- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

[WARN] crypto error while checking RSA signature: padding check failed
by Zenaan Harkness 24 Feb '14

24 Feb '14

Occasionally (such as just now) I have seen these two errors in arm: │ 13:21:25 [WARN] crypto error while checking RSA signature: padding check failed (in rsa routines:- │ RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT) │ 13:21:25 [WARN] crypto error while checking RSA signature: block type is not 01 (in rsa routines:- │ RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1) Are they anything to worry about? Zenaan

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ExtORPort notice
by Delton Barnes 24 Feb '14

24 Feb '14

Upon upgrading obfsproxy to 0.2.6 and Tor to 0.2.5.1-alpha-dev (git-f63b394d90583b77+96972c4) for scramblesuit, I got this in the Tor log: Feb 15 04:40:03.000 [notice] We are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but the Extended ORPort is disabled. The Extended ORPort helps Tor communicate with the pluggable transport proxy. Please enable it using the ExtORPort torrc option. How should this be set? What does it do? I saw some web pages suggesting "ExtORPort 6699" for statistics-gathering purposes. Thanks, Delton

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TTTT, multiple runs
by Sebastian Urbach 23 Feb '14

23 Feb '14

Dear list members, The "multiple runs" question is now added to the FAQ at the "Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes" project site. Right now we are at 95 ip's with at least 1 completed run. Hopefully we can add another 5 to that number and reach the "100 milestone" before the next data review in 03/2014. Multiple run's from the same ip are very welcome as well. Thank you for your support ! Want to help ? Project site: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html Want to see the results ?: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Obfsproxy help
by I 23 Feb '14

23 Feb '14

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Repeated "failed to get unique circID." in the log
by Patrick ZAJDA 23 Feb '14

23 Feb '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi all, I updated my tor relay to Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha (git-7d29e36edb6d0cf0) yesterday, using Tor repository for Ubuntu. I checked the log, and see the following message repeated again and again: "Feb 20 09:52:38.000 [warn] No unused circ IDs. Failing. Feb 20 09:52:38.000 [warn] failed to get unique circID." In fact, this message is repeated so often that I can not even find the last different message in the log... :) I looked for some informations about this message but I didn't find my answer... I read something about used threads, (NumCpu in torrc) and another about bandwidth, so nothing precise. What does this message means? Thanks, - -- Patrick ZAJDA Skype : gansta93 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTBcTdAAoJEKPVT2DeSPb4ZfkIAKSK5aWvRyBh3uNhWwRegARG QkjoXSgkSBCxQcIFfLPTjBYk+dVNJVTsFvQGstTIQt10/Xu62eMu5DD1yNcAroa7 aFIKHaJkQNwel7j92dyIbZgJ2Vsoe1xIQK2Az3YJGc5S6os116H8dpsmr+jxoH+z Aeh7wneCpiHjXkeD37neXUlbCt4O9WG+Otf5d3gVmJ3eGvixmfY+2KH9WpKs9laA ijt2fu8vwPCseN0spEC9abOo+mLDF0mloxU9w872bhKfig4IpyFt+DqF6VZApUHv Sx6kpN34zFsTzbdzSJovfz6yk6BGekQiMN3v4t30q8c1cfk14EQaFPSdvfIlv3g= =NxPQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor relay failure
by starwars1070＠gmail.com 22 Feb '14

22 Feb '14

Hello I am experiencing errors I recently upgrade my computer system and os to windows 8.1 pro an now I am having trouble with the tor relay I was running I have configured the firewall and my router to forward traffics to the tor relay port I have centry link for my ISP I am able to establish an or connection to the directly servers but I keep on getting a server error saying your server port can not be connected and now the past three days I have been getting both my or and server port unable to connect to the tor and my relay will not relay traffic

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Make your obfsbridge faster by installing python-gmpy
by George Kadianakis 22 Feb '14

22 Feb '14

Greetings, here is a tip if you are running an obfs3/scramblresuit bridge: If your bridge is feeling too slow or flooded by too many connections, you can help it by installing the python-gmpy package. If you do that, obfsproxy will use python-gmpy opportunistically to perform some crypto operations (modular exponentiations) much much faster. FWIW, in future packages of obfsproxy, the python-gmpy will be installed as a recommended package.

