- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

intense DDOS of exit relay from China
by Dhalgren Tor 22 Mar '16

22 Mar '16

FYI tor-relays Exit was DDOSed yesterday at 18:00 UTC. The attack was intense enough that the ISP null-routed the server for 16 hours, which has never happened before. Have seen a handful of brief DDOS attacks (about 15 minutes) in the past but none were so intense as this one. All traffic originated from China.

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Running 5000 relays...
by nusenu 21 Mar '16

21 Mar '16

Moritz wrote: > Maybe this is better taken to tor-relays. Ok. url to the tor-dev thread: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-March/010473.html Brian didn't say anything about planed deployment locations, but if _all_ relays are within a single /16 network you might skip MyFamily altogether, but I assume they are not. > In my case machines have a lifecycle. They come and they > go out of curiosity: What percentage of them do you expect to be online concurrently? (starting when) Are planing to rekey when "coming back" or resume with the former? > On 03/05/2016 10:31 PM, Brian "redbeard" Harrington wrote: >> "Lets say you are about to deploy 100 relays within the next week." - >> Take this an order of magnitude greater and we're on the right track >> with the correct scale. It is a regular occurrence for our users to >> deploy 500 to 5000 nodes at a time. This is why I said "and maybe set yourself an upper boundary as to how big you want to grow" A single entity deploying 5000 relays isn't very sane at the current network size I guess, but instead of speaking of relay counts using CW fraction/exit/guard probability as upper boundaries makes more sense. <10% might be a worthy upper boundary for exit/guard probability. The biggest (known) exit operator is currently at 7-8% exit probability. teor wrote: > And there's likely some limit on MyFamily or on descriptor size that would stop > you listing 1000 fingerprints. That is actually another good use-case for replacing the current MyFamily design with something that scales better with family size like Mike's proposed design (#5565), but we did not see declared families that big so far. It was no problem in practice. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n364 > Server descriptors may not exceed 20,000 bytes in length; [...] If they do, the > authorities SHOULD reject them. So the max family size would be something around 400 relays? (20000 - 1250) / 42 = 446 (1250 bytes was the size of a non-exit sample descriptor without family) > generating 1000 relay keys and coordinating that key > distribution dance across the same number of nodes (more than likely in > highly distributed environments) seems to bring more questions than it > answers (securing the keys for those nodes, securely distributing them, > etc) What problems do you expect when generating and transferring 1000 relay keys? (besides the descriptor limit) ... but before trying to solve any problems it is probably best to answer the question whether a single entities should run >5% CW fraction at all. > There are about 7000 relays in > total, with over 1000 of them (almost 40% of the capacity) at only three > ASes. Top 3 ASes currently account for 32% cw fraction. https://compass.torproject.org/#?exit_filter=all_relays&links&sort=cw&sort_… but the top 1000 relays account for >72% cw fraction https://compass.torproject.org/#?exit_filter=all_relays&links&sort=cw&sort_…

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TheOnionBox v2.1 released!
by Ralph Wetzel 20 Mar '16

20 Mar '16

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Exitmap module to count CloudFlare CAPTCHAs
by Philipp Winter 20 Mar '16

20 Mar '16

I wrote an exitmap module [0] that can tell us how many exit relays see a CloudFlare CAPTCHA when connecting to a given site. First, I ran the module for coreos.com because it uses CloudFlare, but the owner configured it to whitelist Tor. Indeed, only one out of 864 exit relays saw a CAPTCHA: <https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/7DD29A65C370B86B5BE706EA3B1417745714C…> Next, I ran the module for cloudflare.com, which does not seem to whitelist Tor. 638 (75%) exit relays saw a CAPTCHA and 211 (25%) didn't. [0] <https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/phw/exitmap.git/tree/src/modules/cloudfl…> Cheers, Philipp

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GoDaddy null-routing Tor Exit IPs
by Dhalgren Tor 20 Mar '16

20 Mar '16

FYI Tor-Relays GoDaddy AS26496 is null-routing selected Tor Exits, presumably in response to abuse originating from them. Know of two thus far FE67A1BA4EF1D13A617AEFB416CB9E44331B223A 2016/01/26 ashtrayhat3 A0F06C2FADF88D3A39AA3072B406F09D7095AC9E 2016/03/16 Dhalgren though probably more exist. Appears to affect faster relays. Affected relays running 'unbound' for DNS may experience total DNS request freeze and should switch to 'named' to mitigate the failure. Null-route seems to be manual and persist for indeterminate time. Null-routed IPs will not be able to ping or connect to address listed in the report at http://www.cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-report?v=4&as=AS26496 Information on how this was discovered can be found at #18580: exit relay fails with 'unbound' DNS resolver when lots of requests time-out https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18580

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please send me the hosters you use
by harvie josh 20 Mar '16

