- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

HW-Accelerated OpenSSL & Tor not playing nicely.
by 12xBTM 05 May '15

05 May '15

Probably (and hopefully) a very obvious fix for those that aren't newbies to Linux, but I'm trying to get Hardware-Accelerated OpenSSL to work with Tor on Jessie. I've gotten the Hardware-Accelerated OpenSSL part done, but the Tor part is giving me problems. I am able to successfully compile Tor by itself, and I'm able to successfully utilize OpenSSL by itself, but getting them to work together isn't working. So, I'll give a run-down of what I've done, and where I'm stuck: Info: Linux beaglebone 3.14.39-ti-r61 #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri Apr 24 18:32:15 UTC 2015 armv7l GNU/Linux Debian 8 Console Tor 2.6.7 Information Sources: https://superuser.com/questions/881404/beaglebone-black-openssl-crypto-acce… and http://datko.net/2013/10/28/tor_cryptodev/ Step 1: Getting OpenSSL to become Hardware-Accelerated sudo apt-get install linux-image-3.14.39-ti-r61 sudo apt-get install linux-headers-3.14.39-ti-r61 wget http://download.gna.org/cryptodev-linux/cryptodev-linux-1.7.tar.gz tar zxf cryptodev-linux-1.7.tar.gz cd cryptodev-linux-1.7/ sudo make sudo make install sudo depmod -a sudo modprobe cryptodev lsmod sudo sh -c 'echo cryptodev>>/etc/modules' cd ~ wget https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.2a.tar.gz tar zxf openssl-1.0.2a.tar.gz cd openssl-1.0.2a/ ls ./config -DHAVE_CRYPTODEV -DUSE_CRYPTDEV_DIGESTS shared sudo make sudo make install Step 2: Test OpenSSL: /usr/local/ssl/bin/openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc Results confirm hardware acceleration is functional Step 3: Making Tor use OpenSSL Added to /etc/apt/sources.list : deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org jessie main deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.2.6.x-jessie main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-experimental-0.2.6.x-jessie main Fixed the key nonsense sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install build-essential fakeroot devscripts sudo apt-get build-dep tor mkdir ~/debian-packages; cd ~/debian-packages sudo apt-get source tor cd tor-* And it's here where I believe the problem lies: sudo nano debian/rules Add the two lines as shown on the "guide" such that mine reads: override_dh_auto_configure: ! [ -e debian/micro-revision.i ] || cp debian/micro-revision.i src/or/micro-revision.i dh_auto_configure -- \ $(confflags) \ --enable-static-openssl \ --with-openssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl \ --prefix=/usr \ --mandir=\$${prefix}/share/man \ --infodir=\$${prefix}/share/info \ --localstatedir=/var \ --sysconfdir=/etc \ --disable-silent-rules \ --enable-gcc-warnings-advisory sudo debuild -rfakeroot -uc -us Error message after 35m: 15/359 TESTS FAILED. (0 skipped) Makefile:6429: recipe for target 'test' failed make[1]: *** [test] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/debian/debian-packages/tor-0.2.6.7/build' dh_auto_test: make -j1 test returned exit code 2 debian/rules:16: recipe for target 'build' failed make: *** [build] Error 2 dpkg-buildpackage: error: debian/rules build gave error exit status 2 debuild: fatal error at line 1376: dpkg-buildpackage -rfakeroot -D -us -uc failed My thoughts: I noticed on the Tor FAQ here: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#RelayMemory That adding the malloc flag it done using the ./configure option, while I used nano. If that's the problem, how do I use configure for adding the other flags such as OPenSSL dir and static openssl. Also, I noticed that the path I add to the configure is not quite the same as the path used to test openssl's functionality. Also, the tor confflag mentions static openssl, but the openssl ./configure talked about being shared. Also, does the ordering other confflags matter? Is it asking for a static openssl prior to learning the directory of the correct library? I'm just trying to brainstorm why I'm getting this one error. Looking at the test log, looks like there's some kind of error in the self-test of the cryptographic engine, yet it works in OpenSSL by itself? Any help would be appreciated, thanks. Super long test log: onion_handshake: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test.c:84: assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)) [onion_handshake FAILED] bad_onion_handshake: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test.c:158: assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)) [bad_onion_handshake FAILED] onion_queues: OK ntor_handshake: OK circuit_timeout: OK rend_fns: OK geoip: OK geoip_with_pt: [forking] OK stats: [forking] OK accounting/bwlimits: [forking] OK addr/basic: OK addr/ip6_helpers: OK addr/parse: OK addr/virtaddr: OK addr/localname: OK addr/dup_ip: OK addr/sockaddr_to_str: OK addr/is_loopback: OK addr/make_null: OK address/get_if_addrs_ifaddrs: [forking] OK address/ifaddrs_to_smartlist: OK address/get_if_addrs_ioctl: [forking] OK address/ifreq_to_smartlist: OK buffer/basic: [forking] OK buffer/copy: [forking] OK buffer/pullup: [forking] OK buffer/ext_or_cmd: [forking] OK buffer/allocation_tracking: [forking] OK buffer/time_tracking: [forking] OK buffer/zlib: [forking] OK buffer/zlib_fin_with_nil: [forking] OK buffer/zlib_fin_at_chunk_end: [forking] OK cellfmt/relay_header: OK cellfmt/begin_cells: OK cellfmt/connected_cells: OK cellfmt/create_cells: OK cellfmt/created_cells: OK cellfmt/extend_cells: OK cellfmt/extended_cells: OK cellfmt/resolved_cells: OK cellfmt/is_destroy: OK cellqueue/basic: [forking] OK cellqueue/circ_n_cells: [forking] OK channel/dumpstats: [forking] OK channel/flush: [forking] OK channel/flushmux: [forking] OK channel/incoming: [forking] OK channel/lifecycle: [forking] OK channel/lifecycle_2: [forking] OK channel/multi: [forking] OK channel/queue_impossible: [forking] OK channel/queue_size: [forking] OK channel/write: [forking] OK channeltls/create: [forking] OK channeltls/num_bytes_queued: [forking] OK channeltls/overhead_estimate: [forking] OK checkdir/perms: [forking] OK circuitlist/maps: [forking] OK circuitlist/rend_token_maps: [forking] OK circuitlist/pick_circid: [forking] OK circuitmux/destroy_cell_queue: [forking] OK config/resolve_my_address: [forking] OK config/addressmap: OK config/parse_bridge_line: OK config/parse_transport_options_line: OK config/parse_transport_plugin_line: [forking] OK config/check_or_create_data_subdir: [forking] OK config/write_to_data_subdir: [forking] OK config/fix_my_family: OK container/smartlist_basic: OK container/smartlist_strings: OK container/smartlist_overlap: OK container/smartlist_digests: OK container/smartlist_join: OK container/smartlist_ints_eq: OK container/bitarray: OK container/digestset: OK container/strmap: OK container/pqueue: OK container/order_functions: OK container/di_map: OK container/fp_pair_map: OK control/bucket_note_empty: OK control/bucket_millis_empty: OK control/sum_up_cell_stats: OK control/append_cell_stats: OK control/format_cell_stats: OK crypto/formats: OK crypto/rng: OK crypto/aes_AES: [forking] OK crypto/aes_EVP: [forking] OK crypto/sha: OK crypto/pk: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_crypto.c:427: assert(128 OP_EQ crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk2, data1, sizeof(data1), "Hello whirled.", 15, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)): 128 vs -1 [pk FAILED] crypto/pk_fingerprints: [forking] OK crypto/digests: OK crypto/dh: OK crypto/aes_iv_AES: [forking] OK crypto/aes_iv_EVP: [forking] OK crypto/base32_decode: OK crypto/kdf_TAP: OK crypto/hkdf_sha256: OK crypto/curve25519_impl: OK crypto/curve25519_impl_hibit: OK crypto/curve25519_wrappers: OK crypto/curve25519_encode: OK crypto/curve25519_persist: OK crypto/ed25519_simple: OK crypto/ed25519_test_vectors: OK crypto/ed25519_encode: OK crypto/ed25519_convert: OK crypto/ed25519_blinding: OK crypto/ed25519_testvectors: OK crypto/siphash: OK dir/nicknames: [forking] OK dir/formats: [forking] OK dir/routerparse_bad: OK dir/extrainfo_parsing: OK dir/parse_router_list: [forking] OK dir/load_routers: [forking] OK dir/load_extrainfo: [forking] OK dir/versions: [forking] OK dir/fp_pairs: [forking] OK dir/split_fps: OK dir/measured_bw_kb: [forking] OK dir/measured_bw_kb_cache: [forking] OK dir/param_voting: [forking] OK dir/v3_networkstatus: [forking] OK dir/random_weighted: OK dir/scale_bw: OK dir/clip_unmeasured_bw_kb: [forking] OK dir/clip_unmeasured_bw_kb_alt: [forking] OK dir/fmt_control_ns: OK dir/http_handling: OK dir/purpose_needs_anonymity: OK dir/fetch_type: OK dir/packages: OK dir/md/cache: [forking] OK dir/md/broken_cache: [forking] OK dir/md/generate: OK dir/md/parse: OK dir/md/reject_cache: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_basic: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_bad_dotexit: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_automap_ipv4: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_automap_ipv6: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_cached_dns_ipv4: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_cached_dns_ipv6: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_unmapped_virtual: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_reject_internal_reverse: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_automap_exit: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_exit: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion2: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion3: [forking] OK entryconn/rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion4: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_is_time_to_retry: [forking] OK entrynodes/choose_random_entry_no_guards: [forking] OK entrynodes/choose_random_entry_one_possibleguard: [forking] OK entrynodes/populate_live_entry_guards_1guard: [forking] OK entrynodes/populate_live_entry_guards_3guards: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_guards_parse_state_simple: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_guards_set_from_config: [forking] OK entrynodes/entry_is_live: [forking] OK guardfraction/parse_guardfraction_file_bad: [forking] OK guardfraction/parse_guardfraction_file_good: [forking] OK guardfraction/parse_guardfraction_consensus: [forking] OK guardfraction/get_guardfraction_bandwidth: [forking] OK guardfraction/should_apply_guardfraction: [forking] OK extorport/id_map: [forking] OK extorport/write_command: [forking] OK extorport/init_auth: [forking] OK extorport/cookie_auth: [forking] OK extorport/cookie_auth_testvec: [forking] OK extorport/handshake: [forking] OK hs/hs_desc_event: [forking] OK hs/pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node: [forking] OK hs/pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node: [forking] OK introduce/early_parse_v0: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v0 FAILED] introduce/early_parse_v1: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v1 FAILED] introduce/early_parse_v2: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v2 FAILED] introduce/early_parse_v3: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0)cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [early_parse_v3 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v0: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v0 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v1: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v1 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v2: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v2 FAILED] introduce/decrypt_v3: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0)cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [decrypt_v3 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v0: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v0 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v1: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v1 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v2: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v2 FAILED] introduce/late_parse_v3: cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0)cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:381: assert(r >= 0) FAIL ../src/test/test_introduce.c:305: assert(r > 0) [late_parse_v3 FAILED] nodelist/node_get_verbose_nickname_by_id_null_node: [forking] OK nodelist/node_get_verbose_nickname_not_named: [forking] OK oom/circbuf: [forking] OK oom/streambuf: [forking] OK options/validate: [forking] OK policy/router_dump_exit_policy_to_string: OK policy/general: OK pt/parsing: OK pt/protocol: OK pt/get_transport_options: [forking] OK pt/get_extrainfo_string: [forking] OK pt/configure_proxy: [forking] OK pt/get_pt_proxy_uri: [forking] OK relay/append_cell_to_circuit_queue: [forking] OK relaycell/resolved: [forking] OK replaycache/alloc: OK replaycache/badalloc: OK replaycache/free_null: OK replaycache/miss: OK replaycache/hit: OK replaycache/age: OK replaycache/elapsed: OK replaycache/noexpire: OK replaycache/scrub: OK replaycache/future: OK replaycache/realtime: OK routerkeys/write_fingerprint: [forking] OK routerlist/initiate_descriptor_downloads: OK routerlist/launch_descriptor_downloads: OK routerset/routerset_new: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_countryname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_is_list: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_needs_geoip: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_is_empty: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__null_set_or_null_set_list: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_null_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_no_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_digest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_no_digest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_null_digest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_addr: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_no_addr: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__set_and_null_addr: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__countries_no_geoip: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains__countries_geoip: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__only_flag_and_no_ccs: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__creates_set: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__add_unknown: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_add_unknown_ccs__add_a1: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_extendinfo: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_router