- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Debian relay Puppet module
by Alexander Fortin 19 Jun '14

19 Jun '14

Hi folks, I’ve recently joined the Tor Project and I have been running a non exit relay for a few days. I’m also a Puppet user and, more in general, I try to make deploying applications on the servers I administer as easy as possibile, Tor included. I think Tor documentation to install on a Debian server is quite good, but I still prefer to have Puppet doing that for me, and I’m quite sure every Puppet user out there would think the same. This is the work-in-progress version of the module I’m currently using to manage my relay: https://github.com/shaftoe/puppet-tor/tree/fixes I’m open to any feedback on how to improve it and eventually publish it to the Puppet forge (make it easier for other Puppet users to use it); maybe adding some decent disclaimer on top of the README? I can also drop the whole idea if someone convince me is a bad one... -- Alexander Fortin http://about.me/alexanderfortin

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Tor-relay - IP
by Rui Branco 18 Jun '14

18 Jun '14

hello, I'm a new user of the Tor-relay and I have many doubts. Sorry about that. In the atlas project why the tor-relays ip are discovered? isn't it dangerous? -- Best Regards, Rui Branco

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normal for a new relay node to be under-utilized?
by Kali Tor 18 Jun '14

18 Jun '14

Is it normal for a new relay node to carry almost no traffic even after 24 hrs? From Atlast Uptime: 1 day 8 hours 30 minutes and 28 seconds Advertised Bandwidth: 59.71 KB/s From arm Bandwidth (limit: 16 Mb/s, burst: 32 Mb/s, measured: 160.0 b/s) Upload (0.0 b/sec - avg: 738.8 b/sec, total: 10.8 MB) Download (0.0 b/sec - avg: 3.6 Kb/sec, total: 52.2 MB) torrcRelayBandwidthRate 2048 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 4096 KB AccountingMax 100 GB AccountingStart month 1 03:00 DirPort 9030

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Advertised Bandwidth increasing
by kingqueen 18 Jun '14

18 Jun '14

Hi I'm running the new, imaginatively-nicknamed kingqueenbtnftw relay. I have read around a lot but something I don't get. I thought advertised bandwidth was what I'd put in torrc whereas consensus weight was what some uber-machines tested my relay at, with the idea that this can foil disruption attacks by false relays pretending to give high bandwidth. SO I expected consensus weight to gradually increase. What I didn't expect was for the advertised bandwidth to increase by step changes (as shown on atlas and globe). Evidently I've got something wrong. Could somebody please enlighten this poor nub? By the way, I appreciate that consensus weight is a dimensions number but I understand that it originated as being based on kibibytes per second? If this is still the case, it's currently significantly more than my advertised bandwidth (which is less than that set in TORRC) but appears below it in the graphs? Thanks to anyone who educates me. I have full intent on both the T-shirts on offer - the standard Tor one for uptime and bandwidth, and the EFF one for still being online in a year with over 1MBps transfer :-) Hi to all who know me Kingqueen

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Operating system diversity?
by Jonathan D. Proulx 18 Jun '14

18 Jun '14

Hi All, In the recent thread relating to Debian relay Puppet modules it was suggested that a greater diversity of operating systems in tor nodes wooudl be preferable. I'm not sure if this was meant as a technical or aesthetic preference, but I am curious. Is there any technical benefit to rounning a more diverse set of opensource oprating systems for tor nodes? I discount closed source as we don't know what's going on in there. Would that present significantly different attack surfaces? I can imagine a vulnerability in the TCP stack or other kernel functionality in Linux would not be the saem in FreeBSD or vice versa... My nodes are currently Ubuntu but if there's a reason to do so I coould possibly switch OS to FreeBSD (or hurd does tor run on hurd :)) -Jon

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Advertised Bandwidth increasing
by kingqueen 17 Jun '14

