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[NEW Report] Myanmar: Data on internet blocks and internet outages following military coup
by Maria Xynou 09 Mar '21

09 Mar '21

Hello, Today, in collaboration with IODA and MIDO, we published a new research report which shares network measurement data on the ongoing internet blocks and internet outages in Myanmar, following the military coup. Our report is available here: https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/ In the report, we share OONI data on: * Blocking of social media (Facebook, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter) in Myanmar; * Blocking of Wikipedia (primarily seen from 20th February 2021 onwards); * Blocking of circumvention tool websites (such as protonvpn.com); * Blocking of Justice for Myanmar (www.justiceformyanmar.org): an activist campaign which aims to pressure businesses and investors around the world to divest from Myanmar military businesses; * Blocking of a COVID-19 website (coronavirus.app); * Ongoing blocking of news media (which started last year), including a few ethnic media sites. Through OONI data, we observe the following: 1) Censorship variance across networks: Internet censorship appears to vary across networks in Myanmar, as we observe different sites being blocked on different networks (and the blocks are not implemented on all networks). 2) Variance in censorship techniques: * IP blocking: In many cases, we observe the IP blocking of websites and apps across networks in Myanmar. * DNS based interference: In some cases, ISPs in Myanmar block sites by means of DNS based interference, returning IP addresses that host block pages (59.153.90.11, 167.172.4.60) or an address in private IP space (such as 127.0.0.1 or 172.29.8.1). We were able to automatically confirm these censorship cases. 3) Non-deterministic censorship: Not all IP blocks appear to be effective. OONI data shows that it is sometimes possible for connections to go through (even though IP blocks appear to be in place), which is likely why we observe inconsistent measurements (in terms of accessibility and blocking). The report also shares IODA data (along with Google traffic data & Oracle Internet Intelligence data) on the nightly internet outages that Myanmar has been experiencing. The first internet disruption was observed in the early hours of 1st February 2021 (on the day of the military coup), followed by a second, higher impact internet outage on 6th February 2021 (which lasted for almost 30 hours). As of 15th February 2021, Myanmar has been experiencing complete internet outages every night (between around 1am to 9am local time). The findings of this study suggest an alarming shift in Myanmar’s internet censorship landscape. In our 2017 study (which examined internet censorship in Myanmar based on the analysis of all OONI measurements collected between 2016-2017), we barely found any internet censorship in the country. Now, the ongoing social media blocks and nightly internet outages raise major human rights concerns, particularly in light of the current political environment. We thank OONI Probe users in Myanmar for contributing measurements, making this study possible! Please help share this report: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1369252608590942208 Thanks, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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[Important] Running old ooniprobe? Please switch over to OONI Probe CLI
by Maria Xynou 23 Feb '21

23 Feb '21

Hi friends, Are you running the old python version of ooniprobe (https://github.com/ooni/probe-legacy)? If so, please switch over to the new OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI): https://ooni.org/install/cli Similarly to legacy ooniprobe, the new OONI Probe CLI is: * Supported on Linux and macOS: https://ooni.org/install/cli * Configured to run all OONI Probe tests automatically every day As legacy ooniprobe is being discontinued, if you continue running it: * You will no longer contribute measurements * You will not receive important updates (such as new OONI Probe tests) We therefore kindly ask you to please switch over to the new OONI Probe CLI: https://ooni.org/install/cli OONI Probe CLI not only supports automated daily testing, but it is also what we are currently maintaining and improving upon, and will include all new OONI Probe tests. If you know others who are running the legacy version of ooniprobe, we'd appreciate it if you could please share the above information with them. Please help spread the word: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1364171996079271938 Thanks a million! ~ OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday, 23rd February 2021
by Maria Xynou 22 Feb '21

22 Feb '21

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Tuesday for our monthly community meeting. => Where? OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC: ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) => When? Tuesday, 23rd February 2021 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour) Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting-keep The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and we hope you can join us! All the best, ~ OONI team -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Survey: Community Health
by Maria Xynou 19 Feb '21

