- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Hibernating / Traffic limit and consequrnces for the network.
by Sebastian Urbach 03 Feb '15

03 Feb '15

On February 1, 2015 10:48:25 PM Markus Hitter <mah(a)jump-ing.de> wrote: > Am 01.02.2015 um 20:02 schrieb Sebastian Urbach: > > I would like to provide a good service for everyone, even at the end > > of the month. That's getting harder the more systems are not present > > at the end of the month. > > I could understand the discussion if it were about providing 500 kBit > continuously vs. 1 Mbit for 2 of 4 >weeks. But the particular case was > about providing no >less than 6 Mbit continuously, which is easily >enough > to comfortably browse the web, for doing large >downloads and probably > exhausts most internet >connections in unfree countries. Accordingly it's > >unlikely a single connection is hobbled by such a >bandwidth limitation. Ah, thats a misunderstanding. This is not part 2 of the discussion from a few days ago. I brought it up because i see this for quite a while right now and observed it again within the last days. I thought it was time for a broader discussion. -- Sincerely yours / Sincères salutations / M.f.G. Sebastian Urbach ----------------------------------------- Religion is fundamentally opposed to everything I hold in veneration - courage, clear thinking, honesty, fairness, and, above all, love of the truth. ----------------------------------------- Henry Louis Mencken (1880 - 1956), American journalist, essayist, magazine editor, satirist and critic.

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Stats [was: freenode]
by grarpamp 03 Feb '15

03 Feb '15

On Sat, Jan 24, 2015 at 3:16 PM, cacahuatl <cacahuatl(a)autistici.org> wrote: > Most of the network is under-utilised guards and middle nodes, hidden > services don't stress exits, which are the limited resource. Exits can and do serve in all the other node roles too. I don't think there has yet been a study to determine the actual unused capacity of the relays as grouped by flag permutations. Nor has compass been enhanced to support that selection matrix. > Triples? A HS doubles vs exit.

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two questions about bridge
by jchase 02 Feb '15

02 Feb '15

Hello, I have a bridge up and running for about 6 months. I have two questions. According to arm my fingerprint is 72DB4EE86C65856E3131A32D8E30EC8A2B72A73D . But if I look up rasptorholland in globe.torproject.org I find that my fingerprint is 1BCD3EBEFE17EEB86EEDE21D5E2DB8468E2864CF . And again according to globe.torproject.org my pool assignment is blank (the empty set). Are these related to each other and is something wrong? Thanks, J Chase

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Hibernating / Traffic limit and consequrnces for the network.
by Sebastian Urbach 02 Feb '15

02 Feb '15

Dear list, I would like to discuss hibernating and the consequences for the network. As someone running unmetered GBit systems i like to point out that there is a downside for the network when it comes to hibernating. Usually a few days before the end of every month my systems are getting slammed with traffic / directory requests. I thought about that and came up with the theory that a lot of systems with traffic limitations are dropping out a few days before the end of the month. This means more pressure on the remaining systems in the network. If the trend that more systems with limitations are participating increases we are going to see a serious imbalance in the network at some point. I know, poor unmetered systems ;-) I would like everybody to bear this in mind when it comes to the decision "Adjust the Rate or just open the gates and burn it as fast as possible". I'm in the fortunate position to be able to tribute a nice amount of money / traffic, but even systems with unmetered traffic can just help until the bandwidth / hardware limits are reached. It would be awesome if i could conbince some of you to take a step back and take a moment to look at the bigger picture. I would like to provide a good service for everyone, even at the end of the month. That's getting harder the more systems are not present at the end of the month. At this point i like to quote G. K. Chesterton: “We are all in the same boat in a stormy sea, and we owe each other a terrible loyalty.” Thank you for reading this and my best wishes for all of you. -- Sincerely yours / Sincères salutations / M.f.G. Sebastian Urbach ----------------------------------------- Religion is fundamentally opposed to everything I hold in veneration - courage, clear thinking, honesty, fairness, and, above all, love of the truth. ----------------------------------------- Henry Louis Mencken (1880 - 1956), American journalist, essayist, magazine editor, satirist and critic.

