- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

doesn't Tor 0.2.7.3_rc like IPv6 ?
by Toralf Förster 29 Sep '15

29 Sep '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Looking at the daily traffic stats got from my ISP I had an Incoming of 50 GB/day and Outgoing of 1.6 GB with version 0.2.6.10 whereas the -rc now gives 8 GB Incoming and 0.06 Outgoing. Anybody with similar experiences ? - -- Toralf, pgp key: 872AE508 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlYJjuYACgkQxOrN3gB26U5DngD/VSJ00A9sstKQ2PNPYrJcJNFZ b+m0SJ4BJK84b9Tt3kwA/jcbLwkgiteMjCTqBRRmAEti8SQtSolvY24wP0GR7Luv =HFDD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Library Freedom Project
by Kenneth Freeman 29 Sep '15

29 Sep '15

This institutional support for the Tor Project is extremely important. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_Freedom_Project The Tor Browser and Intellectual Freedom in the Digital Age https://journals.ala.org/rusq/article/view/5704/7092

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IP and SWIP for a Tor exit node
by starlight.2015q3＠binnacle.cx 27 Sep '15

27 Sep '15

>> (2) SWIP/RWHOIS + ARIN/RIPE >> >> SWIP'ing is a bit exotic though some ISPs provide it. >> Be sure to use a PO box in the contact info rather than >> your real address if you obtain this. > >This would be for privacy reasons, right? i.e. to avoid >advertising my own address? yes >What if I put there my university address? >(I am a PhD there and we can receive mail. . . Sure, that would work perfectly. >> Looked at Aruba offerings, check this out >> >> https://serverdedicati.aruba.it/server-dedicati/basic-1-3.aspx >> >Thanks very much for the advice. I will start >with the small VPS one, see how Aruba behaves >in terms of handling complaints and abuse >reports and if all goes well I will consider >the option above. If you do, try to find out exactly what CPU it will have and whether you can choose if more than one type exists; check them against this list: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Intel_Atom_microprocessors Several newer Atom CPUs have AES-NI instruction support. With AES-NI a 1.6 GHz will "punch above its weight" as a Tor relay. AES supports increases performance for Tor relays by about 2.5 times clock-cycle-for-clock-cycle. >Thank you for taking the time of looking into it. Your are welcome, good luck!

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IP and SWIP for a Tor exit node
by starlight.2015q3＠binnacle.cx 27 Sep '15

27 Sep '15

>I have bought some credit on Aruba. . . Looked at Aruba offerings, check this out https://serverdedicati.aruba.it/server-dedicati/basic-1-3.aspx For 15 euros/month you can have a dedicated dual-core 1.6GHz with 100MBPS unmetered traffic. This will make a rather nice exit node for the cost and will run better than a typical VPS where one has no control over system load. Even with the low clock-speed, network processing latency will be very good. Probably is an Atom or maybe a Celeron CPU and the it will probably run at close to 100%--not a problem. If one 'tor' instance does not use more than 30-40% of the 100MBPS due to limited CPU, fire up a second relay. Up to two relays can run on a single IP address. But if one 'tor' instance runs at 50-60% of bandwidth or better it would make sense to stick with just the one. Non-exit relays typically load at 25-35%; is the intentional design of the bandwidth allocation system. However due to the relative shortage of them, exits run more like 80% of useable bandwidth as determined by the BWauths.

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IP and SWIP for a Tor exit node
by starlight.2015q3＠binnacle.cx 27 Sep '15

27 Sep '15

(1) In the guide it is advised to "Get a separate IP for the node. . . You have the right idea. Tor-exit node IPs end up on all sorts of black-lists and it's best to segregate exit traffic from all other traffic. Try pulling up a few exits using http://multirbl.valli.org and you will see this. In particular, Tor exits usually test positive on http://www.abuseat.org/ (aka the Spamhaus CBL) as all sorts of infectious malware bot(s). (2) SWIP/RWHOIS + ARIN/RIPE SWIP'ing is a bit exotic though some ISPs provide it. Be sure to use a PO box in the contact info rather than your real address if you obtain this. What happens is that the handful of IP addresses assigned to your server get their own WHOIS sub-record listed first before the ISP address-block record. Has the advantage many abuse complaints will go directly to you instead of first to the ISP. At one time some residential ISPs SWIP'ed their customers by default, but this produced all kinds of problems and complaints so the practice is gone. Not necessary if you can manage a constructive dialog with the abuse department of the ISP. Start with an email to the address that http://www.abusix.org/ lists for the IP and ask them what procedures they might have where you can have abuse reports forwarded directly to you and/or have the IP noted as a Tor Exit / VPN / Proxy in whatever system they have for handling abuse reports. Most abuse reports are automated spam from WordPress blogs complaining about brute-force password attacks and automatic malware-detecting honeypots. If you hear from a real person it will be extraordinary.

