- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

FYI: ISP's and blocked Authorities
by Sebastian Urbach 17 Nov '14

17 Nov '14

Hi, It seems to be the case that a few ISP's are not up to date and still using old IP's to block Authorities. That means if you are able to connect to just 1 or 2 Authorities but not to all of them your ISP could be one of those candidates. I saw this behaviour in one case just today. Connectivity with Gabelmoo and longclaw was possible but no other Authority was reachable. Gabelmoo recently changed the IP and longclaw is brand new afaik. That ISP is clearly using an old list of IPs to block Tor for their VPS systems. What makes it even worse is that this system was going to be a Non-Exit relay :-( I will ask the operator for more details and the good/bad ISP page will be updated accordingly. If you can reach some Authorities (not all) and you are not getting indexed and measured (also you can't find your system on the Atlas / Tor site), this could be the reason why. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ----------------------------------------- Definition of TOR: 10% luck, 20% skill, 15% concentrated power of will, 5% pleasure, 50% pain and 100% reason to remember the name! -----------------------------------------

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Re: [tor-relays] Obfsproxy apparmor profile etc.
by thegreatwent＠Safe-mail.net 15 Nov '14

15 Nov '14

OK, I updated the obfsproxy apparmor profile so it works for both standalone and managed obfs3. Needed to add a line to /etc/apparmor.d/local/system_tor too. Profiles below and included in the attachment along with an init.d definition. /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.obfsproxy ------------------- #include <tunables/global> # vim:syntax=apparmor /usr/bin/obfsproxy { #include <abstractions/base> #include <abstractions/python> network inet stream, /dev/random r, /dev/urandom r, /etc/nsswitch.conf r, /etc/passwd r, /usr/** r, /usr/bin/obfsproxy rix, /var/log/tor/obfsproxy rw, signal (receive) set=("term") peer=system_tor, } ------------------- /etc/apparmor.d/local/system_tor ------------------- # Site-specific additions and overrides for system_tor. # For more details, please see /etc/apparmor.d/local/README. signal (send) set=("term") peer=/usr/bin/obfsproxy, -------------------

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iptables / dump
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Nov '14

15 Nov '14

Dear list members, My iptables dump, as promised (v4). Updated every hour and available as long as my relay is alive ;-) I run a pretty tight ship, just one ssh user and harsh fail2ban settings. All these listed IP's are considered to be "the usual suspects". Please feel free to use it, should give you a jump start. It is getting pretty quiet now since i passed the 300+ ip's milestone. Download: https://www.urbach.org/~sebastian/rules.v4 -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ----------------------------------------- Definition of TOR: 10% luck, 20% skill, 15% concentrated power of will, 5% pleasure, 50% pain and 100% reason to remember the name! -----------------------------------------

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Re: [tor-relays] iptables / dump
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Nov '14

15 Nov '14

On November 15, 2014 2:33:23 PM Libertas <libertas(a)mykolab.com> wrote: Hi, > > Honestly, the safest thing to do is to NOT USE PASSWORD BASED > > LOGINS. Im aware of that. > I wrote a script to scan the Tor network for password-based login > availability. If I have the time and no one beats me to it, it'll lead > to a site that warns relay operators about security problems with > their servers. For example, I can combine it with basic, non-invasive > nmap results to warn about non-essential network applications, old OS > versions, and old Tor versions as well. Awesome, like to see that. Sebastian

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Graph not updating.
by Kevin de Bie 14 Nov '14

14 Nov '14

Is there any paticular reason the bandwidth graph flatlined since last night? My ISP may have had some maintenance but my TOR relay is purring like a kitten again, data throughput is quite formidable at the moment at around 1mbps. I use orbot on android.

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Relay's clock settings off no matter what
by Austin Bentley 14 Nov '14

14 Nov '14

Hello everyone, I have an interesting problem. I am monitoring my relay using arm. I am getting the following warnings: >05:56:12 [WARN] Received directory with skewed time (server '154.35.32.5:80'): It seems that our clock is behind by 1 hours, 0 minutes, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings. Most of the messages tell me that my clock is an hour behind. However, I also get these messages occasionally (but not as often): >02:07:27 [WARN] Our clock is 52 minutes, 35 seconds behind the time published in the consensus network status document (2014-11-14 02:00:00 UTC). Tor needs an accurate clock to work correctly. Please check your time and date settings! I am running a Tor exit relay on a FreeBSD VPS. Said VPS is in Czech Republic. If I set the time to CET, it is 1 hour behind true CET (GMT+1); therefore, I have it set to EET (GMT+2.) I have verified the time is correct in Czech Republic. This problem is rather frustrating because it is causing my server to throw away circuit data as old data. Could someone shine some light on this? Thanks, Austin

