- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Enable statistics for hardcoded obfsbridges
by George Kadianakis 19 Feb '14

19 Feb '14

Hello people, I'm sending you an email because your bridges are hardcoded in the pluggable transport bundles. We recently added PT-specific metrics in metrics.torproject.org Specificaally, you can see a graph of PT users here: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-bridge-transport If you select the obfs2 transport, you can see that it displays only 300 users, which is not entirely true. We suspect that the reason for the low number of users is because not many bridges are reporting PT statistics to the bridge authorities. This might be for two reasons: a) Your bridge might be configured to be private, that is to not publish its descriptor. This might happen if you have 'PublishServerDescriptor' set to 0 in your torrc. If you have a bridge hardcoded in the bundles, not publishing your descriptor doesn't really provide any security (your bridge is exposed anyway), so you might as well start publishing your descriptor, since this will allow us to gather statistics about the number of users you see. b) Your Tor might not be bleeding edge: Tor only started reporting PT statistics to the auths in tor-0.2.5.1. To upgrade to this version of Tor you can use either the git master or the automated Debian package builds (see https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003899.html for how to use them). c) You don't have Extended ORPort enabled. With recent versions of Tor, you can enable it by adding 'ExtORPort auto' to your torrc. It would be great if you could fix the above so that your Tor can start submitting statistics! If you have any questions, feel free to ask me!

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Working init script for TOR 2.5.1
by tor＠afo-tm.org 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello, i search a working init script for multiple tor instances. I tried it from https://www.torservers.net/misc/config/initd-tor but that is broken. Does somebody have a working one? Thanks for help -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTASW0AAoJEKawimmefC2InIkP/0guExgToj+B/hk9cQouPNdn J9ml+qdZxeEJH2G8V5NFhre4L1y4lubr9DhvVN0eMQ/vU+Dd/f0KqpO/05DD2pMG z2MJxq5qfvL4M/BApGbsC/+xIZBVRWHNHywO/hlR89sXn1Yd30kbnXYlAIQNCobA 6xsT4zhZ+crhKzUgC6jouIdzq1Wf9nfiChxf4w9UgCbO+t6JTkRBjyX7w0bHcTAP e3hMZBUEiJAuWeB3vubQPiQwvhrqw87yvSj6uNhKAq5u8nWtRo1mStD69jia+bdB yZIKxRgc8Y/+T/Ls8zWDiRvBUdvFd0buVQKiWjn8dX4UNoZNuFGIGtv5U+PfKP+3 osBmf3v20VmkW/7RcC/TAO0/9kqDupkdF4/W9OhzcIKQMv64OwJiEIFjE6mtTM8D sHhRbk++3YsVhSCy504KUvohewltEMpHpGD+/1vDwfebryeelBZTkn6xr51Kk6IM LijzNdcZFwmEtP5NbuioF07NyN5qKMyGUYdUhiDc51BT5ynkis4950lHMgJkpKrO 5ssv1Kw+f3B+53s67LbbaaPwErk1AdxxFnIBZ8RcDMLJIk3BsT/WwujPlF/Ftog1 cc6jLCHcxalMPzBT9b4NbNz9EbpOhqpQE/oUeasBtfPr9606bN2EHSTey4WVcuPp kLPxVVMrvY1B4W4fxI/Q =dy9S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor Relay Downloading much more data than uploading
by borgersnick＠gmail.com 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

The log entry is: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 23 days 0:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.83 MB and received 177.12 MB. I don’t think I made any changes to the torrc, intend to provide a relay. I am using trickle to limit bandwidth consumption instead of the built-in method because I didn’t want to learn about the bursting concept. ExecStart = /usr/bin/trickle -d 500 -u 500 -t .5 /usr/bin/tor --runasdaemon 0 --defaults-torrc /usr/share/tor/defaults-torrc -f /etc/tor/torrc --quiet Running on Fedora. Firewall allows external port 80 and 443 access to the server.

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Dynamic upload limit
by Bram L 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

Dear list members, I am running a tor relay, but I have an upload limit (50GB/7 days). This limit usually can't be increased too much, because that might affect other network users. I would like to request my provider (university) for a bandwidth-free connection during the night (or whenever the network is not used very much), and a limited version during the peak times. My idea is that this way I could contribute to the Tor network without disturbing other users of my university network. Before I do so, however, I am curious whether it actually contributes to the Tor network. I noticed it takes time for the bandwidth to increase, and if my daytime upload limit is low (e.g. 80 kb/s) and unlimited (Gb/s) at night, my overall contribution could be very limited due to the time it takes Tor to utilize my available bandwidth. Do you have any insights in this matter? Thanks in advance! PS: currently, I drain the 50GB in about a day unlimited or I run at very slow speeds... Both don't give me the feeling I really contribute.

