- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] DoS attacks on multiple relays
by null 05 Dec '17

05 Dec '17

> connlimit per /24. it does more good than evil. Any guidance on the specifics? Like how many concurrent connections to allow per /24? Not sure what's expected from legitimate user traffic through the relay... don't want to make things worse.

2 2

Save the date! Thursday, Dec 07 - Tor Meetup in NYC
by isabela＠riseup.net 04 Dec '17

04 Dec '17

Hello community! We are sending this 'save the date' note to let you know that on Thursday December 7th on the 20th floor of 150 Broadway in the LMHQ shared meeting space at 6:45 PM. There are a lot of folks from the community in NYC so we thought it would be cool to have some time share skills, learn new things, and be a place for new folks who want to get involve to come and meet folks. For this first one we will be talking about our community of relay operators. You can read more at this blog post: https://blog.torproject.org/explore-tor-new-york-city-new-meetup-starting-d… So if you are in the area, come and join us! cheers, Isabela

3 2

Please disregard 'excessive bounce' notice
by Damian Johnson 01 Dec '17

01 Dec '17

Hi all. Everyone with a gmail account not a notice that their subscription was suspended due to excessive bounces. You can ignore this notice, no action is needed on your part. I'm not entirely sure of the root cause but something similar happened a few years back with another list too. I've disabled automated bounce processing and re-enabled everyone's subscription. Cheers! -Damian

1 0

do the 800+ UbuntuCore relays constitute a Sybil attack?
by starlight.2017q4＠binnacle.cx 01 Dec '17

01 Dec '17

The population of these has been climbing for more than a week and no-one has commented, which seems odd. No contact provided. https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/UbuntuCore

4 4

Tor security releases coming tomorrow
by Nick Mathewson 30 Nov '17

30 Nov '17

I'm sending this message to announce that we will be releasing new stable and versions of Tor tomorrow, to fix 5 security bugs. I apologise for the short notice; we've had to move up our intended release date in order to try to match with release deadlines for downstream projects. We have classified 3 of these bugs as Medium and 2 as High, per draft security process at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/Securit… . The most serious bugs are a pair of denial-of-service issues, which we treat as high security because of the possibility of escalating them for traffic-analysis purposes. Note that only the following series are supported, and only they will receive updates: 0.2.5, 0.2.8, 0.2.9, 0.3.0, 0.3.1, and 0.3.2. 0.2.8 and 0.3.0 will become unsupported in January; 0.2.5 will become unsupported in May. best wishes, -- Nick

1 0

Screening DNS
by Dr Gerard Bulger 29 Nov '17

29 Nov '17

The DNS 9.9.9.9 https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/11/20/quad9_secure_private_dns_resolver/ At least is not blocking my exit node IP, simply because it is TOR! Nice. So far. Gerry

6 7

ymkeo offline
by René Ladan 28 Nov '17

28 Nov '17

Hi, due to hardware problems my node ymkeo 4E8CE6F5651E7342C1E7E5ED031E82078134FB0D will be offline for an undetermined amount of time. René

1 1

Re: [tor-relays] Detecting Network Attack [re: exit synflooded]
by Dhalgren Tor 26 Nov '17

26 Nov '17

>Well, it's still going on, and is pretty much ruining Libero :( . Running CentOS 6, here. > >When it's happening it can look like this: > ># netstat -n | grep -c SYN >17696 I run a fast exit and can offer some advice: 1) mitigate bug #18580 (also #21394); is a DNS denial-of-service and could be the problem. either upgrade to 0.3.2.4+ or edit resolve.conf per https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/DnsResolver#Tuningeventdn… also check out https://arthuredelstein.net/exits/ 2) if you continue to experience excessive outbound scanning SYNs, I've found that simply enabling connection tracking helps by implicitly limiting the rate a which connections can originate. If an iptables "-m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT" rule exists it will turn it on or you could modprobe the module if you don't want to configure incoming connection rules. some useful sysctl.conf changes, run sysctl -p after or reboot # Tor Exit tuning. net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 1025 65535 net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 2 net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets = 4194304 net.ipv4.tcp_tw_recycle = 1 net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30 net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 300 net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl = 10 net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 3 net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_established = 1000 net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_checksum = 0 you might see many messages: kernel: nf_conntrack: table full, dropping packet which indicates no connection table slots were available for an outbound connection and that rate limiting is effected state of connection tracking appears in /proc/net/nf_conntrack

