- ooni-talk - lists.torproject.org

OONI Monthly Report: July 2021
by Maria Xynou 12 Oct '21

12 Oct '21

Hello, Hope you're all doing well. These days we're primarily supported by the DRL, which is why we do quarterly reporting. That said, we'd like to share monthly updates from the OONI team with the community, hence our July 2021 report shared below. I'll also follow-up to share our August and September 2021 reports. *# OONI Monthly Report: July 2021* Throughout July 2021, the OONI team worked on the following sprints: * Sprint 43 - Confused Kraken (5th - 18th July 2021) * Sprint 44 - Dancing Sirens (19th - 31st July 2021) Our work can be tracked through the various OONI GitHub repositories: https://github.com/ooni Highlights are shared in this report below. *## Published research report on media censorship in Azerbaijan* In collaboration with Azerbaijan Internet Watch, we co-published a new research report titled: "Media censorship in Azerbaijan through the lens of network measurement". Our report is available through the following sites: * OONI: https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/ * Azerbaijan Internet Watch: https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/media-censorship-in-azerbaijan-through-the… As part of our analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021, we found: ** Blocking of independent news media and circumvention tool websites. *Throughout the testing period, several independent news media and circumvention tool sites presented HTTP failures caused by connection timeouts. This suggests the potential use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) by ISPs in Azerbaijan. ** Attempts to block Tor and Psiphon.* ISPs in Azerbaijan attempted to block Tor and Psiphon amid the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. However, both attempts appear to have been quite ineffective, as these tools have built-in circumvention fallback options. Tor Metrics also show a spike in usage during this period. ** Temporary blocking of social media amid 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.* Between September 2020 to November 2020, several social media websites presented the same HTTP failures (as news media and circumvention tool sites), while the testing of WhatsApp and Telegram presented signs of TLS level interference. ** Variance of censorship across networks.* ISPs in Azerbaijan appear to be adopting similar censorship techniques. However, censorship varies from network to network, as different ISPs block different websites and apps at different moments in time. *## Hosted a 3-day online OONI Partner Training* Between 5th-7th July 2021, we organized and hosted a 3-day online OONI Partner Training for our partners from 9 countries in Asia and the Middle East (https://ooni.org/partners) The event also included participants from international organizations, Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch. Overall, 45 participants from 23 digital rights organizations attended this 3-day OONI Partner Training. To ensure a safe, friendly, and pleasant experience for all during the training, we asked all participants to adhere to OONI’s Code of Conduct ( https://github.com/ooni/ooni.org/blob/master/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) and to follow the Chatham House Rule on Privacy ( https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chatham-house-rule) The goal of the OONI Partner Training was to share knowledge and skills on OONI’s censorship measurement tools, dataset, and methodologies to enable their use as part of research and advocacy efforts. We also aimed to collect feedback on how to improve OONI tools to better serve community needs. The event was facilitated entirely online (over Zoom), and entailed two 1.5 hour sessions per day (over 3 days). We facilitated the following 6 sessions as part of the 3-day OONI Partner Training: 1) Information Controls Around the World 2) Introduction to Internet Censorship 3) Using the OONI Probe Apps 4) Using OONI Run to coordinate censorship testing 5) Using OONI Explorer to find censorship measurement data 6) Interpreting OONI data We published a blog post which shares further information about the training sessions and overall event: https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/ At the end of the 3-day training, we shared a post-training survey ( https://forms.gle/n62ktvcfD1u7DgPMA) with all participants to collect their feedback on how to improve future OONI training events. To support ongoing learning, we shared a Resources document ( https://ooni.org/documents/2021-ooni-partner-training-resources/ooni-resour…) with participants that includes OONI-related resources, as well as other resources (on censorship circumvention, digital security, monitoring internet connectivity shutdowns, and other censorship measurement platforms) that participants expressed interest in. We also shared OONI training slides ( https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1mpoB_ObjMH0EWQhyZRpKWnwl5PUHf-Sa5PK…) that they can use (and customize) to facilitate OONI workshops for their communities. In July 2021, we issued OONI certificates for participants who attended our 2 OONI Partner Training events ( https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/) *## Blocking of social media in Cuba amid protests* On 12th July 2021, Cuba started blocking access to online social media services amid anti-government protests. On the same day, we reported on the blocking of the WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal apps based on real-time data collected from Cuba: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1414622433156476930 OONI data on the blocking of WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal in Cuba is available through the following links: * Signal: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-13&since=2021-06-12&probe_cc… * Telegram: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-13&since=2021-06-12&probe_cc… * WhatsApp: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-13&since=2021-06-12&probe_cc… The blocking of the Signal Private Messenger App in Cuba was detected based on OONI’s new Signal test (https://ooni.org/nettest/signal) which was shipped in April 2021. Our new Signal test also contributes ongoing measurements on the blocking of the Signal app in Iran ( https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-30&since=2021-06-30&probe_cc…) and China ( https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-30&since=2021-06-30&probe_cc…) among other countries. We recently added support to our backend for the adjustment of URL priorities (as part of URL prioritization work). This allows us to specify in which countries certain URLs should have higher priority for testing and empowers us to dynamically adjust these in response to censorship events. Following the social media blockade in Cuba, we bumped up the priority of the GRP (Social Media) category code (from the Citizen Lab test lists: https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/00-LEGEND-new_ca…) on 14th July 2021 for Cuba. This enabled us to detect (and collect measurements on) the temporary blocking of facebook.com in Cuba ( https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-30&since=2021-06-30&probe_cc…) It also enabled us to detect (and collect measurements on) the blocking of tiktok.com in Cuba ( https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-07-30&since=2021-06-30&probe_cc…) Following the prioritization of URLs from this category, we were able to collect a total of 960 measurements for the GRP category code from Cuba. OONI’s response to the recent social media censorship events in Cuba has received the following press coverage: https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/cubans-protest-government-cracks-int… https://www.wsj.com/articles/internet-powered-mass-protests-in-cuba-then-th… https://cpj.org/2021/07/journalists-detained-and-harassed-internet-disrupte… Cuban organization, YucaByte, published a report documenting the censorship events in Cuba amid the protests (citing OONI data): https://www.yucabyte.org/2021/07/12/11j-internet-cuba/ *## OONI Probe Mobile* We released OONI Probe Android 3.2.0 ( https://github.com/ooni/probe-android/releases/tag/v3.2.0) and OONI Probe iOS 3.2.0 (https://github.com/ooni/probe-ios/releases/tag/v3.2.0) This release includes: * A reminder encouraging users to enable automated testing * A badge to indicate that a proxy is being used * Support for minimizing a running test * Support for validating URLs shared via OONI Run ( https://github.com/ooni/probe-android/pull/443) * Font size fix on iPhone SE ( https://github.com/ooni/probe-ios/commit/8f3fcf90b286e7e9ffee18c4b8ea223f2f… ) These features were added to encourage users to enable automated testing and contribute measurements regularly. In response to community requests, we also added a badge to indicate that a proxy is being used, and we added support for minimizing a running test (enabling users to make use of other features of the OONI Probe app while a test is running). *## OONI Probe Desktop* We released OONI Probe Desktop 3.5.2: https://github.com/ooni/probe-desktop/releases/tag/v3.5.2 This release fixed a critical bug in autoupdate which prevented downloading and installing updates. In July 2021, we provided mentorship to Google Summer of Code (GSoC) student Shivam Shekhar, who worked on implementing end-to-end tests for OONI Probe Desktop. In particular, he implemented tests for the code responsible for running the OONI Probe command line tool ( https://github.com/ooni/probe-desktop/pull/231) Moreover, tests were implemented for several UI components as part of the following pull request: https://github.com/ooni/probe-desktop/pull/229 *## Progress on browser-based OONI Probe* We made some progress on the browser based implementation of