tor-relays November 2012

tor-relays@lists.torproject.org

24 participants
18 discussions

Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays
by Roger Dingledine 09 Jan '13

09 Jan '13

For a few years now, funders have been asking if they can pay Tor to run more relays. I kept telling them their money was better spent on code and design improvements: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-slow https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Tor/Performance since a) network load would just grow to fill whatever new capacity we have, especially if we don't deal with the tiny fraction of users who do bulk downloads, and b) reducing diversity of relay operator control can harm anonymity. But lately the Tor network has become noticeably faster, and I think it has a lot to do with the growing amount of excess relay capacity relative to network load: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html?graph=bandwidth&start=2010-06-0… At the same time, much of our performance improvement comes from better load balancing -- that is, concentrating traffic on the relays that can handle it better. The result though is a direct tradeoff with relay diversity: on today's network, clients choose one of the fastest 5 exit relays around 25-30% of the time, and 80% of their choices come from a pool of 40-50 relays. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443 Since extra capacity is clearly good for performance, and since we're not doing particularly well at diversity with the current approach, we're going to try an experiment: we'll connect funding to exit relay operators so they can run bigger and/or better exit relays. If we do it right (make more faster exit relays that aren't the current biggest ones, so there are more to choose from), we will improve the network's diversity as well as being able to handle more users. We've lined up our first funder (BBG, aka http://www.voanews.com/), and they're excited to have us start as soon as we can. They want to sponsor 125+ fast exits. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Open questions we need to decide about: 1) What exactly would we pay for? I think the right way to do it is to offer to reimburse bandwidth/hosting costs -- I don't want to get into the business of paying people to run relays, and I don't want people to be trying to figure out how to "profit". That leads to all sorts of horrible incentive structures. More broadly, we should keep in mind that the primary cost of running an exit relay is effort, not dollars: it takes dedication to find an ISP who will host it, and to hold that ISP's hand when an abuse complaint arrives. Or said another way, hosting costs are in many cases not the biggest barrier to running an exit relay. I think we should aim to constrain ourselves to talking about >=100mbit exits, assuming that turns out to give us enough choices. That said, we don't want to concentrate bandwidth too much in any given relay, so we should limit the amount we'll reimburse per relay. 2) Should we fund existing relays or new ones? The worst failure mode here would be that we screw up the current community of relay operators. That's why it's extra important to keep them involved at each step of this discussion. I think the right answer is probably a balance of reimbursing costs from current exits and encouraging new exits to appear. Before we can get more precise though, we need to get a handle on how many current fast exits there are, and what their constraints are (whether their hosting situation could give them more bandwidth, whether they're paying now or getting a deal through a friend/employer, etc). Even then, there are interesting further questions like: - Should we prefer big collectives like torservers, noisetor, CCC, dfri.se, and riseup (which can get great bulk rates on bandwidth and are big enough to have relationships with local lawyers and ISPs), or should we prefer individuals since they maximize our operator diversity? I think "explore both approaches" is a fine first plan. - For existing relays who pay for hosting, should we prefer that our money go to covering their existing costs (and then we encourage them to save their money for use, say, after this experiment finishes), or should we aim to add additional funding so the relay can use more bandwidth? I'd say it comes down to the preferences of the relay operator. That said, if we have plenty to choose from, we should pick the relays that will make the network grow -- but we should take extra care to avoid situations where operators in the first category say "well, fine" and shut down their relay. More generally, we need to consider sustainability. Our current exit relay funding is for a period of 12 months, and while there's reason to think we will find continued support, the Tor network must not end up addicted to external funding. So long as everybody is running an exit relay because they want to save the world, I think we should be fine. 4) What exactly do we mean by diversity? There's network diversity (AS / upstream network topology), organization and operator diversity, jurisdictional (country) diversity, funding diversity, data-center diversity, and more. We've started to answer some of these questions at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6232 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-netw… but this research topic will need ongoing attention. I'd love to get to the point where our diversity metrics can recommend network locations that best improve the various diversity scores. 5) How much "should" an exit relay cost? Since we're aiming for diversity, we can't send all our volunteers to the same cut-rate German VPS provider. After all, much of the work in setting up an exit relay is finding a good provider that doesn't already host a bunch of Tor relays. But if we declare that we'll reimburse $50/month for 100mbit, we're going to attract a different set of volunteers -- and a different set of network locations -- than if we reimburse $100/month for 100mbit. We need to learn about current bandwidth pricing: I know there are 10 cheap hosting places that will tolerate exit relays, but are there 200? And do all of those 200 turn out to overlap diversity-wise? Initial guesses appreciated. I'm inclined toward the $100 number to give our volunteers more flexibility. If we want to reimburse on a monthly basis, how do we handle situations where the ISP wants a longer-term contract? I think the answer will come down to how many choices we have. 6) How exactly should we choose which exit relay operators to reimburse? It might be premature to speculate until we better understand what choices are available to us. But I think the answer must include doing it in a way that encourages continued growth of the relay operator _community_. People who are active in the Tor community, and well-known to many other people, should be part of the answer. At the same time, we should be willing to put some of the money into trying out new places and people, especially if they're in good locations diversity-wise. The broader answer is that we as a community need to figure out a good answer here. I definitely don't want it to be "Roger picks people in an opaque way". But I also don't want the answer to be "anybody on the Internet who offers to take our money". Maybe we should put together a consortium of current Tor activists who run fast exits? 7) How do we audit / track the sponsored relays? How should we check that your 100mbit relay is really working? What do we measure to confirm its capacity? To a first approximation I'm fine assuming that nobody is going to try to cheat (say, by colluding with an ISP to write legit-looking invoices but then just split the money). But as the plan scales, we need good ways to track statistics on how many relays are being sponsored and how much bandwidth they're providing (so funders can see how effective their money is), and what fraction of the overall network these sponsored relays are (to keep an eye on the diversity questions). 8) Legal questions? Tor exit relays raise plenty of legal questions already, especially when you consider jurisdiction variety. But reimbursing relays introduces even more excitement, such as: - Does such a relay operator end up in a different situation legally? - Does the overall Tor network change legal categories in some country, e.g. becoming a telecommunications service when it wasn't before? - Does The Tor Project Inc incur new liabilities for offering this money? Tor has a history of creating fascinating new challenges for legal scholars, and this exit relay funding experiment will be no exception. I believe if we position it correctly, we won't really change the legal context. But I encourage people to investigate these questions for their jurisdiction. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Next steps: I'm going to do a short blog post pointing to this thread, since many interested parties aren't on tor-relays yet. Then I'll send individual emails to exit relay operators pointing them to it and asking for their feedback (on the list or private, whichever they prefer). I'll also try to get some sense of how much their hosting costs, whether they'd want to participate in our experiment, whether they're in a position to ramp up to a faster connection, etc. Once we have some concrete facts about how many current exit relays want to participate, how many new volunteers want to help, and how many ISPs could handle more exit relays and at what prices, we'll be in a better position to decide how to proceed. --Roger