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Re: [tor-relays] BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running Tor
by Dan Hanley 13 Nov '14

13 Nov '14

Looks like the BBC have changed their rules. I am still running a relay, but can now access www.bbc.co.uk in a normal fashion. Still blocked by national lottery, but I'm hopeful that they both use the same third party ip checker, and that the next lottery update will fix the issue. On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 10:41 PM, <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> wrote: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. RELAY_EARLY tor network update status (CVE-2014-5117) (Nusenu) > 2. Re: BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running relay > (Ross Petrie) > 3. Re: BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running relay > (Chris Whittleston) > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Nusenu <BM-2D8wMEVgGVY76je1WXNPfo8SrpZt5yGHES(a)bitmessage.ch> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: markus(a)mdfnet.se, info(a)enn.lu, torpids(a)yahoo.com, nick(a)calyx.com > Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 21:00:41 +0000 > Subject: [tor-relays] RELAY_EARLY tor network update status (CVE-2014-5117) > (if you are on the CC list of this email you are probably one of the tor > relay operators running one of the 10 fastest vulnerable [CVE-2014-5117] > relays on the tor network. Please upgrade your tor relay) > > > The tor network is currently at 64% of the bandwidth being served by > > relays running a recommended version according to torstatus.blutmagie.de > . > > I updated a previous metrics feature request so we might see nice > > graphs about patching progress in the future [2]. > > Since we are seeing active RELAY_EARLY attacks again (or new buggy tor > implemantations) I was wondering what the current update stats look like. > > ~85%* of the tor network's bandwidth is provided by patched relays. > (~66% 0.2.4.23, ~11% 0.2.5.6-alpha, ~7% 0.2.5.7-rc) > > *) according to data from torstatus.blutmagie.de > > > 10 fastest relays still running a vulnerable version: > > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/EC98311F9EC02BEAA183651CE8402249CD036… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D1271A1E15C568DA709D3A1E68188EEAE8DDB… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/12AD30E5D25AA67F519780E2111E611A455FD… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/1B9FACF25E17D26E307EA7CFA7D455B144B03… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/2F57987F3942BA0BBD706D623F1FF86A89684… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/935BABE2564F82016C19AEF63C0C40B5753BA… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B83DC1558F0D34353BB992EF93AFEAFDB226A… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/104A9453FD93BDBEAE9E2024898266AD2051A… > > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/C11650E31F83E149C855D574B3171CC9CF9BE… > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Ross Petrie <ross.petrie(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 22:18:05 +0100 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running > relay > > Hi all, > > I've just reported this same issue this week, no reply yet. > > I can still watch catch up BBC TV through my sky box though. > On 18 Sep 2014 21:40, "Dan Hanley" <hanley.dan(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> >>> I have just received a slightly more positive reply: >> >> "At present, our GeoIP data provider classes Tor nodes as proxies, >> regardless of whether or not they're an exit node. We understand that there >> is room for improvement in this model, since non-exit relays do not present >> traffic on behalf of other users. We have asked our provider to give us a >> way of differentiating Tor exit nodes from non-exit relays, to allow us to >> block exit nodes only." >> >> So perhaps they will make a change... certainly reporting the issue seems >> to raise its importance :-) >> >> atb >> >> Dan >> >> >> >>> >> >> 5. Re: BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running relay >>> nodes (Chris Whittleston) >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Chris Whittleston <csw34(a)cam.ac.uk> >>> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>> Cc: >>> Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 01:40:31 +0100 >>> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses >>> running relay nodes >>> Yeah ouch - maybe I just got someone a bit more helpful. I'm with Matt >>> though, it seems like they still don't get the difference between using Tor >>> as a client and running a relay, so this isn't the end of the road there. >>> You are going to have to rely on them wanting to actually think about it >>> though. >>> >>> If all else fails, you could always try to simply report the issue again >>> using the form I linked before, but this time just don't mention Tor at all >>> and see if you get a different customer service person... >>> >>> http://iplayerhelp.external.bbc.co.uk/tv/incorrect_location_may2014 >>> >>> I suspect you'll end up having to explain that you're running a relay in >>> the end anyway, but you never know. >>> >>> Chris >>> >>> On 17 September 2014 21:48, Matt Puckey <matt(a)puckey.org> wrote: >>> >>>> Stephen Mollett: >>>> > [...] >>>> > "Thank you for contacting the BBC iPlayer support team. >>>> > >>>> > "I understand you’re experiencing problems accessing BBC iPlayer as >>>> > you’re told that you are outside of the UK. >>>> > >>>> > "Please note that if you run TOR, then I’m afraid as per our >>>> development >>>> > team’s confirmation you’ll not be able to access BBC iPlayer. If you >>>> > continue to use TOR then your IP address may be blacklisted against UK >>>> > only services across bbc.co.uk." >>>> > >>>> > I made a point of stating