4 5

Re: [tor-relays] Pretty sure our exit was being synflooded
by tor＠t-3.net 26 Nov '17

26 Nov '17

I spoke too soon, it seems - the exit is struggling again, with some time spent destroyed today. As I look at what it's doing, it's clear that someone is relaying SYN packets to random ports and also random destination addresses that aren't even alive. The destination hosts and ports continually vary - it never hits multiple destinations on 1 port, and it does not hit multiple ports on 1 host. I presume it is an attack that is intended to degrade this relay's service quality, or otherwise more broadly, degrade Tor. I'm going to reject a few more trojan listen ports, it might help but it isn't a real fix. My thought btw was for Tor to rate-limit syn scanning activity between the client and the first onion router, with the function taking place in that first-hop router, not at the exit.

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] Pretty sure our exit was being synflooded
by tor＠t-3.net 26 Nov '17

26 Nov '17

Thanks for the configuration suggestions. I intentionally set the conntrack limit high, maybe that was not the best thing. I think I'll be putting it back. Removing my extra IPTables code plus adding a reject for :8888 has made the exit behave properly again. I wonder if the best possible course of action for this sort of thing would be within Tor itself. I don't know that it was a single client connection into Tor that was causing all this trouble, but maybe it was. One would think that one client should not be allowed to do something so severe with the TCP that it can single-handedly ruin a fast exit. Maybe a code change that forces a rate-limit that significantly slows down the ability of a single client to roll port scans should be considered by the devs.

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] Detecting Network Attack [re: exit synflooded]
by tor＠t-3.net 26 Nov '17

26 Nov '17

Well, it's still going on, and is pretty much ruining Libero :( . Running CentOS 6, here. Actually, I think from what I'm seeing that it may not exactly be a synflood targeting Libero. I think Libero may be being (ab)used to do massive portscanning or similar. Image should be visible below - it's normal statistics for the 18th through say, part of the 21st, messed up 22ed - 24th and on the 24th me trying different things in an attempt to mitigate (graph is from yesterday). Look at the SYN_SENT2 maximum. When it's happening it can look like this: # netstat -n | grep -c SYN 17696 # Also one tiny part of the netstat looked like this: tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:33354 <external IP munged>:81 SYN_SENT tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:39659 <external IP munged>:8888 SYN_SENT tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:44247 <external IP munged>:87 SYN_SENT tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:42038 <external IP munged>:8888 SYN_SENT tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:42077 <external IP munged>:83 SYN_SENT tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:36282 <external IP munged>:8888 SYN_SENT tcp 0 1 64.113.32.29:46023 <external IP munged>:8888 SYN_SENT Port 8888 is supposedly opened up for listen by a virus.

3 3

Detecting Network Attack [re: exit synflooded]
by grarpamp 26 Nov '17

26 Nov '17

On Fri, Nov 24, 2017 at 6:23 PM, <tor(a)t-3.net> wrote: > Was anyone else's exit being synflooded yesterday and today? There could be a combined monitoring array deployed among all nodes that might start to answer these questions. And further alert on all sorts of interesting network attacks launched at Tor. Software exploits... segmentation / modulation attacks... etc. This is perimeter security 101, and Tor currently has no fence, no guard dogs, not even a janitor you can ask the next day. That's beyond bad. And big oppurtunity for new research project.

