- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

ORPort is unavailable after a couple of minutes of successful self-testing
by Tachkov Sergey 25 Mar '14

25 Mar '14

Hello, We have previously set up and adjusted a non-exit node with the following key parameters: ORPort 443 NoListen ORPort 127.0.0.1:4443 NoAdvertise After upgrading tor up to the latest version (0.2.4.21) we started receiving in log the following: Mar 23 11:53:06.000 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 1.2.3.4:443 and DirPort 1.2.3.4:9030 are reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success) Mar 23 11:53:07.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Mar 23 12:13:06.000 [warn] Your server (1.2.3.4:443) has not managed to confirm that its ORPort is reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc. Mar 23 12:33:06.000 [warn] Your server (1.2.3.4:443) has not managed to confirm that its ORPort is reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc. Firewall and the application which redirects traffic to the 4443 port haven't changed. What may be the cause of that?

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Tor Relay Performance
by Sebastian Urbach 25 Mar '14

25 Mar '14

Hi, Everytime i speak with colleagues i wonder that the most performance related options for TOR relays are unknown. I just started to write down what i know and i would be happy if someone else could benefit from that. http://key-server.org -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Port 8118 Traffic?
by Dennis Crawford 25 Mar '14

25 Mar '14

Hello - I just recently installed a Tor Relay and now I'm seeing a TON of port 8118 denied requests in my log. Mar 21 17:24:51 kendra kernel: Firewall: *TCP_IN Blocked* IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=c8:0a:a9:9e:2f:02:00:90:1a:a2:a0:7e:08:00 SRC=162.211.126.188 DST=72.90.68.179 LEN=48 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=122 ID=16300 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=4853 DPT=8118 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 Mar 21 17:24:53 kendra kernel: Firewall: *TCP_IN Blocked* IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=c8:0a:a9:9e:2f:02:00:90:1a:a2:a0:7e:08:00 SRC=162.211.126.227 DST=72.90.68.179 LEN=48 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=122 ID=19011 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=1146 DPT=8118 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 Mar 21 17:24:55 kendra kernel: Firewall: *TCP_IN Blocked* IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=c8:0a:a9:9e:2f:02:00:90:1a:a2:a0:7e:08:00 SRC=162.211.126.173 DST=72.90.68.179 LEN=48 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=122 ID=28405 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=3137 DPT=8118 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 Mar 21 17:24:57 kendra kernel: Firewall: *TCP_IN Blocked* IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=c8:0a:a9:9e:2f:02:00:90:1a:a2:a0:7e:08:00 SRC=216.245.222.105 DST=72.90.68.179 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=56 ID=24995 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=2998 DPT=8118 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 Mar 21 17:24:59 kendra kernel: Firewall: *TCP_IN Blocked* IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=c8:0a:a9:9e:2f:02:00:90:1a:a2:a0:7e:08:00 SRC=162.211.126.180 DST=72.90.68.179 LEN=48 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=122 ID=21683 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=3372 DPT=8118 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 Mar 21 17:25:01 kendra kernel: Firewall: *TCP_IN Blocked* IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=c8:0a:a9:9e:2f:02:00:90:1a:a2:a0:7e:08:00 SRC=173.234.116.173 DST=72.90.68.179 LEN=48 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=247 ID=9188 PROTO=TCP SPT=1976 DPT=8118 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 I'm not configured at 8118. My config: SocksPort 72.90.68.179:9050 # Bind to this adddress:port too. SocksPolicy accept 72.90.68.176/29 ControlPort 9051 ORPort 9001 DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections On my firewall, I'm allowing: TCP_IN: 9030,9001,9050,9051 and TCP_OUT: 9030,9001,9050,9051 Am I doing something wrong? Why am I getting all this 8118 traffic? Any help would be greatly appreciated. Dennis

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Raspberry Pi binary .debs - 0.2.4.21
by Gordon Morehouse 24 Mar '14