25 59

Prepared for [Raided for running a Tor exit node]?
by grarpamp 01 Dec '12

01 Dec '12

> Only regarding home Wireless access in the US > I was involved in a case with just this situation. > > According to my lawyer there is no consensus on who is responsible for wifi. > Every State has different laws each one is just a vague. > In NY, if your wireless is secured (pw protected) you are ok. > In NH, you are responsible for all data that passes your wifi point secured > or not. > In MA(my state) there is no specific law Putting links to such laws on the Tor wiki would be useful for operators and users to know. It would seem hard to believe that there are 'must secure' laws [1] in the US or elsewhere. Even harder that anyone would be sentenced... regardless of whether their AP is open, 12345, or dR;$8w@G... merely for traffic traversing their AP/node that was not theirs, or that cannot be proven was theirs. Not that you wouldn't be questioned, charged or held before the case was dropped. [1] There are 'must secure' civil ISP contracts. They are only meant to 'secure' more revenue (no account/line sharing) for the ISP and save revenue from dealing with whatever headaches your open AP/node creates. And criminal 'theft of service' laws for the same reasons. > you just need a good lawyer :) This (and links to the actual laws) are much easier to believe. Because if someone here took the NY example above literally and did illegal deeds via their secured wifi thinking that example was the law (and thus their immunity), they be jailed pretty quickly. And what does being forced to secure or responsible mean? If you hit a bug, exploit, or get cracked, and can show it, you're jailed? What if there is no proof either way but the existence of traffic, is the user then jailed by default? What if no evidence but crypted disk, or questions as to character/belief? In those crazy places even 100% lily white users would seem better off running an open AP/node and risking that lone lesser charge [2] than attempting to be rather secure, risking a crack, and being held responsible for some major crime. [2] If the major wasn't dropped, at least they'd be jailed with evidence the access was open, which looks a lot better than if it wasn't. The crazy is why you're supposed to visit, write, call and email your lawmakers, educate your executive, and hang your jury.