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Re: [tor-relays] TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Hi Mateusz, 19 days with 1/5 of the default pps value (1000) That would be around 4 days with pps 1000. That's exactly the value estimated in the project faq. Everything seems to be fine. Project site / faq: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#faq Results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Thank you for participating ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman On 13 Feb 2014, at 13:10, Sebastian Urbach wrote: > Dear honorable list members, > Some stats from my side: bash-3.2$ PPS=200 DONTERASE=yes time ./traceroutes.sh 1645980.86 real 28760.92 user 181530.51 sys Started on 27 Jan 2014 00:49 GMT Finished on 15 Feb 2014 02:02 GMT ca. 19 days to complete with scamper on OSX 10.7 Thanks, -mateusz

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TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Dear honorable list members, If anybody has questions regarding his / her submitted results than please include your public ip address in your mail. We can process your requests way faster if we have this essential information and don't have to ask for it. Btw. we are at 88 ip's with at least 1 complete run. Come on, let's make it 100 before the data review in March :-) Thank you very much for your attention ! The project: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html The results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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obfs3 a risk to scramblesuit?
by Delton Barnes 14 Feb '14

14 Feb '14

I am running a bridge with both obfs3 and scramblesuit. obfs3 is vulnerable to active probing. Say someone in China makes the mistake of connecting with obfs3 instead of scramblesuit, and active probing identifies it as a Tor bridge. Wouldn't the bridge IP address then be blacklisted, making it impossible for other people to connect even with scramblesuit? Would it make sense, then, as a bridge operator to elect to only support scramblesuit, even though no one will use it for a while? It seems you are only as good as your weakest transport. Thanks, Delton p.s. Would reply to original thread about scramblesuit, but I only just joined the mailing list, and cannot figure out how to reply to preexisting messages.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Thu, 13 Feb 2014 18:10:38 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > Hm, the "Could not set up listener" error message usually appears when > something is already listening on the port that obfsproxy wants to > bind to (Twisted throws the error.CannotListenError exception). > I managed to avoid the problem by running `killall obfsproxy` before restarting Tor. This time around I registered server transport 'obfs3' and registered server transport 'scramblesuit'. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Wed, 12 Feb 2014 18:29:26 +0000 Matt <matt(a)pagan.io> wrote: > I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing > this message: > > [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the > configuration protocol and will be destroyed. > > That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean? > Here is more from the debug log: Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is complete: 3 steps long Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Looking for firsthop '[redacted IPv4]:443' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Conn open. Delivering first onion skin. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First skin; sending create cell. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(): circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() found nothing for circ_id 2147489864, channel ID 2 (0x2ba73fe349b0) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_deliver_create_cell(): Chosen circID 2147489864. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit active. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First hop: finished sending CREATE cell to '$5A0EF08FC99F236C5E48FB52E649F092088D009C=ganooloonix at [redacted IPv4]' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] pt_configure_remaining_proxies(): Configuring remaining managed proxies (1)! Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (VERSION 1) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (SMETHOD-ERROR obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Server managed proxy encountered a method error. (obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] tor_process_handle_destroy(): Terminated process with PID '30355'. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] mark_my_descriptor_dirty(): Decided to publish new relay descriptor: configured managed proxies Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 17 wants to write. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] flush_chunk_tls(): flushed 1542 bytes, 0 ready to flush, 0 remain. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] connection_handle_write_impl(): After TLS write of 1542: 0 read, 1589 written Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_write_packed_cell(): Writing packed_cell_t 0x2ba7403cb698 to channel 0x2ba73fe349b0 with global ID 2 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(): Made a circuit inactive.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 16:04:56 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Greetings, > > a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit > is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it > at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ > > If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy > to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git > master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will > hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some > testing :) > > After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin > line from: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed to: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed > > This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. > > It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based > pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a > password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't > connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor > will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that > clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random > password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a > torrc line like this: > ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit > password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA > > By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the > beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we > will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. > > Feel free to ask any questions you have! > > Thanks! > > PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, > please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not > hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the > number of obfuscated bridges out there. > > [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing this message: [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean?