2 2

Tor Metrics issue
by Arisbe 25 Nov '17

25 Nov '17

In the immediate past I monitored both my relays and my bridges through atlas. So, now with Tor Metrics, I don't see my bridges. Am I doing something wrong or are they not in the data base? Arisbe

4 5

Re: [tor-relays] Detecting Network Attack [re: exit synflooded]
by tor＠t-3.net 25 Nov '17

25 Nov '17

I went and added a reject for exit to port 8888 and HUPed the process. Maybe this is the fix! :)

1 0

Exit from Different IP from OR Port
by Dr Gerard Bulger 25 Nov '17

25 Nov '17

Direct Exit to a different IP. I naively thought that the proxy lines in torrc could to that via an https proxy. Alas that's not what that line is for! I got an impression from earlier chats a while ago that exiting to a non-advertised IP was regarded as simply not cricket, in that the internet should know the IP or Tor exits exiting. The trouble now is too many are sites apply blanket bans on Tor exits. I failed get a Tor on my VPS to use a VPN as the final exit, as my knowledge of routing is too limited. I kept cutting myself off from the branch I was sitting on fiddling with this remotely. As some exits to do manage this, I wonder if anyone can post be a script or point me in the right direction as to how they do it. Scenario: Set up a VPN connection. Have a script that in effect offers split tunnelling for TOR to allow exit via the VPN. The OR port needs to remain local fixed IP. The default route of the VPN server remains local. Doing everything in and out via most VPNs would not be useful as these services have very dynamic IPs. Gerry >>>Detecting exit nodes is error prone, as you point out. Some exit >>> nodes have their traffic exit a different address than their >>> listening port. Hey does Exonerator handle these? >> Right. It's not trivial for tor to figure out what exit relays are >> multi-homed -- at least not without actually establishing circuits >> and fetching content over each exit relay. >> >> I just finished an exitmap scan and found 17 exit relays that exit >> from an IP address that is different from what's listed in the >> consensus: > This mode of operation, regardless of how it happens, is not in itself > a problem, nor cause for alarm. In fact, the nature of these "exit IP > different than ORPort" relays can and often does assist users in > circumventing censorship... a fundamental use case of Tor. > For instance, the arbitrary automated and blind blocking via dumb > blocklists that prevent even such most basic user activity and human > right to knowledge as simply reading websites via Tor. Such blocking > examples can often be found here: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBl > ockingTor > > It's also entirely up to the exit operator to determine if the third > party non contractual / SLA exonerator service is of any particular > use or benefit to them or not... perhaps they have other notary means, > or are immune or not subject to any such legal or jurisdictional > issues, for which it becomes moot. > > Similarly, realtime TorDNSEL and the like could be considered to be > censorship enabling tools. > -----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of teor Sent: 25 November 2017 07:31 To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Tor Metrics issue > On 25 Nov 2017, at 17:36, Arisbe <arisbe(a)cni.net> wrote: > > In the immediate past I monitored both my relays and my bridges through atlas. So, now with Tor Metrics, I don't see my bridges. Am I doing something wrong or are they not in the data base? How do you search for your relays and bridges? T _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

3 2

Pretty sure our exit was being synflooded.
by tor＠t-3.net 25 Nov '17

25 Nov '17

Was anyone else's exit being synflooded yesterday and today? I put some iptables code in to help, it might have mitigated it. I'm pretty sure our exit "Libero" was being synflooded. Managed to lose all our flags shortly after the instability was (finally) resolved, go figure =p

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] my IP got blocked -> closed
by Patrice 25 Nov '17

25 Nov '17

Hi, I want to tell that the issue is no longer exists. I can now visit ebay, ikea, ect. without a problem. It was like grarpamp said, there was a bunch of malicious software on one of my Computers. Very shameful, there was no virus detection installed. Therefore my tor relay was not the problem but my windows pc. ;-) Thank you for your help! Kind regards Kalle > 2. Re: my IP got blocked (grarpamp) > >>> Detecting exit nodes is error prone, as you point out. Some exit nodes >>> have their traffic exit a different address than their listening >>> port. Hey does Exonerator handle these? >> Right. It's not trivial for tor to figure out what exit relays are >> multi-homed -- at least not without actually establishing circuits and >> fetching content over each exit relay. >> >> I just finished an exitmap scan and found 17 >> exit relays that exit from >> an IP address that is different from what's listed in the consensus: > This mode of operation, regardless of how it happens, is not in > itself a problem, nor cause for alarm. In fact, the nature of these > "exit IP different than ORPort" relays can and often does assist > users in circumventing censorship... a fundamental use case of Tor. > For instance, the arbitrary automated and blind blocking via dumb > blocklists that prevent even such most basic user activity and human > right to knowledge as simply reading websites via Tor. Such blocking > examples can often be found here: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockin… > > It's also entirely up to the exit operator to determine if the > third party non contractual / SLA exonerator service is of any > particular use or benefit to them or not... perhaps they have other > notary means, or are immune or not subject to any such legal or > jurisdictional issues, for which it becomes moot. > > Similarly, realtime TorDNSEL and the like could be considered > to be censorship enabling tools. >

