January 2026 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: name resolution with libc
by Marco Moock 18 Jan '26

18 Jan '26

Am 18.01.2026 um 14:19:28 Uhr schrieb D.O. Bronk: > One of my exits is on FreeBSD too, I didn't know this yet, so good to > know. But normally a 'reload' instead of a 'restart' will suffice. > This way your tor relay doesn't lose it's uptime etcetera. > > If I'm not mistaken, this should also be done after sysctl fine > tuning. Is that anywhere documented? -- Gruß Marco Send unsolicited bulk mail to 1768742368muell(a)cartoonies.org

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Tor guard relay memory: what actually reduces RSS on Ubuntu 24.04
by Tor at 1AEO 17 Jan '26

17 Jan '26

Hello, We ran experiments over 10 days on ~100 Tor guard relays (Tor 0.4.8.x) on Ubuntu 24.04 to determine which memory optimizations materially affect long-term, steady-state RSS under sustained load. Results: allocator choice dominates steady-state RSS outcomes. Using mimalloc 2.x and jemalloc 5.x produced large, sustained reductions in resident memory, on the order of 70–80 percent, compared to the default glibc malloc; tcmalloc showed a smaller but measurable improvement. By contrast, the two commonly cited configuration parameters, MaxMemInQueues and MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs, showed little to no impact on steady-state RSS when adjusted in isolation. Operationally, these reductions allow higher relay density per host, with guard relay memory footprints decreasing from roughly 5–6 GB to approximately 1–2 GB per relay under sustained load. Attached are the summary chart and table. Full methodology, comparisons, and data are here, with links to scripts on GitHub to reproduce: https://www.1aeo.com/blog/tor-memory-optizations-what-actually-works.html Tor at 1AEO Approach Result Viable? mimalloc 2.1.2 1.16 GB (80% reduction) Yes jemalloc 5.3.0 1.59 GB (72% reduction) Yes tcmalloc 2.15 3.79 GB (33% reduction) Partial mimalloc 3.0.1 4.39 GB (23% reduction) Partial DirCache 0 0.29 GB (94% reduction) No (loses Guard) MaxMemInQueues ~5.0 GB (no change) No MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs ~5.7 GB (no change) No Periodic restarts 5.0–5.3 GB (minimal) Workaround only glibc 2.39 (control) 5.68 GB Baseline

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forest08 dropped out of the consensus; all authorities think it is down
by forest-relay-contact＠cryptolab.net 15 Jan '26

15 Jan '26

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello. My relay with fingerprint BDB0F71C8EB2572080D38F036E3EB33494500E9E is no longer being recognized by the consensus. I can confirm that the entire subnet it is on is able to reach the directory authority's ORPorts, but, according to the consensus health page, not a single DA reports it as running. This has lasted for 11 hours so far. How do I get it back in the consensus? Regards, forest -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEARYKAB0WIQQtr8ZXhq/o01Qf/pow+TRLM+X4xgUCaWjfzAAKCRAw+TRLM+X4 xsIVAP9E6Ijjzt1yt7AtFTUy6TSoTnVjGMgP2A09bZr0TWNseQD/SqWS27zFl2zq wdEZyZfQHArlgB4YHyS7j06gij2GzAo= =XdXh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor exit relay lifecycle - update
by Georg Koppen 14 Jan '26

14 Jan '26

Hello! We have been working on a proposal to introduce an exit relay lifecycle (similar to the one we have for non-exit relays)[1]. That proposal got recently accepted and merged[2] and now we need to get it implemented. Folks interested can follow the implementation part by tracking the respective ticket in core/tor[3]. For more context see the discussion in the original exit lifecycle ticket[4] as well. Thanks, Georg [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/policies/-/issues/32 [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/policies/-/blob/main/docs/relay… [3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/41196 [4] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/220

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Tor Relay Operator Meetup at 39c3
by Alexander Hansen Færøy 06 Jan '26

06 Jan '26

Hello folks, Leibi has managed to get a spot for a Tor Relay Operator Meetup here at #39c3. Folks can join us on day 3 at 00:00. For more information, check out: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/en/event/detail/tor-relay-operators… Cheers, Alex -- Alexander Hansen Færøy

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Relay forest18 is still not on the consensus
by forest-relay-contact＠cryptolab.net 06 Jan '26