2 2

Suggestions for Tor Relay Operators after a Police interaction
by Andrew Lewman 30 Nov '12

30 Nov '12

# Suggestions for Tor Relay Operators after a Police interaction Disclaimer: We are not lawyers, and this is not legal advice. This is friendly advice from those of us at Tor who work with relay operators after a police visit or raid. This is a collection of suggestions of what we've gathered from five years of helping people like you. Exit relay operator visits are exceedingly rare. You are in the 1% of operators ever visited or even raided by a police force. If you're reading this message, then you probably have a poor photocopy of the warrant the police served to you. The warrant may mention Tor and some suspected criminal activity (such as terrorism, money laundering, child abuse materials, or copyright violations). 1. Read the EFF legal FAQ for relay operators, https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en. 2. Find legal representation. A list of possible legal advisers can be found here, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/start-tor-legal-support-directory. If none of these people are in your country, or close to you, ask either the EFF or Tor Project. We can likely help you find someone in your jurisdiction. 3. Get a copy of the full warrant. There is a generally a process to get a full copy of the warrant. It will have details you'll need to know to defend yourself. At a minimum, it's likely to have a timestamp and IP address of your exit relay. 4. Make sure the IP address in question is your exit relay and was a valid relay at the time in question. We make available the exonerator tool to look through the entire history of the Tor Network to find your relay, https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html. 5. Get in touch with The Tor Project, preferably by email, see https://www.torproject.org/about/contact for finding ways to reach us. If you need someone official to explain Tor to either a bondsman, judge, or the police, generally phone works best, https://www.torproject.org/about/contact#phone. When you contact Tor, we need the following details in order to help you maintain your innocence: - The IP address of each relay. - The timestamp (date and time of day) for each IP address in the warrant. - How to reach you or your legal adviser. 6. Likely, your legal adviser is going to want a signed, notarized, official letter from the Tor Project stating the IP address was or was not an exit relay at the date and time in question. They are going to want this mailed via trackable method (FedEx, UPS, DHL, registered mail, etc). We need to know if you want one letter per IP/timestamp combination, or if we can put everything into one letter. Best of luck going forward. The police generally only receive an IP address and a street address. They do not know it is a tor exit relay. Some national police forces in Europe and North America are sophisticated enough to determine "tor or not" before they execute a warrant. Generally, but not always, these national police forces send detectives to interview you (known as a "knock and talk"), rather than send in a SWAT team (known as a raid). The press repeats the SWAT team stories because it generates page views for their organization. It's not the norm. Tor is available for further help, whether it be as an expert witness, further explanations of how Tor works, etc. Just ask for help, we're happy to do so. By sharing your experience with us, you also help us to help law enforcement understand Tor better in the future. Thanks for sharing and thanks for running a relay. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475

2 1

Prepared for [Raided for running a Tor exit node]?
by grarpamp 30 Nov '12

30 Nov '12

>> Running an exit node from home DSL or Cable is bad idea. One must look >> for a Tor friendly ISP and have balls made of steel! ... ISP[/hoster] and[/or] have ... > However, I do not believe it is that way in > the United States What 'way'? Running an exit node at home, or elsewhere, would seem to come down to... a) Are you physically ready for a query / subpoena / search warrant / exigent raid? Are things segregated by room? Are your doors and machines labeled with the same sort of exit node notice you'd put on the TCP port and in DNS? Have you inventoried, photographed and documented your setup and property? Do you have offsite backups? Are private things encrypted? Are any co-habitants aware and similarly prepared? b) Are you mentally ready? Is your life and butt otherwise clean, legal, and organized? If you were to appear in court, how would you act and be perceived? How do you feel about being in the news and in public docs? Have you networked with other operators and entities? c) Are you legally, financially, and timewise ready? Have you consulted with and preselected a couple attorneys? Have you made arrangements for making bail? How will you make court required appearances? All these sorts of meta things, and surely more, come into play whether or not you're ever raided. I'd suggest making a wiki article for them.