explicitly in my original case filing that I >>>> > run a middle relay and that no traffic exits from my node to the BBC's >>>> > website or to anywhere else, along with a link to my node's stats on >>>> > blutmagie confirming the (non-)exit policy. >>>> > [...] >>>> >>>> Hi Stephen, >>>> >>>> I'm not sure whether I'm surprised at the BBC or not! >>>> >>>> It is a shame if they seem to be doing blanket blocking of Tor relay IP >>>> addresses. I suppose this >>>> ( >>>> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-arms-helping-internet-services-accept… >>>> ) >>>> has /some/ relevance. >>>> >>>> The problem is obviously convincing a organisation like the BBC to treat >>>> individual IP addresses different from other Tor relay IP addresses (and >>>> whether they should be doing that at all). Although it seems Chris >>>> Whittleston obviously managed it! Maybe you simply got 'the wrong person >>>> at the other end'. Personally, I would continue to pursue this with >>>> them! >>>> >>>> --Matt >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tor-relays mailing list >>>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Dr Chris Whittleston 栗主* >>> Department of Chemistry >>> University of Cambridge >>> Lensfield Road, Cambridge, CB2 1EW >>> Email: csw34(a)cam.ac.uk >>> Tel: +44 (0)1223 336423 >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> tor-relays mailing list >>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> >> > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Chris Whittleston <csw34(a)cam.ac.uk> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: > Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 22:41:04 +0100 > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running > relay > > That's great news Dan, keep us posted! > > Chris > On 18 Sep 2014 21:40, "Dan Hanley" <hanley.dan(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> >>> I have just received a slightly more positive reply: >> >> "At present, our GeoIP data provider classes Tor nodes as proxies, >> regardless of whether or not they're an exit node. We understand that there >> is room for improvement in this model, since non-exit relays do not present >> traffic on behalf of other users. We have asked our provider to give us a >> way of differentiating Tor exit nodes from non-exit relays, to allow us to >> block exit nodes only." >> >> So perhaps they will make a change... certainly reporting the issue seems >> to raise its importance :-) >> >> atb >> >> Dan >> >> >> >>> >> >> 5. Re: BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses running relay >>> nodes (Chris Whittleston) >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Chris Whittleston <csw34(a)cam.ac.uk> >>> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>> Cc: >>> Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 01:40:31 +0100 >>> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] BBC and UK Lottery blocking ip addresses >>> running relay nodes >>> Yeah ouch - maybe I just got someone a bit more helpful. I'm with Matt >>> though, it seems like they still don't get the difference between using Tor >>> as a client and running a relay, so this isn't the end of the road there. >>> You are going to have to rely on them wanting to actually think about it >>> though. >>> >>> If all else fails, you could always try to simply report the issue again >>> using the form I linked before, but this time just don't mention Tor at all >>> and see if you get a different customer service person... >>> >>> http://iplayerhelp.external.bbc.co.uk/tv/incorrect_location_may2014 >>> >>> I suspect you'll end up having to explain that you're running a relay in >>> the end anyway, but you never know. >>> >>> Chris >>> >>> On 17 September 2014 21:48, Matt Puckey <matt(a)puckey.org> wrote: >>> >>>> Stephen Mollett: >>>> > [...] >>>> > "Thank you for contacting the BBC iPlayer support team. >>>> > >>>> > "I understand you’re experiencing problems accessing BBC iPlayer as >>>> > you’re told that you are outside of the UK. >>>> > >>>> > "Please note that if you run TOR, then I’m afraid as per our >>>> development >>>> > team’s confirmation you’ll not be able to access BBC iPlayer. If you >>>> > continue to use TOR then your IP address may be blacklisted against UK >>>> > only services across bbc.co.uk." >>>> > >>>> > I made a point of stating explicitly in my original case filing that I >>>> > run a middle relay and that no traffic exits from my node to the BBC's >>>> > website or to anywhere else, along with a link to my node's stats on >>>> > blutmagie confirming the (non-)exit policy. >>>> > [...] >>>> >>>> Hi Stephen, >>>> >>>> I'm not sure whether I'm surprised at the BBC or not! >>>> >>>> It is a shame if they seem to be doing blanket blocking of Tor relay IP >>>> addresses. I suppose this >>>> ( >>>> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-arms-helping-internet-services-accept… >>>> ) >>>> has /some/ relevance. >>>> >>>> The problem is obviously convincing a organisation like the BBC to treat >>>> individual IP addresses different from other Tor relay IP addresses (and >>>> whether they should be doing that at all). Although it seems Chris >>>> Whittleston obviously managed it! Maybe you simply got 'the wrong person >>>> at the other end'. Personally, I would continue to pursue this with >>>> them! >>>> >>>> --Matt >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tor-relays mailing list >>>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Dr Chris Whittleston 栗主* >>> Department of Chemistry >>> University of Cambridge >>> Lensfield Road, Cambridge, CB2 1EW >>> Email: csw34(a)cam.ac.uk >>> Tel: +44 (0)1223 336423 >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> tor-relays mailing list >>> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> >> > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >