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Information leak through WebRTC in FF/Chrome
by JusticeRage 02 Feb '15

02 Feb '15

Hi everyone, I'm not sure this is the place to share this, but I though some of you might want to know: an information leak has been discovered on Firefox / Chrome, and it can be used to reveal a user's real IP address. The article is focused on VPN, but people who connect to the Tor network through a local SOCKS proxy are also affected. Demo here . -- JusticeRage

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entry guard interference?
by starlight.2015q1＠binnacle.cx 01 Feb '15

01 Feb '15

A couple of months ago I hard-configured two entry nodes that I trust for my own browsing. Both are very fast, very reliable nodes on the opposite side of the Atlantic. For about 20 minutes this evening the 'tor' daemon appears to have lost connectivity to the both nodes and I could not browse via Tor. Quite a few instances of this message were logged: Jan 30 22:59:06 Tor[]: Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit. Neither of the configured guards were restarted during the outage, and they are located in diverse networks. The BGP looking-glass routes are different except for the first hop, which is a massive AS aggregation presumably for a trans-Atlantic cable operated by AS1299 (Telianet). I presume that this "cable" is actually a fully redundant load-balanced set of cables and any outage would be measured in milliseconds, or at most two or three seconds. Looking now, I see roughly 200 occurrences of the above message on Jan 14, 26 and 30. The reason I hard-coded the guard nodes was that, after extending the guard lifetime to 18 months, the guards were changing fairly often anyway. This bothered me. So the slightly paranoid side of my personality wonders if this is the result of a determined effort by one of the various spooky organizations out there purposefully disrupting Tor connections with the intent of forcing guard reassignment, naturally with the idea that Tor users might end up selecting guard nodes controlled by same said spooky organizations. Thoughts, comments and sharing of similar experiences are all welcome.

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Re: [tor-relays] Digital Ocean: Moving to better Plan (Abhiram Chintangal)
by Spencer Rhodes 01 Feb '15

01 Feb '15

On Feb 1, 2015, at 7:00 AM, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > > On Sat, 31 Jan 2015 13:23:39 -0800, Spencer Rhodes <spencer(a)rhodespa.com <mailto:spencer@rhodespa.com>> wrote: >> If you are on the 1TB plan at DigitalOcean, you will want to set something like the following: >> >> RelayBandwidthRate 600 KB # Throttle traffic to 600KB/s >> RelayBandwidthBurst 1.2 MB # But allow bursts up to 1.2 MB/s >> >> rather than set a daily or monthly limit. The reason being that your server will stay up all the time instead of suddenly hibernating (essentially going offline) when it hits the cap. > > I'm not sure that's the best course of action. See the Tor Manual section for AccountingMax > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en <https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en> > > If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". Yes, I suppose that for a non-exit relay speed is more important than uninterrupted service...

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Re: [tor-relays] Digital Ocean: Moving to better Plan (Abhiram Chintangal)
by Spencer Rhodes 01 Feb '15

01 Feb '15

> > > I have been running a tor middle relay[1] for the past few months. > > One thing that I noticed in the last two months is that my relay is eating > up the 1tb bandwidth in the first three weeks. So I am thinking of moving > to a better plan or tweaking the current config to serve the bandwidth so > that the relay is up for the entire month. > > I assume that you want a recommendation. A better plan probably means spending more money. Would be better for the network. If you can spare the money, go for it. > > If you dont want to spend more money than it would be a good idea to lower the Rate value until you end up within your traffic limit for the month. The benefit would be a permanent available relay. > > Hmm, I think I will try changing the rate and see what happens. Last year, I used a daily limit instead of monthly one. It drastically reduced the relays reported bandwidth ( 1Mbps to 60 kbps ). > If you are on the 1TB plan at DigitalOcean, you will want to set something like the following: RelayBandwidthRate 600 KB # Throttle traffic to 600KB/s RelayBandwidthBurst 1.2 MB # But allow bursts up to 1.2 MB/s rather than set a daily or monthly limit. The reason being that your server will stay up all the time instead of suddenly hibernating (essentially going offline) when it hits the cap.