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New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by George Kadianakis 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

Greetings, a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some testing :) After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin line from: ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed to: ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a torrc line like this: ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. Feel free to ask any questions you have! Thanks! PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the number of obfuscated bridges out there. [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en

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Trusted Tor Traceroute Scoreboard Link Modified
by Anupam Das 11 Feb '14

11 Feb '14

Hi Relay Operators, We have made some modifications to the way we are running our live scoreboard script. Previously we were running into some problems with handling multiple simultaneous web requests, as the server started a heavy script for each incoming request. Now we are updating a static HTML files every 10 minutes. The link of our scoreboard has changed. Now the scoreboard is available at- http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Sorry for the inconveniences. Thanks Anupam

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Re: [tor-relays] reading the captchas
by eliaz 11 Feb '14

11 Feb '14

On 2/10/2014 9:37:23 AM, Lunar (lunar(a)torproject.org) wrote: > eliaz: > > Would it be possible for someone to change the captcha images at the > URL > > for getting bridges, without of course lessening their effectiveness? > > The present ones are pretty much unreadable, to this human at least. - > eliaz > > The issue is already tracked, see: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10809 > -- > Lunar <lunar(a)torproject.org> Thanks for the pointer & your work. I see it's more complicated than I thought. Hope it gets fixed soon, magnifying the screen isn't of much help. I'm reluctant to suggest the page to people as long as reading the captchas is so difficult. --- This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus protection is active. http://www.avast.com

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High speed exit
by Craig C-S 10 Feb '14

10 Feb '14

Hi all, I've been running a few fail relays over the past few years. All relays I run they begin with the prefix "Telos". I've recently come across a really good deal http://www.soyoustart.com/ca/en/ on hosting..., and begun hosting "TelosTor" and "TelosTor2" from 192.99.8.96. I would welcome any comments on security. At the moment I do not have a stable IP to access them, so have defaulted to 1/min IP access for OpenSSH. I would relish the TOR communities feedback in order to further secure my tor exit node. Thanks! Craig

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Relay bandwidth
by Tora Tora Tora 09 Feb '14

09 Feb '14

I have configured Tor with the following (with daily accounting): RelayBandwidthRate 384 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 512 KB I always assumed that the burst bandwidth will set the maximum relay bandwidth. However, by using iftop, I can see individual connections with speeds as high as 2+ Mbps. Even when individual connections are not exceeding burst speeds, adding up bandwidth of all connections would probably exceed allowed relay burst bandwidth. Is this because Tor is using up the bandwidth allowance, since it is well below its long-time average or is this something unexpected that should not be happening?

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using Arm to manage nodes
by jason＠icetor.is 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

Hello all, This is something that's bothered me for quite some time. I often use arm (https://www.torproject.org/projects/arm.html.en) for monitoring my relays and to keep a quick eye on things like overall bandwidth consumed, traffic stats and my favorite client locale statistics. I run it in a screen session and often when I re-attach the session often the keymapping is all messed up and the arrow keys will offer to close arm. Usually it will correct after I shift-m to get to the menu and switch around a few times. Has anyone else experienced this and how did you solve it? -Jason

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Re: [tor-relays] Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

Hi, That's odd, please send us your ip address and we will look into this and get back to you asap. Feel free to send me your ip by private mail if you feel more comfortable. I would suggest that you keep running the script, we will check your submitted data and then we go from there. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman Hi, I've seen this error message twice now within about 12 hours: ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host If I read the script correctly, it tries to upload the data and then deletes it without checking for successful upload. Since the data is probably lost, should I start over? Best regards, Alexander --- PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp On 2014-02-07 22:05, Sebastian Urbach wrote: > Dear list members, > The Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes project is coming closer to the > next data review (03/2014). > Basically every relay (except Bridges) can help to evaluate the Tor > Routes. Please consider that one complete run takes about 4 days with > the default settings. > It's really easy to participate, just download and run the script ! We > are currently at 82 completed runs and i think 100 is a great > milestone :-) > The project website: > http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html > The scoreboard with the results: > http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html > Thank you for your help ! > -- > Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours > Sebastian Urbach > ---------------------------------------------- > Those who would give up essential Liberty, > to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve > neither Liberty nor Safety. > ---------------------------------------------- > Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, > journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Checking a bridge
by Martin Kepplinger 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

When my bridge uses only the same few MBs each day, i guess it isn't used at all right? Is there a simple way to ensure it is in bridgeDB and functioning as it should? thanks, martin

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Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes
by Sebastian Urbach 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

Dear list members, The Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes project is coming closer to the next data review (03/2014). Basically every relay (except Bridges) can help to evaluate the Tor Routes. Please consider that one complete run takes about 4 days with the default settings. It's really easy to participate, just download and run the script ! We are currently at 82 completed runs and i think 100 is a great milestone :-) The project website: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html The scoreboard with the results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Thank you for your help ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Onion address or clearnet address
by Hang 07 Feb '14

07 Feb '14

Some sites such as RiseUp and DuckDuckGo could be accessed via onion addresses. I would like to know which address (onion address vs clearnet address) should I use when using TBB. I believe both ways are more or less the same in terms of identity protection and communication security (provided that the clearnet addresses are using HTTPS). Perhaps the main difference is using the clearnet addresses adds burden to the exit relays, while using onion addresses only consumes bandwidth of middle relays which is relatives more in supply. Am I right? Do I overlook anything? Or it doesn't matter at all for either way? Best Hang