24 Mar '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello all, I've finally released[1] signed binary .debs for Tor 0.2.4.21 for Raspberry Pi. All the usual "random dude's binaries" apply, but at least these are signed with my PGP key and distributed with hashes. They're really for temporary Pi testing or convenience, be paranoid and build from source following the procedure alluded to in the project README. Check the Cipollini Project README[2] for more information about the (very nascent) project. Best, - -Gordon M. 1. https://github.com/gordon-morehouse/cipollini/tree/master/raspbian_packages… 2. https://github.com/gordon-morehouse/cipollini -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJTLg/MAAoJED/jpRoe7/ujO+8H/3c3RJzsYEtWq8/BJcwnW0nP awxBU3Lb0iAt9JNOw7zcdtA6WdC6eIHgKYZ0nH7Vwc4+bHn/RGyvLrD4n11pgB2I eKz2ikQXSWb5jqNQD7sCwQeh5drLxH0VMedOtirpMlqyUteKJOMQfbxmDRA5MBtN KXSSsbKxatnnVA/3/9GFO8oLDEfA0IXp5/RN4bjXDqzW9jHJfC7LVRxq8LK3RRif MYTuzNV3e8CQ9+q5fyqgCBPLA7OBIhH+wVKOVwU/RLlyQTRUqtV9b9Fe7CXXj5eZ YgUgZeNVQZ3gBtSuWWuVHGPu+ZKskSvVKu8Gcj71XCnu6LfI+3DyRWmhCXRU5i4= =yTek -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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New obfsproxy release: obfsproxy-0.2.7 [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by George Kadianakis 24 Mar '14

24 Mar '14

Hello, a few days after the release of obfsproxy-0.2.6, we spotted a bug where scramblesuit would basically reject clients if they try to connect a second time after a short amount of time has passed [0]. This is a serious correctness bug and bridge operators are advised to upgrade to obfsproxy-0.2.7 as soon as possible (we want to start suggesting scramblesuit to users and we need to make sure that most bridges have already upgraded by then). You can use git master or pip to upgrade to 0.2.7. We have also notified the obfsproxy Debian maintainers and we should soon have obfsproxy-0.2.7 packages ready (we will send an email to this list when they are ready). Furthermore, obfsproxy-0.2.7 clients now support SOCKS5 (thanks Yawning!) and the changes also include a few performance enhancements for obfs3 and scramblesuit. Please upgrade your bridges. Thanks! PS: We will do yet another obfsproxy release soon-ish (probably in the next 2 weeks) which will include some more scramblesuit improvements and other miscellaneous code changes. Again, we will inform you by sending an email to this list. [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11100

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External connections to port 9050
by Greg W 24 Mar '14

24 Mar '14

I turned on some logging on my firewall today to help troubleshoot and issue and noticed a load of connections from external addresses to port 9050 on my exit node. I don't think that should be publicly accessible. Am I wrong about it being publicly accessible and does anyone else see lots of connection attempts on that port? Thanks, Greg

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Why would consensus weight would be declining like this?
by Tora Tora Tora 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

Declining dramatically https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/90743CFA1B93295B9334CC0C625D22990AABA… vs https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/CC2F7C6ED12B67CB3882B98213E02DEF2CB82… that is holding steady

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Exiting only port 8333
by Mike Hearn 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

I would like to be an exit for port 8333 only. I have configured my relay to do this, but I am not being listed with the relay flag and do not see any traffic exiting my node (at least not using arm). I saw an FAQ that says this is because you have to exit web traffic to get marked as an exit. I do not wish to do this. Is there any way to exit just one port?

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Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 38, Issue 27
by Oliver Schönefeld 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

