tor-relays November 2022

tor-relays@lists.torproject.org

17 participants
17 discussions

recommended way to run 0.4.7 on armhf?
by ilf 25 Nov '23

25 Nov '23

What's the recommended way to run 0.4.7 on armhf? > The package repository [deb.torproject.org] does not offer 32-bit ARM > architecture (armhf) images (yet). https://support.torproject.org/apt/tor-deb-repo/ Debian has 0.4.7 in bullseye-backports. But Raspbian doesn't have bullseye-backports: http://raspbian.raspberrypi.org/raspbian/dists/ -- ilf If you upload your address book to "the cloud", I don't want to be in it.

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security update for obfs4proxy
by meskio 10 Jan '23

10 Jan '23

Hello, The latest version of obfs4proxy (0.0.14) comes with an important security fix. If you are running a obfs4 Tor bridge please upgrade as soon as possible. If you use debian you can find the Debian package in stable-backports: https://packages.debian.org/stable-backports/obfs4proxy If you use docker you'll find the latest version in docker hub: https://hub.docker.com/r/thetorproject/obfs4-bridge/ Or you can find the source code in the upstream repository: https://gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4 If you need help upgrading your relay, please use this mailing list or the Tor Forum: https://forum.torproject.net/c/support/relay-operator/17 We appreciate a lot your effort and time! Thank you -- meskio | https://meskio.net/ -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- My contact info: https://meskio.net/crypto.txt -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Nos vamos a Croatan.

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How to reduce tor CPU load on a single bridge?
by David Fifield 19 Dec '22

19 Dec '22

The main Snowflake bridge (https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/5481936581E23D2D178105D44DB6…) is starting to become overloaded, because of a recent substantial increase in users. I think the host has sufficient CPU and memory headroom, and pluggable transport process (that receies WebSocket connections and forwards them to tor) is scaling across multiple cores. But the tor process is constantly using 100% of one CPU core, and I suspect that the tor process has become a bottleneck. Here are issues about a recent CPU upgrade on the bridge, and observations about the proportion of CPU used by different processes: https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowfl… https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowfl… I have the impression that tor cannot use more than one CPU core—is that correct? If so, what can be done to permit a bridge to scale beyond 1×100% CPU? We can fairly easily scale the Snowflake-specific components around the tor process, but ultimately, a tor client process expects to connect to a bridge having a certain fingerprint, and that is the part I don't know how to easily scale. * Surely it's not possible to run multiple instances of tor with the same fingerprint? Or is it? Does the answer change if all instances are on the same IP address? If the OR ports are never used? * OnionBalance does not help with this, correct? * Are there configuration options we could set to increase parallelism? * Is migrating to a host with better single-core performance the only immediate option for scaling the tor process? Separate from the topic of scaling a single bridge, here is a past issue with thoughts on scaling beyond one bridge. it looks as though there are not ways to do it that do not require changes to the way tor handles its Bridge lines. https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowfl… * Using multiple snowflake Bridge lines does not work well, despite that we could arrange to have the Snowflake proxy connect the user to the expected bridge, because tor will try to connect to all of them, not choose one at random. * Removing the fingerprint from the snowflake Bridge line in Tor Browser would permit the Snowflake proxies to round-robin clients over several bridges, but then the first hop would be unauthenticated (at the Tor layer). It would be nice if it were possible to specify a small set of permitted bridge fingerprints.

7 57

relayor v22.0.0-rc is released
by nusenu 03 Dec '22

03 Dec '22

Hi, relayor v22.0.0-rc is released. relayor is an ansible role that helps you with running tor relays with minimal effort (automate everything). https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor#main-benefits-for-a-tor-relay-ope… Changes since relayor v21.2.0-rc: * MetricsPort support improvements: * generate nginx reverse server config for remote prometheus scraping on the relay (we do not install nginx) * generate htpasswd file for HTTP basic auth of MetricsPort on the relay * debian/ubuntu: support new alpha repos (branch name is no longer included in the repo name). * FreeBSD 12.3 is supported kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io

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Difficulties testing my bridge
by binarynoise 02 Dec '22

02 Dec '22

Hello everyone, I run a bridge and as I was doing maintenance on my server, I wanted to check whether my bridge works and whether the bandwidth is really as low as advertised in the relay search (it's not, maybe because no-one uses it, as it's on reserved distribution). So I started my tor-browser, opened htop locally and on the server and started browsing. Everything went smoothly, but something was odd: I did not see any traffic on my server (that idles most of the time, so I should see my bridges traffic). Checked connection-info: no bridge there. Went to settings, checked the bridge settings: yes, I had entered by bridge-line. Odd. Continued to the tor logs: oh, bridge-line didn't parse. Interesting. (I put in the server's identity key ed25519 fingerprint instead of the not-ed25519 one and put my bridges name somewhere there too). Ok, but why doesn't it tell me? Why is there no big "Couldn't connect to your configured bridges"- warning after hitting the connect-to-tor-button? Anyway, does some tool exist, where you enter your bridge's information or run it on the server, that tells you if the recommended versions of tor + dependencies are installed and actually used? That would make the task of keeping the bridge healthy easier. Greetings binarynoise

