- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Blocking outbound 22 or no?
by AMuse 06 Oct '17

06 Oct '17

Hi all! I'm getting a number of ISP Abuse complaints around outbound ssh brute-forcing from our exit relay. I'm personally of the opinion that people should run fail2ban (or equiv) and get on with life and I generally ignore the complaints - but wondered, what are other operators doing? Is anyone exit-policy blocking outbound 22 to make the internet a kinder place? Is anyone refusing to on principle?

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Quintex Exit Relays
by John Ricketts 05 Oct '17

05 Oct '17

All, I am performing some operating system upgrades and my exit nodes may be down for a period of time. Just a heads up. John

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Re: [tor-relays] AU Relays and data retention
by Paul Templeton 05 Oct '17

05 Oct '17

Thanx Teor, I did speak to a lawyer and there is no requirement to retain any data if you run a node. It's treated as a VPN. My question that I sent was more about whether a service (non commercial service) was exempt. They don't delineate. Paul

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AU Relays and data retention
by Paul Templeton 05 Oct '17

05 Oct '17

Hi All, I have asked the Attorney Generals Department about data retention and got the following response. If you run a relay/bridge here you seem to be exempt from retaining data. If your not an ISP and you run a service from home the ISP/carrier will retain the data though. This just general information. Regards, Paul UNCLASSIFIED Dear Mr Templeton Thank you for your enquiry to the Office of Communications and Cybercrime. I am re-sending our reply to your original enquiry that we sent on 12 September 2017 that seems to have not arrived. The extent of data retention obligations for your relevant service would relate to the extent to which elements of the data set “visible” to you. For example, where a provider does not have “visibility” of a customer’s IP address, it is likely that the IP address was assigned as part of a different relevant service. For example, if you have a record of the MAC addresses of users who access your network then this information must be retained for the required period. You are not obliged to retain the identity of the user if this is not information to which you have access. Whether the service is being offered on a commercial basis or is free is irrelevant in determining a service provider's obligations. In your email you noted that "The true origin of a connection and the true destination will never be known and there will be no way of obtaining the information. That also pertains to the ports used in the circuit and all data passing through the circuit will be encrypted." This sentence appears to suggest that you may be looking to offer some kind of an internet access service, in which case the destination is not required to be retained. Your reference to encrypted content suggests a VPN. If this is the case and this service is not operated you, obligations do not apply. Also, data retention would not require you to store the contents of the communications. Please do not hesitate to contact our office if you require further information. Regards Kerry Office of Communications Access & Cybercrime Intelligence and Identity Security Division T: (02) 6141 2884 The information contained in this email is intended as guidance only. It does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. If you require legal advice, you should consult an independent legal adviser.

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SSH Bruteforce Attempts
by tanous .c 04 Oct '17

04 Oct '17

Hi, I have been running one tor exit relay for about 51 days and i recently got this abuse report: Good afternoon, Your Ip address (212.47.239.73) has been reported to us by profihost because it seems to have attempted to bruteforce. Thank you to take the necessary action as soon as possible. You will find more information about this report below this message. Feel free to contact Online.net technical assistance for more information. Online.net Abuse service ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (time is MET / GMT+1): Tue Oct 3 08:59:40 2017: user: root service: ssh target: 77.75.252.250 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 08:59:10 2017: user: root service: ssh target: 77.75.252.250 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 08:59:10 2017: user: root service: ssh target: 77.75.252.250 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 08:36:18 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 37.228.155.188 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 07:06:42 2017: user: user service: ssh target: 77.75.252.80 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 07:06:12 2017: user: user1 service: ssh target: 77.75.252.80 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 06:14:12 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 77.75.251.85 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 06:01:41 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 77.75.252.78 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 05:37:01 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 185.39.221.52 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 02:07:46 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 77.75.249.19 source: 212.47.239.73 Tue Oct 3 01:23:57 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 85.158.176.137 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 20:10:45 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 77.75.255.76 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 17:30:13 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 185.39.221.145 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 17:30:13 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 185.39.221.145 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 17:09:32 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 37.228.154.149 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 17:09:23 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 37.228.154.102 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 16:43:12 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 77.75.252.233 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 16:23:41 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 37.228.155.125 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 14:17:24 2017: user: admin service: ssh target: 77.75.250.84 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 13:24:14 2017: user: supervisor service: ssh target: 37.228.159.139 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 13:24:14 2017: user: support service: ssh target: 37.228.159.139 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 13:23:44 2017: user: super service: ssh target: 37.228.159.139 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 12:48:09 2017: user: user service: ssh target: 37.228.159.98 source: 212.47.239.73 Mon Oct 2 12:47:39 2017: user: user service: ssh target: 37.228.159.98 source: 212.47.239.73 ------ This data has been truncated because it was too long ------ Have any of you had this sort of problem? I'm having difficulty determining if this log information represents a normal exit relay ocurrence or if my server has been compromised... What could i do in order to solve this? Thank you all, Tanous

