March 2026 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

relayor v26.0.0 is released: Happy Family design deployed by default
by nusenu 07 Mar '26

07 Mar '26

Hi, relayor v26.0.0 is released. https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor/releases/tag/v26.0.0 relayor is an ansible role that helps you with running tor relays with minimal effort (automate everything). https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor#main-benefits-for-a-tor-relay-ope… Changes in this release: * enable Happy Family by default (remove variable `tor_happy_family`) * MyFamily support remains enabled by default as well but will be removed in future relayor releases * drop support for tor version 0.4.8.x and require tor version 0.4.9.x or newer Ensure to upgrade your tor version to 0.4.9.x on your relays and control machine before running this relayor version for the first time. tor version 0.4.9.x packages are available for all relayor supported operating systems (Debian, Ubuntu, FreeBSD). kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io

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Relay operators meetup in France
by Jolie Fleure 04 Mar '26

04 Mar '26

Dear relay operators, Interhack, a network of french-speaking hackerspaces organises a gathering from 2 to 5 July, in Sévérac (Loire Atlantique) in France https://2026.camp.interhacker.space/ Tor-related discussions typically occur at Interhack/hackerspaces events. Following the call for more distributed relay operator meetups, we are thinking of taking the opportunity of this event to propose one there. That would be a rather small meeting, considering the limited size of the event itself and the quite remote location. Also we are very small scale relay operators (currently we operate one relay and a bunch of bridges). Nontheless, we would be very happy to meet other relay operators and push more tor discussions in our hackerspaces. What do you think of this? Is there a more official way of announcing a relay operator meetup than sending email on this list? Are there guidelines for how such meetings should/could be conducted?

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Advisory: Unauthenticated remote trigger of Hetzner's "Netscan" detection
by invisibleprefixes＠mailbox.org 01 Mar '26

01 Mar '26

CVSS v4.0 Score: 6 / Medium CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Hetzner aims to detect portscans from within their network to targets outside their network, especially to destinations not visible via BGP. When their outbound scan detection triggers on a given customer IP address the customer gets an email: "Netscan detected from host ..." If the customer does not react in time, the customer's source IP is blocked from any further communication until the customer responds to the report. According to Hetzner the blocking is enforced after "manual verification" only. Vulnerability Description ========================= An unauthenticated remote attacker, who is able to trigger outbound packets from a given Hetzner customer source IP, can trigger the described portscan detection and block a Hetzner customer's Internet access if the customer does not respond to Hetzner in time. There are many services that allow the provocation of outbound packets by design, a few popular examples: * SMTP: various outbound checks performed for incoming emails (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ...). The attacker can influence the target of outbound destinations by sending emails from domains under their control. * DNS: Recursive resolver are usually not directly exposed to the public but other servers (SMTP, Webserver, ...) might use resolvers located within the Hetzner network. * Web Applikations can have features that allow users to trigger outbound connections to arbitrary destinations. Examples: * Link previews generated server side (for example on a fediverse server) * Server-Side RSS Readers * Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) weaknesses * tor relays It is NOT possible to exploit this without a service on the target system by using source IP spoofing with source IPs from prefixes not announced via BGP. Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can - in the worst-case - block a Hetzner customer's server Internet access and take all services offline (denial of service) until the block is removed. If a host has multiple source IP addresses only the actually used source IP address is blocked. The integrity and confidentiality of the system is NOT affected. Timeline ======== * 2026-01-04: Advisory is sent to security(a)hetzner.com - including the intended release date of the advisory (2026-02-05). * 2026-01-13: Asked Hetzner for an update via email * 2026-01-27: Sent Advisory to bsi.bund.de * 2026-01-28: Hetzner answered: According to Hetzner it is a customer responsibility to deal with this. * 2026-01-28: We asked Hetzner to clarify how their customers should mitigate this risk if it is their responsibility (no answer). * 2026-02-06: Reply from Hetzner stating that this can not be exploited via source IP spoofing - which we did not claim. * 2026-02-06: We offer a call to clarify the issue * 2026-02-06: Hetzner reply: they will get back to us on 2026-02-10 * 2026-02-06: Advisory publication is postponed due to ongoing emails. * 2026-02-10: Clarify that no source IP address spoofing is involved. * 2026-02-12: Asked Hetzner if they have any further questions and if they have any feedback on the advisory release date (no answer). * 2026-03-01: Advisory is released. Credits ======== We did not discover this and we do not take any credits for the discovery of this issue. This issue got discovered because the Netscan detection also got triggered during BGP outages where some IP prefixes were no longer visible via BGP. Some Hetzner customers were affected by these BGP outages causing Netscan detections.

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No. of connections according to nyx
by tor＠busybear.se 01 Mar '26

01 Mar '26

Hello! I would like to know what is considered a normal amount of connections and what affects that? My exit 7BE9E2EF2BB41BB662D9A3CD68289B9E3DBF8A08 WYSWYG hovers around 4500 inbound, 4200 outbound and sometimes a few directory connections, according to nyx. Output in Mb varies, but increases with the normal lifespan of relays. Is this important, will this increase over time, thus generate more traffic, or does it matter? From what I remember, this have been roughly the same during the lifetime of this relay, no matter what connection speed (5Mb - 1Gb) or which machine I've been running. No restrictions in torrc, as far as I know; Nickname WYSWYG Contactinfo <tor AT busybear DOT se> ExitRelay 1 IPv6Exit 1 Log notice file /home/*/torlog SafeLogging 1 ProtocolWarnings 1 RunAsDaemon 1 ControlPort 9051 CookieAuthentication 1 CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 CookieAuthFile /home/*/Downloads/control_auth_cookie ConnDirectionStatistics 1 ExtraInfoStatistics 1 DirPort 65534 ORPort 65535 NumCPUs 6 Any comments or suggestions are welcome! Cheers! //Bamse

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Hibernate vs 10 Mbps throttle when bandwidth cap exceeded
by forest-relay-contact＠cryptolab.net 01 Mar '26

01 Mar '26

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello. Many server providers have a monthly bandwidth limit. It's easy enough to deal with that by using the AccountingMax option so that Tor will hibernate when it reaches the bandwidth cap to avoid service suspension. I run a relay on a provider that, rather than suspending the service, simply throttles the bandwidth to 10 Mbps until the next month when the 8 TB/month traffic cap is reset. I run through that traffic in just half a month, so the relay is only operational 50% of the time. But 10 Mbps is not nothing. What should I do here? I can think of a few options: 1. Set AccountingMax and let the relay hibernate like normal, ensuring that, whenever it is on, it can achieve maximum performance. The "free" 10 Mbps bandwidth can then be used for other things, such as I2P which does not have a ramp-up period. 2. Keep the relay running, relaying up to 1.5 TB/month extra for free, but with the caveat that the relay suddenly becomes overloaded each time it reaches the 8 TB mark until the consensus weight falls. 3. Shortly before the bandwidth cap is exceeded, automatically adjust the torrc to include "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 10 Mbits", and remove it when the bandwidth cap resets. What is a reasonable thing to do here? Regards, forest -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEARYKAB0WIQQtr8ZXhq/o01Qf/pow+TRLM+X4xgUCaY/3wQAKCRAw+TRLM+X4 xtgQAQC2HWAGe7tcmuOGu2v/473IQC9lWHL03lUUpuJPSpGZpwD+LItXaqzV4vPy phr/rC4LNDZ1AY8m2ZuTzd4MwsVpsgI= =c+pq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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