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Re: [tor-relays] moving digital ocean
by Jan Nielsen 31 Jan '15

31 Jan '15

Digital ocean does not currently charge for going over your data limit. On Jan 31, 2015 1:51 PM, <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> wrote: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: entry guard interference? (starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx) > 2. Re: entry guard interference? (starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx) > 3. Re: Digital Ocean: Moving to better Plan (Abhiram Chintangal) > 4. Re: Consensus weight dropped (Bram de Boer) > 5. Re: Consensus weight dropped (starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx) > 6. Re: Consensus weight dropped (starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx) > 7. Re: Consensus weight dropped (Network Operations Center) > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 09:26:24 -0500 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] entry guard interference? > At 06:20 1/31/2015 -0500, grarpamp wrote: > >Yet during the time of an outage, you might try > >to leave the old tor running and. . . > > I see the idea here but it's a lot > of fiddling and preparation. If it > continues to happen and I suspect > a bug, I'll upgrade the relay > version and run 'tcpdump' with > a ring-buffer capture that holds > the last two or three hours of > traffic. Then I just have to > stop the 'tcpdump' and review what > happened. Look for ICMP "not > reachable," injected RST's etc. > > If my "just because your paranoid > doesn't mean they're not out to > get you" theory is correct, it > may never happen again. Certainly > the spooks of the world all read > the Tor mailing lists. > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 10:04:14 -0500 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] entry guard interference? > At 06:20 1/31/2015 -0500, grarpamp wrote: > >Yet during the time of an outage, you might try > >to leave the old tor running and. . . > > Also I see I should make a copy of the > cached-* files and the state file in > case some anomaly is present the Tor > routing data. > > I did look at Vidalia'a network map > at the time of the incident and the > list of relays on the left side looked > ok. On the right side something like > > <path> > <path> > etc > > appeared where client connections > normally are listed. > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Abhiram Chintangal <abhiram.chintangal(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 12:22:42 -0500 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Digital Ocean: Moving to better Plan > Hello Sebastian, > > Thanks for responding. > > On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 10:15 PM, Sebastian Urbach <sebastian(a)urbach.org> > wrote: > >> On January 31, 2015 2:09:14 AM Abhiram Chintangal < >> abhiram.chintangal(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi Abhiram, >> >> >>> I have been running a tor middle relay[1] for the past few months. >>> >> >> Thank you very much ! >> >> >>> One thing that I noticed in the last two months is that my relay is >>> eating >>> up the 1tb bandwidth in the first three weeks. So I am thinking of moving >>> to a better plan or tweaking the current config to serve the bandwidth so >>> that the relay is up for the entire month. >>> >> >> I assume that you want a recommendation. A better plan probably means >> spending more money. Would be better for the network. If you can spare the >> money, go for it. >> >> If you dont want to spend more money than it would be a good idea to >> lower the Rate value until you end up within your traffic limit for the >> month. The benefit would be a permanent available relay. >> > > Hmm, I think I will try changing the rate and see what happens. Last > year, I used a daily limit instead of monthly one. It drastically reduced > the relays reported bandwidth ( 1Mbps to 60 kbps ). > > Thanks! > > > -- >> Sincerely yours / Sincères salutations / M.f.G. >> >> Sebastian Urbach >> >> ----------------------------------------- >> Religion is fundamentally opposed to >> everything I hold in veneration - courage, >> clear thinking, honesty, fairness, and, >> above all, love of the truth. >> ----------------------------------------- >> Henry Louis Mencken (1880 - 1956), >> American journalist, essayist, magazine >> editor, satirist and critic. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> > > > > -- > Abhiram Chintangal > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Bram de Boer <list-tor-relays(a)nosur.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 20:54:42 +0100 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped > All, > > Consensus weight of my relays and those of others is still near zero, and > not improving. For a network that attempts to break censorship, it is > peculiar that this is getting so little attention. > > Apparently a few malfunctioning bwauth systems is enough to censor > specific Tor relays. Endless research and development effort is put in > tweaking and optimizing the relay-to-relay communication, but having only > a few systems in the world that determine the consensus weight of the > entire network does not seem to trouble anyone. Wierd. > > I hope the bwauth operators can find a way to correct the problem. I am > feeling silly spending good money on a high-end server with unmetered > bandwidth that has now been relaying a whopping 300 Kb/s on average during > the last five weeks. > > Thanks, > Bram > > > > Thank you all for looking into this. > > > > Karsten wrote: > >> You could start a second relay on the same physical machine on a > >> different port and see whether the bandwidth scanners