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Pretty sure our exit was being synflooded.
by Paul Templeton 25 Nov '17

25 Nov '17

Happening to middles as well - I get black hold all the time - ISP has auto rules. Paul ----- Original Message ----- From: tor(a)t-3.net To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Sent: Saturday, November 25, 2017 10:23:24 AM Subject: [tor-relays] Pretty sure our exit was being synflooded. Was anyone else's exit being synflooded yesterday and today? I put some iptables code in to help, it might have mitigated it. I'm pretty sure our exit "Libero" was being synflooded. Managed to lose all our flags shortly after the instability was (finally) resolved, go figure =p _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

2 1

Tor meetup at Primavera hacker (Santiago de Chile) [es/en/pt]
by ilv＠torproject.org 22 Nov '17

22 Nov '17

[ES][EN][PT]¡Encuentro Tor en la Primavera Hacker! ¡Ven! ======================================================== [ES] ¡Encuentro Tor en la Primavera Hacker! ¡Ven! [EN] Tor Meetup at Primavera Hacker! Join us! [PT] Encontro Tor na Primavera Hacker! Venha! [ES] ¡Encuentro Tor en la Primavera Hacker! ¡Ven! ------------------------------------------------- ¡Hola! La Primavera Hacker está por llegar. Durante los días 2 y 3 de diciembre, hackers, activistas, tecnólogos, feministas y demás fauna se darán cita en Santiago de Chile. Esta es una invitación para todos los interesadas e interesados en colaborar con la comunidad Tor. Tor es software libre, estructurado alrededor de una red de servidores mantenidos por voluntarias y voluntarios a lo largo del globo para proteger el anonimato en línea y evadir la censura en Internet. Durante los dos días, miembros de la comunidad Tor estarán presentes en la Primavera Hacker con agenda abierta, dispuestos a conversar, intercambiar experiencias, aprender y enseñar respecto a las tecnologías contra la vigilancia y, principalmente, discutir sobre cómo colaborar con Tor. Tendremos también una mesa llena de stickers y regalitos de Tor :-) Encuentro Tor ------------- La red Tor está compuesta por más de 6 mil computadoras alrededor del mundo. Sin embargo, América Latina tiene una participación muy pequeña. Actualmente en Chile hay solamente 2 nodos en funcionamiento. En Brasil, apenas 25. ¡Necesitamos aumentar la diversidad de la red más allá de los Estados Unidos y Europa! Ven y participa del Encuentro Tor, y aprende como ser parte de la comunidad. Durante los dos días del festival, nuestra idea es cubrir los siguientes temas: - Como funciona Tor, por qué Tor tiene problemas con los VPNs y con los servicios proxy de un salto (1-hop) - Install fest: ¡Instala Tor Browser y Orbot con nosotros! - Como colaborar con la traducción de la documentación al castellano. - Como instalar, configurar y administrar su nodo de Tor. - Como ser voluntario más allá de mantener nodos. - Como usar OONI para detectar la censura en redes. - Como usar herramientas como onion-share. - Tor en universidades y buenas prácticas de investigación. - Tor y la ley, ajustar la legislación sobre Tor en Latinoamérica. - Mejorar la metodología de pruebas para OONI -- Listas de URLs de prueba (https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/) - OONI y bloqueos: Cómo analizar los datos de OONI (https://api.ooni.lo) Si no puedes llegar al encuentro, puedes hablar por el canal: IRC: irc.oftc.net #tor-south Por la lista de correo: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/global-south/ Y el Wiki (Trac) para la documentación, eventos y otras cosas: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Proje… Primavera Hacker: https://phacker.org - http://u5ed42u6sbzq7xzs.onion Un abrazo, =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- [EN] Tor Meetup at Primavera Hacker! Join us! Hi! Primavera Hacker (Hacker Spring) is coming. During December 2 and 3, hackers, activists, technologists, feminists and related people will meet in Santiago de Chile. This is an invitation for all people interested in collaborating with the Tor community. Tor is free software, structured around a network of volunteer-run servers, spread all around the world to anonymity online and circumvent Internet censorship. During the two