19 Feb '21

Hello friends, Team CommUNITY will publish the first ever Community Health Report examining the psychological well-being of the internet freedom and digital rights communities. Please contribute to this study by donating 7 minutes of your time to fill-out this survey: https://www.digitalrights.community/blog/take-the-survey Based on the results from this survey, the Community Health Report will be published this spring. Please share this survey with your networks! Thanks, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Myanmar: Blocking of news media, social media, human rights site, and COVID-19 site
by Maria Xynou 13 Feb '21

13 Feb '21

Hi, We analyzed OONI data from Myanmar and we were able to confirm the blocking of: * Social media websites (such as twitter.com, facebook.com, instagram.com) * News media websites (30 local Myanmar news outlets) * A human rights website (https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/) * A COVID-19 site (https://coronavirus.app/) We are able to confirm the blocking of these sites because in OONI network measurement data, we are able to see that ISPs in Myanmar are implementing DNS based interference which returns IP addresses (59.153.90.11, 167.172.4.60) that host block pages. On some networks in Myanmar, there appears to be TCP/IP level interference, suggesting IP based blocking. You can find more details here: https://gist.github.com/hellais/397af212f267757ab492534cd1bded85 Meanwhile, both WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger apps continue to be blocked in Myanmar. This is evident through OONI data: * WhatsApp: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-02-14&since=2021-01-15&probe_cc… * Facebook Messenger: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-02-14&since=2021-01-15&probe_cc… In summary: * Censorship appears to vary across networks (i.e. different sites are blocked on different networks) * Different ISPs in Myanmar appear to adopt different censorship techniques (primarily DNS based interference returning a block page, and what seems to be IP based blocking) * Some ISPs in Myanmar are not blocking these sites and apps We've also shared the above information through the following Twitter thread: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1360615643322724355 ## Further testing If you're in Myanmar and interested in testing blocked sites further, you can: 1. Install the OONI Probe mobile app: https://ooni.org/install/mobile 2. Open this link with your OONI Probe mobile app: https://run.ooni.io/nettest?tn=web_connectivity&ta=%7B%22urls%22%3A%5B%22ht… 3. Tap "Run" (please ensure that your VPN is turned off when running tests) You will then have access to the test results in your OONI Probe app. Unless you opt out, test results will automatically get openly published here: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-02-14&since=2021-01-15&probe_cc… Warm thanks & solidarity with all OONI Probe users in Myanmar! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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[New] OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI) for Linux & macOS
by Maria Xynou 05 Feb '21

05 Feb '21

Hello, We are excited to share that we have released a new OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI)! You can install OONI Probe on the command line on: * Debian/Ubuntu: https://ooni.org/install/cli/ubuntu-debian * macOS: https://ooni.org/install/cli/macos Upon installation, OONI Probe will run all tests *automatically* every day! This is very exciting because you can easily contribute lots of measurements every day without having to remember to run OONI Probe. :) Given that all OONI Probe measurements are openly published in near real-time (https://ooni.org/data/), you will help the internet freedom community better investigate internet censorship. IMPORTANT: Are you running the python legacy version of ooniprobe (https://github.com/ooni/probe-legacy) on Linux or macOS? This is the old version of ooniprobe that has been around since ~ 2012. If you're still running it (and we know that many of you are!): * First of all: We love you for being such a long-term Oonitarian and contributing so many measurements over the years! <3 * Second (and importantly): Please SWITCH OVER to the new OONI Probe CLI: https://ooni.org/install/cli We are in the process of discontinuing the legacy ooniprobe version. Similarly to the legacy version, you'll be able to have all tests run automatically in the background every day with the new OONI Probe CLI, and it will also receive important future updates (such as new tests, code improvements, etc.). If you know others who are running the legacy version of ooniprobe, we'd appreciate it if you could please share the above information with them! Happy to address any questions. Thanks a million! ~ OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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NEW RiseupVPN test in OONI Probe Mobile App
by Maria Xynou 28 Jan '21