06 Jan '26

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello. One of my new relays is simply not showing up on the consensus. It's been a few days already. I ended up wiping /var/lib/tor and restarting in order to get a new fingerprint, but it has been a while and it is still not showing up on the consensus. I have 21 relays, and this one, the 18th, is the only one having this problem. Even the 21st has shown up on the consensus already. The new fingerprint is 6435C5172690160DA25681BEBA1EA5EAC6F2BE70. Is it possible that it has been incorrectly blacklisted due to being mistaken for one of the relays involved in the recent sybil attack? The IP address is 160.250.225.3. What confuses me is that, even after changing fingerprints, it still is not showing up. It is connected to the network and is reachable from the outside. Regards, forest -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEvLrj6cuOL+I/KdxYBh18rEKN1gsFAmk1NxEACgkQBh18rEKN 1gtojw/9Hoix29gE4oevhlRJvGLftgbJHv5caZ7iGNZ7KdN7R/8HQ//0InfyG5d4 8Mb49D2jzNfLK+89svlMyNso5ZqR3sMcy7dpnTNAq+PlxB84AwQE/9Qb/8R3sTDZ A2S8ezzCtViQTEQh9eYx+zmnjJckwVt4sAbjumc6t3kIdN+f7CjOj2SZ+AbT6e4l hBZdaGwKLUQhPzL35SK20RSTjIvVNDHAwMo5rR6BsHCj/+W+3fmAG29pieqCAGp/ lwXR6E4EMII0f53Pb65ZB38FOTuMkBBFL0I3WUB90IqS4z+L3U9oU2u7KY1np1lp ApCSbQjoY+NSgpdJ0yH5b1ZZEvEnr1OhQqY0RMpVTLXOuByj79NG31mjE1v8aUaN a5Lwk6scYXuPr8ryOkxkX80tN5V21pIQWt9hubpXBHtPLvfGmTS51DwwOOEKYoIA yyFnVST75f38uyvm73H48s9c68263I5fKQvFCzUmq8Go0lpbLutjxC8LNML3J0cq 0rIINHWKDw4UjnboKihkuoRdXi+tH2ERW3ZAoKVUXTi1VHomwfDvBHJSYxb3SipI 54Qjrnd6IFr8LaHcTfFacrD/OH4WAYnGCE3lC4Ly3xX0P8Cb9KDkop8nXPuBJAup Jq7GgDP8vsmWW6hp4q/Sh+ajHkeZm/luNWA3DZqsp4q0grHi/IM= =Zdqz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Netscan Hetzner
by Diyar Ciftci 04 Jan '26

04 Jan '26

Good evening, Apologies as this is likely the incorrect way to do things. I'm not fantastic with mailing lists. I saw on tor forum that some people were getting these netscan emails from hetzner. https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-abuse-report-from-relays-in-famil… I got my first a few months ago and I just got my second one about an hour ago. Both times it was to the 1st amendment group IP addresses. Last time I just clicked their check button and it passed and then I gave reasoning in the next link. For some reason it doesn't seem to be liking when I click the first link this time and keeps saying not solved. I don't know what my best course of action is. I've gotten 2 reports for hetzner for a guard and 0 for netcup for an exit relay :( I saw in the forum post (which is to a clone of the mailing list) about temporarily blocking tor but that feels a bit deceptive so I don't really want to go down that route. The best thing though it may be a long process as there may be a potential harm to how circuits are built negatively affecting user anonymity is for the tor program to operate in a manner so that it doesn't look like a netscan to some sensitive providers like hetzner even though we know it isn't a netscan anyways. If this issue keeps coming up with hetzner I may look at not hosting a tor relay with them because I have a lot of stuff on this server like my personal website and project mirrors and such and don't want those to be negatively affected due to a unjust IP ban by hetzner for running a tor relay. Any advice? Kind regards, Diyar Ciftci

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Questions about running an exit relay
by tor＠rehcamp.de 03 Jan '26

03 Jan '26

Hi dear list, I hope I am in the correct place for my questions regarding my tor setup. I am currently running a guard/middle relay on a vServer. The relay runs inside a docker container, exposing OrPort and DirPort externally and ControlPort and MetricsPort internally. On the same machine, but in different docker networks (except for prometheus for metrics), multiple other containers providing my personal infrastructure are running. All of them run behind caddy, which only forwards requests coming to specific subdomains on a specific domain. First of all: Is this already a bad idea? Do you seperate tor relays and personal infrastructure physically or in VMs instead of containers? Now, as netcup is my provider and they seem to tolerate exit nodes, I am thinking about allowing exits. I assume this would increase visibility of my server and maybe attract more attention. Knowing the IP address of the tor node, it could be possible to find other domains pointing to it (the PTR record however points to an irrelevant entry) and maybe find the subdomains leading to (still login-protected) infra. Do you think this is a reason not to open the relay for exits? I only have a single IPv4 address to use, additional addresses would imply additional costs. However, I do have a /64 block of IPv6 addresses. For IPv6, i could separate the tor address from the address used personally and therefore make it impossible to reach anything except tor over the designated address and covert any other domains, as they won't be associated with the tor address. Do you think this would be needed/enough? In this case, I would restrict the relay to IPv6-only exits. I am sorry if I could have found more information in the docs, but everything that I did find did not answer my questions enough. Kind regards.

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