days of the meeting, Tor community members will be present at Primavera Hacker with an open schedule, eager to tealk, exchange experiences, learn and teach about technologies against surveillance and, mainly, discuss how to collaborate with Tor. We will also have a table full of stickers and other Tor swag :-) Tor Meetup ---------- The Tor network is formed by over 6 thousand computers around the world. However, Latin America hosts a very small share of it. Nowadays, in Chile there are only 2 working servers. In Brasil, just 25. We need to increase the diversity of the network beyond the United States and Europe! Come and be a part of the Tor Meetup, and learn how to engage in the Tor community. During the two days of primavera hacker we will cover the following topics: - How does Tor work, why does Tor have problems with VPNs and 1-hop proxy services. - Install fest: Install Tor Browser and Orbot with us! - How to collaborate translating documentation into Spanish. - How to install, configure and administer your Tor relay. - How to use OONI to detect network censorship. - How to use tools such as onion-share. - Tor for universities and good research practices. - Tor and the law, adjust legislation about Tor in Latin America. - Improve the OONI testing methodology -- List of test URLs (https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/) - OONI and blocking: How to analyze OONI data (https://api.ooni.lo) If you cannot make it to the meeting, you can talk with the participants on the following channel: IRC: irc.oftc.net #tor-south On our mailing list: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/global-south/ And the Wiki (Trac) for documentation, events and other things: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Proje… Primavera Hacker: https://phacker.org - http://u5ed42u6sbzq7xzs.onion hugs, ==== Encontro Tor na Primavera Hacker! Venha! ======================================== Hola! A Primavera Hacker está chegando! Nos dias 2 e 3 de dezembro, hackers, ativistas, tecnologistas, feministas se encontrarão em Santiago, no Chile. Este é um convite para todos interessados e interessadas em colaborar com a comunidade Tor. O Tor é um software livre rodado por uma rede de servidores voluntários distribuída pelo mundo para garantir o anonimato online e contornar a censura na Internet. Durante os dois dias membros da comunidade Tor estarão presentes na Primavera Hacker com a agenda aberta para conversar, trocar experiências, aprender e ensinar as tecnologias anti vigilância e, principalmente, discutir sobre como colaborar com o Tor. Teremos uma mesa cheia de adesivos e brindes do Tor :) Encontro Tor ------------- A rede Tor é composta por mais de 6 mil computadores ao redor do mundo. No entanto, a América Latina tem uma participação muito pequena. Atualmente, no Chile há apenas 2 servidores em funcionamento. E no Brasil apenas 25. Nós precisamos aumentar a diversidade da rede além dos Estados Unidos e Europa! Venha participar do Encuentro Tor e saiba como se engajar na comunidade Tor. Durante os dois dias a nossa ideia é ensinar: - Como funciona o Tor, porque Tor, os problemas com as VPNs e serviços proxy de 1-hop. - Install fest: instale Tor browser & Orbot com a gente! - Como colaborar na tradução da documentação em ES/PT. - Como instalar, configurar e gerenciar o seu relay do Tor. - Como usar o OONI para detectar a censura na rede. - Como usar ferramentas como onion-share. - Como ser voluntário além da hospedagem de servidores. - Tor em universidades e boas práticas de pesquisa. - Tor e a lei: ajustar as leis para o Tor na América Latina. - OONI melhorar a metodologia testada -- listas de URL de testes (https://ooni.torproject.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/) - OONI e bloqueios, como analisar OONI data (https://api.ooni.io) Se você não puder comparecer no Encontro, você pode falar com a gente por esse canal: IRC: irc.oftc.net #tor-south E pela lista de email: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/global-south/ E wiki (Trac) para documentacao, eventos e outras coisas: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Proje… Primavera Hacker: https://phacker.org - http://u5ed42u6sbzq7xzs.onion um abraço, -- ilv, gus, vasilis, gwolf