: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_routerstatus: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_node__none: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_node__routerinfo: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_contains_node__routerstatus: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__no_routerset: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__list_with_no_nodes: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__list_flag_not_running: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__list: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__nodelist_with_no_nodes: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_get_all_nodes__nodelist_flag_not_running: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__geoip_not_loaded: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__no_countries: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__one_valid_country: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_refresh_counties__one_invalid_country: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_union__source_bad: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_union__one: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__malformed: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__valid_hexdigest: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__valid_nickname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__get_countryname: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_parse__policy: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_subtract_nodes: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_subtract_nodes__null_routerset: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_to_string: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__empty_empty: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__empty_not_empty: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__differing_lengths: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__unequal: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_equal__equal: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_free__null_routerset: [forking] OK routerset/routerset_free: [forking] OK scheduler/channel_states: [forking] OK scheduler/compare_channels: [forking] OK scheduler/initfree: [forking] OK scheduler/loop: [forking] OK scheduler/queue_heuristic: [forking] OK socks/4_unsupported_commands: [forking] OK socks/4_supported_commands: [forking] OK socks/5_unsupported_commands: [forking] OK socks/5_supported_commands: [forking] OK socks/5_no_authenticate: [forking] OK socks/5_auth_before_negotiation: [forking] OK socks/5_authenticate: [forking] OK socks/5_authenticate_with_data: [forking] OK socks/5_malformed_commands: [forking] OK status/count_circuits: [forking] OK status/secs_to_uptime: [forking] OK status/bytes_to_usage: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__fails: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__simple: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__not_in_consensus: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__calls_log_accounting: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__packaged_cell_fullness: [forking] OK status/log_heartbeat__tls_write_overhead: [forking] OK util/time: OK util/parse_http_time: OK util/config_line: OK util/config_line_quotes: OK util/config_line_comment_character: OK util/config_line_escaped_content: OK util/expand_filename: OK util/escape_string_socks: OK util/string_is_key_value: OK util/strmisc: OK util/pow2: OK util/gzip: OK util/datadir: OK util/memarea: OK util/control_formats: OK util/mmap: OK util/sscanf: OK util/format_time_interval: OK util/path_is_relative: OK util/strtok: OK util/di_ops: OK util/round_to_next_multiple_of: OK util/laplace: OK util/strclear: OK util/find_str_at_start_of_line: OK util/string_is_C_identifier: OK util/asprintf: OK util/listdir: OK util/parent_dir: OK util/ftruncate: OK util/exit_status: OK util/fgets_eagain: OK util/format_hex_number: OK util/format_dec_number: OK util/join_win_cmdline: OK util/split_lines: OK util/n_bits_set: OK util/eat_whitespace: OK util/sl_new_from_text_lines: OK util/envnames: OK util/make_environment: OK util/set_env_var_in_sl: OK util/read_file_eof_tiny_limit: OK util/read_file_eof_one_loop_a: OK util/read_file_eof_one_loop_b: OK util/read_file_eof_two_loops: OK util/read_file_eof_two_loops_b: OK util/read_file_eof_zero_bytes: OK util/write_chunks_to_file: OK util/mathlog: OK util/weak_random: OK util/socket: [forking] OK util/socketpair: [forking] OK util/socketpair_ersatz: [forking] OK util/max_mem: OK util/hostname_validation: OK util/ipv4_validation: OK util/logging/sigsafe_err_fds: [forking] OK util/logging/sigsafe_err: [forking] OK util/thread/basic: [forking] OK util/thread/conditionvar: [forking] OK util/thread/conditionvar_timeout: [forking] OK