17 Jun '14

Hi I'm running the new, imaginatively-nicknamed kingqueenbtnftw relay. I have read around a lot but something I don't get. I thought advertised bandwidth was what I'd put in torrc whereas consensus weight was what some uber-machines tested my relay at, with the idea that this can foil disruption attacks by false relays pretending to give high bandwidth. SO I expected consensus weight to gradually increase. What I didn't expect was for the advertised bandwidth to increase by step changes (as shown on atlas and globe). Evidently I've got something wrong. Could somebody please enlighten this poor nub? By the way, I appreciate that consensus weight is a dimensions number but I understand that it originated as being based on kibibytes per second? If this is still the case, it's currently significantly more than my advertised bandwidth (which is less than that set in TORRC) but appears below it in the graphs? Thanks to anyone who educates me. I have full intent on both the T-shirts on offer - the standard Tor one for uptime and bandwidth, and the EFF one for still being online in a year with over 1MBps transfer :-) Hi to all who know me Kingqueen -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

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Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators
by grarpamp 17 Jun '14

17 Jun '14

Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators We are ops because we want to allow people to avoid censorship and speak freely. But are we doing all we can? It is well known that all relays, exit or non-exit are added to a variety of blocklists. Primarily through scraping the consensus. And those blocklists are then used to indiscriminately deny legitimate users/people access to sites, regardless of their 'behaviour', which more often than not has simply not been determined yet. So we need to augment what we're doing in order to be effective in our mission. Here's how... We already run Tor on an IP, that IP is blackballed as noted above, so using another port on it as a vpn terminator is pointless. Yet our hosting packages often offer other IP's in the same range, or we already have them to use as part of the deal (or, failing that, we can forward the openvpn TCP port on our bad relay IP to another clean non-bulk-blocked IP we control). We obviously cannot publish this new openvpn 'exit/termination' IP anywhere, such as in the comment field of the consensus as it will be banned. *But we can bind to it and let users find it with their own openvpn scans close to (one up or down from) our OR IP.* Just use the standard openvpn TCP port on it. There is no bandwidth cost to us to do this because all the traffic is moved between the exit IP and the openvpn termination IP over localhost. (Well, unless you are forwarding openvpn port on OR IP to another termination real IP off your box.) At minimum we should allow TCP transport out from the vpn to the world, aka the usual nat, so as to make websurfing work for our users. Bonus for allowing nattable outbound UDP, ICMP, etc. Further bonus for allowing inbound binds on whatever port on the IP that is available to be bound to. Obviously sine the IP is scarce to us, we can't allow full unnatted use of the IP. The point is, we already own these extra IP's, and legitimate people are being blocked from services for no reason other than kneejerk or blind reactions to Tor via blocking services. Ahem, cloudflare, et al and other blocking 'services' well known to us. So to the extent we have other IP's available to us, we should set them up to be unpublished openvpn nodes and let users find us by trying to terminate their vpn connections on us at that IP and openvpn port. Yes, blocklists could try the 'one IP up/down' scan method and list this project of ours too, but it's more work for them and they're unlikely to do it in any sort of global fashion. Especially since they can't prove it's part of Tor (because we don't publish the IP's as such). If we wish to make an announcement that we are running such terminators, obviously it should not be made from addresses related to our OR IP's. [FWIW, there is another openvpn terminator project out there. Unlike ours would be, its nodes are public, and even with that detriment (though possibly only because it is lesser known) it obtains more freedom from blocklisting than Tor. However its termination points perform poorly/unreliably whereas ours would be both nonpublished and better managed.]