1 0

The Onion Box v4.0
by Ralph Wetzel 18 Nov '17

18 Nov '17

3 3

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Detecting multi-homed exit relays (was: Onion auto-redirects using Alt-Svc HTTP header)
by grarpamp 18 Nov '17

18 Nov '17

>> Detecting exit nodes is error prone, as you point out. Some exit nodes >> have their traffic exit a different address than their listening >> port. Hey does Exonerator handle these? > > Right. It's not trivial for tor to figure out what exit relays are > multi-homed -- at least not without actually establishing circuits and > fetching content over each exit relay. > > I just finished an exitmap scan and found 17 > exit relays that exit from > an IP address that is different from what's listed in the consensus: This mode of operation, regardless of how it happens, is not in itself a problem, nor cause for alarm. In fact, the nature of these "exit IP different than ORPort" relays can and often does assist users in circumventing censorship... a fundamental use case of Tor. For instance, the arbitrary automated and blind blocking via dumb blocklists that prevent even such most basic user activity and human right to knowledge as simply reading websites via Tor. Such blocking examples can often be found here: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockin… It's also entirely up to the exit operator to determine if the third party non contractual / SLA exonerator service is of any particular use or benefit to them or not... perhaps they have other notary means, or are immune or not subject to any such legal or jurisdictional issues, for which it becomes moot. Similarly, realtime TorDNSEL and the like could be considered to be censorship enabling tools.

1 0

my IP got blocked
by Patrice 18 Nov '17

18 Nov '17

Hi everyone, I`ve got an issue with my local IP address. I am running a relay about 1 year and since 3 or 4 weeks I can`t reach some websites like: ebay or ikea. All I get is this message: * * *Access Denied* You don`t have permission to access "Http://www.ebay.com/" on this server. Reference # ____looong number______ I think I am on some blacklists. After I change my IP address all worked fine for only 2 days. Can I do something about this? Thank you for your help! Kind regards Kalle

7 7

Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 82, Issue 25
by Gabriel Curtis 16 Nov '17

16 Nov '17

tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org On Nov 16, 2017 3:22 AM, <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> wrote: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Atlas is now Relay Search! (teor) > 2. Test (Alessandro Lo Mo) > 3. Re: Test (Paul Templeton) > 4. Re: Atlas is now Relay Search! (Iain R. Learmonth) > 5. Re: Atlas is now Relay Search! (r1610091651) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 13:36:52 +1100 > From: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Atlas is now Relay Search! > Message-ID: <FA8F2762-65E0-430B-BAE1-E3B45827A464(a)gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > > > On 15 Nov 2017, at 09:26, Iain R. Learmonth <irl(a)torproject.org> wrote: > > > > On 14/11/17 18:26, teor wrote: > >> No, it isn't: one of the new resources appears to be blocked by AdBlock > >> Plus for iOS. So it only works with content blockers turned off. You > probably > >> want to fix this eventually, because these blocklists are popular. And > the > >> issue likely affects multiple platforms. But it's not an all iOS > devices bug. > > > > I've tested with AdBlock Plus in Firefox and I cannot recreate this > problem. > > > > Can you tell me what resource it is that is blocked and what rule it is > > matching? > > No, I can't, because iOS ad blockers do not provide this information. > Did you add many resources in the transition? > > T > > -- > Tim / teor > > PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B > ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >

1 0

Atlas is now Relay Search!
by Iain R. Learmonth 16 Nov '17

16 Nov '17

Hi All, You may notice that Atlas has a new look, and is no longer called Atlas. For now no URLs have changed but this is part of work to merge this tool into the Tor Metrics website. The style is determined by the Tor Metrics Style, and modifications have been made to fit this. The decision was made to deploy these changes before the actual integration into metrics.torproject.org to allow for other issues to be worked on. This was a big change and it was tricky maintaining two branches of the codebase. Issues should still be reported on the Metrics/Atlas component in the Tor trac if they arise. When we come to full integration, URLs will change but there will be a period where we maintain redirects to prevent any URLs from breaking while waiting for being updated. Thanks, Iain.

13 30

Test
by Alessandro Lo Mo 16 Nov '17

16 Nov '17

Test

2 1