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SSH brute force attempts to connect to my Middle Relay IP address
by Fr33d0m4all 04 Oct '17

04 Oct '17

Hi, My Tor middle relay public IP address is victim of SSH brute force connections’ attempts and the attack is going on since two weeks ago. It’s not a problem, the server that is listening with SSH on the same IP address than my Tor relay blocks the connections and bans the IP addresses (with Fail2Ban) but I just wanted to know if there is some campaign of attacks carried against Tor relays.. are you experiencing the same? The attacks are carried on with a botnet given the large amount of different IP addresses that I see in the logs. Best regards, Fr33d0m4All

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Attacks to and from Tor
by Thomas Dünser 04 Oct '17

04 Oct '17

Hi everybody, I've read a few threads about attacks from exit nodes to the clear net and from the clear net to tor nodes and have several questions: -How can you recognize that the attacks to tor nodes are especially against Tor? -And how can a clear net user or better IDS easily differencing between an attacker that comes over Tor (exit node) or from a clear net host? I think this is important to categorize the situation. Thanks, Tom

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Feedback wanted: letter to my university's library
by AJ Jordan 02 Oct '17

02 Oct '17

Hey, all! I'm AJ; I've been lurking on this list for many years but have never had cause to post. I've run a Tor relay (`strugees`) on AWS for a number of years now, but haven't been able to dedicate all that much bandwidth to it due to cost concerns. However I've just started college at the University of Rochester, which obviously presents a great opportunity to set up a relay on a really great network. I'm planning to reach out to the library with the following email and would love some feedback: > Heya! > > I'm a new first-year student and I'm active in the technology > activism community. One of the things I'm very interested in is the > Tor Project (https://torproject.org) whose mission is to make it > possible to freely and anonymously use the internet, without fear of > surveillance or censorship. Tor is used by a wide variety of people > - activists, journalists, corporations, law enforcement, and > individuals - to gain free access to information and speak their > mind. Tor is able to provide this free expression by utilizing a > worldwide network of relays run by volunteers. A relay can make a > big difference on the Tor network if it's run on a connection which > is fast and has lots of bandwidth - like the University's > connection. > > I think it would be really cool if UR would donate part of its > internet resources to the Tor network. I considered directly > contacting IT, but I thought it actually made sense to talk to the > library first since the core values are actually really similar - > libraries and the Tor project both know the value and power of > unrestricted access to information and are dedicated to making > information available to anyone who wants it. > > If this is something that sounds interesting, I would love to chat > about this in person. I would also be willing to invest the time > needed to administrate the relay - I have several years of > experience doing this already, but haven't had access to the > resources the University has. > > Thanks very much! > > AJ Jordan Does anyone who's done something like this before have any tips or suggestions? Am I going about this in the best way? Cheers! AJ

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Relay uptime versus outdated Tor version
by K. Besig 02 Oct '17

02 Oct '17

One of my relays has over 416 days of uptime, which I'm very proud of, however it's running an outdated version of Tor. I should probably already know the answer, but it seems to me I would have to stop the tor service to update the relay. Would I in fact lose my uptime or would it be seamless? Thanks for the response

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bwauths doesn't reach reliable my relay
by Toralf Förster 30 Sep '17

30 Sep '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I do wonder why both longclaw and Faravahar seems since few days not to reach my relays 1AF72E8906E6C49481A791A6F8F84F8DFEBBB2BA and 6EABEBF38CE7E3DF672C4DB01383606FE3EB2215 respectively - resulting in a bw value of 20. B/c I switched to version 0.3.1.7 I do wonder if this could be the culprit ? - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWcwE1BccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTik4AP4ubRPDKm3jz73xGXmNAhupWarC 9pVPhRNqoD19jgpbGwD/QUnYKHIpbV4983kVMBjr9vbt2zwHRwmT0o+YMFJEVws= =NYwf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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