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Why isn't my relay getting indexed?
by Dedalo 13 Nov '14

13 Nov '14

I was running 2 relays but I'm currently running 1 (with no problem) since some months ago, One of my VPS accounts got suspended and I'm now trying to setup another relay, a middle relay. This new VPS has been running the tor relay since about 12 hours ago but It's not getting indexed in http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/ neither atlas :/ not sure why, I can see I'm getting connections to 9001 but I can't understand why is this happening... Regards, Dedalo. -- Twitter: @SeguridadBlanca Site: Blog.Dedalo.In

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Re: [tor-relays] Standalone obfsproxy apparmor profile etc.
by thegreatwent＠Safe-mail.net 13 Nov '14

13 Nov '14

Drake Wilson <drake(a)dasyatidae.net> wrote: > thegreatwent(a)Safe-mail.net wrote: > > So that mostly just leaves open the question of why managed mode obfsproxy wants to read /etc/passwd and nsswitch.conf? > > Sorry for jumping in without reading the whole context, but on GNU/Linux systems, > nsswitch.conf is used for determining how resolution works for host and user names > (among other things), and passwd is usually needed to map names to UIDs. If there's > anything that takes a "which user should I run as" parameter then it'll read those > two in the process of looking up the user, for instance. > > ---> Drake Wilson Thank you, I knew enough to be a bit concerned about /etc/passwd (even though there's no actual passwords in it), but not enough to know if it was an issue in this particular case! I'll continue with adding those files to the Apparmor profile and post back here when it's complete.

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Re: [tor-relays] Standalone obfsproxy apparmor profile etc.
by thegreatwent＠Safe-mail.net 13 Nov '14

