- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

exit operators: tor-exit-notice.html file needs updating to solve 404
by nusenu 07 Apr '19

07 Apr '19

Hi, due to some recent changes on the tor project website some URLs in the default tor-exit-notice html file that many exit operators use result in 404s. To prevent 404 simply add "2019." at the beginning of the URLs. If you are using ansible-relayor this is fixed in v19.1.5 (released on 2019-04-06). and rerunning the playbook should fix it for you unless you use a custom file via 'tor_exit_notice_file'. upstream: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30052 -- https://twitter.com/nusenu_ https://mastodon.social/@nusenu

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Question about new website
by Keifer Bly 07 Apr '19

07 Apr '19

Hi all, the new website looks nice. I like the look of it. I have one question, where can the tor expert bundle be downloaded from now? Thanks. -- --Keifer

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mailing list tone
by George 06 Apr '19

06 Apr '19

The mailing list is specifically for Tor relay operators and related issues. There's no space for personal attacks. Such attacks debase the main purpose of this mailing list, and set a negative tone for everyone, including those who are just watching the attacks. Additionally, condescending remarks like: >> No one else cares about you and your confused lackeys attempts to >> be big-boy tor relay operators. ...have no place here. Such remarks can discourage newcomers who are still learning, especially those who are not men. It reinforces the outdated idea that the relay operator community is a boys' club for the properly initiated. Let's respectfully help people who are still learning, and let's also be respectful about giving constructive feedback when people behave in ways we might not like. We want a mailing list environment that is conducive to both new and experienced relay operators to engage in fruitful discussions. We ask that you follow those guidelines, or leave. George for the Tor Community Council -- 34A6 0A1F F8EF B465 866F F0C5 5D92 1FD1 ECF6 1682

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High Speed Exit Relay or just a plain Relay?
by Conrad Rockenhaus 06 Apr '19

06 Apr '19

Hello, I have a FreeBSD box on a 1 Gbit/s connection. I'm trying to determine if we need more high speed relays or high speed exit relays. The AS it's on has no plain relays, just exit relays. That's what has me wondering what to do. So, what is the general consensus - should it be an exit or just a plain relay? Thanks, Conrad -- Conrad Rockenhaus https://www.rockenhaus.com Cell: (254) 292-3350 Fax: (254) 875-0459

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Re: [tor-relays] Hello
by Old Man Tor 05 Apr '19

05 Apr '19

Sorry to hear that, that's really unfortunate and I would never want to wish that upon anyone. I wish you a speedy recovery with hopefully no lasting side effects. That said, it has been a GOOD amount of quiet while you've been gone. For the love of god/shiva/onions, please don't let these new relays turn into Conrad and Nathaniel 'Cordially' Suchy's DeadGreyPonyIT show again. No one else cares about you and your confused lackeys attempts to be big-boy tor relay operators. If you wish to join the network again, please do it in the style of someone respectable like Quintex - He just 'does' it, and doesn't clog up everyone's inboxes with useless messages about new nodes/downtime/'customers'/things that should be experimented with or tested on your own first. It's not a competition to get the fastest speeds from a box, the most nodes (maybe a personal goal, being mindful of operator percentages) or anything else. We're just here for the bigger cause. We, and all tor users appreciate your efforts in running a relay of any kind, we can just do without the 'look at me' circus again. Love, Old Man Tor. [Sent from a throwaway account, over Tor of course. Cowardly, but I said what needed to be said that a lot of other relay operators are thinking but are too scared to say.] From:Conrad Rockenhaus<conrad(a)rockenhaus.com> Date: Thu Apr 4 04:48:01 UTC 2019 Subject: [tor-relays] Hello To: Tor Relay Mailinglist <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> Hi Tor-Relays, I apologize that I just disappeared, I wound up with a massive stroke last year which was more significant than the last one and was hospitalized longer for recovery and rehabilitation. Things just kind of fell to the wayside since it's kind of hard to computer when you can't computer :P. Anyway, I've been home for the past few weeks and starting to get back into my old hobbies again. I brought two new exit relays up in NYC, one Linux, and one FreeBSD on 1 Gb/s Links. I have another FreeBSD box in NYC on a 1 Gb/s link that I'm trying to think if I should make an exit relay or just a regular relay. Relay names - greyponyitnyc001 and greyponyitnyc002. I hope everyone is having a good day! -- Conrad Rockenhaus https://www.rockenhaus.com Cell: (254) 292-3350 Fax: (254) 875-0459 _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Representing Megabits correctly (ex: Slow Relay)
by grarpamp 05 Apr '19