Am 22.03.2014 um 21:04 schrieb tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > Today's Topics: > > 1. new fingerprint after update (Oliver Sch?nefeld) > 2. Re: new fingerprint after update (Alexander Dietrich) > 3. Re: new fingerprint after update (I) > 4. Re: Relay configuration for FreedomBox (James Valleroy) > 5. Re: new fingerprint after update (Roger Dingledine) > 6. Re: Relay configuration for FreedomBox (Lunar) > 7. Re: Relay configuration for FreedomBox (Lance Hathaway) > > Von: Oliver Schönefeld <oliver.schoenefeld(a)me.com> > Betreff: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 15:26:07 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Hi guys, > > i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday and the relay fingerprint changed to 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. > > Is there any way to get the new version working with the old fingerprint? > I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the torrc file, which looks as the following: > DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT > > But then Tor doesn't start. > > I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, but it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. > > > So thanks for your help in advance and have a nice weekend everybody! > > Oli > > > > Von: Alexander Dietrich <alexander(a)dietrich.cx> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 15:47:29 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Is it possible that either the "DataDirectory" setting changed due to the update or the directory content? > yes, because vidalia isn't part of the game anymore - yes i'm a little late with the update :( > Best regards, > Alexander > --- > PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp > > On 2014-03-22 15:26, Oliver Schönefeld wrote: >> Hi guys, >> i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay >> 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday >> and the relay fingerprint changed to >> 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. >> Is there any way to get the new version working with the old >> fingerprint? >> I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the >> torrc file, which looks as the following: >> DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT >> But then Tor doesn't start. >> I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, but >> it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. >> So thanks for your help in advance and have a nice weekend everybody! >> Oli >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > Von: I <beatthebastards(a)inbox.com> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 17:58:58 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > ...and the t-shirt counter at Atlas.torproject.org resets > there are worse things than that - but thanks for the reminder to claim it ;) > > Von: James Valleroy <james.valleroy(a)gmail.com> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox > Datum: 22 .März 2014 19:56:12 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 9:25 AM, Lance Hathaway <qhltx(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> If you're going to be running these as bridges, it seems to make sense >> to include obfsproxy support, probably with obfs3 and scramblesuit [0] >> enabled right off the bat. > > Thanks for the information. Is it likely that obfs3 and scramblesuit > will be usable in the long-term? Or will they need to be deprecated at > some point like obfs2? > > Also, if obfs3 or scramblesuit were deprecated, but some FreedomBoxes > continued to run those transports, what would be the result? Would the > worst case be that the bridge is no longer usable by some, as in [0]? > > The reason that I'm asking is that FreedomBox is currently working > within Debian "testing" but our target is Debian "stable". Once our > packaged configuration is frozen for the next stable release, it will > be more difficult for us to push changes other than security fixes. > > [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > > > > > Von: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] new fingerprint after update > Datum: 22 .März 2014 19:57:50 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 03:26:07PM +0100, Oliver Schönefeld wrote: >> i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday and the relay fingerprint changed to 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#UpgradeOrMove > >> I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the torrc file, which looks as the following: >> DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT >> >> But then Tor doesn't start. > > Yeah, that's not at all what DirAuthority is for. Can you help us > understand what made you think this was a good idea to try, so we can > fix it in the man page? :) > >> I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, >> but it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. > > Hopefully the above faq entry helps. > > Thanks for running a relay! > --Roger > > thank you so much, roger! i copied the old /keys folder and it's working like a charm. i basically ctrl+f'ed "fingerprint" in the stable manual and the DirAuthority property was the only one that made sense, since i don't run a bridge. but i have to admit that i didn't read the NOTE section... shame on my head. thank y'all! > > > > Von: Lunar <lunar(a)torproject.org> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox > Datum: 22 .März 2014 20:23:49 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > James Valleroy: >> The reason that I'm asking is that FreedomBox is currently working >> within Debian "testing" but our target is Debian "stable". Once our >> packaged configuration is frozen for the next stable release, it will >> be more difficult for us to push changes other than security fixes. > > (Debian hat on:) I try to keep Debian backports as up-to-date as possible. > Are official backports out of your set of allowed packages as well? > > -- > Lunar <lunar(a)torproject.org> > > > > Von: Lance Hathaway <qhltx(a)yahoo.com> > Betreff: Aw: [tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox > Datum: 22 .März 2014 21:03:43 MEZ > An: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > Antwort an: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > > Signierter PGP Teil > On 22/03/2014 11:56 AM, James Valleroy wrote: > > Thanks for the information. Is it likely that obfs3 and > > scramblesuit will be usable in the long-term? Or will they need to > > be deprecated at some point like obfs2? > > > > Also, if obfs3 or scramblesuit were deprecated, but some > > FreedomBoxes continued to run those transports, what would be the > > result? Would the worst case be that the bridge is no longer usable > > by some, as in [0]? > > > > The reason that I'm asking is that FreedomBox is currently working > > within Debian "testing" but our target is Debian "stable". Once > > our packaged configuration is frozen for the next stable release, > > it will be more difficult for us to push changes other than > > security fixes. > > > > [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > > I can't speak to whether more pluggable transports will be deprecated > in future, but I'll go out on a limb here and say "probably." The > nature of things ensures that the capabilities of censors continue to > advance. And as they do, new approaches will be found and deployed to > bypass those advancing attempts to block the network. > > When bridges were first deployed, the fact that they weren't all > openly listed in a public directory made them more difficult to block. > Now, most plain bridges are very easy to block. When obfs2 was first > deployed, it was a solid protocol (I have no doubt). These days, China > is actively hunting down and blocking obfs2. There is very little > point to deploying either a plain bridge or an obfs2 pluggable > transport these days, especially on a mass scale. > > On the plus side, obfs3 is still pretty strong, and it's one of the > common pluggable transports right now. Scramblesuit is not live in the > official bundles yet (AFAIK), but it just released and has some pretty > robust-looking defenses against active probing and other attacks. If > you're working on something new to deploy, these should be included, > without a doubt. They may indeed be deprecated in future, and in the > worst case may become unusable or make the bridge more susceptible to > being blocked. But if you go with a plain bridge or obfs2, you're > already in your worst-case scenario. You have nothing to lose and > everything to gain by enabling the newest pluggable transports. > > I would highly recommend adding the Tor package repository to the > FreedomBoxes. As explained in [0], this won't always give you the > latest version of tor, but it will provide security fixes. My hunch is > that it will almost always also be a little fresher than Debian > stable. And given that network censors and network developers are > always going to be in an escalating arms race, enabling new releases > of Tor (and obfsproxy) directly from the project is going to make the > FreedomBox much more useful in the long term. > > -Lance > > [0] https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian > > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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"Invalid length on ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS."
by Tora Tora Tora 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

