- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

new warning with Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev (git-efc105716283bbdf)
by Toralf Förster 10 Apr '18

10 Apr '18

This happenes here now with that version usually once a day. Feb 19 18:59:00.000 [warn] Our clock is 1 minutes, 1 seconds behind the time published in the consensus network status document (2018-02-19 18:00:00 UTC). Tor needs an accurate clock to work correctly. Please check your time and date settings! Feb 19 18:59:00.000 [warn] Received microdesc flavor consensus with skewed time (CONSENSUS): It seems that our clock is behind by 1 minutes, 1 seconds, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings. -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E

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Relay down again
by smichel0 10 Apr '18

10 Apr '18

Hello! Former my relay was connected via a powerline adapter and I often had connection problems. Then I connected it directlia via a LAN to the router and it worked for 3 days. This morning it was down again since 6 h (no traffic, no flags but the netbook still said that there is a internet connection). I tried to restart the relay but that didn't work, so I rebooted the hole machine and now the relay is up again (Nick: SMichel). I tried to check the logs, but that didn't help me. I suppose that the connection problem or whatever will persist.

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My Exit node has lost all flags.
by Alan 10 Apr '18

10 Apr '18

So I moved my Exit node from a Centos install to Debian on the same ip and copied over the keys to keep things the same. I've been monitoring the speed and checking things are running properly. Today as i'm looking at nyx all the flags disappear and replaced with just the word 'none'. Did I do something wrong? pic: http://clutterbuck.uk/nyx-no-flags.png

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Abuses for non-exit relay
by Felix 08 Apr '18

08 Apr '18

Happy today Since November my ISP and I received a hand full of abuses for a non-exit. It is about scanning ports and addresses of a certain let's say victim ISP. I received one other abuse with another server. For now I kindly want to ask if some operator received similar abuses for non-exits ? [1] Under my perspective it could be: - ip-spoofing. A third entity uses my ip and sends sync requests to the victim. There will never be a statefull connection, but the victim feels offended. As result the only one who gets trouble is me. - I got hacked (Uhh, don't like these words) which I suspect is not the case. Then statefull connections are possible and by scanning etc the attacker interfers the victim. We should not discuss this here. - There is some way out of the code which enables an attacker to perform solicited or unsolicited interference. Like [2] or not known or whatever. It is difficult to discuss with my ISP because the world expects the non-exits connect only inside the Tor network and onion services. Some facts: - The victim ISP hosts no relay - The relays are guards and potentially fallbacks (fallback and non-fallback share an ip) - I firewall blocked (outbound) all victim ISPs subnets. I logged some outbound trials but this could not stop the abuses. Why? May-be the victim ISP has changing ip ranges which usually happens from time to time or I do not know their subnets completely. Interesting was that one destination ip was x.x.x.0 which is subnet zero. - Currently I firewall block (inbound) all victim ISPs subnets and found log entries scanning (syn) my server on a non Tor port. Before blocking inbound, was there a way that someone from the vicitm ISP ip range can drive my relay (not server) to act like an offender back to the victims ISP? Pretty weired stuff but please swarm help! I apologize for my may-be foolish thoughts and please don't hit me too hard, though. [1] [tor-relays] abuse email for non-exit relay (masergy) https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-September/013030.html [2] Re to [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-September/013041.html -- Cheers, Felix

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Re: [tor-relays] Lost HSDir flag
by teor 08 Apr '18

08 Apr '18

> On 8 Apr 2018, at 16:25, tschador(a)posteo.de wrote: > > Hi, > > every time Tor is restarted (for example after upgrading) the HSDir flag > of my relay (6A7551EEE18F78A9813096E82BF84F740D32B911) is lost for 4 > days. Why? The minimum uptime for HSDirs is 96 hours (4 days): https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2524 Why 4 days? HSDirs rotate every 24 hours. If a relay has been up for 4 days, then it is likely to be up for the next 24 hours. So it is given the flag. (If a HSDir goes down, it takes a few hours for clients and services to find out it is down. If too many HSDirs go down at the same time, the services assigned to those HSDirs are unreachable for a few hours. The minimum uptime reduces the risk of HSDir downtime.) T

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empty exit policy if ipv6 address is not surrounded by [..]
by Toralf Förster 07 Apr '18

07 Apr '18

Hi atagar, ./run_nyx gives an empty exit policy: line in that case - is this bug or a feature? :-) Example for a wrong line: ExitPolicy reject6 <snip>/32 Good is ExitPolicy reject6 [<snip>]/32 Tested with latest stem and nyx Git trees. -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E

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Estimation of bridge traffic / Bridge or relay needed?
by Olaf Grimm 07 Apr '18