05 Apr '19

>> 97Mb >> speeds at 11Mb/sec. >> couple of meg > be careful with > Megabit (Mb) vs. MegaByte (MB). > Here is the part with the important information: > With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes, > KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" > can also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as > "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can be written as "kilobits"; and so forth. > Tor also accepts "byte" and "bit" in the singular. The prefixes "tera" > and "T" are also recognized. If no units are given, we default to bytes. > To avoid confusion, we recommend writing "bytes" or "bits" explicitly, > since it’s easy to forget that "B" means bytes, not bits. > > Copied from here: https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en > 97MBit/s, and it gives you a data rate > of 11MByte/s Much misuse and bad information here as usual. See my posts that include links to the actual worldwide ratified technical standards and the appropriate representation choices for pure network applications such as tor and routers, vs disk ram storage nasty phone companies silly webhosts etc.

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Hello
by Conrad Rockenhaus 05 Apr '19

05 Apr '19

Hi Tor-Relays, I apologize that I just disappeared, I wound up with a massive stroke last year which was more significant than the last one and was hospitalized longer for recovery and rehabilitation. Things just kind of fell to the wayside since it's kind of hard to computer when you can't computer :P. Anyway, I've been home for the past few weeks and starting to get back into my old hobbies again. I brought two new exit relays up in NYC, one Linux, and one FreeBSD on 1 Gb/s Links. I have another FreeBSD box in NYC on a 1 Gb/s link that I'm trying to think if I should make an exit relay or just a regular relay. Relay names - greyponyitnyc001 and greyponyitnyc002. I hope everyone is having a good day! -- Conrad Rockenhaus https://www.rockenhaus.com Cell: (254) 292-3350 Fax: (254) 875-0459

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Spamcop question
by ylms 04 Apr '19