13 Nov '14

I fixed the logging issue by changing "/var/log/tor/log rw," in the profile to "/var/log/tor/obfsproxy rw,"; and changing the value in my service script to: DAEMON="/usr/bin/obfsproxy -- --profile=/usr/bin/obfsproxy -- /usr/bin/obfsproxy --log-file=/var/log/tor/obfsproxy --log-min-severity=info obfs3 --dest $DEST server $SERVER" I also changed to PIDFILE="/var/run/obfsproxy.pid" because the earlier version didn't work on reboot. Now I can see I am getting traffic! 8 unique addresses in the past hour etc. So that mostly just leaves open the question of why managed mode obfsproxy wants to read /etc/passwd and nsswitch.conf? Is this the wrong place to ask? -------- Original Message -------- From: thegreatwent(a)Safe-mail.net Apparently from: tor-relays-bounces(a)lists.torproject.org To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-relays] Standalone obfsproxy apparmor profile etc. Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2014 18:01:16 -0500 > Not sure if this is the right place to post or if this will help anybody, but I think I figured out how to run a standalone (NOT managed) obfs3 obfsproxy on Ubuntu 14.04 with a somewhat confined apparmor profile running under the debian-tor user. > > I verified this by looking at ps and it shows "debian-tor [...] /usr/bin/python /usr/bin/obfsproxy obfs3[...]". AA-STATUS says /usr/bin/obfsproxy is in enforce mode, and removing "network inet stream," for example from the aa profile results in obfsproxy failing to start. > > The line in the profile for "/usr/** r," is ugly, but replacing it with "/usr/bin/** r," didn't work. Obfsproxy log messages also seem to be going to /dev/null, so I'm missing something there. > > So Linux/Apparmor experts, is there anything bad/wrong with this setup? Am I relatively safe from bad guys hacking into my obfsproxy ports? How can I see if the good guys are using it successfully? > > The aa profile does not work for managed instances of obfsproxy. It complained about wanting read access to nsswitch.conf and /etc/passwd and I don't know enough python to understand why it wants that, so I didn't add it. > > Below is also attached: > > /etc/tor/torrc [just the relevant lines, using iptables to redirect from advertised obfs3port to actual] > > ------------------- > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 proxy a.b.c.d:[advertisedobfs3port] > ExtORPort auto > ------------------- > > > /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.obfsproxy > > ------------------- > # vim:syntax=apparmor > #include <tunables/global> > > /usr/bin/obfsproxy { > #include <abstractions/base> > #include <abstractions/python> > network inet stream, > > /var/log/tor/log rw, > /dev/urandom r, > /dev/random r, > /usr/** r, > /usr/bin/obfsproxy rix, > > } > ------------------- > > > /etc/init.d/obfsproxy > > ------------------- > #!/bin/bash > > PIDFILE="/var/run/obfsproxy/obfsproxy.pid" > DEST="127.0.0.1:[ORPort]" > SERVER="a.b.c.d:[obfs3port]" > DAEMON="/usr/bin/obfsproxy -- --profile=/usr/bin/obfsproxy -- /usr/bin/obfsproxy obfs3 --dest $DEST server $SERVER" > > ### BEGIN INIT INFO > # Provides: Obfsproxy > # Required-Start: > # Required-Stop: > # Default-Start: 2 3 4 5 > # Default-Stop: 0 1 6 > # Short-Description: Obfsproxy > ### END INIT INFO > > case "$1" in > start) > echo "Starting Obfsproxy" > > /sbin/start-stop-daemon --make-pidfile --background --oknodo --start --pidfile $PIDFILE \ > --chuid debian-tor:debian-tor --startas /usr/sbin/aa-exec --exec $DAEMON > ;; > stop) > echo "Stopping Obfsproxy" > > /sbin/start-stop-daemon --stop --pidfile $PIDFILE --verbose > ;; > restart|reload) > /sbin/start-stop-daemon --stop --pidfile $PIDFILE --verbose > sleep 1 > /sbin/start-stop-daemon --make-pidfile --background --oknodo --start --pidfile $PIDFILE \ > --chuid debian-tor:debian-tor --startas /usr/sbin/aa-exec --exec $DAEMON > ;; > *) > echo "Usage: /etc/init.d/obfsproxy {start|stop|restart|reload}" > exit 1 > ;; > esac > > exit 0 > -------------------

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Standalone obfsproxy apparmor profile etc.
by thegreatwent＠Safe-mail.net 12 Nov '14

12 Nov '14

Not sure if this is the right place to post or if this will help anybody, but I think I figured out how to run a standalone (NOT managed) obfs3 obfsproxy on Ubuntu 14.04 with a somewhat confined apparmor profile running under the debian-tor user. I verified this by looking at ps and it shows "debian-tor [...] /usr/bin/python /usr/bin/obfsproxy obfs3[...]". AA-STATUS says /usr/bin/obfsproxy is in enforce mode, and removing "network inet stream," for example from the aa profile results in obfsproxy failing to start. The line in the profile for "/usr/** r," is ugly, but replacing it with "/usr/bin/** r," didn't work. Obfsproxy log messages also seem to be going to /dev/null, so I'm missing something there. So Linux/Apparmor experts, is there anything bad/wrong with this setup? Am I relatively safe from bad guys hacking into my obfsproxy ports? How can I see if the good guys are using it successfully? The aa profile does not work for managed instances of obfsproxy. It complained about wanting read access to nsswitch.conf and /etc/passwd and I don't know enough python to understand why it wants that, so I didn't add it. Below is also attached: /etc/tor/torrc [just the relevant lines, using iptables to redirect from advertised obfs3port to actual] ------------------- ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 proxy a.b.c.d:[advertisedobfs3port] ExtORPort auto ------------------- /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.obfsproxy ------------------- # vim:syntax=apparmor #include <tunables/global> /usr/bin/obfsproxy { #include <abstractions/base> #include <abstractions/python> network inet stream, /var/log/tor/log rw, /dev/urandom r, /dev/random r, /usr/** r, /usr/bin/obfsproxy rix, } ------------------- /etc/init.d/obfsproxy ------------------- #!/bin/bash PIDFILE="/var/run/obfsproxy/obfsproxy.pid" DEST="127.0.0.1:[ORPort]" SERVER="a.b.c.d:[obfs3port]" DAEMON="/usr/bin/obfsproxy -- --profile=/usr/bin/obfsproxy -- /usr/bin/obfsproxy obfs3 --dest $DEST server $SERVER" ### BEGIN INIT INFO # Provides: Obfsproxy # Required-Start: # Required-Stop: # Default-Start: 2 3 4 5 # Default-Stop: 0 1 6 # Short-Description: Obfsproxy ### END INIT INFO case "$1" in start) echo "Starting Obfsproxy" /sbin/start-stop-daemon --make-pidfile --background --oknodo --start --pidfile $PIDFILE \ --chuid debian-tor:debian-tor --startas /usr/sbin/aa-exec --exec $DAEMON ;; stop) echo "Stopping Obfsproxy" /sbin/start-stop-daemon --stop --pidfile $PIDFILE --verbose ;; restart|reload) /sbin/start-stop-daemon --stop --pidfile $PIDFILE --verbose sleep 1 /sbin/start-stop-daemon --make-pidfile --background --oknodo --start --pidfile $PIDFILE \ --chuid debian-tor:debian-tor --startas /usr/sbin/aa-exec --exec $DAEMON ;; *) echo "Usage: /etc/init.d/obfsproxy {start|stop|restart|reload}" exit 1 ;; esac exit 0 -------------------

