- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

'nudging' is a crime - 1B98468097E7F3FF102926423DF44315E414CBCF: down
by Fred 08 Oct '22

08 Oct '22

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Lots of dropped onion skins
by Jonathan D. Proulx 07 Oct '22

07 Oct '22

HI All, I was checkign up on my (middle) relay stats: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/9715C81BA8C5B0C698882035F75C… and saw an "overload" banner, after some learning I see lots of onionskins being dropped in the metrics: tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="tap",action="processed"} 890 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="tap",action="dropped"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="fast",action="processed"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="fast",action="dropped"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="processed"} 3096501 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="dropped"} 2827649 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action="processed"} 3096501 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action="dropped"} 2827649 processed and dropped are growing pretty rapidly so maybe this is a know and ongoing attack, but I don't see why I would be dropping. The system has 8 corse and 8G RAM neither of which seems stressed. Less than 2G or RAM is in use and systrrem load (top under linux) reports ~70% idle (I guess if they're coming in really tight bursts it could average to that and still be droppong peaks). Anyone know what this is or have hints as to where to look? Thanks, -Jon

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Re: [tor-relays] consensus weight tanking
by Me 07 Oct '22

07 Oct '22

Thanks for the prompt response. My apologies for the omission in the original post. My relays are called 405test1 and 405test2. Both relays are vm's on a proxmox server with the only difference in set up being port numbers. I have had both operating since July 2022 with no issues. Thanks again! On October 6, 2022 4:59:22 AM CDT, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: >Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > >To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > >You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > >When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > >Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Moving middle relays to bridges? (Chris) > 2. Consensus weight tanking (Me) > 3. Re: Consensus weight tanking (Georg Koppen) > 4. Re: many connections (Chris) > > >---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Message: 1 >Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2022 05:32:20 -0400 >From: Chris <tor(a)wcbsecurity.com> >To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Moving middle relays to bridges? >Message-ID: <2d1975a2-6362-48d3-8dc3-05bd16797797(a)wcbsecurity.com> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > >Bridges more or less function as guard relays except their IP addresses are not known. Having a bridge with an IP address that's already know somehow defeats the purpose. > >As far as I'm concerned the list of relays should not be public. Only exit relays need to be known for liability reasons. Once we stop publishing IP addresses of relays, the need for bridges will be greatly reduced. > >That being said, I believe if your relay is no longer a relay for a week, it will be removed from the public relay list. Not sure if it will be removed from the censors' list. >?? > > >-------- Original Message -------- >From: "Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T." <igrover(a)aileronit.com> >Sent: Tue Oct 04 12:15:52 EDT 2022 >To: "tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org" <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> >Subject: [tor-relays] Moving middle relays to bridges? > >Good morning, > >According to tor metrics, there have been nearly three times the number of relays as bridges over the last three months so I would like to move my handful of middle relays to bridges. They will keep their same IP address. Is there a best practice with regards to doing this so the directories don't get confused? > >Make your day great, >Isaac Grover > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >tor-relays mailing list >tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >

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Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests
by teamcat＠genocide.fun 07 Oct '22

07 Oct '22

Hello, After setting up a relay, I noticed that my log file was full of "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests" messages. This seems odd to me, as htop reports that my CPU and memory usage is nowhere near full. I'm running on two cores and 8 GB of RAM, and it's averaging about 40% usage on both cores and 2 GB of RAM usage. I've used the tor-ddos iptables rules that were suggested in a previous message thread, but it doesn't seem to have done anything to address the problem. (https://github.com/Enkidu-6/tor-ddos) I've also configured /etc/sysctl.conf to support a traffic flow as outlined in the github repo. Here is the link to the metrics page for my relay. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/74181AB4D1A7D403ED9F190FAC92… Is this something that I should be concerned about, and work to mitigate? I am able to migrate my relay to much more powerful hardware, but obviously that would incur additional cost, so if there is some way to fully utilize my existing hardware I would prefer that. Regards, Evan

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(FYI) Rejecting outdated snowflake proxies
by gus 06 Oct '22

06 Oct '22

Hello everyone, As part of scaling snowflake bridge and adding distributed snowflake server support[1], this week the Anti-censorship Team started to reject *outdated* snowflake proxies that can't support this feature (distributed server support). This will result in a loss of 30% of unrestricted NAT proxies. Read below the instructions how to check your snowflake proxy version: - WebExtension: 0.6.2. - Docker: To check the version: $ docker run thetorproject/snowflake-proxy -v should include "-allowed-relay-hostname-pattern" in the output. To update: $ docker pull thetorproject/snowflake-proxy - Standalone with Go Toolchain: To check the version: $ proxy -v should include "-allowed-relay-hostname-pattern" in the output. To update: $ go install git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/v2/proxy@latest If you need help, please check this Forum post: https://forum.torproject.net/t/please-update-your-snowflake-proxy-to-help-u… Thank you! gus [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow… -- The Tor Project Community Team Lead

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Consensus weight tanking
by Me 06 Oct '22

06 Oct '22

Good day, Not sure if this would be the proper avenue to pursue this. I operate a couple of middle relays from my home server. All seemed well until this morning. Three days ago one was promoted to guard status while the other lags behind. This morning I check the Tor metrics page and the consensus weight graphs on both relays have bottomed out. The other metrics do not have appeared to have remained normal for daily operations. Any suggestions or input are greatly appreciated

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Moving middle relays to bridges?
by Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T. 05 Oct '22

05 Oct '22

Good morning, According to tor metrics, there have been nearly three times the number of relays as bridges over the last three months so I would like to move my handful of middle relays to bridges. They will keep their same IP address. Is there a best practice with regards to doing this so the directories don't get confused? Make your day great, Isaac Grover

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Thoughts about potentially abusive config option for exit nodes
by abuse-node49＠posteo.de 03 Oct '22

03 Oct '22

I did not manage to find anywhere on the new website the current config options of the torrc. So I ask the question here, although it may be already outdated. This is the third time I have had contact with the police about Exits Relays. That's why it occurred to me that someone might be acting targeted, because I run more than one node. Looking for configurations that allow dedicated IP addresses, I found the torrc-config option 'StrictNodes 1' in conjunction with 'ExitNodes [IP/Nickname/Key]' on the web. There were also hints that something had been changed before, but I tried it on a local installation. The goal was to use a specific exit address. StrictNodes 1 ExitNodes [MY_EXIT_NODE_IP] First I had a typo and the Tor service did not start. After the correction it worked and I got into the network. The conclusion remained that Tor accepts these configuration lines. The problem with this is, should this config line really allow a dedicated exit as the sole exit point into the network, the operator of that exit could be targeted and harmed with illegal traffic. In Metrics it is easy to show whole Tor families that always belong to a single operator. It would be nice if the developers remove the possibility to specify a dedicated IP address/nickname/key, if not already done. The config option 'Exitnodes {COUNTRY_CODE}' should remain though. Kind regards, Olaf

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bridge distribution
by potlatch 28 Sep '22

28 Sep '22

[0] FB45183DD82D572CA2B2641C1AB0EB0D8CE7B858 Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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bridge distribution
by potlatch 24 Sep '22

24 Sep '22

People, I have a bridge [0] with a bridge distribution mechanism of "non". It's been that way since May 2022. What gives? Should I remove it from the network as unless> potlatch Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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