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duplicated log output after SIGHUP
by Scott Bennett 07 Feb '14

07 Feb '14

I made a minor change to my torrc file and sent tor a SIGHUP. The only logging I'm doing is "notice" level to a file. Here's what has been going on since the SIGHUP. Feb 06 22:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 3:00 hours, with 206 circuits open. I've sent 8.22 GB and received 7.72 GB. Feb 06 22:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.286% Feb 06 22:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 12% Feb 06 23:10:33.967 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading config and resetting internal state. Feb 06 23:10:33.967 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc". Feb 06 23:10:33.976 [warn] Skipping obsolete configuration option 'MaxOnionsPending' Feb 06 23:10:33.978 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.20 (git-3cb5c70beec5bf46) opening log file. Feb 06 23:10:33.978 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.20 (git-3cb5c70beec5bf46) opening log file. Feb 06 23:10:34.293 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MYCROFTsOtherChild 023220505A550D6FDF0C20FF7C48E66BA06A49A6' Feb 06 23:10:34.293 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MYCROFTsOtherChild 023220505A550D6FDF0C20FF7C48E66BA06A49A6' Feb 06 23:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2129/2129 TAP, 364/364 NTor. Feb 06 23:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2129/2129 TAP, 364/364 NTor. Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 4:00 hours, with 296 circuits open. I've sent 8.55 GB and received 8.05 GB. Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 4:00 hours, with 296 circuits open. I've sent 8.55 GB and received 8.05 GB. Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.276% Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.276% Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 06 23:32:01.222 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 00:31:59.201 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2781/2781 TAP, 348/348 NTor. Feb 07 00:31:59.201 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2781/2781 TAP, 348/348 NTor. Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 5:00 hours, with 384 circuits open. I've sent 8.62 GB and received 8.11 GB. Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 5:00 hours, with 384 circuits open. I've sent 8.62 GB and received 8.11 GB. Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.264% Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.264% Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 00:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 01:31:59.219 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 3469/3469 TAP, 278/278 NTor. Feb 07 01:31:59.219 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 3469/3469 TAP, 278/278 NTor. Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 6:00 hours, with 559 circuits open. I've sent 8.63 GB and received 8.13 GB. Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 6:00 hours, with 559 circuits open. I've sent 8.63 GB and received 8.13 GB. Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.151% Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.151% Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 01:32:01.202 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 02:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 4090/4090 TAP, 345/345 NTor. Feb 07 02:31:59.200 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 4090/4090 TAP, 345/345 NTor. Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 7:00 hours, with 540 circuits open. I've sent 8.82 GB and received 8.31 GB. Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 10 days 7:00 hours, with 540 circuits open. I've sent 8.82 GB and received 8.31 GB. Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.116% Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.116% Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% Feb 07 02:32:01.201 [notice] TLS write overhead: 11% And so on. Is the duplication of messages after a reload a known bug? Please note that the double logging I reported earlier has been corrected by commenting out the --Log stuff in /usr/local/etc/rc.d/tor, so the new double logging appears to be a different problem. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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What is more necessary: Bridge or Relay?
by an.to_n-73＠riseup.net 06 Feb '14

06 Feb '14

Hello List! Since 7/2013 I operate a small Tor Server as internal relay or as obfuscated bridge. What is more necessary: An internal relay to speed up the network, or an obfuscated bridge to help censored users? My ISP gives me dynamic IPs, which change daily. I guess this is good for bridges, because my IP is valid only for one day. Otherwise I've got an upload > 500 kbps and could contribute to the network speed. Actually I've got not clue about the need for anonymous bridges. In addition: I could combine both, because my VPN provider iVPN offers port forwarding. So I could run the RaspberryPi as bridge on my own IP and the 2nd server as internal relay over the VPN. So the public relay runs on another IP. But actually the VPN connection terminates by itself, the relay goes offline and I can fix it the evening. => Has anyone experience with servers listening over VPN? Does anyone know more? Best regards Anton -- an.to_n-73(a)riseup.net Public PGP key fingerprint 5FD2 DE00 1B1A 1970 8D32 A59E 4A25 3CE1 A82F F4C4

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http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/
by K. Besig 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

Why shouldn't I be concerned when, by simply accessing this page, all my actual ip/dns information is readily available to all?

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Middle relay
by Tora Tora Tora 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

I am trying to run a middle relay with no-exit policy. It was my assumption that a middle relay would only communicate with other relays on 9001 port. Yet I see my relay IP address attempting connections to other IP address on ports that are non-9001 (or 9030).

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Bridge or Relay
by Sebastian Urbach 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

Hi, I really wonder why we even bother to have a FAQ: http://torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#RelayOrBridge -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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