20 Mar '16

Hello! I'm spending quite some time in finding new cost-efficient VPS hoster in "unpopular" countries (non-exit). The relay community would actually have a lot information to provide in that regard - I think. I would really appreciate if you can share any hoster that provides VPSes with the following properties: * cost efficiency: at least 4 MBit/s per $ / month (min 20MBit/s) * not located in NL, FR, DE, US, GB, AS16276, Digital Ocean ASes * KVM or Xen based (no OpenVZ) * unmetered or at least 7TB/month outbound * proper https for customer area (reboot functionality, console access, ...) * English customer area You can also help by adding hoster information to your contactinfo field: ISP:<url to hoster> so others can find that (sometimes it isn't easy to find the hoster based on IP/AS information). So far I made good experience with itldc.com + price + reliable + SSH pub key pre-polulated in VPS + custom ISO possible + greate CPU performance in UA DC - plaintext root password in email mixed experience with seflow.it - almost regular outages - poor support (response time and know-how) - unable to provide correct billing information for hourly billed VPSes (start-stop times) ~ CPU performance + price (especially memory) + root password not disclosed via plaintext email unusable hoster ----------------------- alexhost.md Unreliable; to many outages serverastra.com no https coolhousing.net no https server.ua no https prohoster.info OVH reseller layeronline.com OVH reseller vmline.pl polish interface only unixhost.pro poor CPU/network performance (<15MBit/s) www.hosteasy.eu passport copy required ablenet.jp passport copy required albahost.net simply failed to provide working VPS vinahost.vn international traffic limited to 10MBit/s www.infiumhost.com no proper https (self-signed cert) alphavps.bg metered <1TB/month xserver.ua customer area language vps.ua customer area language Rx-name.ua no reaction to email request If you can not suggest specific hoster but good sites to find new hoster that is also great, like: https://www.exoticvps.com/ https://www.lowendtalk.com/ https://www.webhostingtalk.com -- harvie josh

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What IPs does Torbrowser need?
by Martin Kepplinger 19 Mar '16

19 Mar '16

Hi Imagine a router that want to only whitelist the IP addresses that Torbrowser needs to work. What IPs would it need (for start up and browsing) ? * Guards * Authorities * HSDir flagged relays (?) and would such a whitelisting of IPs even work? At least I think DNS can be ignored as it is routed over Tor too. Any more thoughts? ps: please leave me in CC as I'm not on the tor-talk list. thanks!! martin

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fast exits running 'unbound' should switch to 'named'
by Dhalgren Tor 19 Mar '16

19 Mar '16

Bug #18580: exit relay fails with 'unbound' DNS resolver when lots of requests time-out https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18580

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unbound bogs down strangely, degrading exit relay
by Dhalgren Tor 19 Mar '16

19 Mar '16

Hit a repeat of an earlier incident: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-January/008621.html message from tor daemon is Resolved [scrubbed] which was already resolved; ignoring About 5400 of these messages over 37 hours, during which the relay dropped down to 30% of usual load and did not work for Tor Browser when the exit was specifically set. Unlike the earlier incident, DNSSEC was disabled. Probably the IP address for root-server H was incorrect because it changed in December and 'unbound' was built in September. Just installed and configured the current 'named.root' hints file. Both "iterator" and "validator" modules were loaded, though validation was disabled. Changed the config to load only "iterator". Unbound 1.5.4, tor 0.2.6.10. Running 164 days. If I see this again I'm planning to attempt purging the 'unbound' request queue with unbound-control dump_requestlist >reqlist.snap unbound-control flush_requestlist and if that doesn't work, bouncing 'unbound' without stopping the 'tor' daemon. Interesting stats were recorded, starting with the good pre-incident entries: Mar 11 05:53 notice: sendto failed: Invalid argument notice: remote address is 0.0.0.1 port 53 ...repeated 4 times Mar 15 17:45 server stats for thread: 1029423 queries, 415824 answers from cache, 613599 recursions, 0 prefetch server stats for thread: requestlist max 132 avg 22.5692 exceeded 0 jostled 0 average recursion processing time 4.070100 sec Mar 16 05:46 Resolved [scrubbed] which was already resolved; ignoring Mar 16 17:45 server stats for thread: 1162172 queries, 287662 answers from cache, 874510 recursions, 0 prefetch server stats for thread: requestlist max 421 avg 198.684 exceeded 0 jostled 0 average recursion processing time 25.833646 sec Mar 16 21:08 notice: sendto failed: Invalid argument notice: remote address is 0.0.0.1 port 53 ...repeated 4 times Mar 17 16:52 notice: sendto failed: Invalid argument notice: remote address is 0.0.0.1 port 53 ...repeated 4 times Mar 17 17:45 server stats for thread: 1078496 queries, 144557 answers from cache, 933939 recursions, 0 prefetch server stats for thread: requestlist max 459 avg 296.668 exceeded 0 jostled 0 average recursion processing time 40.621863 sec service stopped (unbound 1.5.4). Mar 17 19:28 server stats for thread: 53991 queries, 3455 answers from cache, 50536 recursions, 0 prefetch server stats for thread: requestlist max 342 avg 290.977 exceeded 0 jostled 0 average recursion processing time 35.947563 sec If anyone has seen this or knows anything please comment. Tried searching but came up with nothing but thread referenced above.