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Re: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust
by tor＠t-3.net 11 Nov '14

11 Nov '14

On 11/07/2014 10:26 PM, grarpamp wrote: > Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? > Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, > do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with > them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? > Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day > stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? > Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces > we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. I can't think of a good reason to do this, or why there is a problem. Can think of quite a few negatives, the worst of which are related to the fact that NSA/GCHQ would like for Tor to go away. Something like what you describe would be a nice little tool for them to get useful-to-them personal info about Tor node operators. Even assuming that the node operators' identities are already known to the aforementioned agencies, how could feeding them juicy little details possibly help the situation. It also kinda has "perfect environment for social engineering" written all over it. Who's to say that the most trusted-feeling people in such a group wouldn't necessarily be one of the infiltrating baddies. They are pro at this.

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Node Operators Web Of Trust
by grarpamp 11 Nov '14

11 Nov '14

Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. NOWoT participation is optional, it is of course infiltratable, and what it proves may be arguable, but it seems a necessary thing to try as a test of that and to develop a good model. Many operators know each other in person. And the node density per geographic region supports getting out to meet operators even if only for the sole purpose of attesting 'I met this blob of flesh who proved ownership of node[s] x'. That's a big start, even against the sybil agents they'd surely send out to meet you. Many know exactly who the other is in the active community such that they can attest at that level. And so on down the line of different classes of trust that may be developed and asserted over each claimed operator. Assuming a NOWoT that actually says something can be established, is traffic then routable by the user over nodes via trust metrics in addition to the usual metrics and randomness? WoT's are an ancient subject... now what are the possibilities and issues when asserting them over physical nodes, not just over virtual nodes such as an email address found in your pubkey? And what about identities that exist only anonymously yet can prove control over various unique resources? If such WoT's cannot be proven to have non-value, then it seems worth doing. This doesn't just apply to Tor, but to any node based system.

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Bwauths Measures question, friends.
by Rafael Rodriguez 10 Nov '14

10 Nov '14

Anyone knows how often bwauths measures a relay? I don't understand why directory authorities have not lifted the 20KB cap for my older relay. Now I have doubts if it could be a problem with my server. This is a 2MB/s relay with burst of 4MB/s to start tuning it and increase it later if stable, which is not being used and has been running for over 3 days. Is it normal for Relays to take longer than three days to start getting at least some traffic and for directory authorities to lift the 20KB cap? Fingerprint 48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765

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Windows Tor Server Guide
by Rafael Rodriguez 10 Nov '14

10 Nov '14

Hello fellows, Where can we contribute (post a guide) to deploy Tor in Windows without the extras unneeded stuff? I was looking for a Tor Server installation guide on Windows to run Tor as a service. I did not wanted to install all the extra browser stuff but a plain "Tor server" service and secure it by giving the service its own limited account and write permissions just to the datadir. Since I couldn't find information online to help me out, I ended up using the latest Tor Browser package and removing everything except Tor itself and deployed it in two Windows servers as services. I would like to post somewhere in the Top project about the process for others to benefit from it.