pick that up. > >> Give it a day or two, and see if only tor26 and moria1 measure it. > > > > In fact, both the 7C3AE76BB9E9E6E4F2AE9270FD824DF54A944127 and > > E6D740ABFFAAAD8052EDF95B2C8DC4059763F365 relays operate on the same IP > > address. Both dropped to 0.000000%. > > > > However, other nodes in the same AS16265 are doing fine (e.g. > > B144DC5C08AF1FB3ABD729AFC2CF938CF63F78AC). This seems to suggest that the > > route between the bwauths and the relay is irrelevant and connectivity is > > not an issue. > > > > I can imagine that an overloaded bwauth occasionally skips a few relays. > > But wouldn't that be corrected automatically during the measurement the > > next day? Given that the relays are missing votes consistently during > many > > consecutive days, some other mechanism must be causing this. > > > > Would a quick-fix be to randomize the order in which relays are measured? > > That way, if a bwauth has trouble processing the entire list in 24h, > every > > day other relays are given a chance? > > > > Thanks, > > Bram > > > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 15:23:08 -0500 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped > At 20:54 1/31/2015 +0100, you wrote: > >Consensus weight of my relays and those of others > >is still near zero, and not improving. . . > > I read the earlier discussion around this > issue with interest. Have no specific > ideas about resolving the problem, but > I can recommend pulling the raw text > data files for the authority votes, > grep'ping your nodes, and looking at > the specific BWauth votes over time. > > The data is found here > > https://collector.torproject.org/archive/relay-descriptors/votes/ > > and while the files are a bit huge, > are easy to whack at with *nix > command line tools such as > egrep/awk/sed/perl etc. In a > pinch one might apply Excel to the > problem, but first trim the data > set down to size with a grep or your > desktop and Excel will choke and > die. > > I did this at the point where the > bandwidth for election to guard > status was increased greatly and > my node was shipped off to middle- > relay mediocrity. Could see > clearly how it all transpired, but > of course I could do nothing about > it short of spending more $$ on > bandwidth. > > With the raw data in hand, it will > be easier to campaign the operators > of the troublesome BWauths to correct > the problem. > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 15:32:23 -0500 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped > also, for recent data. . . > > https://collector.torproject.org/recent/ > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Network Operations Center <noc(a)schokomil.ch> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 21:51:12 +0100 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped > This has already been done. And I was under the impression that things > would be changing soon. I still find it weird that the network is ignoring > several nodes. > > On 31.01.2015 09:23 PM, starlight.2015q1(a)binnacle.cx wrote: > >> At 20:54 1/31/2015 +0100, you wrote: >> >>> Consensus weight of my relays and those of others >>> is still near zero, and not improving. . . >>> >> >> I read the earlier discussion around this >> issue with interest. Have no specific >> ideas about resolving the problem, but >> I can recommend pulling the raw text >> data files for the authority votes, >> grep'ping your nodes, and looking at >> the specific BWauth votes over time. >> >> The data is found here >> >> https://collector.torproject.org/archive/relay-descriptors/votes/ >> >> and while the files are a bit huge, >> are easy to whack at with *nix >> command line tools such as >> egrep/awk/sed/perl etc. In a >> pinch one might apply Excel to the >> problem, but first trim the data >> set down to size with a grep or your >> desktop and Excel will choke and >> die. >> >> I did this at the point where the >> bandwidth for election to guard >> status was increased greatly and >> my node was shipped off to middle- >> relay mediocrity. Could see >> clearly how it all transpired, but >> of course I could do nothing about >> it short of spending more $$ on >> bandwidth. >> >> With the raw data in hand, it will >> be easier to campaign the operators >> of the troublesome BWauths to correct >> the problem. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >

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Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped
by starlight.2015q1＠binnacle.cx 31 Jan '15

31 Jan '15

At 20:54 1/31/2015 +0100, you wrote: >Consensus weight of my relays and those of others >is still near zero, and not improving. . . I read the earlier discussion around this issue with interest. Have no specific ideas about resolving the problem, but I can recommend pulling the raw text data files for the authority votes, grep'ping your nodes, and looking at the specific BWauth votes over time. The data is found here https://collector.torproject.org/archive/relay-descriptors/votes/ and while the files are a bit huge, are easy to whack at with *nix command line tools such as egrep/awk/sed/perl etc. In a pinch one might apply Excel to the problem, but first trim the data set down to size with a grep or your desktop and Excel will choke and die. I did this at the point where the bandwidth for election to guard status was increased greatly and my node was shipped off to middle- relay mediocrity. Could see clearly how it all transpired, but of course I could do nothing about it short of spending more $$ on bandwidth. With the raw data in hand, it will be easier to campaign the operators of the troublesome BWauths to correct the problem.

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