3 8

T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by Matthew Finkel 05 May '15

05 May '15

Hi Ops, We recently began responding to t-shirt requests again. Sorry for the long silence. There's been a lot happening around here but not enough time or people to do everything, so the t-shirt requests simply remained untouched. But, despite the overload, t-shirts are important because they are a small token of our thanks and appreciation for making the network what it is today. We responded to around 70 t-shirt requests from relay operators in April, which comprised all requests for which we could verify (within reason) the request came from the person who controlled the qualifying relay. We still have another 20 requests where the requestor is not obviously the owner of the relay. Currently the content of a relay's Contact field is used, but this does not always provide enough (or any) information. For this case, we need an authentication mechanism which proves control of the relay but is something relay operators won't mind running. My currently plan is to ask relay operators to sign the fingerprint file which tor creates. The major disadvantage of this method is that it must be run as root (or a user with access to tor's data directory). The following process is the current plan, but does anyone have a better idea? Does it seem logical? ------------------------------------------------------------ When we receive a t-shirt request from someone who isn't obviously in control of the relay, we ask them to sign their fingerprint file with a unique salt. Assuming the path to their data dir is /var/lib/tor, we ask them to run: $ (echo -n "salt "; cat /var/lib/tor/fingerprint) | openssl sha256 \ -binary | openssl pkeyutl -inkey /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key \ -sign -pkeyopt digest:sha256 -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss \ -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:32 | openssl base64 > signed_fingerprint They send us both /var/lib/tor/fingerprint and signed_fingerprint. When we receive them, we confirm the fingerprint in the fingerprint file matches the qualifying relay. Then we retrieve the relay's public key from its descriptor and convert it into pkcs#8 format using: $ openssl rsa -pubin -in pubkey_pkcs1 -RSAPublicKey_in -out pubkey and then we verify the sig using following commands: $ (echo -n "salt "; cat fingerprint) | openssl sha256 -binary | \ openssl pkeyutl -pubin -verify -inkey pubkey -sigfile \ $(OUT=/tmp/signed_fingerprint_bin; base64 -d signed_fingerprint > \ ${OUT}; echo ${OUT}) -pkeyopt digest:sha256 -pkeyopt \ rsa_padding_mode:pss -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:32; rm \ /tmp/signed_fingerprint_bin; This should yield "Signature Verified Successfully". ------------------------------------------------------------ Another disadvantage of this is PSS wasn't implemented in openssl's apps until 1.0.1. I wonder how many relays are running on servers which are still using openssl 0.9.8 (and 1.0.0?). For these servers we can fallback on pkcs#1 v1.5 signatures. ------------------------------------------------------------ The signature can be created using a command similar to the one above: $ (echo -n "salt "; cat /var/lib/tor/fingerprint) | openssl dgst \ -sha256 | openssl rsautl -inkey /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key \ -sign | openssl base64 > signed_fingerprint Again, they provide /var/lib/tor/fingerprint and signed_fingerprint, and we verify using: $ test "$(openssl base64 -d -in signed_fingerprint | openssl rsautl \ -pubin -verify -inkey pubkey)" = "$((echo -n "salt "; cat \ fingerprint) | openssl dgst -sha256)"; echo $? In addition, again, we confirm the fingerprint in the fingerprint file matches the fingerprint of the qualifying relay. ------------------------------------------------------------ Originally I used a few bashisms which made these simpler, but for this I suspect portability is important. Sorry this is a bit long. Thanks, Matt

11 19

Enabling obfs4 and obfs3 on 80 and 443
by R-one 05 May '15

05 May '15

I have recently set up a bridge and was reading some old emails on the list. I found some instructions from s7r on setting up obfs4 and obfs3: > Sample torrc entry for enabling obfs4 and obfs3: > ExtORPort auto > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy > ServerTransportListenAddr obfs3 [::]:port > ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 [::]:port > > To make the bridge even better, you can bind obfs3 and obfs4 to lower > ports (< 1024), if you have them free, such as obfs3 on 80 and obfs4 > on 443 (for example). This seemed like a good idea (I am not running a web server). I am running tor 0.2.4.27, which does not seem to support ExtORPort. From some other recommended bridge setup I had previously set ORPort to 443. I tried changing my config to: ORPort auto ServerTransportListenAddr obfs3 0.0.0.0:80 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:443 (and doing the capabilities stuff, of course). This didn't work -- obfs4 complained that 443 was in use (is that because I had previously set it for ORPort?). So, for now, I have set obfs4 to a random high port. I will admit to being pretty confused about the recommended bridge setting for ORPort and the obfs ports (and what ExtORPort does differently). Does anyone have a recommendation for what I should do? Do I need to upgrade to tor 0.2.5?

2 1

Tor Relays Network Survey
by Zoe White 04 May '15

04 May '15

Hello everyone, I am doing a research project called “Understanding Anonymous Network” conducted at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The purpose of this project is to investigate what motivates people to participate in Tor project and to run the relay nodes. We also want to know what obstacles may hinder people to run relay(s). Our aim is to increase people’s participation in Tor network through understanding motivation. Your participation will help us have a better understanding about this issue. This survey will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. If you run Tor nodes and are willing to participate in this research project, please click the following link and start the survey! *https://uiuc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9GkkX5zGEkjQhx3* <https://uiuc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9GkkX5zGEkjQhx3> Thank you very much!!