07 Apr '18

How can I check bridge traffic if it only occurs temporarily? That would also mean that there are enough bridges. I use the Tor browser with the bridge feature for me. I have relays 2x Ubuntu, 1x CentOS and 1x LFS running. Three are working at full capacity. Now I intend to establish a FreeBSD system. The provider does not allow an exit relay so that only "relay" or "bridge" remains. It was not possible to find an exit relay provider with FreeBSD for my financial resources. Should I set up a relay or bridge on www.bhost.net or cloudflexy.org? BHOST wants to become active in ASIA in 2018 too. BHOST: USA, Netherland, UK Cloudflexy: France, Romania Investments must be meaningful. (Of course I can configure a bridge for tests, but I do not know if I made a mistake or if there is no need for a bridge.) A short answer is sufficient. Thank you! Olaf

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Ubuntu LTS about to ship with a soon-to-expire Tor version?
by Roger Dingledine 06 Apr '18

06 Apr '18

Do we have any good Ubuntu contacts here? I noticed today that Ubuntu Bionic LTS will come out this month: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Releases and they are currently on track to include Tor 0.3.2.10: https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/bionic/+source/tor which is scheduled to go end-of-life before the end of 2018: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTor… So we are on track for 4.5 years of sadness for Ubuntu users -- and since some of the most critical users of the Tor deb on Ubuntu are relay operators, this seems like a good time to try to rescue things. The best fixes I've thought of are to either: (A) Convince them to downgrade to Tor 0.2.9, which we will maintain for another few years. (B) Make a deal with them where they know that 0.3.2 will be abandoned soon, and that they'll move to our next LTS once it comes out. In the past we tried something like 'B' and it did not go smoothly. So I'm inclined to think 'A' is the better plan. See also this trac ticket where I'll aim to keep track of our progress: https://trac.torproject.org/25715 I'm also going to forward this note to tor-project@ in case there are better Ubuntu contacts there. Never a dull moment, --Roger

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Heartfelt gratitude from censored region
by jackoreamnos＠tutanota.com 04 Apr '18

04 Apr '18

For those who may skip emails by the subject line, I resend my own email. There is a sinking feel in general over here, where a bunch of us learn more about Tor. We learnt we cannot run our own relays because here censorship is very strong; at the same time, we realize we have many relay operators in other countries to thank, for giving us a window into the world. Thank you. And I write this email over Tor. - Jack Date: 4. Apr 2018 03:55 From: jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com <mailto:jackoreamnos@tutanota.com> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Cc: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 87, Issue 4 > We had some more discussions over here, and someone pointed out a key fact which we novices did not get at first - the Tor network does not REALLY trust the relay operators until the directory authorities DAs (whose IPs are hardcoded into the source code) can check them out and then vote about what they have learnt about these relays. If relays pass that test, they get onto a live document called the "Consensus" (between the DAs). So new clients to the network trust these DAs and they trust the consensus reached by the DAs. That is how new clients learn the network topology and find relays to connect to. > > So we were wrong on a few points: > (1) we thought we can contribute to the relay networks without being detected, but basically no - you cannot contribute to the relay network unless you are in the consensus, and if you are in the consensus, your IP address is world readable. > (2) a private bridge is providing relay WITHOUT publishing descriptors to the consensus, so it is a hybrid creature: (a) it appears as a client to the Tor network proper, being hidden from the consensus, and therefore cannot help relay traffic; (b) it appears as a relay server to connecting clients but unlike relays already on the consensus certain clients trust it because they know about the private bridge from channels they trust outside the Tor consensus; and these clients gain a extra measure of security from whatever obfuscation the bridge can offer. > > So by design, Tor does not trust and cannot completely trust a relay that just pops up one day. There is no way for Tor DAs to work with a relay node that hides itself behind a VPN. > > So in the area where we live, if we run a relay, we will be caught, plain and simple. No way around it. No way for us to contribute by running a relay. Zero, nada. We utterly depend on bridges hosted outside our geography, to have any hope of accessing Tor. Some of us who have facilities in another country might help, but for us that is comparatively difficult and expensive. > > The only reason I can access the "outside world" is due to people who hosts bridges for us. If you guys pack and go home, nothing we can do. Zero, nada. I am writing this email over Tor. > > - Jack > > 3. Apr 2018 16:02 by > development(a)jivanamara.net <mailto:development@jivanamara.net>> : > > >> Hey Jack, >> >> Here's my understanding of your concerns, anyone else please chime in if >> I'm mistaken anywhere. >> >> For running a normal relay compared to a client connecting to a relay >> via obfs4, it's less likely to be discovered by examining the content of >> traffic. The obfs4 protocol is designed to disguise the connection >> between a client (i.e. torbrowser). Once the traffic hits a relay, the >> interaction between relays contains less opportunities to identify it as >> tor traffic as opposed to any other encrypted traffic. >> >> That being said, there are a couple of other things that would make it >> very easy to identify a TOR relay. First, by default, relays are listed >> for anyone to examine. >> >> Second, if the authorities are watching, the change in traffic to/from >> your home computer will be pretty obvious. >> >> Regarding your concerns about children being inappropriately exposed to >> the dark web, running a relay will make very little difference compared >> to not running one. For your children to see the content of the dark >> web they'll need to install torbrowser (or equivalent) and that's going >> to be the same whether or not you're running a relay. The only >> potential difference is that if in your area it's very difficult to >> connect to the tor network and your children know you're running a >> relay, with some knowledge they could configure torbrowser to connect >> first to your relay. In some sense, if the authorities are successful >> in blocking access to the tor network, you could be enabling their romps >> on the dark web. >> >> HTH >> >> Jivan >> >> >> On 04/03/2018 02:38 AM, >> tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays-request@lists.torproject.org>>> wrote: >>> Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to >>> >>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> >>> >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>> >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays> >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>> >>> tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays-request@lists.torproject.org> >>> >>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>> >>> tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays-owner@lists.torproject.org> >>> >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>> than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." >>> >>> >>> Today's Topics: >>> >>> 1. Re: failed setup of obfs4 on relay (>>> jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com <mailto:jackoreamnos@tutanota.com>>>> ) >>> 2. Re: failed setup of obfs4 on relay (>>> jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com <mailto:jackoreamnos@tutanota.com>>>> ) >>> 3. Re: Estimation of bridge traffic / Bridge or relay needed? >>> (>>> jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com <mailto:jackoreamnos@tutanota.com>>>> ) >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Message: 1 >>> Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 05:00:18 +0200 (CEST) >>> From: <>>> jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com <mailto:jackoreamnos@tutanota.com>>>> > >>> To: <>>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org>>>> > >>> Cc: <>>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org>>>> > >>> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] failed setup of obfs4 on relay >>> Message-ID: <>>> L98Ret7--3-0(a)tutanota.com <mailto:L98Ret7--3-0@tutanota.com>>>> > >>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>> >>> Thank you all, that was very helpful. - Jack >>> >>> 30. Mar 2018 20:53 by >>> arma(a)mit.edu <mailto:arma@mit.edu>>>> <>>> mailto:arma@mit.edu <mailto:mailto:arma@mit.edu>>>> >: >>> >>> >>>> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 04:52:23PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: >>>>> For obfs4, the active prober doesn't know the secret "cert" parameter, >>>> For far far more detail on the various pluggable transports and how >>>> they look on the wire, check out this awesome page that David Fifield >>>> put together: >>>> >>>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableT… <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableT…>>>>> <>>>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableT… <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableT…>>>>> > >>>> >>>> --Roger >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tor-relays mailing list >>>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org>>>>> <>>>> mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org <mailto:mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org>>>>> > >>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays>>>>> <>>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays>>>>> > >>>