I am testing 0.2.5.2-alpha for non-exit relay and seeing lots of "Invalid length on ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS" errors. Any cause for concern?

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Best price/efficiency ratio
by Trigger Happy 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi list, I'm running tor-relay (middle) on VPS from statnet.pl (reseller form Hetzner) https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/C528972A915EEADE37F5B11A7AB7B571C89F46… Now i'm in top 50 of all relays for only 8,3 euro/month i think it's a good deal . Do You know better options ? - -- Trigger Happy jabber: triggerhappy(a)jabber.ccc.de torchat: xruq34bnhbqlkjtn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTLfftAAoJEEtm9wC9fGLFFJsP/RADCmlr3/8aTUrdefsOEgk8 CeDCQGasCuQ/iPNdJRCpILkiz7s+SM2FBzMLQVpDUiM5A9VD8aLOfnvhNGjKo4eo uaJUc7t1GrDlhDBzd4C7kV5o48hMeqP/61iDFR0eEO3sH5EIheV3io1fEzQc3XmW hGpgRR0SnfS0VDeQp4FhKXtxfiw4Dp7UMgRS9wQbI7TbFhdETkFjn4YvDIi1AfXg 8xH1xMUhfpJo4wa4RY1+UG+aa7X90HbF278QWlUnMdHiOr1VK3dgbRiV5cvYRF1U XZ6Jr+hDBWScn0dxxKWnebCqRIdh2mmn3G2aF9MdZ9WEaNwoNMzd+NAhUQy43vFr M3w3HZ3NJbVHA2WwQRFfVlg675Z4/PI+Uh60SGMHZoTXRVM2AFYQwUk9r4Mwbfwi qU8jj7pa228gwk5HYBgnOQMRFX/mpqe/Ww82qf/c1YispX+6JvevlfOKe2BF5X0t 66XIMNPJ+639h70XOcFJJyoe/mvbw21N0FZoShrFjAnoIDXyZek5LY1rGkdm4g5j 6w4F6RMQkEuK61eSFTC1lPhpUrUwkkCrBoU+Gg0rAFiqSYytT/rvSgtdlfbhcOlu SoMPY8rR6sG6b6Ib1YumiMXNc+fpT+9QbBxoaVxbORyLtvvb78dH8PcpQdwj79KK 9M0CeGy7A6Ex6tvcDVOf =h07G -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Relay configuration for FreedomBox
by James Valleroy 23 Mar '14

23 Mar '14

Hello, The FreedomBox project [1] is planning to include Tor in the upcoming 0.2 release. FreedomBox is intended to be used as an always-on server, so its Tor node has been configured as a bridge relay. There is also a need for FreedomBoxes to be able to find each other regardless of location or restrictive firewall. This feature is not yet completely implemented for FreedomBox, but it will likely involve each box running a Tor hidden service, and making the initial connection to other boxes over the Tor network. Here is the configuration that we are currently using in /etc/tor/torrc: ORPort 4431 BridgeRelay 1 Exitpolicy reject *:* It is based on example configuration for bridge relays given in the Tor documentation [2] but modified to still allow SOCKS connections. Do you see any vulnerabilities, attacks, or risks with the current configuration, and are there any changes that you would recommend? [1] https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox [2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges#RunningABridge Thanks

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new fingerprint after update
by Oliver Schönefeld 22 Mar '14