28 Jan '21

Hello, We're excited to share that the latest OONI Probe version features a brand new test for RiseupVPN! You can now check whether RiseupVPN works on your network. Learn all about this test here: https://ooni.org/nettest/riseupvpn/ To run the new RiseupVPN test, update to the latest version (2.9.1) of OONI Probe Mobile: https://ooni.org/install/mobile All RiseupVPN test results from around the world are openly published in near real-time: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2020-12-30&test_name=riseupvpn Warm thanks to the folks from the LEAP collective for developing this new test! <3 Cheers, Maria (on behalf of the OONI team). -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Signal blocked in Iran
by Maria Xynou 25 Jan '21

25 Jan '21

Hello, Iran seems to have started blocking Signal today. This is suggested through OONI measurements testing signal.org in Iran: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2020-12-27&domain=signal.org&probe_c… While the testing of signal.org in Iran was previously successful, today every measurement collected so far suggests potential blocking. You can continue to monitor the accessibility of signal.org in Iran through the above link (which openly shares OONI data collected in real-time from Iran). ~ Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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[New Report] Uganda internet blocks & nationwide internet outage amid 2021 general election
by Maria Xynou 22 Jan '21

22 Jan '21

Hello, Today, in collaboration with DefendDefenders, Defenders Protection Initiative, and IODA, we co-published a new research report examining the recent internet disruption in Uganda amid its 2021 general election. Our report is available here: https://ooni.org/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/ We based our investigation on: * OONI measurements collected from Uganda: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-01-23&since=2020-12-23&probe_cc… * OONI experiments using the `miniooni` research client (which we plan to eventually integrate into the OONI Probe apps) * Public data sources monitoring internet outages (IODA data, Google traffic data, Oracle Internet Intelligence data, and CloudFlare Radar data) In the days leading up to Uganda’s 2021 general election, ISPs blocked access to the Google Play Store (hampering people’s ability to download apps), as well as to a number of social media apps (including WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Telegram) and websites (such as facebook.com) – regardless of OTT tax payment. Access to certain circumvention tool websites (such as protonvpn.com) was blocked as well, though both Tor and Psiphon worked throughout the election period. Starting from the eve of Uganda’s 2021 general election (in the evening of 13th January 2021), Uganda was disconnected from the internet entirely. The country experienced a 4-day internet outage (which included election day), as shown through several public data sources: Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA), Oracle’s Internet Intelligence Map, Cloudflare Radar, and Google traffic data. In our report, we also share network-level analysis of the internet outage based on IODA data. The internet outage is further corroborated by the absence of OONI measurements from Uganda during this time period (since OONI Probe requires internet connectivity to perform tests), as well as by the drastic drop in Tor users and Psiphon users during this period. Even though internet connectivity in Uganda was restored on 18th January 2021, access to social media and circumvention platforms remained blocked. Notably, Ugandan ISPs only appear to have started blocking access to YouTube on 18th January 2021, even though the platform is not included on the OTT list of taxed platforms. You can continue to monitor ongoing internet censorship in Uganda though OONI data (which is openly published in real-time): https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-01-23&since=2020-12-23&probe_cc… We thank OONI Probe users in Uganda who contributed measurements, making this study possible. Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Uganda elections and testing
by Maria Xynou 13 Jan '21

13 Jan '21

Hi folks, Leading up to Uganda's elections tomorrow, a number of social media and VPN platforms appear to have been blocked (even when the OTT is paid). We've shared relevant OONI Probe testing instructions through this Twitter thread: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1349064291480166415 If you know people in Uganda, please share this with them. This thread contains information for: * Running all OONI Probe tests (including those that measure WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Telegram, Psiphon, and Tor) * Testing social media websites, VPN sites, and Ugandan websites (through relevant OONI buttons) * Testing the Google Play Store and App Store * Limiting website testing based on (a) websites of your choice, (b) specific website categories (e.g. news media, circumvention, communication tools, etc.) * Downloading the OONI Probe APK (if you're unable to install OONI Probe from the Play Store) In all cases, please ensure that your VPN is turned off when running OONI Probe (to help ensure more accurate test results). All OONI Probe test results from Uganda (unless the user has opted-out) are openly published here: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-01-14&since=2020-12-14&probe_cc… Happy to address any questions. Thanks, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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