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schedule tor relay uptime/ bandwidth
by Zenaan Harkness 22 Feb '14

22 Feb '14

I know tor relay bandwidth usage per period can be configured, but is it possible to schedule a tor relay to sleep during business hours, and only operate after hours? TIA Zenaan

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Relay unresponsive
by Zenaan Harkness 22 Feb '14

22 Feb '14

Somewhat regularly, I get "relay unresponsive" with a heartbeat delta of about 12seconds. Could this mean my upload pipe is still saturated and I need to throttle back slightly? recent arm log: 13:12:56 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay resumed [6 duplicates hidden] 13:12:31 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 13:12:20 2014) 12:11:34 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 12:11:20 2014) 11:10:33 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 11:10:20 2014) 09:30:24 [NOTICE] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 2:18 hours, with 146 circuits open. I've sent 14.23 GB and received 9.69 GB. 09:09:20 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 09:09:07 2014) 09:08:30 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 09:08:19 2014) 07:16:39 [NOTICE] Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. 07:12:43 [NOTICE] Performing bandwidth self-test...done. 07:11:31 [NOTICE] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. 07:11:26 [NOTICE] Your IP address seems to have changed to 203.158.36.137. Updating. 07:09:25 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 07:09:12 2014) 07:08:04 [ARM_NOTICE] Relay unresponsive (last heartbeat: Sat Feb 22 07:07:51 2014) 03:30:24 [NOTICE] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 5:52 hours, with 189 circuits open. I've sent 12.95 GB and received 12.78 GB.

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[WARN] Your system clock just jumped 100 seconds forward; assuming established circuits no longer work.
by Zenaan Harkness 22 Feb '14

22 Feb '14

My tor logs (running on Debian) are showing this warning: [WARN] Your system clock just jumped 100 seconds forward; assuming established circuits no longer work. I tried running openntpd as well as ntp packages (debian), and both display the same problem - once or twice a day I get this jump in time of in the order of a couple of minutes. Any idea why? TIA Zenaan

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Multi-instance Tor init script
by Alexander Dietrich 20 Feb '14

20 Feb '14

Hello, the recent thread on this topic prompted me to make a multi-instance init script: https://gist.github.com/7adietri/9122199 It's basically the current official init script and torservers.net's "instances" mechanism frankensteined together. Maybe other people will find it useful too. Config files should be layed out as described on torservers.net: https://www.torservers.net/wiki/setup/server#multiple_tor_processes Best regards, Alexander -- PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp

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^null$ httpd requests
by phrag 20 Feb '14

20 Feb '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello, So I've been receiving a few of these httpd requests on my SSL web server. The webserver runs on the root domain of a subdomain hosting a tor relay. From a whois, i see rgnx is owned by Jacob Appelbaum. The webserver in question is running a good ssl setup according to https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/. Any information as to what this could be? ###### ## httpd log ## rgnx.net - - [20/Feb/2014:17:29:46 +0100] "\x16\x03\x01" 301 217 "-" "-" ## logwatch ## Attempts to use known hacks by 1 hosts were logged 62 time(s) from: rgnx.net: 62 Time(s) ^null$ 62 Time(s) A total of 1 sites probed the server rgnx.net A total of 1 possible successful probes were detected (the following URLs contain strings that match one or more of a listing of strings that indicate a possible exploit): null HTTP Response 301 ###### -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAlMGPOgACgkQceRvMfxmL+0jMwCgr3zMBm7GngflSXiHB2WzJG/d 7ucAoJDOhmcOeIGUwNZzuaHwTcG/QntN =yDA4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] TTTT, multiple runs
by Sebastian Urbach 19 Feb '14

19 Feb '14

Hi Sanjeev, Basically yes. Here are the details: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#q-canrunelsewhere Feel free to ask if anything is unclear. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Sebastian Urbach <sebastian(a)urbach.org>wrote: > Right now we are at 95 ip's with at least 1 completed run. Hopefully we > can add another 5 to that number and reach the "100 milestone" before the > next data review in 03/2014. Multiple run's from the same ip are very > welcome as well. > Sebastian, Does this have to be run on a Tor Relay? I thought so, for my first run, but re-reading it now I am not sure. If running this on a non-relay would help, I can add a few more servers tonight. -- Sanjeev Gupta +65 98551208 http://www.linkedin.com/in/ghane

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Enable statistics for hardcoded obfsbridges
by George Kadianakis 19 Feb '14