OONI Probe. Specifically, we integrated React into the project so that we can reuse the existing components we developed for web based projects (see: https://github.com/ooni/probe-web/commit/a9da79b9384f7f496bb3278a4a00cacc39…) We also did some research into how to tweak the fetch API calls so that we minimise the amount of sensitive data transmitted to the measured web hosts (see: https://github.com/ooni/probe-web/commit/5bf0ba41a9e2464da070ba21f4463ddce2… ). *## Expanding OONI censorship measurement methodologies* We looked into alternative TLS stacks that we could use for performing measurements, but potentially also for communicating with our backend services. This was prompted by the fact that we have noticed that some countries (such as Iran) will implement blocking of all TLS connections that present a specific fingerprint. In particular, we looked into https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls and researched how we could go about integrating it into the OONI codebase, as well as what work would be necessary to update it to the latest version of the golang TLS library. This work is documented through the following ticket: https://github.com/ooni/probe/issues/1702 In July 2021, we provided mentorship to Google Summer of Code (GSoC) student Kathrin Elmenhorst, with whom we collaborated on making several improvements to how errors are handled inside of our measurement engine. Specifically, we ensured that it’s possible to accurately map more classes of errors to OONI error strings, as documented through the following ticket: https://github.com/ooni/probe/issues/1505 We also made some progress on comparing the new golang-written Web Connectivity test helper to the old python-based one. The goal of this comparison is to determine how well-suited the new test helper is at replacing the legacy one and if, in doing the switch from one to the other, we are introducing any inaccuracies in the resulting measurements. *## Created mockups for new OONI Probe Snowflake test results* We implemented mockups for displaying the test results of our new Snowflake pluggable transport test inside of OONI Probe. This has been tracked as part of the following issue: https://github.com/ooni/ooni.org/issues/759 *## Research on whether to ship PTs as a separate binary* We carried out research to explore whether to ship pluggable transports as separate binaries or link them with the ooniprobe binary. Based on this research, we wrote an internal document which explains our design choices, PT spec considerations, and conclusions. In the end, we chose to integrate our new Snowflake experiment into ooniprobe as a Go library leveraging version 2 of the pluggable-transports specification: https://github.com/ooni/ooni.org/issues/765 *## OONI backend* In July 2021, we worked on the following OONI backend activities: * Fixed certbot nginx configuration bug (server/port overlap) * Made improvements to the API rate limiting system and developed new integration tests to ensure it’s working as expected: https://github.com/ooni/api/pull/256 * Added support for the global prioritized testing of popular social media URLs: https://github.com/ooni/backend/issues/507 * Added support for the prioritized testing of the GRP Citizen Lab category code in Cuba * Worked on the test helper rotation tool which automatically deploys on cloud infrastructure machines for running backend infrastructure. These are rotated automatically on a periodic basis: https://github.com/ooni/backend/issues/496 * As part of the development of the rotating test helpers, we also did a major rework to how TLS certificates are generated. Specifically we integrated it with DNS and certbot and deployed it to production. * Test with probes on test API. * API: Deployed test.ooni domains in CORS: https://github.com/ooni/api/pull/259 * API: Switched URL submission to account_id: https://github.com/ooni/api/pull/260 * Reprocessed legacy measurements and created JSONL files * Monitored measurement coverage by unattended runs * Updated internal ASN coverage charts * Developed charts that make predictions on the expected measurement volume based on the submission API. We have these charts implemented in our internal backend dashboards and have configured alerts to notify us if the expected measurement volume falls below a certain threshold. * Implemented support for running end-to-end integration tests of the API and fastpath on our continuous integration platform. Through this setup we can ensure that a large part of the backend infrastructure is working as expected and that the API and fastpath are run on real OONI measurement data: https://github.com/ooni/api/pull/258. * Refactored scripts to run tests on different environments *## Building a web platform for test list updates* We deployed the private beta of our new web platform for test list updates to production (https://test-lists.ooni.org/login) We worked on fixing issues reported as part of