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Re: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust (Spencer Rhodes)
by Spencer Rhodes 10 Nov '14

10 Nov '14

> > From: Gareth Llewellyn <gareth(a)networksaremadeofstring.co.uk> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Date: November 10, 2014 at 5:58:12 AM EST > Reply-To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust > > > On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 8:26 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com <mailto:grarpamp@gmail.com>> wrote: > Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? > Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, > do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with > them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? > Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day > stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? > Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces > we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. > > I had an idea for this a little while ago; https://tortbv.link/ <https://tortbv.link/> using the published GPG signature in the contact info to sign the node fingerprint, if you trust the GPG key then you can _possibly_ trust that the node is run by the named operator. > > Never got round to actually doing anything with it though... > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays Strikes me as a very good idea. Perhaps lawyers wielding attorney-client privilege could be used to protect the identities of those node operators who wish to remain anonymous. -- Spencer Rhodes, Esq. 126 East Jefferson Street, Orlando, Florida USA 32801-1830 t: +1.321.332.0407 | f: +1.321.332.0409 | m: +1.407.796.8282

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Re: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust
by Eric Hocking 10 Nov '14

10 Nov '14

That sounds like an excellent idea. if the site nowot.com is available, someone could register it. Maybe we could even get providers on board with the idea. > On Nov 10, 2014, at 7:00 AM, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Node Operators Web Of Trust (grarpamp) > 2. Re: Node Operators Web Of Trust (Gareth Llewellyn) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2014 15:26:40 -0500 > From: grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Cc: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > Subject: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust > Message-ID: > <CAD2Ti2__JyLd2CYfWOitEOkPfOFDOiGb7_xqtUCgo+cKrJRVKw(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? > Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, > do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with > them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? > Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day > stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? > Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces > we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. > NOWoT participation is optional, it is of course infiltratable, > and what it proves may be arguable, but it seems a necessary > thing to try as a test of that and to develop a good model. > Many operators know each other in person. And the node > density per geographic region supports getting out to meet > operators even if only for the sole purpose of attesting 'I met > this blob of flesh who proved ownership of node[s] x'. > That's a big start, even against the sybil agents they'd surely > send out to meet you. > Many know exactly who the other is in the active community > such that they can attest at that level. And so on down the > line of different classes of trust that may be developed > and asserted over each claimed operator. > Assuming a NOWoT that actually says something can > be established, is traffic then routable by the user over nodes > via trust metrics in addition to the usual metrics and randomness? > WoT's are an ancient subject... now what are the possibilities and > issues when asserting them over physical nodes, not just over > virtual nodes such as an email address found in your pubkey? > And what about identities that exist only anonymously yet > can prove control over various unique resources? > If such WoT's cannot be proven to have non-value, then it seems > worth doing. > > This doesn't just apply to Tor, but to any node based system. > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 10:58:12 +0000 > From: Gareth Llewellyn <gareth(a)networksaremadeofstring.co.uk> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust > Message-ID: > <CAM8M=ki3y0xgOEdsTJPU_Y7DPVRQ37uZ5rPrE1W4i_TjByNNaQ(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > >> On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 8:26 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? >> Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, >> do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with >> them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? >> Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day >> stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? >> Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces >> we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. >> > > I had an idea for this a little while ago; https://tortbv.link/ using the > published GPG signature in the contact info to sign the node fingerprint, > if you trust the GPG key then you can _possibly_ trust that the node is run > by the named operator. > > Never got round to actually doing anything with it though... >

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How's your relay doing? Reporting Bad Relays
by Matthew Finkel 08 Nov '14

08 Nov '14

Hi Relay Operators, A few months ago[0], we announced the bad-relays(a)lists.torproject.org mailing list and asked everyone to send reports to that list if they suspected a relay was...bad. We've already received many reports, so please keep them coming. We also want to ask all of you to use that list, as well. If at anytime you think your relay is no longer safe for use, please tell us. Roger tweeted about this yesterday[1][2], too. The Tor network exists because of all of you and we can only keep it safe with your help. Let us know if you have any questions. Thanks! Matt [0] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-report-bad-relays [1] https://twitter.com/RogerDingledine/status/530878388605423616 [2] For those who don't want to open Twitter: If your #Tor relay is stolen or you lose control of it, please report it so we can blacklist it: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-report-bad-relays @TorProject

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This may be a stupid question to you but how do I unsubscribe from these posts? Graeme.
by Graeme Briggs-White 07 Nov '14

07 Nov '14

As above....