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New SSL keys for new OpenSSL version?
by no.thing_to-hide＠cryptopathie.eu 16 Jun '14

16 Jun '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello Tor! I run an internal Tor relay on Debian Wheezy. Today the OpenSSL version was updated to 1.0.1e-2+deb7u11 . Do I need to delete the old SSL keys like after the Heartbleed bug? Thanks and best regards Anton - -- no.thing_to-hide at cryptopathie dot eu 0x30C3CDF0, RSA 2048, 24 Mar 2014 0FF8 A811 8857 1B7E 195B 649E CC26 E1A5 30C3 CDF0 Bitmessage (no metadata): BM-2cXixKZaqzJmTfz6ojiyLzmKg2JbzDnApC -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTn1hxAAoJEMwm4aUww83weJAH/jYHtjrhrFrGnVdjrKPlN/TR w9NZcvRd0GrNDbZGGwemVam+OmFdHTDEeWZ73fgb/DvrGT8Iej8hD09/vD37xn9p GYhLabsKW06j8oRz7fiVDlWVOWND8QHW+UImnwKcIlvgp9a2EaSyBGVshIGppqMW wGgc8ZhoXvo5fAe/M630PHi6e/oGDJZIilSTIDmttV8M9cTEmsxah64oHZiJqVqc ierCAlAlsbkYH7fs7/QgJw0QolnhtcIZ5ALgijT+Z4EGH5oJBFnA20lvni1qLp1T O/RUTuF8qLAUWFBLgrF1Ng5zDlyPEaVUK5SO1pM6dzvDwvSWOlrapmfCd3b07DI= =OslV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Ansible repo for setting up relays
by Sam Kottler 15 Jun '14

15 Jun '14

Alexander's email about the Puppet module he's putting together has reminded me to send a mail about an ansible repository I use to manage my relays. https://github.com/skottler/tor-ansible is where it lives. Unlike the puppet module, I'm working on getting a whole environment deployment put together. Ultimately (when I get some time) I'll have it stand up all the necessary pieces to securely run (i.e. ssh configuration, user setup, etc) a relay. For now it just installs Tor. Let me know if you've got any questions. Pull requests are all welcome, of course! -s

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Hash of session info was not as expected
by Logforme 14 Jun '14

14 Jun '14

My tor log file is usually quite boring but today it looks like this: Jun 14 13:42:46.000 [warn] Hash of session info was not as expected. Jun 14 13:57:56.000 [warn] Hash of session info was not as expected. Jun 14 14:11:58.000 [warn] Hash of session info was not as expected. A new line about every 10 minutes since 04:14:53 (CET) Is it a user with problems, an attack on my relay or a sign that my relay have some kind of hardware/software issues?

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Torservers herngaard issues
by grarpamp 12 Jun '14

12 Jun '14

Seems to be consistently delivering random length web pages (if they are artificially slowed such as https://berlin.craigslist.org/) and its bandwidth is tanking on globe.tpo. 3B486DEC5A22694C0960B4A97A3665C617C89B1C

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Sinkhole IPs to block for Cryptolocker and Gameover Zeus
by Adam Brenner 11 Jun '14

11 Jun '14

As you know, the Tor network can be used for mischievous and in some countries illegal activity hurting the reputation of Tor. Two of these activities include Cryptolocker[1] and Gameover Zeus[2]. Recently my exit node was inserted into a few block lists due to this two issues mentioned above and I would guess this hinders 'good' traffic within the Tor network using an exit node. I have complied a list of Sinkholes from CBL for both Cryptolocker and Gameover Zeus. Consider adding these IPs to your ExitPolicy reject list. ExitPolicy reject 85.159.211.119 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 212.71.250.4 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 54.83.43.69 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 192.42.116.41 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 192.42.119.41 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 198.98.103.253 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 208.64.121.161 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 142.0.36.234 # Cryptolocker ExitPolicy reject 173.193.197.194 # Cryptolocker [1]: http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-309A [2]: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-150A -- Adam Brenner <adam(a)aeb.io>

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Exit policies pointing to IP blocks not appearing on Globe
by Mendelson Gusmão 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

Hi! I just setup a tor relay, encouraged by EFF's Tor Challenge. All I have is a domestic connection. I've read my TOS and my ISP seems to be very friendly to this case. Although I have a little suspicion about traffic shaping, my exit node seems to be running very well! I'm worried about one thing, though. I remember that a while ago, when I tried to access Facebook using a tor client, I saw a message telling that I was blocked for using the network. To avoid the other users of my network to be blocked due to the traffic in my exit node, I managed to add exit policies rejecting every IP block that belongs to Facebook. However, these exit policies don't appear in neither globe.torproject.com nor any site that provides information about nodes. Are these addresses being scrubbed? How do I make sure that these policies being applied? Thanks!