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Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 87, Issue 4
by Jivan Amara 04 Apr '18

04 Apr '18

Hey Jack, Here's my understanding of your concerns, anyone else please chime in if I'm mistaken anywhere. For running a normal relay compared to a client connecting to a relay via obfs4, it's less likely to be discovered by examining the content of traffic. The obfs4 protocol is designed to disguise the connection between a client (i.e. torbrowser). Once the traffic hits a relay, the interaction between relays contains less opportunities to identify it as tor traffic as opposed to any other encrypted traffic. That being said, there are a couple of other things that would make it very easy to identify a TOR relay. First, by default, relays are listed for anyone to examine. Second, if the authorities are watching, the change in traffic to/from your home computer will be pretty obvious. Regarding your concerns about children being inappropriately exposed to the dark web, running a relay will make very little difference compared to not running one. For your children to see the content of the dark web they'll need to install torbrowser (or equivalent) and that's going to be the same whether or not you're running a relay. The only potential difference is that if in your area it's very difficult to connect to the tor network and your children know you're running a relay, with some knowledge they could configure torbrowser to connect first to your relay. In some sense, if the authorities are successful in blocking access to the tor network, you could be enabling their romps on the dark web. HTH Jivan On 04/03/2018 02:38 AM, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: failed setup of obfs4 on relay (jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com) > 2. Re: failed setup of obfs4 on relay (jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com) > 3. Re: Estimation of bridge traffic / Bridge or relay needed? > (jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 05:00:18 +0200 (CEST) > From: <jackoreamnos(a)tutanota.com> > To: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> > Cc: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] failed setup of obfs4 on relay > Message-ID: <L98Ret7--3-0(a)tutanota.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Thank you all, that was very helpful. - Jack > > 30. Mar 2018 20:53 by arma(a)mit.edu <mailto:arma@mit.edu>: > > >> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 04:52:23PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: >>> For obfs4, the active prober doesn't know the secret "cert" parameter, >> For far far more detail on the various pluggable transports and how >> they look on the wire, check out this awesome page that David Fifield >> put together: >> >> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableT… <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableT…> >> >> --Roger >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays> >

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