- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

consensus-health
by Felix 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

https:// consensus-health.torproject.org/ (observed 2017-01-03 16:00:00 and 2017-01-03 17:00:00) shows * dannenberg: Missing entirely from consensus * faravahar: Missing Signature! Valid-after time of auth's displayed consensus: 2017-01-03 15:00:00 * moria1: Sees only 2620 relays running Is https:// lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2017-January/date.html ok ? -- imho - like always

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] Speed up of reconnections after IP Address change
by balbea16 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi ThereI've just written a simple bash script which verifies (in a while loop) every 2 minutes if the OR address has been changed by my ISP. If so, it stops and then restarts the Tor service again. Then it sleeps for 24 hours and starts the 2 minute loop again. Not very sophisticated, but it might work. Mike

2 1

how to generate relay keys manually (before actually running the relay)
by nusenu 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

>> Tipp: If you are planing to grow beyond your 31 relays I recommend >> you preemptively generate the keys for your upcoming relays so you >> don't have to touch all other relays everytime you add a single >> relay (to the MyFamily line). > How do you pregenerate keys? Id be interested as Im spinning up > quite a few soon create a folder per tor instance: mkdir future-relay1 future-relay2 ... then invoke tor manually (this will just generate keys and exit after that): tor --PublishServerDescriptor 0 --orport auto --list-fingerprint --datadirectory future-relay1 --Log "err stdout" tor --PublishServerDescriptor 0 --orport auto --list-fingerprint --datadirectory future-relay2 --Log "err stdout" ... In these folders you will then find the fingerprint that you can use in MyFamily, so you don't have to touch your existing relays anymore once you actually use these generated keys on new relays. Make sure you take care of filesystem permissions when using these keys on the actual relay.

2 1

Container tor relay
by Sec INT 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Had a search but cant find much info on running tor relays in containers specifically by proxmox lxc containers - I have a free server atm but dont really want to spinup a load of vms when I could do containers instead - its a load test for me but would mean quite a few relays running with gbps network card (all their own ip's) Anyone tried this yet? Cheers Mark B Snaptor.co.uk (non commercial)

1 0

what to expect with baby exitnodes?
by stinkyonion＠sigaint.org 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

well the subject sums it up really I couldn't find a solid explanation. I believe it was ARMA that explained the life cycle of a relay, so I'm curious does this apply for exit nodes? thanks for the clarification

2 1

what to expect with baby exitnodes?
by stinkyonion＠sigaint.org 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

well the subject sums it up really I couldn't find a solid explanation. I believe it was ARMA that explained the life cycle of a relay, so I'm curious does this apply for exit nodes? thanks for the clarification

1 0

Speed up of reconnections after IP Address change
by balbea16 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi There,I only have a dynamic IP address and my ISP changes it almost every time after 24 hours. It is somehow sad to see 1.400 connections drop to almost none. After the change it takes 20 minutes until my OR notices this (our IP Address has changed from ...). It than takes another hour until the connections start to actualy rebuild. This means it takes more than an hour (every per day) to reach the normal operating Mode. Is there any way to speed up this process? Could adjust the torrc script for instance? TNX Mike

4 3

Re: [tor-relays] Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP
by balbea16 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi There I evaluated some relays with newly assigned (red) guard flags. All of them had already the stable flag assigned. And (so far I could see) all of them had (almost) static IP addresses. In my case, this may be the reason why I don't get a guard flag. My ISP changes it every 24 hours. However, I'd be fine with "just" operating a fast middle node. I will keep an eye on this. Mike

3 4

_AceLewis tor relays: please specify 'MyFamily' in your torrc
by nusenu 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Hi Lewis, thanks for adding your 6 tor relays to the network! Please do not forget to set the MyFamily parameter in your torrc configuration to tell clients your relays belong to a single operator. If you need help with the MyFamily option let us know. thanks, nusenu +------------+-----------+-----------------+----------------+ | first_seen | nickname | IP | eMyFamilyCount | +------------+-----------+-----------------+----------------+ | 2016-12-27 | acelewis4 | 138.197.131.213 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis | 188.226.129.48 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis3 | 207.154.205.226 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis5 | 139.59.160.33 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis6 | 139.59.42.48 | NULL | | 2016-12-27 | acelewis2 | 139.59.252.170 | NULL | +------------+-----------+-----------------+----------------+

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Grizzly Steppe
by rush23＠gmx.net 02 Jan '17

02 Jan '17

By the way Jerry Gamblin checked the list against the tor exit nodes and found 191 that have been used in this hacking... There you can find his thread with the whole listing.. https://twitter.com/JGamblin/status/814627227656683521 Regards 0x23 Am 2. Januar 2017 09:39:50 MEZ schrieb tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: >Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > >To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > >You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > >When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > >Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Grizzly Steppe (Rana) > > >---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Message: 1 >Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 10:39:40 +0200 >From: "Rana" <ranaventures(a)gmail.com> >To: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> >Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Grizzly Steppe >Message-ID: <03ed01d264d3$c4700b40$4d5021c0$(a)gmail.com> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > >My bet is that the recorded IP address dates back to the days when your >node >was an exit. Naturally the Russian hackers have used Tor, probably in >tandem >with a VPN - it would have been stupid of them not to, and stupid they >are >not. > >And you are right - now the US government will blame Tor exit operators >for >the sheer stupidity of email operators in political shops such as DNC >that >do not force their users to encrypt email end to end. PGP is too much >trouble for them. > >If I am right there is nothing you can do now, you have already closed >the >exit. If they pressure you, migrate your relay to another IP. > >Rana > >From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On >Behalf >Of Dr Gerard Bulger >Sent: Monday, January 02, 2017 10:15 AM >To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >Subject: [tor-relays] Grizzly Steppe > >I ran an exit node, but gave up after too many abuse reports that >annoyed my >ISP. So I turned al exit ports off, and reports stopped as a rely. >After >months and many terabytes of data I get an abuse complaint that my tor >IP >has been used for espionage. > >"NCSC have been made aware of a report and associated malicious >indicators >released by the United States Government relating to malicious cyber >activity. A copy if the report and indicators can be found at the >following >link:- >https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/GRIZZLY-STEPPE-Russian-Malicio >us-Cyber-Activity >Details within this report indicate network assets which may have been >compromised or associated with malicious activity. We have identified >the >following IP address from this report as x.x.x.x As a minimum, it is >recommended that you check systems and any available logs concerned >with the >above addresses for indications of malicious activity" > >There are no other details as to HOW my tor relay is being used. The >espionage seems to relay on the stupidity of recipients on receiving >emails >asking for passwords. I am not sure HOW ISP or relay service can stop >that. >Or is it that my relay was being used to transfer the data? > >I assume my IP was found by way of a DNS leak which I need to look >into. >There is nothing else I can do as a relay to stop this or is there? > >Gerry > > > >

1 0