internal team testing of the platform ( https://github.com/ooni/test-lists-ui/pull/2) We also shared the private beta with a few community members to collect their feedback, based on which we worked on further improvements, which are documented as issues here: https://github.com/ooni/test-lists-ui/issues Once the private beta is further polished, we will share it more extensively to collect further community feedback before launching the platform. *## Collaboration with Netalitica* Netalitica researchers continued to do excellent work in reviewing and updating more Citizen Lab test lists. In July 2021, we reviewed their updates to the test lists for India and Burundi and shared feedback for improvements. *## Test list updates* In July 2021, we contributed updates to the following Citizen Lab test lists: * Russia: https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/pull/805 * Ethiopia: https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/pull/804 * Armenia: https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/pull/803 *## New partnership with Internet Society (ISOC)* In July 2021, we established a new partnership with Internet Society (ISOC). As part of this partnership, OONI is now a data partner ( https://pulse.internetsociety.org/partners) for ISOC’s Pulse project on Internet shutdowns: https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns As a data partner, we will provide ISOC with relevant OONI data in support of their Pulse project which maps internet shutdowns around the world. *## Community activities### Zaina Foundation Internet Shutdown Training* On 12th and 13th July 2021, Zaina Foundation organized and facilitated an Internet Shutdown Training for human rights defenders in Tanzania. One of the core objectives of this training was to train coalition members on OONI censorship measurement methodologies and to explore OONI data. As part of this training, Zaina Foundation facilitated the following 2 OONI workshops: 1) Introduction to OONI Probe and OONI Explorer 2) OONI practical session Following the training, Zaina Foundation shared community feedback with us and coordinated with local communities on translating OONI Probe to Swahili. *### OONI presentation at the Nexa Center for Internet and Society* On 28th July 2021, OONI’s Arturo presented OONI at the Nexa Center for Internet and Society of the Polytechnic University of Turin. As part of his presentation, Arturo provided OONI updates on the state of internet censorship worldwide in 2020. Information about the event is available here: https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-90 The presentation can be viewed through the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fO53FLTu4a8 *### Access Now webinar on internet shutdowns* On 30th July 2021, OONI’s Maria presented OONI as part of Access Now’s webinar titled: “#KeepItOn during an internet shutdown: How to measure, document, and circumvent network interference”. In particular, she discussed how OONI’s tools and data can be used for measuring partial internet shutdowns (involving the blocking of websites and apps). This webinar was live-streamed on YouTube: https://youtu.be/aFIBrRXKm2E *### OONI documentation in Farsi* Iranian community members created detailed and comprehensive documentation which explains OONI tools and methodologies in Farsi. This documentation is available here: https://wikicensorship.github.io/fa/docs/measure-internet-censorship/OONI/ The Farsi documentation covers the following areas: * Investigate Internet censorship through the OONI probe * How Websites Test Works * Directly enter custom addresses in the application * Create a custom test list * Analysis of results * Simple analysis of results * Advanced results analysis * Diagnosis of sanctions * Internal breaker setting only for backend connection * Data mining in OONI results data *### OONI Probe video tutorial in Spanish* Our Bolivian partners, Fundación Internet Bolivia ( https://ooni.org/partners/fundacion-internet-bolivia.org/) created a video tutorial in Spanish where they present OONI and explain OONI Probe, providing a live demo of using the tool. This is available here: https://peertube.tv/videos/watch/e6991978-a3d7-4718-b688-482a9a4de525 *### OONI Community Meeting* On 27th July 2021, we hosted the monthly OONI Community Meeting on our Slack channel (https://slack.ooni.org/) during which we discussed the following topics: 1) New web platform for updating the Citizen Lab test lists: Request for community feedback 2) Adding Signal under instant messaging tests for Debian/Ubuntu OONI Probe users 3) Backend proxy for OONI Probe Desktop and OONI Probe CLI *## Userbase* In July 2021, 13,522,345 OONI Probe measurements were collected from 4,969 AS networks in 195 countries around the world. This information can also be found through our measurement stats on OONI Explorer (see chart on “monthly coverage worldwide”): https://explorer.ooni.org/ ~ OONI team.