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IP and SWIP for a Tor exit node
by starlight.2015q3＠binnacle.cx 27 Sep '15

27 Sep '15

>What are additional IPs good for? My ISP sells additional >(public) IPs for 3,60 euro/month, would it be worth it or >necessary purchasing such an additional service? For the size node presently indicated, additional IP address are of no particular value. Extra IPs can be use for 1) running additional 'tor' router instances on medium-to-large multi-core servers with high available bandwidth (high as in 100TB/month per core for non-AES-NI CPU cores, multiple 1G connections or a 10G network connection for AES-NI CPUs) 2) allowing exit traffic to travel out on different interfaces than the OR port--not sure if that provides extra value 3) perhaps running a bridge node instance along with the router instance--is best to have non-adjacent IPs 4) for bridge-only setups extra IPs allow one to start new bridge instances when old ones are blocked by censors and/or simply run multiple bridges; again non-contiguous addresses are best If you can obtain a "bare-metal," "root" or "dedicated" server (synonyms) for a good price, in general the router will be dramatically faster due to better latency afforded by the lack of a virtualization layer and lack of competition from other users. Similar for Linux container setups where virtualization is almost free, but servers can be heavily loaded with numerous customers.

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Blutmagie is Good Looking and VERY SLOW -- this script is VERY FAST
by starlight.2015q3＠binnacle.cx 27 Sep '15

27 Sep '15

one more enhancement: added a -W option to have underscore characters used for inactive flag positions. Produces a single column for flags, thus enabling trivial command-line 'awk' and 'perl -n' scripting.

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new exit node
by support＠ruggedinbox.com 26 Sep '15

26 Sep '15

Hi we are running from few hours a new Tor exit node: 87.120.37.163 aka tor-exit-node-01.cryptonoid.com aka cryptonoid.com We couldn't register the IP with ARIN but of course the data center knows what we are doing and is willing to take the risk, we hope to be able to handle the abuses notices and are here to learn :) The current configuration is: ORPort 9001 Address tor-exit-node-01.cryptonoid.com Nickname cryptonoid01 RelayBandwidthRate 768 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 1024 KB ContactInfo RuggedInbox team <support(a)ruggedinbox.com> DirPort 9030 DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html ExitPolicy accept *:22 ExitPolicy accept *:80 ExitPolicy accept *:443 ExitPolicy accept *:465 ExitPolicy accept *:993 ExitPolicy accept *:995 ExitPolicy reject *:* Does it looks good to you ? Currently both https://torstatus.blutmagie.de and https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/87.120.37.163 show the server as 'relay', not as exit. Is that normal ? Thank you, RuggedInbox team

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Flipping from guard and back again
by 29230912＠tutanota.com 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/113FCC01A29B4600A8BAA1CB72E6AB1FD899A… Any pointers about why my relay is flipping between guard and not guard? Thank you

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Legal status of operating Tor exit in UK?
by Jonathan Baker-Bates 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

I run an exit node with an ISP who initially indicated they would not have a problem with Tor as long as I was transparent about what I was doing, and ran a sufficiently reduced exit policy. They have now sent me evidence of malicious traffic coming from the exit. I don't think they've had any 3rd party complaints about this traffic, but they have expressed various misgivings about Tor in general. They now also want me to consider running Snort IDS on the outgoing traffic. I don't intend to monitor my traffic. But it occurs to me I don't know whether my ISP needs to be worried about it or not. The last one wasn't, so why them? I've asked the EFF about the legal situation in the UK, who passed me to the Open Rights Group. They've not replied to my enquiry as of three weeks ago. So does anyone know of any reliable source of information on running Tor exits in the UK? What would happen if my ISP pressed me to monitor my traffic, and I refused on legal grounds? I'm not suggesting I actually do that, or that there are even any legal grounds to refuse. In fact right now I'm resigned to closing down the node if my ISP turns up the heat. They probably have me by the balls. But I'm at least curious, and can't immediately find any information about things like public carrier status, or traffic monitoring conducted by people like me when it's done in the context of onion routing. Thanks in advance for any help.

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