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Re: [tor-relays] FreeBSD's global IP ID (was: Platform diversity in Tor network)
by grarpamp 07 Nov '14

07 Nov '14

On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Adrian Chadd <adrian(a)freebsd.org> wrote: > ... that's .. odd. > > Let's poke the freebsd crypto and network stack people and ask. I > can't imagine why this is a problem anymore and we should default to > it being on. I don't think there's a crypto@ list, though security@ might represent. > The other thing you could do is have the tor port require > it be turned on before tor runs. That would not cover people who compile and use upstream Tor. Ideally, the Tor client could check for any system parameters it feels are critical before running, or simply delegate them and/or any parameters of lesser importance to platform specific guides on the Tor wiki. > On 7 November 2014 00:20, grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:52 AM, Philipp Winter <phw(a)nymity.ch> wrote: >>> >>> FreeBSD still seems to use globally incrementing IP IDs by default. >>> That's an issue as it leaks fine-grained information about how many >>> packets a relay's networking stack processes. (However, nobody >>> investigated the exact impact on Tor relays so far, which makes this a >>> FUD-heavy topic.) It looks like approximately 50 out of the 131 FreeBSD >>> relays I tested (38%) use global IP IDs. >>> >>> There's a sysctl variable called "net.inet.ip.random_id" which makes a >>> FreeBSD's IP ID behaviour random. FreeBSD relay operators should set >>> this to "1". >>> >>> Note that this issue was already discussed earlier this year in a thread >>> called "Lots of tor relays send out sequential IP IDs; please fix >>> that!". >> >> It's been default off since before it was a sysctl over a decade ago. >> Anyone know what the deal is with that? Some objection, or >> forgotten flag day, or oversight that really should be set to 1? >> https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=133720

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Re: [tor-relays] Unexpected sendme cell from client. Closing circ (window 1000)." error message.
by K. Besig 06 Nov '14

06 Nov '14

Thanks for all the informative responses, they were truly underwhelming...

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Re: [tor-relays] Adding relays with a click
by Nan 04 Nov '14

04 Nov '14

SiNA Thank you -- that looks like the script we need. Even though it was written for Ubuntu it should work just as well on debian. We probably can simplify it because every GoodCrypto server is already a tor proxy. Thanks again, Nan ----- On Nov 4, 2014, at 17:41:37, SiNA Rabbani sina(a)redteam.net wrote: > You mind find this script interesting: > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-cloud.git/blob/ce98487e1174bff3a76c1f9f03… > > --SiNA GoodCrypto warning: Anyone could have read this message. Use encryption, it works.

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Adding relays with a click
by Nan 04 Nov '14

04 Nov '14

We're considering trying to make it a single click for a sysadmin to add their GoodCrypto server to tor as a bridge or non-exit relay. Any experience with anything like this, especially responses from sysadmins? Nan GoodCrypto warning: Anyone could have read this message. Use encryption, it works.

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CMU exit node IP address will change
by Zack Weinberg 02 Nov '14

02 Nov '14

CMU network operations has decided to move the Tor exit node that my group operates (tor-exit.cylab.cmu.edu) to an isolated subnet in order to minimize consequences for the rest of the campus network. For instance, apparently there have been several cases where third parties blacklisted the entire CMU IP space in response to malicious traffic from the exit node. This is currently scheduled to happen Tuesday (Nov. 4). The new IP address will be 204.194.29.4. I'm sending this message primarily as an assertion that nothing nefarious is going on, but also because I haven't had to change the IP address of a running node before and I would like to ask if there's anything in particular that should be done to minimize downtime. Thanks, zw

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Unexpected sendme cell from...
by Kurt Besig 01 Nov '14

01 Nov '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I this was discussed awhile back through the mailing list and online to some extent, however I never grasped the solutions or any real resolution to the issue. My relay is getting fairly hammered daily and I'd appreciate any input regarding the, "[WARN] Unexpected sendme cell from client. Closing circ (window 1000)." error message. Horizons3 Thanks -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJUVSJWAAoJEJQqkaGlFNDPKbcH/jZ1H4IAmNZ0PHUHIEvisBJJ oSHPQ6fgmtAHwdo6uJakc5L+f4aeIZrOfCKWQ+cQ/LxkcWmZs7H/0N4w/PV8mJWV xN0lPAso9VZLulLuHhLbIJrq6G2XJ1zmBbkmLrEGhT1ZAvFhjcFtwsVTsB0h52EO da2NWvMpNFESkznkvPZSVa7zIRk4nM4YIdb0jrMa1Jw+Z/JdhfE4IJZ2sCgf9HRu 1fX0318uL1AEN9KKYU4yxwZnboEoyluGALy42e7oGxHryctOHmez0MjXglA2j0BA 4VakJJfF8A4BTkGEzMhi4laDDh1glkRal8nJRONsBlTCulzqEMCCNSLml+Cw6Po= =PQab -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com

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