- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt
by Dakota Hourie 09 Dec '16

09 Dec '16

Also been looking for a T-shirt. I would even be willing to buy it! How do I contact Jon? - Dakota Hourie Outfall Exits Operator

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Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
by Rana 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.

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Creanova hosting Finland
by Sec INT 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

Hi Please dont use this group if you are planning to - although they apparently support Tor they dont. I was running a reduced reduced exit policy with spamhaus listings and only got 2 complaints from security bots but they suspended the vps both times with no warning - now its offline altogether with no warning or email at all. Not to mention they are rude and over reactedto the most minor abuse reports (no dmca etc due to reduced exit policy) Support person emails like he used to be in the NKVD Cheers Mark B

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Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
by myflyrybr 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

Trying to hide exit nodes would have little effect on censorship. I believe a more effective approach would be just do the same the vpngate guys did to beat the chinese firewall. Just mix in the published list some essential or high popularity IPs (ex. DNS servers...) as if they were relays. That would send the censors in a goose-chase when a lot of people start complaining about the block. The cost to censor is raised considerably. They would have to check every relay address before adding it to a blacklist, or risk breaking popular services. It's just not worth the trouble.

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how to distribute pgp public key?
by Univibe 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

If I want to include a reference to my public PGP key on Atlas using the ContactInfo field on my relays, what's the best way to do it? Should I upload my key to some of the public keyservers and then list the fingerprint on Atlas? If so which keyservers are recommended? I had a thought to publish it on my relay's DirPort (using DirPortFrontPage and a simple html doc containing the public key). Then I could just provide a link to the DirPort in ContactInfo. Is there a better way to do this?

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Re: [tor-relays] Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP
by Tristan 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

Stop it, both of you. This is not the place for a flame war. If this were a forum, the topic would be locked. Can we just have a normal conversation and get back to what this mailing list is actually used for? On Dec 7, 2016 5:29 AM, "Rana" <ranaventures(a)gmail.com> wrote: There's an alternative interpretation but mentioning in reply to your message would be... rude :-) -----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Ralph Seichter Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 12:59 PM To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP On 07.12.2016 10:56, Rana wrote: > Calling "rude" people who, to make a point, use a bit of obvious and > harmless humor, is rude. Your getting on other people's nerves must *obviously* be the fault of other people. Welcome to Trump World. :-) -Ralph _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Is my exit affected by a botnet?
by Volker Mink 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

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Re: [tor-relays] relays with dynamic IP - here Rasp2
by Roman Mamedov 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

On Wed, 7 Dec 2016 11:13:54 +0200 "Rana" <ranaventures(a)gmail.com> wrote: > But is it possible to tell Tor on which cores to run? I mean, install a 2nd > instance of Tor and tell it to run on the two cores not used by the first > instance? The Linux kernel will sort it out automatically. Deciding optimally which programs get to run on which cores is the kernel's job. It's also possible to pin programs to specific cores using "schedtool", but that's more of an advanced tuning trick: not something you should need as the first thing you do, but you could look into that if you get to the point when both of them use 100% CPU, and you want to micro-optimize things a bit further. -- With respect, Roman

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Circuits from Tor relay?
by Rana 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

Arm reports that my relay has 15 circuits connected to my (middle only) relay. Some of the circuits have one middle relay and some of them have two. All the circuits are FROM my relay to exit nodes, and all have the same guard (first) relay. My relay has a small number of inbound connections and a minuscule number of outbound connections (it is a very new relay as I wiped out and restarted my old one a day and a half ago). Most of the inbound connections are from DurAuths. What are all these circuits??? Why would a middle relay build full circuits to exit nodes?

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Call for Tor Fallback Directories
by teor 07 Dec '16

07 Dec '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Dear Tor Relay Operator, Your relay(s) can help tor clients find the tor network by becoming a fallback directory mirror.[0] These mirrors are hard-coded into tor's source code, like the directory authorities. We have 80 fallbacks, but we want 200 for the next release. Fallbacks need to have: - - the same IP address(es) and ports for the next 2 years, - - the same relay identity key for the next 2 years, - - good uptime (at least 95%), and - - good bandwidth and network connectivity (we estimate an extra 25GB per month). Please email me to add your relays that fit these criteria to the list. If you are BCC'd on this email, it looks like you have at least one relay that could become a fallback. You can also email me if you know your relay will be changing address or key, and I'll make sure we don't choose it. We are keeping the fallback lists from the last release[1][2]. So if you have emailed me before about becoming a fallback, there is no need to email again. But please let me know if your relay details have changed. (I did not BCC relay operators who are already on the fallback lists, unless their relay details changed.) In a week or two, I will run a script to select the hard-coded list for the release. If you're interested, here's some background to this request: The latest list[3] and log[4] of candidates was generated using the instructions in [5] from scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py on my GitHub branch[6]. (This branch has some bug fixes compared to what's in master.) We're tracking this work in [7]. [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/FallbackDirectoryMirrors [1]: https://github.com/teor2345/tor/blob/fallbacks-029-v2/scripts/maint/fallbac… [2]: https://github.com/teor2345/tor/blob/fallbacks-029-v2/scripts/maint/fallbac… [3]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/18828/potential_… [4]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/18828/potential_… [5]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectory… [6]: https://github.com/teor2345/tor/blob/fallbacks-029-v2/scripts/maint/updateF… [7]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18828 T - -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYQ+laAAoJEEUMun+WjwlLXd8QAMVKWrGW+N5ij5/1k1AEDQpC qMK3C3stukeuHYqLEU3GnhJFU/CWMp+iThRNueC5I96MEpcioJDQaCDK6aGEvTY3 efPnYwOJcgE7v4up+JSFWUlO4HcF5Fu5cSVl710JjRiHuZAyLOQw0rWEMzfp0OQp sZLgijbtCUCcels7IS+bE89y4KKQvLu5lz+H7cPIcsx4TJ4QHd5LbWuvtNIHE2lW zA3LlrYsO4vtrFs/0kBWku1u7l1ZhD0Un/lwY7JWaxGmwm9C6kJDFwBFCGYRlakF VLfsoVSgcdjQPkZV9jeL0X+9Wn9L6zZ5JNhM5lhYYpGVD+Rl/apPfhxHI5aOTsGe WRcDjxvgUdMD//xnk2XTmnzKCNUNMyUKGSL8Y7Fadp7+dLLkWlovEp6iOnyAffh1 ZnrV7dhRgH3NcgACDpQ2rAqVzUnhdn1//bcD1MlXjObxvZD1Io1zp7CDQHnG6IaG ydc+3qoqUoII0JQFxrRCFi2cH/E8+3x0+7fC0g91irdGG+Pcosf7IFPJvFsdilCg rN4n6Ohmm1L3KQVWLG7TcvEAcjIeyMurhCvK042Q/X7HYenVS3wVxawd8dnb/rOl 0ItMUsXBKgLVcZXhzUTOB+pNaX8aFj1sJnCB2LRDT8s8a2+zESufNxjgGYZ3Nduk FziDqhHJs7MXyX0HPJPH =omox -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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