3 4

Tor DDoS Mitigation iptables scripts update. Version 4.0.1
by Chris 30 Nov '22

30 Nov '22

Background: A set of bash scripts used to apply iptables rules to fight the current DDoS attacks. They require no dependencies to install except iptable/nftables which all Linux flavors already have and require no particular expertise. The issue was discussed here: [issue 40093](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40093) Change log: Some modifications due to a change in the nature of the attacks. - Re ordered rules for more efficiency and reducing the load - Removed the hashlimit rule as it puts more load on the system with not much overall benefit as the attackers have adapted to it and it reduces the size of the block list. - Reduce the number of allowed concurrent connections to 2 if you're not a relay. - Use of remove.sh cron script at regular intervals (optional) will give relays a chance to create up to 4 connections if they need to. ******- Created a new cron file **refresh-authorities.sh** to refresh your allow-list with the most up to date IP addresses for the authorities and snowflake. Should be run daily. - Removed an unnecessary line in the update files. - Modified Readme.MD file to reflect new changes. The new modifications have been tested for two weeks now and the systems are running smoothly with no ill effect. You can read more and download here: [Enkidu-6 tor-ddos on Github](https://github.com/Enkidu-6/tor-ddos) To avoid occasional NTor drops a minimum NumCPUs 16 in torrc is recommended. P.S. The NumCPUs option is unfortunately poorly documented. It really has nothing to do with the number of CPUs you have. It's about the number of worker threads Tor will create to deal with decryption of onionskins. So you can have two CPUs and still set NumCPUs to 16.

1 0

Considering running a relay on AWS Free tier
by Keifer Bly 29 Nov '22

29 Nov '22

Hi, So I don't know if I will do it, but I am considering setting up a tor middle relay on AWS free tier. I have been asking their support tem regarding how much traffic one can push and remain free tier, their response was: If your microservice application is using an RDS or Amazon DynamoDB Accelerator (DAX) database, the Lambda-to-database traffic will be free if it’s in the same region, including if VPC peering is used. Traffic to databases in a different region will incur a regional transfer fee of $0.09 per GB for both the Lambda and database egress traffic. Ingress traffic is free for both.\" I am wondering does anyone else run tor middle relays on AWS free tier, and what is the best torrc configuration to use for keeping the inbound and outbound traffic in free tier in case I do go fourth with this? Thanks. --Keifer

2 1

Next Tor relay operator - November 19th at 19.00 UTC
by gus 23 Nov '22

23 Nov '22

Dear relay operators, The next Tor relay operator meetup will happen on Saturday, November 19th at 19.00 UTC. ## Where BigBlueButton: https://tor.meet.coop/gus-og0-x74-dzn ## Agenda (WIP) - Announcements - State of DoS attack - Q&A - Next Tor Relay Operator Meetup Meeting pad: - https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-relay-op-meetup-n19-keep - http://kfahv6wfkbezjyg4r6mlhpmieydbebr5vkok5r34ya464gqz6c44bnyd.onion/p/tor… Everyone is free to bring up additional questions or topics at the meeting itself. ## Registration No need for a registration or anything else, just use the room-link above. We will open the room 10 minutes before so you can test your mic setup. Please share with your friends, social media and other mailing lists! cheers, Gus -- The Tor Project Community Team Lead

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Re: [tor-relays] preventing DDoS is more than just network filtering
by Toralf Förster 15 Nov '22

15 Nov '22

On 11/8/22 10:57, Chris wrote: > The main reason is that a simple SYN flood can quickly fill up your > conntrack table and then legitimate packets are quietly dropped and you > won't see any problems thinking everything is perfect with your server > unless you dig into your system logs. Hhm, my system log doesn't show any problems, maybe due to (or regardless of?): CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y ? Nevertheless, I updated the Readme to explain my point of view [1] [2]. [1] https://github.com/toralf/torutils#block-ddos-traffic [2] https://github.com/toralf/torutils#rule-set -- Toralf

3 3

Tor Relay on Gandi.net
by protectmyonion 14 Nov '22

14 Nov '22

mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org I was wondering if anyone had experience running a Tor relay on Gandi. According to [good-bad-isps](https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-resources/g…, Gandi supports all relays. However, I contacted support asking them their policy on Tor and if their policy was the same for all Tor relays. Their response was basically 'You can install any software you want, but its use is subject to French law and our terms of service. If a complaint is received, the Abuse department will take appropriate action and notify you.'. This was pretty vague and kind of seemed like they didn't know what Tor was. I responded and tried to explain what Tor was using most of what was in the Common Boilerplate template. I explained that there were things that I could do to reduce potential abuse, like limiting the exit policy, but that there was always still potential for abuse. The next response came from the Abuse department and basically said 'Any illegal activity on your IP will result in your server being shutdown.'. Based on this, it seems like Gandi is not a good ISP for Tor exits, but likely fine for all other relays. What's a little confusing is that according to Tor metrics, Gandi currently has Tor exits. It is only 2, but nevertheless, they exist. [France](https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS203476) location has 2 exits, but [Luxembourg](https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS29169) has none. I'm not sure if [good-bad-isps](https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-resources/g… should be updated, given there's conflicting information, but I figured I'd ask if anyone had personal experience with Gandi. Thanks.

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tor-relays November 2022