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Update to OONI Probe Mobile 3.3
by Maria Xynou 05 Oct '21

05 Oct '21

Hello friends, We have *released OONI Probe Mobile 3.3*! Please update to the latest version: https://ooni.org/install/mobile On Android, the latest version is 3.3.1, while on iOS, it's 3.3.0. With the latest release, we have improved the layout of the measurement screens with the goal of improving the accessibility of information. In particular, we have removed the menu settings that used to exist in each test result page (to avoid nesting information too much), and we have moved those settings (log, data, OONI Explorer link) to the main measurement screen of each test result. We have also included a *share button* on the top right corner of each test result, enabling you to share each measurement directly with your contacts. Thanks to support from *Zaina Foundation and the Localization Lab community*, the latest version of the OONI Probe mobile app *now supports Swahili and Dutch*! :) As a side note: If you ran OONI Probe while Facebook services were down yesterday, test results were marked as "anomalous". Unless you live in a country where Facebook services are blocked anyway, you can treat "anomalous" measurements as results of Facebook services being down (rather than blocking). Cheers, OONI team.

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by Dennis Reimund 04 Oct '21

04 Oct '21

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by Dennis Reimund 04 Oct '21

04 Oct '21

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New tutorial for writing OONI Probe tests
by Maria Xynou 01 Oct '21

01 Oct '21

Hello, We are excited to share that we have published a *new tutorial for writing OONI Probe tests*! The starting point of the tutorial is here: https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli/tree/master/internal/tutorial If you are a developer interested in contributing an OONI Probe test, we encourage you to read our tutorial and reach out to the OONI team on Slack ( https://slack.ooni.org/) or IRC (ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) for coordination. :) OONI Probe has always been free and open source to encourage independent third-party review of our methodologies. Now, you can contribute your own network measurement test -- particularly with the help of our new tutorial. If integrated into OONI Probe, your test will be run in around 200 countries and territories every month, with test results published as open data (https://ooni.org/data/) We have already integrated the RiseupVPN test developed by the LEAP collective, and we have worked with M-Lab on integrating the NDT and DASH tests. We look forward to integrating more tests from the community! Best, OONI team.

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday, 28th September 2021
by Maria Xynou 27 Sep '21

27 Sep '21

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Tuesday for our monthly community meeting. *=> Where? *OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC: ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) *=> When?* Tuesday, *28th September 2021 at 14:00 UTC* (for 1 hour) Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting-keep The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We hope you can join us! All the best, ~ OONI team

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User Guide: OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI)
by Maria Xynou 24 Sep '21

24 Sep '21

Hello, We are excited to share that we have published a *new user guide* for the *OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI)*. You can access the OONI Probe CLI user guide here: https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-cli Our new user guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to use OONI Probe CLI on *macOS, Debian/Ubuntu Linux, and on Raspberry Pis*! We also have other guides for: * OONI Probe Mobile (Android & iOS): https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-mobile * OONI Probe Desktop (Windows & macOS): https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-desktop We hope these guides help with sharing your OONI Probe knowledge and skills with others! Cheers, OONI team.

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[New Report] Italy blocks Gutenberg book publishing website
by Maria Xynou 10 Sep '21

10 Sep '21

Hello, Today, in collaboration with Davide Brunello (independent researcher), we published a new report which examines the *blocking of the Gutenberg book publishing website across networks in Italy* based on OONI data. Read the report here: https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/ Since May 2020, access to the Gutenberg book publishing website has been blocked in Italy (in compliance with a decree of the court of Rome) over copyright violation. The criminal lawsuit is currently ongoing and that does not permit access to relevant documents that would help with further understanding the background and situation that resulted in the blocking of www.gutenberg.org. OONI measurement analysis shows that access to www.gutenberg.org is blocked on at least 7 AS networks in Italy. Most ISPs primarily block access by means of DNS tampering. In blocking www.gutenberg.org, some ISPs in Italy (e.g Fastweb & Tiscali) return an NXDOMAIN, others (e.g. TIM, Telecom Italia, Iliad) return the IP address 127.0.0.1, while Vodafone Italia returns the IP address 83.224.65.170. Regardless of what is returned in the DNS response, what all ISPs in Italy (at least those included in this study) appear to have in common is the *lack of transparency* of the fact that access to www.gutenberg.org is intentionally blocked. Internet users just see an error message. Further details and analysis is available in our report: https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/ Thanks for reading! ~ OONI team.