19 Feb '14

Hello people, I'm sending you an email because your bridges are hardcoded in the pluggable transport bundles. We recently added PT-specific metrics in metrics.torproject.org Specificaally, you can see a graph of PT users here: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-bridge-transport If you select the obfs2 transport, you can see that it displays only 300 users, which is not entirely true. We suspect that the reason for the low number of users is because not many bridges are reporting PT statistics to the bridge authorities. This might be for two reasons: a) Your bridge might be configured to be private, that is to not publish its descriptor. This might happen if you have 'PublishServerDescriptor' set to 0 in your torrc. If you have a bridge hardcoded in the bundles, not publishing your descriptor doesn't really provide any security (your bridge is exposed anyway), so you might as well start publishing your descriptor, since this will allow us to gather statistics about the number of users you see. b) Your Tor might not be bleeding edge: Tor only started reporting PT statistics to the auths in tor-0.2.5.1. To upgrade to this version of Tor you can use either the git master or the automated Debian package builds (see https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003899.html for how to use them). c) You don't have Extended ORPort enabled. With recent versions of Tor, you can enable it by adding 'ExtORPort auto' to your torrc. It would be great if you could fix the above so that your Tor can start submitting statistics! If you have any questions, feel free to ask me!

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Working init script for TOR 2.5.1
by tor＠afo-tm.org 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello, i search a working init script for multiple tor instances. I tried it from https://www.torservers.net/misc/config/initd-tor but that is broken. Does somebody have a working one? Thanks for help -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTASW0AAoJEKawimmefC2InIkP/0guExgToj+B/hk9cQouPNdn J9ml+qdZxeEJH2G8V5NFhre4L1y4lubr9DhvVN0eMQ/vU+Dd/f0KqpO/05DD2pMG z2MJxq5qfvL4M/BApGbsC/+xIZBVRWHNHywO/hlR89sXn1Yd30kbnXYlAIQNCobA 6xsT4zhZ+crhKzUgC6jouIdzq1Wf9nfiChxf4w9UgCbO+t6JTkRBjyX7w0bHcTAP e3hMZBUEiJAuWeB3vubQPiQwvhrqw87yvSj6uNhKAq5u8nWtRo1mStD69jia+bdB yZIKxRgc8Y/+T/Ls8zWDiRvBUdvFd0buVQKiWjn8dX4UNoZNuFGIGtv5U+PfKP+3 osBmf3v20VmkW/7RcC/TAO0/9kqDupkdF4/W9OhzcIKQMv64OwJiEIFjE6mtTM8D sHhRbk++3YsVhSCy504KUvohewltEMpHpGD+/1vDwfebryeelBZTkn6xr51Kk6IM LijzNdcZFwmEtP5NbuioF07NyN5qKMyGUYdUhiDc51BT5ynkis4950lHMgJkpKrO 5ssv1Kw+f3B+53s67LbbaaPwErk1AdxxFnIBZ8RcDMLJIk3BsT/WwujPlF/Ftog1 cc6jLCHcxalMPzBT9b4NbNz9EbpOhqpQE/oUeasBtfPr9606bN2EHSTey4WVcuPp kLPxVVMrvY1B4W4fxI/Q =dy9S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor Relay Downloading much more data than uploading
by borgersnick＠gmail.com 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

The log entry is: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 23 days 0:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.83 MB and received 177.12 MB. I don’t think I made any changes to the torrc, intend to provide a relay. I am using trickle to limit bandwidth consumption instead of the built-in method because I didn’t want to learn about the bursting concept. ExecStart = /usr/bin/trickle -d 500 -u 500 -t .5 /usr/bin/tor --runasdaemon 0 --defaults-torrc /usr/share/tor/defaults-torrc -f /etc/tor/torrc --quiet Running on Fedora. Firewall allows external port 80 and 443 access to the server.

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Dynamic upload limit
by Bram L 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

Dear list members, I am running a tor relay, but I have an upload limit (50GB/7 days). This limit usually can't be increased too much, because that might affect other network users. I would like to request my provider (university) for a bandwidth-free connection during the night (or whenever the network is not used very much), and a limited version during the peak times. My idea is that this way I could contribute to the Tor network without disturbing other users of my university network. Before I do so, however, I am curious whether it actually contributes to the Tor network. I noticed it takes time for the bandwidth to increase, and if my daytime upload limit is low (e.g. 80 kb/s) and unlimited (Gb/s) at night, my overall contribution could be very limited due to the time it takes Tor to utilize my available bandwidth. Do you have any insights in this matter? Thanks in advance! PS: currently, I drain the 50GB in about a day unlimited or I run at very slow speeds... Both don't give me the feeling I really contribute.

