December 2021 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Is Tor Actually "Blocked" In Russia, or Are Some Users Unblocked for now?
by Neel Chauhan 06 Dec '21

06 Dec '21

Hi tor-relays@, While I don't live in Russia, nor are my parents from Russia (they're from India), today, I noticed these articles that some people noticed Tor is blocked in Russia (sorry for being late): https://ntc.party/t/ooni-reports-of-tor-blocking-in-certain-isps-since-2021… https://forum.torproject.net/t/tor-blocked-in-russia-how-to-circumvent-cens… Yet, when I look at Tor Relay Status, I noticed many relays hosted on Russian residential ISPs are still online, and only a few aren't: Moscow City Telephone: *https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS25513 Rostelecom: * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS12389 * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS42610 * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS34168 Vimpelcom: * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS8371 * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS8402 MTS: * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS60496 I didn't notice a big reduction in "relay" users on Metrics: https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2021-09-0… But did see an increase in "bridge" users: https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2021-09-… And most Ooni results still show Tor can connect fine: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-12-06&since=2021-11-29&probe_cc… I feel it could be possible it's one of the two: * Most likely, the censorship rollout is in stages. Some users are blocked but other's aren't, where it wasn't rolled out is still unblocked. * Less likely, but Russia found people could use pluggable transports, like HTTPS obfs4 bridges and maybe they found blocking Tor itself is ineffective, or trying to block "meek" users ended up blocking Microsoft and ASP.NET/Azure-based webapps. Disclaimer: I work at Microsoft, but not on Azure as of now. I did however interview for a position in the Azure umbrella (not on the CDN however). -Neel Chauhan

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Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 131, Issue 2
by Ali Druno 06 Dec '21

06 Dec '21

Hi! I've also noticed suddenly 3-5x more bridge users using the one I run with a concrete difference in Russian connections highly increased in number of unique users compared as the others countries which are looking stable. (Sorry for my bad English, I hope it was comprehensible enough) Have a nice week! Nils Le lun. 6 déc. 2021 à 13:00, <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> a écrit : > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available (Vin?cius Zavam) > 2. Is Tor Actually "Blocked" In Russia, or Are Some Users > Unblocked for now? (Neel Chauhan) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2021 19:30:38 +0000 > From: Vin?cius Zavam <egypcio(a)googlemail.com> > To: undisclosed-recipients:; > Subject: [tor-relays] Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available > Message-ID: > < > CA+Kr6DNtCC6-iQ7Et71UyTkqArcB_ruO4CcY8nMUm278BJaeyg(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > ol?! :) > agora temos um pacote para instalar Snowflake em FreeBSD. aproveitem! > > tl;dr; we now have a package to install Snowflake on FreeBSD. enjoy! > > since the 14th of Nov 2021 we have a port that builds a Snowflake package > that can be installed on FreeBSD. it gives us all 3 different > features/functions that we can use Snowflake for: > > - client > - proxy > - server > > don't know Snowflake yet? > > - https://snowflake.torproject.org/ > - https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/ > - > > https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow… > > if you are using the "latest" branch of pkg, try it out! the package is > called "snowflake-tor" > > # pkg update -f > # pkg install -U snowflake-tor > > wanna checkout the source of its port? > > - > > https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/commit/?id=057c0c3c0645c0b237bb2a96dda440e04… > > did you know about the "Run a Bridge" campaign? > > - https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/ > > that's it! stay safe and have a great one > obrigado ]=) > > > -- > Vin?cius Zavam > keybase.io/egypcio >

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Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available
by Vinícius Zavam 05 Dec '21

05 Dec '21

olá! :) agora temos um pacote para instalar Snowflake em FreeBSD. aproveitem! tl;dr; we now have a package to install Snowflake on FreeBSD. enjoy! since the 14th of Nov 2021 we have a port that builds a Snowflake package that can be installed on FreeBSD. it gives us all 3 different features/functions that we can use Snowflake for: - client - proxy - server don't know Snowflake yet? - https://snowflake.torproject.org/ - https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/ - https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow… if you are using the "latest" branch of pkg, try it out! the package is called "snowflake-tor" # pkg update -f # pkg install -U snowflake-tor wanna checkout the source of its port? - https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/commit/?id=057c0c3c0645c0b237bb2a96dda440e04… did you know about the "Run a Bridge" campaign? - https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/ that's it! stay safe and have a great one obrigado ]=) -- Vinícius Zavam keybase.io/egypcio

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Recent rejection of relays
by Georg Koppen 02 Dec '21

02 Dec '21

Hello everyone! Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast majority were middle-only relays. We don't have any evidence that these relays were doing any attack, but there are attacks possible which relays could perform from the middle position. Therefore, we decided we'd remove those relays for our users' safety sake. While we were already tracking some of the relays for a while, a big chunk of them was also independently reported by a cypherpunk and nusenu helped analyzing the data. Thanks to both of them from our side. Foe what it is worth: a large part of those relays did not set any valid contact info and/or when we tried to contact some of the relays' operators the emails bounced. However, we sometimes need to have ways to reach relay operators, be it for debugging purposes or for helping them with relay misconfiguration. Thus, please set a valid contact info when running relays. Finally, anyone running relays: try to get connected to the community so we can build some trust among each other. That seems to be an essential part in our long-term strategy to fight bad relays trying to enter our network. Georg [1] https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs

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Relays running an unsupported (EOL) Tor version
by Georg Koppen 01 Dec '21

01 Dec '21

Hello! Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1] but then we dropped the ball. Alas. We just started that process again by contacting every relay operator running an outdated Tor version (any version not 0.3.5.x or 0.4.5.x or 0.4.6.x or 0.4.7.x) by email where possible. Additionally, we created a wiki page outlining the current process and things we still need to figure out.[2] On that page we plan to make statistics related to the EOL relay removal available as well, including the final list of relays we'll reject. Thus, stay tuned. Feedback, as always, is very much welcome! We plan to keep this topic on our radar this time while refining the process as we go. Meanwhile, if you are running a relay with an unsupported Tor version, please upgrade for the sake of our users' safety. If you need help, join us on #tor-relays or #tor-relays:matrix.org if you use Element. Thanks, Georg [1] https://blog.torproject.org/removing-end-life-relays-network [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Relay-EOL-pol…

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