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Running relays at consortia networks [was: JANET/edu]
by grarpamp 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 3:50 PM, Iain R. Learmonth <irl(a)fsfe.org> wrote: > I'm wondering if anyone knows anything about JANET's (the UK academic ISP) > views on running a Tor relay? > > It's probably not worth putting together a proposal for running one in a UK > University if the ISP is going to have problems with it. Has anyone tried approaching these networks themselves to see about running relays there? Their bandwidth for sponsored things is often free. In the US you might try internet2.edu and all its various connecting regional networks. On a second further approach, once all the risks and pro-reasons have been discussed and accepted, the consortia backing of many Uni's within would be bulletproof.

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suspicious exit?
by JB 08 Jun '14

08 Jun '14

Hi All, FP! :) I just setup my relay node today, and am keeping a hawkish(ish) eye on traffic.... And noticed a flurry of activity from SSH port (22) at 5.104.224.5 - which is listed as an exit. But it's also listed on http://cbl.abuseat.org/lookup.cgi?ip=5.104.224.5 as infected (or NATting for a computer that is infected) with the Conficker botnet. I've black-holed it in the meantime, but am wondering if I'm being overly cautious... Any advice/response/input appreciated. TIA Jeff.

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Unblocking blacklisted exits [was: suspicious]
by grarpamp 07 Jun '14

07 Jun '14

> But it's also listed on http://cbl.abuseat.org/lookup.cgi?ip=5.104.224.5 as If you find exits on blacklists, you could try to contact the operator via their descriptor contact, exit http banner, etc so that they can try to have it removed. Usually a few clicks on an assertion of ownership/cleanliness and an email ack is all that's needed for removal. Since ownership of IP's is always in flux from perspective of BL's such that any 'real' owner could always do it too, absent exit contact info, many users could probably submit removal for them without issues. There's a project covering this on the wiki: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/DontBlockMe

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Tor bridges with AWS
by CD 06 Jun '14

06 Jun '14

I've signed up to AWS with Tor's instructions for bridges. I've intalled Tor on my PC. Wondering how to proceed. Am obviously an illiterate newbie, so any links for a basic knowledge-base would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance.

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Re: [tor-relays] Update your OpenSSL, several high-risk CVEs
by Jesse Victors 06 Jun '14

06 Jun '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Thanks. I saw the OpenSSL update, but thanks for explaining what it was about. Is it necessary to restart Tor to apply the update? Jesse V. On 06/06/2014 04:00 AM, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 16:36:06 +0200 > From: Jeroen Massar <jeroen(a)massar.ch> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: [tor-relays] Update your OpenSSL, several high-risk CVEs > Message-ID: <53908056.50209(a)massar.ch> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > See for the details: > > https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt > > Debian etc all have packages available. > > Greets, > Jeroen -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJTkdiSXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQxMjgyMjhENjEyODQ1OTU1NzBCMjgwRkFB RDk3MzY0RkMyMEJFQzgwAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yABpUIAJ9ZSohmGuH3r4UEg//FrYRF 3IJc6UPJx22FU0pdplN09I5L0LRzH7SehJly62niid6XNS/8bKByzjkvrnik0qRP Hjo8Rq4C/2wbRJU0w8MHvpCRLFhTRdCHdGI2+HkUaYbp7abwIZVWbTMdXB0T5lGx KvSgMeQfmlWzkwEb3WqDUqcc2NJG5D3K5WFV4WOsAi+KerBUiNyJKUqwGRd21PgS VV6S4JLQy0PVKdCAIbeEeOy2xclRfwKjBfe8RVD9b8fOmBY6ty7v1k6Org54PceA hLtJXDQXg9XQfe1u2T+peEYxf1bYIZMu+DI/7DJ0xFDr6naxJ4ttQabE2WmN6lE= =FOEn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sign up for the Tor Challenge
by Adam Brenner 05 Jun '14