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[New Report] No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries
by Maria Xynou 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

Hello, Today, in collaboration with the *Citizen Lab* and *OutRight Action International*, we co-published a new research report, "*No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries*", which examines the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report is available on each of our websites: * OONI: https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countrie… * Citizen Lab: https://citizenlab.ca/2021/08/no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-in-six-co… * OutRight Action International: https://outrightinternational.org/content/no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorsh… Download the full (203-page) report here: https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbti… *# About the report* We joined forces with OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab to examine the *blocking of LGBTIQ websites in 6 countries: *Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). We selected these countries because they are (a) known to serve block pages (i.e., pages that website visitors may see when access is restricted), which enable us to automatically confirm the blocking of LGBTIQ websites, and (b) known to censor LGBTIQ related content, based on prior research. We adopted a mixed methods research approach, combining *OONI network measurement analysis with interviews and literature research*. The timeframe that we selected for OONI data analysis was *June 1, 2016 to July 31, 2020*. To examine the impact of online LGBTIQ censorship, OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab interviewed LGBTIQ communities in the six countries. *# Summary of key findings* *1) Variation in the blocking of internationally-relevant LGBTIQ websites vs. locally-relevant ones.* All six countries blocked LGBTIQ websites that are internationally-relevant and meant for an international audience (such as www.grindr.com, www.advocate.com, and ilga.org) In Malaysia and Indonesia, all local LGBTIQ websites tested (e.g., queerlapis.com and suarakita.org) however, were accessible during our analysis period, and therefore, it appears that both countries block internationally-relevant LGBTIQ websites only. In contrast, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE blocked access to several local and regional LGBTIQ sites, in addition to blocking internationally-relevant LGBTIQ sites. *2) LGBTIQ websites on “culture and community” were blocked most often. *In Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, the most frequently blocked LGBTIQ websites were those that belong under the “Culture and Community” category. These are websites that aim primarily to create a sense of community among LGBTIQ individuals, as well as provide information about art and culture. This is not the case in Russia, however, where LGBTIQ websites under the “News Media" category instead presented the most blocking, while in the UAE, most of the LGBTIQ websites found to be blocked were no longer operational (categorized as “404 Not Found”). *3) Variation in how block pages are served for LGBTIQ websites.* ISPs in Indonesia and Malaysia serve block pages by means of DNS hijacking, whereas Iranian ISPs serve block pages primarily by means of DNS injection. In Russia, ISPs commonly make use of HTTP transparent proxies to serve blockpages, but some Russian ISPs serve block pages by means of DNS hijacking instead. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ISPs deliver block pages to internet users through the use of censorship technologies. *4) Detection of censorship technologies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.* In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ISPs serve block pages through the use of WireFilter technology, which is a network filtering device made for the ISP and commercial market, manufactured by Riyadh-based Sewar Technologies Ltd. In the UAE, we also observed blocking using a tool manufactured by Netsweeper, which is a Canadian company that sells internet filtering products to ISPs around the world. *5) Some block pages in Russia contained affiliate ads.* Unlike other countries, some block pages in Russia contained affiliate ads, suggesting the presence of financial incentives. We previously observed ads being served as part of censorship efforts in Egypt ( https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/) *6) Iran blocks the highest number of LGBTIQ URLs in our test lists. *Out of the six countries, the highest instance of LGBTIQ URL blocking was seen in Iran, where 75 unique LGBTIQ URLs were detected as blocked. In Iran, we also observed the blocking of www.outrightinternational.org, the website of OutRight Action International, one of this report’s authors. Further details and findings are available through our report: https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbti… We thank OONI Probe users for contributing measurements, supporting this study. We also thank those who participated in interviews, sharing valuable insights into the realities and impact of LGBTIQ website censorship in their countries and regions. Thanks for taking the time to read and share this study! Kind regards, ~ OONI team.

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday, 31st August 2021
by Maria Xynou 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Tuesday for our monthly community meeting. *=> Where? *OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC: ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) *=> When?* Tuesday, *31st August 2021 at 14:00 UTC* (for 1 hour) Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting-keep The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We hope you can join us! All the best, ~ OONI team

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