22 Mar '14

Hi guys, i updated from Tor 0.2.3.25 (relay 266C0CADC79F802C554019887324A57332A1DA70) to Tor 0.2.4.21 yesterday and the relay fingerprint changed to 07E333A3B979C27739096C5B2EE10D7C8E3D8FFD. Is there any way to get the new version working with the old fingerprint? I looked in the manual and tried adding a DirAuthority line in the torrc file, which looks as the following: DirAuthority 123tor *:9030 FINGERPRINT But then Tor doesn't start. I also tried writing the old fingerprint in the fingerprint file, but it's changed to the new one everytime i start Tor. So thanks for your help in advance and have a nice weekend everybody! Oli

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Exit node re-writing PKI certificates?
by Iggy 21 Mar '14

21 Mar '14

Hey all, I use an email account from riseup.net, which I usually access via Thunderbird, running on a linux machine. My Thunderbird is configured to check mail via TOR. Earlier tonight I got a certificate warning message from thunderbird, saying that mail.riseup.net:465 was presenting a certificate that had been issued to cab.cabinethardwareparts.com on 03-01-2014, and expiring on 03-01-2015. Oddity among oddities, this does not match the issue dates of the other certificate reported below. Whois returns no match for cabinethardwareparts.com When I mentioned this on a Riseup IRC channel, I was told that there had previously (02-28-2014) been a help ticket from a riseup mail user, accessing their account via TOR, who had a certificate error involving a certificate issued to the same domain. So, I guess I just wanted to alert you all to the fact that this is happening. I'm not sure what it means. Is the exit node in question pointing my traffic at somewhere other than mail.riseup.net:465? Is the exit node re-writing the traffic to include the bad certificate? If so, why? If part of a MITM scheme, why not use a certificate issued to mall.riseup.net or mail.riseop.net, or something else less obvious than cab.cabinethardwareparts.com? I am more curious than anything, and any thoughts are appreciated. I'll paste the details from the previous help ticket below, since they actually captured more details about the bad certificate than I did. Kind Regards, -Iggy =-=-=-=-==-=-==-=- PASTED TEXT BEGINS =-=-==-=-=-=-=--=- Hi there wonderful riseup birds, Today I was attempting to sent a GPGd email to another riseup.net user but thunderbird flagged that a suspicious certificate was being served whose address did not match riseup.net. Its common name was: cab.cabinethardwareparts.com Serial 01:E3:94:E1:BD issued on: 05/03/13 expires: 05/03/14 organization: unknown The key was: Modulus (2048 bits): ba 29 4e f5 89 c8 4c 61 76 4c 08 fe 2e d9 4d af 8f 47 20 2b cb ee 00 56 d3 9b 4c 47 8c ee 75 f5 94 f8 65 f3 83 71 12 ed 32 ef 92 4e 25 90 ac df 4c 82 e6 6e 4e df b2 a9 48 f0 2a 7a 21 bd 10 01 7d fc 31 b4 93 ca ec ec 99 b2 91 e1 04 a7 5c 39 72 55 1f ee 74 49 4c e7 75 fe 84 67 a9 ff 81 74 e5 1e 35 db 2b 93 e1 f5 74 96 6b 19 3a 54 a3 0d 90 b1 8f 0c 2f e2 4f f1 13 5a ad c5 37 4e b5 93 54 70 54 7f 04 6b 30 58 fc f8 c8 15 04 c7 f6 90 25 9f 45 4b 38 9e 28 e8 ec df 7d 06 d4 0f d1 9c 2e 6c 9d ad 90 65 ce e4 de a0 5a 8a 14 fc b4 32 26 c9 2d 7e 91 fc c3 90 1c 52 9d 93 f0 47 38 d3 b1 66 27 38 0a 2f 2a 08 31 7c ea 62 fa 66 1d f2 90 4d 0f 8b 42 78 7b 69 00 c8 4a b3 84 4c c6 e0 a3 0d ce 91 b2 e7 75 6a c1 34 76 22 4e e4 df 85 1c d2 19 d5 2e ca 91 71 be 4e fd d3 81 2e e5 83 Exponent (24 bits): 65537 =-=-=-=-==-=-==-=- PASTED TEXT ENDS =-=-==-=-=-=-=--=-

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Mail from a few minutes ago
by Sebastian Urbach 18 Mar '14

18 Mar '14

Hi, My last mail should have been sent to Moritz not to the list, my apologies. -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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Spiegel Online Artikel
by Sebastian Urbach 18 Mar '14