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Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by teor 04 May '15

04 May '15

> Date: Mon, 04 May 2015 13:06:51 +0200 > From: Markus Hitter <mah(a)jump-ing.de> … > > The more demanding part of this is to collect the addresses, especially the software to do so. An application which formats them ready for printing, calculates the stamp required, perhaps also prints some customs stickers depending on destination. Here volunteers can easily help and there's no need to hide such discussions, because such software doesn't require the real data, can be written/tested with dummy data instead. All the trusted person (you) has to do is to run this software on the real data and hit the "print" button. Your post office or shipping company might have software like this already - and if it's done using their software, getting the stamps and stickers right is their responsibility, not yours. Of course, this software might not be free, in either sense of the word. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

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Determining geographical locations for a new exit relay would help most
by Seth 04 May '15

04 May '15

I'm standing up a new exit relay on the VULTR network. How would a person go about determining which location is in most need of additional exit relay capacity? Available locations: https://www.vultr.com/locations/ * Miami, Florida * Chicago, Illinois * New York / New Jersey * Dallas, Texas * Seattle, Washington * Atlanta, Georgia * Los Angeles, California * Silicon Valley, California * (AU) Sydney, Australia * (Asia) Tokyo, Japan * (EU) Amsterdam, NL * (EU) London, UK * (EU) Paris, France * (EU) Frankfurt, DE Also, curious to hear people's thoughts on any potential jurisdictional arbitrage benefits to be gleaned by choosing a location other than ones country of residence or citizenship. For the sake of argument, consider a VULTR account opened by U.S. citizen residing in the U.S. Choopa LLC (VULTR parent company) is also a US based company. http://start.cortera.com/company/research/k5o8lvm2j/choopa-llc/

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Why can't I see authorities bandwith stats
by Dedalo 04 May '15

04 May '15

Hi, I was making some changes in my relay configuration and I made some queries in GLOBE and ATLAS and something happened. I noticed that all authorities are not showing bandwidth stats from the last week and I was wondering why. Regards, Dedalo. -- twitter: @SeguridadBlanca Github: Dedal0 Blog: https://blog.dedalo.in

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Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by JovianMallard 04 May '15

04 May '15

Matt, Inspired by the options to confirm domain ownership with Google, Could you ask the relay operator to include a randomly generated (by you) token in their contact field? It may take a while to propagate and it requires action on the operator's part, but it's not difficult and I expect it provides the assurance you need. > On 05/03/2015 04:20 PM, Matthew Finkel wrote: >> On Sun, May 03, 2015 at 12:05:49PM -0700, Aaron Hopkins wrote: >>> On Sun, 3 May 2015, Matthew Finkel wrote: > >>> Or as Robert suggests, just send verification mail to the listed contact >>> address of the relay. If they don't list one on their config, find an >>> alternate verification mechanism like e-mailing whois contacts for the IP or >>> domain name, or refuse the request. >> >> I'd prefer not denying them a t-shirt because they don't want to publish >> an email address publically, but using whois seems like a stretch and >> usually ends at the hosting provider instead of the operator. >

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Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control
by teor 04 May '15

04 May '15

> Date: Sun, 3 May 2015 17:44:39 +0000 > From: Matthew Finkel <Matthew.Finkel(a)gmail.com> > … > > Another disadvantage of this is PSS wasn't implemented in openssl's > apps until 1.0.1. I wonder how many relays are running on servers which > are still using openssl 0.9.8 (and 1.0.0?). For these servers we can > fallback on pkcs#1 v1.5 signatures. OS X still ships with OpenSSL 0.9.8 by default. But Darwin is such a small fraction of the network, and it's less likely that a Darwin server would push enough data to get a t-shirt unless it had an OpenSSL version with aes-ni. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

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Drop in relay count
by Linus Nordberg 03 May '15

03 May '15

Hi, Looking at the graphs showing the number of relays in the network it seems like we've lost about 500 (-7%) relays since the beginning of this year. https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html?graph=networksize&start=201… https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html?graph=networksize&start=201… Looking at the graphs showing the total relay bandwidth of the network it seems like the advertised bandwidth has increased with about 25 Mbps (+23%). https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2015-01… https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2012-01… Seems a bit contradictory at first sight. A guess would be that a lower number of fast relays have replaced a higher number of slow ones but I haven't looked into it more. Anyone who's looked into this? And can back up their theory with some numbers. Thanks, Linus

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