04 Apr '19

Hello fellow Tor-Exit operators, today I got the following Abuse message: //Start [ SpamCop V5.0.0 ] This message is brief for your comfort. Please use links below for details. Email from 5.199.130.188 / Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:20:30 +0000 https://www.spamcop.net/w3m?i=.....(removed) 5.199.130.188 is open proxy, see: https://www.spamcop.net/mky-proxies.html [ Offending message ] Return-Path: <admin(a)abc.gr> X-Original-To: bingobongo69(a)cd.ru Delivered-To: bingobongo69(a)cd.ru Received: from 31.184.255.247 (unknown [5.199.130.188]) by relay (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7cqntswbr6frkskj for <bingobongo69(a)cd.ru>; Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:20:30 +0000 Message-ID: <EAAACECBFAFDDACFCAEABBBEC(a)abc.gr> From: <admin(a)abc.gr> To: <bingobongo69(a)cd.ru> Subject: smtp:>>smtp.efg.es,587,test(a)efg.es,123456>> Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 13:20:18 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1251"; Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit smtp:>>smtp.efg.es,587,test(a)efg.es,123456>> veblcshgtpwfdonxkebdghrwf pboqjycmmdslmliomafclayaheiuft uybveafdbnsuydqvbgyukf zsszifpadkpaufibjosuk //End I wasn't sure what to remove from the abuse message so I removed all the domains to protect the owners of these hosts/addresses, I hope I didn't miss any. My question, what did I miss in in the exit policy, I have used the following in the torrc. Maybe I did not miss anything at all. Thanks for helping me to understand how the spammer could use the the exit for spamming. I assume with the reduced exit policy spammers should not be enabled to use the exit. // torrc # Reduced Exit policy according to: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy ExitPolicy accept *:20-21 # FTP ExitPolicy accept *:22 # SSH ExitPolicy accept *:23 # Telnet ExitPolicy accept *:43 # WHOIS ExitPolicy accept *:53 # DNS ExitPolicy accept *:79 # finger ExitPolicy accept *:80-81 # HTTP ExitPolicy accept *:88 # kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:110 # POP3 ExitPolicy accept *:143 # IMAP ExitPolicy accept *:194 # IRC ExitPolicy accept *:220 # IMAP3 ExitPolicy accept *:389 # LDAP ExitPolicy accept *:443 # HTTPS ExitPolicy accept *:464 # kpasswd ExitPolicy accept *:465 # URD for SSM (more often: an alternative SUBMISSION port, see 587) ExitPolicy accept *:531 # IRC/AIM ExitPolicy accept *:543-544 # Kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:554 # RTSP ExitPolicy accept *:563 # NNTP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:587 # SUBMISSION (authenticated clients [MUA's like Thunderbird] send mail over STARTTLS SMTP here) ExitPolicy accept *:636 # LDAP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:706 # SILC ExitPolicy accept *:749 # kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:853 # DNS over TLS ExitPolicy accept *:873 # rsync ExitPolicy accept *:902-904 # VMware ExitPolicy accept *:981 # Remote HTTPS management for firewall ExitPolicy accept *:989-990 # FTP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:991 # Netnews Administration System ExitPolicy accept *:992 # TELNETS ExitPolicy accept *:993 # IMAP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:994 # IRCS ExitPolicy accept *:995 # POP3 over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:1194 # OpenVPN ExitPolicy accept *:1220 # QT Server Admin ExitPolicy accept *:1293 # PKT-KRB-IPSec ExitPolicy accept *:1500 # VLSI License Manager ExitPolicy accept *:1533 # Sametime ExitPolicy accept *:1677 # GroupWise ExitPolicy accept *:1723 # PPTP ExitPolicy accept *:1755 # RTSP ExitPolicy accept *:1863 # MSNP ExitPolicy accept *:2082 # Infowave Mobility Server ExitPolicy accept *:2083 # Secure Radius Service (radsec) ExitPolicy accept *:2086-2087 # GNUnet, ELI ExitPolicy accept *:2095-2096 # NBX ExitPolicy accept *:2102-2104 # Zephyr ExitPolicy accept *:3128 # SQUID ExitPolicy accept *:3389 # MS WBT ExitPolicy accept *:3690 # SVN ExitPolicy accept *:4321 # RWHOIS ExitPolicy accept *:4643 # Virtuozzo ExitPolicy accept *:5050 # MMCC ExitPolicy accept *:5190 # ICQ ExitPolicy accept *:5222-5223 # XMPP, XMPP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:5228 # Android Market ExitPolicy accept *:5900 # VNC ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6669 # IRC ExitPolicy accept *:6679 # IRC SSL ExitPolicy accept *:6697 # IRC SSL ExitPolicy accept *:8000 # iRDMI ExitPolicy accept *:8008 # HTTP alternate ExitPolicy accept *:8074 # Gadu-Gadu ExitPolicy accept *:8080 # HTTP Proxies ExitPolicy accept *:8082 # HTTPS Electrum Bitcoin port ExitPolicy accept *:64738 # Mumble ExitPolicy reject *:* Regards yl

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IRC relay operator meetup - April 4th
by Colin Childs 02 Apr '19

02 Apr '19

Hi everyone, This is the announcement that we will be holding the April IRC relay operator meetup this Thursday, April 4th, at 22:00UTC in #tor-meeting on irc.oftc.net. As usual, please add any agenda items to the pad below that you would like to discuss! https://storm.torproject.org/shared/_595igXmpGkxq4FdyusPOI-6zzbvwzcodMl4hl2… <https://storm.torproject.org/shared/_595igXmpGkxq4FdyusPOI-6zzbvwzcodMl4hl2…>

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Protecting the bridge port from active probes
by Marek Szuba 31 Mar '19

31 Mar '19

Hello, I run a private obfuscated Tor bridge for myself and some friends. All in all it has worked fine so far but having recently run some security scans on the bridge host, I now wonder how resistant to active probing my bridge is. Apologies if this has already been asked, I have yet to find a searchable archive of this list. Anyway, here is my logic. In order to operate properly, my bridge must have its ORPort reachable from the Internet. I have chosen a port to be used for this purpose at random but these days, scanning all 64k TCP ports on a host takes mere minutes. The X.509 server certificate offered on the ORPort is rather suspicious, if only because of the randomly generated name; I suspect there might be other peculiarities as well. Therefore, I strongly suspect that it wouldn't take more than a few minutes for any attacker employing active probing to detect my bridge and block access to it. Does this make sense? And in any case, is there anything else I could do to protect my bridge against active probing? The best I could come up with is to make the bridge host periodically change the ORPort, I reckon wouldn't really help because if I had to restart tor on the bridge every few minutes the it wouldn't be of much use connectivity-wise. Having the border firewall block or slow down suspected port scans might perhaps make it possible to change the ORPort less frequently but alas, I have no control over the border firewall beyond being able to ask to open or close specific ports on my host. Thank you in advance for your time. -- MS

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