18 Mar '14

Hi Moritz, Ich hatte Andrew im Januar auf diesen Artikel aufmerksam gemacht und da er deutschsprachig ist hattest du dem Kollegen Böhm dazu was geschrieben (ich war CC oder BCC) Wenn ich das richtig erinnere dann sagte er das er die Spiegel Kollegen in HH um Änderung des Bildes gebeten habe. Als bitteres Fazit bleibt: 1. Bild wurde nicht geändert. 2. Er hat weder seinen eigenen Text korrigiert noch hat er wenigstens ein Update hinzugefügt um klarzustellen das sein Artikel Schrott war. 3. Von "Uns" gibt es afaik kein Statement zu dieser Sache die in verschiedenen Ländern u.a. USA gleichernassen falsch berichtet wurde. Deshalb meine Frage, war das alles oder sollte man Ihn vielleicht noch zu einer Richtigstellung auffordern ? Oder akzeptieren wir einfach jede Berichterstattung weil es zu viel Arbeit wäre dagegen anzugehen ? Das Ganze hat doch am Ruf gekratzt finde ich. http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/e-mails-fbi-hat-die-daten-der-anonym-die…

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New tor relay, some questions
by Tobias Markus 17 Mar '14

17 Mar '14

Hi, I've been running a new tor relay for about a week now and I've got some questions. 1) I plan on running other services than tor on my server, including a (private) mail system. Other than the general possibility of tor having security holes and my server (and its IP address) being public and thus possibly target of attacks, are there security implications I should consider? 2) I would be interested to eventually run a directory/bandwith authority, so I read about them in [1] and [2], but the places seemed a bit odd (hidserv-perf branch in tor svn/torflow repo) so I thought I better ask here: Would I really just have to follow the steps in [1] to become a dirauth? Is there currently a need for auths, would contribution be welcomed? Thanks for your answers! Regards Tobias [1] https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/branches/hidserv-perf/doc/v3-authority-h… [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/blob/HEAD:/NetworkScanners/BwAuth…

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Re: [tor-relays] Setting up Tor Bridge
by Sebastian Urbach 17 Mar '14