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Re: [tor-relays] TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Hi Mateusz, 19 days with 1/5 of the default pps value (1000) That would be around 4 days with pps 1000. That's exactly the value estimated in the project faq. Everything seems to be fine. Project site / faq: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#faq Results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Thank you for participating ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman On 13 Feb 2014, at 13:10, Sebastian Urbach wrote: > Dear honorable list members, > Some stats from my side: bash-3.2$ PPS=200 DONTERASE=yes time ./traceroutes.sh 1645980.86 real 28760.92 user 181530.51 sys Started on 27 Jan 2014 00:49 GMT Finished on 15 Feb 2014 02:02 GMT ca. 19 days to complete with scamper on OSX 10.7 Thanks, -mateusz

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TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Dear honorable list members, If anybody has questions regarding his / her submitted results than please include your public ip address in your mail. We can process your requests way faster if we have this essential information and don't have to ask for it. Btw. we are at 88 ip's with at least 1 complete run. Come on, let's make it 100 before the data review in March :-) Thank you very much for your attention ! The project: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html The results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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obfs3 a risk to scramblesuit?
by Delton Barnes 14 Feb '14

14 Feb '14

I am running a bridge with both obfs3 and scramblesuit. obfs3 is vulnerable to active probing. Say someone in China makes the mistake of connecting with obfs3 instead of scramblesuit, and active probing identifies it as a Tor bridge. Wouldn't the bridge IP address then be blacklisted, making it impossible for other people to connect even with scramblesuit? Would it make sense, then, as a bridge operator to elect to only support scramblesuit, even though no one will use it for a while? It seems you are only as good as your weakest transport. Thanks, Delton p.s. Would reply to original thread about scramblesuit, but I only just joined the mailing list, and cannot figure out how to reply to preexisting messages.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Thu, 13 Feb 2014 18:10:38 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > Hm, the "Could not set up listener" error message usually appears when > something is already listening on the port that obfsproxy wants to > bind to (Twisted throws the error.CannotListenError exception). > I managed to avoid the problem by running `killall obfsproxy` before restarting Tor. This time around I registered server transport 'obfs3' and registered server transport 'scramblesuit'. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Wed, 12 Feb 2014 18:29:26 +0000 Matt <matt(a)pagan.io> wrote: > I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing > this message: > > [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the > configuration protocol and will be destroyed. > > That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean? > Here is more from the debug log: Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is complete: 3 steps long Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Looking for firsthop '[redacted IPv4]:443' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Conn open. Delivering first onion skin. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First skin; sending create cell. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(): circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() found nothing for circ_id 2147489864, channel ID 2 (0x2ba73fe349b0) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_deliver_create_cell(): Chosen circID 2147489864. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit active. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First hop: finished sending CREATE cell to '$5A0EF08FC99F236C5E48FB52E649F092088D009C=ganooloonix at [redacted IPv4]' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] pt_configure_remaining_proxies(): Configuring remaining managed proxies (1)! Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (VERSION 1) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (SMETHOD-ERROR obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Server managed proxy encountered a method error. (obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] tor_process_handle_destroy(): Terminated process with PID '30355'. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] mark_my_descriptor_dirty(): Decided to publish new relay descriptor: configured managed proxies Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 17 wants to write. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] flush_chunk_tls(): flushed 1542 bytes, 0 ready to flush, 0 remain. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] connection_handle_write_impl(): After TLS write of 1542: 0 read, 1589 written Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_write_packed_cell(): Writing packed_cell_t 0x2ba7403cb698 to channel 0x2ba73fe349b0 with global ID 2 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(): Made a circuit inactive.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 16:04:56 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Greetings, > > a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit > is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it > at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ > > If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy > to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git > master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will > hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some > testing :) > > After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin > line from: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed to: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed > > This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. > > It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based > pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a > password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't > connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor > will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that > clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random > password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a > torrc line like this: > ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit > password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA > > By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the > beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we > will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. > > Feel free to ask any questions you have! > > Thanks! > > PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, > please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not > hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the > number of obfuscated bridges out there. > > [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing this message: [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean?

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New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by George Kadianakis 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

Greetings, a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some testing :) After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin line from: ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed to: ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a torrc line like this: ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. Feel free to ask any questions you have! Thanks! PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the number of obfuscated bridges out there. [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en

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Trusted Tor Traceroute Scoreboard Link Modified
by Anupam Das 11 Feb '14

11 Feb '14

Hi Relay Operators, We have made some modifications to the way we are running our live scoreboard script. Previously we were running into some problems with handling multiple simultaneous web requests, as the server started a heavy script for each incoming request. Now we are updating a static HTML files every 10 minutes. The link of our scoreboard has changed. Now the scoreboard is available at- http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Sorry for the inconveniences. Thanks Anupam

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