1 0

How to get client locale statistics without arm?
by tor-admin 30 Nov '12

30 Nov '12

Hi, I would like to know from which countries my nodes are mostly used. I tried to use arm for this but on high capacity relays arm eats the same cpu resources as the tor process it monitors, if the connection panel is activated. Switching to the connection panel lets arm often freeze. Is there another way to get country statistics from a node? Maybe something build in Tor? Thanks, Torland

2 3

Bandwidth and server leads [was: Tor raid]
by grarpamp 29 Nov '12

29 Nov '12

> From: elijah wright <elw(a)stderr.org> > Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 13:38:51 -0600 > Cc: nanog(a)nanog.org > Subject: Re: William was raided for running a Tor exit node. > We had a guy (aka potential customer) inquire the other day about hosting a > Tor exit on our infrastructure the other day; he disappeared fairly > quickly when he figured out that we weren't just going to give him an > endless supply of unmetered 10G bandwidth. I was looking forward to > billing him. :-) Contemporary mailing list lols aside, I believe you'll find that most operators in this space are quite serious and professional. If you're a potential friend of Tor, anonymity networks and the general thought space around it... and your price [or that of someone you know, nanog or otherwise, who might be such a friend] was highly competitive, or even special... I'd be fairly confident that consultation with those on this list would lead to a sale of said (or related) billable services. Feel free to forward and/or put any interested parties in touch with this list or torproject.org.

1 0

Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?
by grarpamp 29 Nov '12

29 Nov '12

Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the descriptor set? I think this can happen if the default route is out another interface or secondary address. Something of that nature.

10 14

setting up a Tor exit node
by esolve esolve 29 Nov '12

29 Nov '12

I want to use Tor browser bundle to set up a Tor exit node in vidalia, I click "set up relay" -> sharing then there are some options, I checked "Relay traffic for the Tor network(exit relay)" and then click "ok" however, it doesn't work, and the exit relay option is automatically unchecked, while the option "relay traffic inside the tor network (non-exit relay)" is checked how can I set up a Tor exit node? thanks!

5 13

TOR relay and their flags
by androny 29 Nov '12

29 Nov '12

Hello all! My torrc main config: SocksPort 0 RunAsDaemon 1 DataDirectory /tmp/.tor ControlPort 9051 CookieAuthentication 1 ORPort 4999 AvoidDiskWrites 1 BridgeRelay 1 ExitPolicy reject *:* so, its pure relay. Run arm and got: "flags: none" Well, read flags definitions at https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=dir-spec.t… and still don't understand it :-) My tor has almost 4 days uptime, and at logs have: ----- Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor ----- Performing bandwidth self-test...done. ----- Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working ----- Connections (1 inbound, 6 circuit, 1 control) ----- It means, it works well - so, why my tor relay server doesn't have an "Running" flag, "Valid" flag or "Stable"? Regards And-ron

4 3

DFRI is running two sponsored exits
by Linus Nordberg 26 Nov '12

26 Nov '12

Hi Moritz, DFRI [1] is running two relays, DFRI0 and DFRI3, which should qualify as fast relays as defined by sponsor j. (They were just recently bumped From 10 MB to 12.5 MB. They both have an exit policy allowing the ports explicitly required on https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorJ.) We'd love to be able to get some funds for this which would make it possible for us to run more exit traffic. We only have one /24 network to run exit traffic from atm though so this is all we can do for now without breaking the stated diversity rules. (Anybody sitting on an IPv4 /24 PI that we can borrow for a year or so? We'd handle it with care!) We could technically run bridges too but we would have to discuss this internally some more first. Do we really want to take money for running entry _and_ exit relays? Isn't that exactly how you'd attack Tor users if you had the power, by controlling entry and exit? If we've missed some public discussion on this topic, please point us at it. [1] https://dfri.se/index.en/ Thanks, Linus, DFRI

4 4

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-relays November 2012