17 Mar '14

Hi, First things first. 0.2.2 is quite old, you should consider 0.2.4 if possible. Next thing is that you have multiple SocksPort entries in your torrc. You just need one, remove the others. Is it just ServerTransportPlugin without any further specification ? On March 17, 2014 7:02:30 PM Eric Giannini <eric.giannini(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Hi I would like to set up a Tor Bridge but I have run into a few problems. > Can anyone give me a few recommendations on what to do? Raising maximum > number of filedescriptors (ulimit -n) to 32768. > Starting tor daemon: tor... > ABORTED: Tor configuration invalid: > Mar 17 10:56:35.546 [notice] Tor v0.2.2.35 (git-73ff13ab3cc9570d). This is > experimental software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity. (Running on > Linux i686) > Mar 17 10:56:35.548 [warn] Option 'SocksPort' used more than once; all but > the last value will be ignored. > Mar 17 10:56:35.548 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option > 'ServerTransportPlugin'. Failing. > Mar 17 10:56:35.548 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. > > > > > ________________________________ > От: Tobias Markus <tobias(a)markus-regensburg.de> > Кому: Sebastian Urbach <sebastian(a)urbach.org> Копия: > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Отправлено: понедельник, 17 марта 2014 10:37 > Тема: Re: [tor-relays] New tor relay, some questions > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hi Sebastian, > > now that you say it -- yes, it seems we both choose the same quote :D > (Really, I didn't copy you. I've read it somewhere else a while ago > and adopted it because I liked it. But really, you didn't read > hundreds of quote books just to suddenly stumble on Franklin's quote, > did you?) > > But another thing: Do you still need participating relays for TTTT? > > Tobias > > Am 17.03.2014 16:24, schrieb Sebastian Urbach: > > Hi, > > Great that it finally worked out, welcome to thd > > brother/sisterhood. And btw. what are you doing with my mail > > signature ? That seems to be the more important issue to me ;-))) > > > Hi, > > just wanted to inform you that I could resolve the issue simply by > deleting the tor data folder (thus getting a new fingerprint). > > PS: I actually replied to Bryan, but forgot to CC tor-relays. Sadly > > I can't find the message anymore, otherwise I would have resent > > it. > > On 03/13/2014 11:08 PM, Tobias Markus wrote: > >> Hi, sorry for replying rather late! In response to 1): Thinking > >> about it, I think the main (possible) problem is that my MTA is > >> rejected by SMTP servers it connects to because of a Tor > >> blacklist. Is this probable? Has someone got experience running a > >> complete mail system and a (public) Tor relay on the same > >> host/IP? About 2): That is indeed very unfortunate, but at the > >> same time a reason to start contributing to Tor! (Sadly, I am > >> presently occupied by various other projects, but I think Tor is > >> definitely worth a 'visit'.) Now about something else. I recently > >> had to restart my server for unrelated reasons. (The relay had > >> the Guard and Stable flag at that time.) I sadly forgot to add > >> the Tor service to the default runlevel, so it was not started at > >> boot time. I went to bed thinking everything was OK and was only > >> able to start Tor about 12 hours later. Unfortunately, my relay > >> got no flags since then -- not even "Running"! The Tor consensus > >> website confirms this: Three Auths voted for all previous/normal > >> flags except Guard, the others only for Valid and V2Dir leading > >> to my relay getting no flags! I cannot really explain this to myself. > What is going on here? Tobias On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at > >> 07:32:17PM +0100, Moritz Bartl wrote: > >>> On 03/02/2014 04:06 PM, Tobias Markus wrote: > >>>> I've been running a new tor relay for about a week now > >>> Great. Thank you! > >>> >>>> 1) I plan on running other services than tor on my server, > >>>> including a (private) mail system. Other than the general > >>>> possibility of tor having security holes and my server (and > >>>> its IP address) being public and thus possibly target of > >>>> attacks, are there security implications I should consider? > >>> Unfortunately, many sites block Tor relay IPs regardless of > >>> their exit policy. So, if you share one IP between the relay > >>> and other services, your might be impacted. This is especially > >>> true for exit relays. > >>> >>>> 2) I would be interested to eventually run a > >>>> directory/bandwith authority, so I read about them in [1] and > >>>> [2], but the places seemed a bit odd (hidserv-perf branch in > >>>> tor svn/torflow repo) so I thought I better ask here: Would I > >>>> really just have to follow the steps in [1] to become a > >>>> dirauth? Is there currently a need for auths, would contribution be > welcomed? > >>> The offer is well appreciated. In the current design, > >>> directory authorities and bandwidth authorities play a very > >>> special role. There are several ideas on how to improve the > >>> situation and then open participation to the broader community, > >>> but for the time being, authorities can only be run by people > >>> very close to the core dev team. > > - -- Tobias Markus > > "They who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little > temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." > -- Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) > > iEYEARECAAYFAlMnMtoACgkQAO6N0EYmC9a66QCfSE+zXecw9aFJpOx7NNwnBnhZ > imoAn0rbxsbu+NeiiJnxz82TUFe3vlWg > =ZBIk > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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log: DNS servers not contactable (but only for a few seconds)
by Zenaan Harkness 17 Mar '14

17 Mar '14

Notwithstanding the short DNS outage as shown in the logs, I added a couple of extra Australian DNS servers to resolv.conf since previously I only had the primary and secondary DNS servers as assigned by the ISP. Just wondering if there's anything else I should do to increase robustness on this front. TIA Zenaan

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tip: when running relay in domestic situation, have server be DHCP dependency
by Zenaan Harkness 16 Mar '14

16 Mar '14

Otherwise, others in the household might turn off everything to save power, and have no idea that this effects their local Free Speech Server (TM) (C) (R). If stopping the server from connecting to the modem, or powering down the server, stops all internet access, local fauna quickly notice said loss of internet access and appeal with relative urgency to the local Free Speech Server Guru. Disconnection problems rapidly reduce in frequency. Sincere apologies in hindsight to all anonymous clients to gracemissionstor, which went down again this evening due to a depressingly monotonously similar reason to the last few times. But Good News: a report came, via txt message, rapidly followed by personal phone support personnel (said internet users), whom, and who would have thought it, said "urgent: our internet connection is down" Wonder of wonders, awareness can be raised. :) Oh happy days! I get multiple personal contacts in almost real time, from on-site specialists no less (and with direct personal knowledge of the problem at hand), when our wholesome Free Speech Server Services stop working! You'd find it hard to find such service even if paid for :) TECH Notes: Put ADSL modem into bridge mode. Run pppoe (or as appropriate) client on server. Configure NAT, dhcpd and dnsd on server. Test all these services work after a reboot. For bonus points, install upnpd server. Prophet (for the Guru).