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Re: [tor-relays] Bandwidth Fallen Off Drastically
by stealth＠nym.mixmin.net 15 Mar '16

15 Mar '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Mon, 14 Mar 2016 19:29:58 +0000, you wrote: > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Bandwidth Fallen Off Drastically (stealth(a)nym.mixmin.net) > 2. Re: Bandwidth Fallen Off Drastically (Daryl Styrk) > 3. Re: Bandwidth Fallen Off Drastically (s7r) > 4. Re: Bandwidth Fallen Off Drastically (Sebastian Niehaus) > 5. Re: Running 5000 relays... (Brian 'redbeard' Harrington) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 3 > Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 19:45:06 +0200 > From: s7r <s7r(a)sky-ip.org> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Bandwidth Fallen Off Drastically > Message-ID: <56E6F8A2.5030903(a)sky-ip.org> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" > > Hello, > > Your relay seams fine on atlas: > > http://atlas777hhh7mcs7.onion/#details/A290A9E71ADFC2FB1C80E64EF851A4B90545… > > > It has an observed bandwidth of 582.23 KB/s > Advertised bandwidth of 512 KB/s > and burst 716.8 KB/s > > Which is exactly as per your configuration. > > The consensus weight is 613, which is totally normal for this value of > observed bandwidth. > > Tip: if you are on a limited bandwidth plan, better set AccountingMax > and do not cap the speed via RelayBandwidthRate / RelayBandwidthBurst. > Instead let it run at its maximum speed for less than an entire month > rather than capping it to few KB/s to ensure maximum n GB/TB are > consumed within a month. > In a previous post someone recommended that I try to reduce my bandwidth to allow my relay to stay active 24/7 x 31 days. This is why I removed the AccountingMax setting and reduced my RelayBandwidthRate to 500kb/s and RelayBandwidthBurst to 700kb/s. What concerns me is that while running arm in graph mode, I rarely see the bandwidth rate steadily flow around 500kb/s. With a 3tb bandwidth limit per month, following your recommendations, would you recommend that my AccountingMax be set to 55gb per day up and down and turn off RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst? This will probably mean that the bandwidth will be used up within the first 10-12 hours of each day and my relay will be in hibernation for the remaining portion of that 24 hours. This hibernation period appears to affect the uptime statistics, which means my middle consensus numbers will drop as a consequence. I'm trying to figure out what's the secret sauce here to keep the relay running 24/7 and stay within my 3tb bandwidth limitation. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.15 (MingW32) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJW5yi+AAoJEH1gNwhiMDZubTgQAJuj6EdfLZsyPsLxfeiLA2nh w52jJLO3yXg+InJ4IzoSaHzbXsqdUuSmj7RxOsgTr9K1xflX3XkdNmlWYkhs005F JNMGyglnOb3LlSbJ9fxspZH1KOhwJwy9ZJrHGRqVRXrAC7VBMpJ016TEcFNL3daL J98LhZuyN5Iecm0k9LhuxoZ0YfnCc03qpkUJDMiM0khsXfoesFWd+Zdss/Igj2aC mVcE+BMKvO8gHATdVytvHvqqZ07unIAV6mRkw/c/NBqRh07xX6qEJwoDANCEvfS6 7NGQZpgEVWw2lT2GPj5T4WGmEPN6CAfCJTE7fJG1IA1j4iLNgHwRM7kKxQpFWpVa CAwE8wgc9BxFYCVg8Kzjr/PDJO7mNLFRH3yXXJ9dTo6qS+GRxdZEYTH6FaNc9ERP W9/hnv18bo0IuQ+o8+sMtzDbAbyyPXDeSbx2qHOzxuTJkzLPkq2t8W2HX5kiurZ8 MIkdkJH+bc71EwV1YBzb/Ca4/kdqTRqEMJzXFtn8wq6fa1uRxDC1S7Su374y4fTy C1OmTfURhKhK39yVFVJrKqINsgE1GQnKikE2DCMlbrp+IFaItrDOg+gx81mO7WkK /KbpxnKJotLxIxBX12j0T6CYyGKQio6SSTbI0iObsXJNpEkQCX+jPp3GDDcWPzlK p/XtNor8MXQS1u96hpwP =z+T6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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