05 Jun '14

If you have not already, you should consider signing up for EFF's tor challenge https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/ Today also marks the Reset the Net event https://www.resetthenet.org/ -- Adam Brenner <adam(a)aeb.io>

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Update your OpenSSL, several high-risk CVEs
by Jeroen Massar 05 Jun '14

05 Jun '14

See for the details: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt Debian etc all have packages available. Greets, Jeroen

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Best way for normal OS X users to run a relay?
by Roger Dingledine 05 Jun '14

05 Jun '14

What is the best way to run a relay on OS X currently? Now that the Vidalia bundles are deprecated and hard to find, I believe we have no packages or bundles for OS X other than TBB 3.x? So either "install from source, write your own init script, hope you know what ulimit -n is, good luck with that" or "install tbb3 and edit the torrc, still hope you know what ulimit -n is" are the current options? Compare with https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian for the Debian/Ubuntu users, where our deb takes care of a lot of these things for them. Assuming my summary is accurate, what are some good ways to move forward here? Thanks! --Roger

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VPS for tor exit nodes
by Contra Band 04 Jun '14

04 Jun '14

Dear exit node operators, Could you please recommend vps providers allowing to run tor exit nodes? I checked many vps operators but most of them allow relays but not exit nodes according to AUP or ToS. thanks.

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Re: [tor-relays] "as well as block BitTorrent after repeated offenses..."
by Tor Admin 04 Jun '14

04 Jun '14

Hi, I'll happily block BitTorrent it before any offenses start. Just tell me how. Regards, =-John-= <snip snip> Spencer Neitzke <spencer(a)neitzke.me> spake thusly: > as well as block BitTorrent after repeated offenses -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/

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Re: [tor-relays] VPS for tor exit nodes
by Mike Patton 03 Jun '14

03 Jun '14

I have an exit with exigent here in Australia. They advised by email that they don't have an issue with Tor. M. On 4 Jun 2014 08:56, I <beatthebastards(a)inbox.com> wrote: > > > So can you post some provider names? > > Comsitec.de is one which is ok with exits but I have a lot of trouble getting their attention when it stops. > It is in Germany which is much better than being in USA because the mentality is better. > Two I have which now say exits are not accepted are Lunanode and Bluevm. One which was expensive but good is DrServer/AbusiveCores. The guy set up Tor when I had a problem with Linux!. > > Since some have said yes to exits when I paid but a week later 'introduced a new policy' I wonder if it is worth being open. If you know what can be done with fifteen VPSs for the next nine months which can't have Tor please tell me. > > Lowendbox.com is good for scavenging addresses and sudden bargains but it may be better in the long run to pay a little more and get more cooperation. > > It may be more useful to Tor at the moment to provide bridges and for that, I believe, the very cheapest VPSs would do the job e.g. $AUD15/year. > > Robert > > > So can you post some provider names? > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Usefulness of very limited exit policy nodes?
by Phil 31 May '14

31 May '14

Hi, Opinions please - is it worthwhile running an exit node on a home DSL connection with limited bandwidth and exit policies? I'm talking 150Mb per day, 20Kb/s, and only allowing ports 80, 443 and 53 out. I'm concerned about potential abuse from exit traffic more so than limited bandwidth. I've only had it up for a few days and the bandwidth is being used. Is such an exit policy useful for the network? Or would I be better off just running as a relay? Are there other ports that I could allow to exit that would make this node more useful, while not greatly increasing the risk of abuse reports coming my way? Phil

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