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IPV6 exit
by tor＠afo-tm.org 16 Mar '14

16 Mar '14

Hello, i run some exits they have IPV4 and IPV6 i did bind OR port to IPV4 and IPV6 which works good. I can connect to them using IPV6 but i can't exit to IPV6 destinations. I did set IPv6Exit 1 in torrc but it's not possible to exit to a ipV6 destination. Did i miss something? what else to do to be able to connect via tor to ipv6? Thanks for help

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Are zealous connections to directory port common?
by Tora Tora Tora 14 Mar '14

14 Mar '14

I just recently allowed the directory ports of my relay to be listed and noticed that some IPs are a bit overzealous in connecting to the directory port. As in 108 connections within a minute zealous. Is this unusual?

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Tor plugin for Nagios - Alpha release
by ramo＠goodvikings.com 12 Mar '14

12 Mar '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hiya List As I mentioned a few weeks ago, I am developing a tor plugin for nagios. Well, today, the first alpha release is out, available at https://github.com/goodvikings/tor_nagios/tree/v0.01 . Currently it supports 6 different checks: 1 - A page fetch through the socks proxy port 2 - Hibernation state 3 - Current bandwidth 4 - OR port reachability 5 - DIR port reachability 6 - Bytes remaining until hibernation If you're interested please give it a go, feedback is more than welcome. Additionally, if you want to see any additional checks implemented, give us a yell. Cheers Ramo -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTH7neAAoJEAXQWoW8lug/ws8H/RxVSKi3Ft8Lr/a3DKi+JMIC HNpOWrGbJEY3RWaJAx/H2L32KC5lE1mJbHm7BI3H1JTmdGkXmkFkyM4pou2/XQg6 DfJO+Zd7LGuJlIzqED3fyH7jB+SA4Syu+eOD710kYF4zQKBmsOy/qqW7R6Ymgq8Q 88JUUuYveAWIDgqir8WwBe8SqJsIWriVd5bObzzB5GZXiZarfMG6dw/kmJicZgyG QUOrddU/9ndrO7B3PCM8JmlB9xHMMuH97up9jS0/kIQFDUiejN/NM62AyDApd+Ef 5jqG8+E6wYWli3mlsc0d3ge4Wix0HPLhllHMxsxrTK3A3quveyVT7pZiO7t1Yas= =awZI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Ask Me Anything on Reddit about Tor
by Jesse Victors 11 Mar '14

11 Mar '14

I recently held an Ask Me Anything on Reddit about Tor. For those that don't know, Reddit is famous for its AMAs, wherein someone unique or otherwise interesting will introduce themselves and then the community gets a chance to ask questions and learn. Traditionally it's been used as an excellent way of asking the questions that you never get an opportunity to ask. We've seen everyone from Chris Hadfield to Barack Obama give AMAs. Since I run some relays and a couple of exits I figured I'd give it a shot, and there was quite the turnout! I got responses from all over the world, and I strongly feel that it was a very educational moment for everyone. The main thread was voted on by about a thousand people, but many Redditors don't log on so I'd say that many thousands of people read it. The thread is still ongoing and I'll continue to answer questions as they arrive, but I figured that I'd share it with everyone since it's winding down. Pretty cool news moment for Tor, and should help clear up some misconceptions and correct public perceptions. https://pay.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/20243q/iaman_operator_of_eight_tor_r… Thanks guys. Jesse V.

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Re: [tor-relays] Is Kaspersky right to be concerned?
by grarpamp 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

> [oh the bad..., re: ] > http://cryptome.org/2013/09/tor-analysis-hidden-services.pdf Do you seriously think that reporters, aid workers, freedom fighters, investigators, whistleblowers, and simple chatfriends, etc are going to publish their onions for all to see, with all their data and logs and so on as some kind of stage show for you? The answere to that is no. They have better good and private things to do that do not concern you until it hits the AP wire. So of course all you're goin to see on the public onions are a bunch of channers, criminals, crazy loons and a growing scattering of real projects and clearnet multihomes. Unlike clearnet, any statistic over the onions you can see is simply not going to be representative of the whole of onionspace, quite a bit of which you cannot see. You need to both understand and come to terms with that. Lest you too could not use anonymous systems when you needed them because some other thoughtless crybaby banned them and your ability to communicate freely and securely out from under you. ps: please drop relays and take this tired subject to tor-talk.

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