflbhkVPZkCBB43LFCeUKf+SGRR4= =98Se -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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