December 2024 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Attempting to create a relay with Orbot
by blueapple128 21 Jun '25

21 Jun '25

Hi, I am trying to use Orbot's "Enable your device to be a non-exit relay" option, but (after waiting enough hours) the relay's nickname fails to show up in Tor Metrics' Relay Search. How can I begin to debug this?

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Tor node shutdown
by Tschador 30 Dec '24

30 Dec '24

FYI: My Tor node »TorMachine« (6A7551EEE18F78A9813096E82BF84F740D32B911) will be shut down on 2024-12-31. Sorry folks – but I'm too old for the job. Good luck and all the best wishes for the future!

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Re: Strange UFW logs from another Tor node - update.
by code9n＠pm.me 30 Dec '24

30 Dec '24

On Thursday, December 26th, 2024 at 12:00, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> wrote: > > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via email, send a message with subject or > body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: What're these ufw block logs saying? (George Hartley) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2024 19:55:08 +0000 > From: George Hartley hartley_george(a)proton.me > > Subject: [tor-relays] Re: What're these ufw block logs saying? > To: "tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org" > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org, "code9n(a)pm.me" code9n(a)pm.me > > Message-ID: <9ct9ASpMXXnKRo6w2spT3sRh5hspGh1EqSneiQFDwbhNlI4ZZLyU8F2f3 > 3x_KowFg5e-IYk7P0soKNit50FrGm61lKh50WazDZNkCyfJ5qs=(a)proton.me> > > Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; > micalg=pgp-sha512; boundary="------b4924ec6e97f2ee894d2a6644c496d719be > 5fc5bbba1fc1072274ea1ae63bf7c"; charset=utf-8 > > Hello, > > this is weird indeed, but the packet size is interesting. > > For example, using the tool MTR, you can trace the route to another host using different protocols: > > 1.) ICMP being the obvious default. > 2.) TCP. > 3.) UDP. > > If all these TCP packets were just below 100 bytes, that would be my guess. > > Looking up the relay, there is a name, e-mail contact and PGP key ID for this node operator: > > "Tom" > tom(a)kh6ilt.org > 0x620836CF > > Just ask this operator first to check his server for something that could cause this, and if he is running something special alongside Tor. > > Then, if that does not sufficiently explain or resolve the spurious packets, I would recommend to install tcpdump, and to use a syntax like: > > > sudo tcpdump tcp and src host 155.138.146.249 and not dst port 443 -w dump.pcap > > > You will need elevated privileges in order to run tcpdump. > > This will guarantee to exclude all legitimate Tor traffic originating from his server by excluding destination port 443, and log the remaining packets to file "dump.pcap". > > You can add the -i <interface> parameter to the beginning of the tcpdump argument list if you have multiple public interfaces. > > > Like so: > > tcpdump -i eth0 <other arguments> > > > Once the dump is finished, you can send signal 2 / SIGINT if the process is running in the background, or simply press CTRL + C.. both ways lead to a graceful exit of tcpdump: > > > kill --signal 2 tcpdump > > > Now you can inspect the traffic using a GUI tool like Wireshark (highly recommended) which can parse .pcap files and decode / recognize many types of packets. > > Please report back what you find! > > All the best, > -GH > > > On Monday, December 23rd, 2024 at 6:46 PM, code9n via tor-relays tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > > > Hi, > > > re. my (guard / middle relay) : 181.215.226.65 : 443 : http://hctxrvjzfpvmzh2jllqhgvvkoepxb4kfzdjm6h7egcwlumggtktiftid.onion/rs.ht… > > > I'm getting traffic from another (non-exit) relay : 155.138.146.249 : 9001 : http://hctxrvjzfpvmzh2jllqhgvvkoepxb4kfzdjm6h7egcwlumggtktiftid.onion/rs.ht… ( CCed) > > > always from port 9001 but to different, high number destination (on my vps) ports which ufw is blocking. > > This isn't Tor traffic I'm blocking, right? That would only come to my ORport? Is this abuse attempts? Under the cover of Tor relay traffic? They're quite infrequent (sample) : > > > Dec 23 14:33:29 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2228957.705152] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=37256 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 14:33:34 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2228962.788380] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=37256 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 14:52:36 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2230104.586835] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=55546 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 14:53:16 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2230144.487410] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=55546 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 14:53:54 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2230183.086653] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=55546 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 15:16:42 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2231550.336547] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=40998 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 ACK RST URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 15:18:15 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2231644.112246] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=40998 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 15:22:31 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2231900.117391] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=40998 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 ACK RST URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 15:42:30 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2233098.835686] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=32822 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 15:43:34 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2233162.852181] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=32822 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 15:45:42 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2233290.874044] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=32822 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 ACK PSH RST URGP=0 > > > Dec 23 16:14:43 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2235032.148940] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=1124 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=47586 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 > > > Thanks, > > > Pete > >

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Re: Question about middle relays and common web usage annoyances
by Zachary 29 Dec '24

29 Dec '24

I wanted to chime in. I run an entry-middle relay in my basement connected to 300mbps fiber. It doesn’t push much traffic but it’s mine and I’m proud. The bank where I do my banking blocked our IP. After carefully explaining the situation to their IT team, they contacted their web host and had them whitelist my IP. It changed recently because I registered a new router on my ISP’s network, and they happily whitelisted that one too. My bank is a small town bank where everyone knows everyone, and I’m sure it would be much harder at some big corporate bank. Nonetheless, it’s always possible to make a change! Zachary

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Question about middle relays and common web usage annoyances
by tor＠computhings.be 26 Dec '24

26 Dec '24

Hello, I'm located in Belgium. I keep two small middle relays (no exit, not even guard)… https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/89B4597169A9DBB171F0B4629C73… https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/07E3A0DC6AD4A5F07D1AF942626E… If I browse the web using a common browser using the basic services of the ISPs (no torbrowser, no tor network) and at least since may 2023, I've observed that some websites (banks, federal services,…) simply don't respond when I want to open their webpages. If I use another IP from the same locations (using vpn, ssh proxy, whatever), those same websites simply respond and works without issue. If I switch back to the local ISP IP, those are unreachable, and so on. If I contact those ISPs or the banks IT services, for them there are no problem. For me, it's clear that hosting simple middle relays puts my ISPs IPs to some black lists handled by who knows who. If hosting basic middle relays is blocking common web services, it will be hard / nearly impossible for me to encourage family, friends or customers to host a basic middle relays. Maybe there is no need for more and more middle relays, I don't know. Does someone encounter the same kind of annoyances ? regards, tierce

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What're these ufw block logs saying?
by code9n＠pm.me 24 Dec '24

24 Dec '24

Hi, re. my (guard / middle relay) : 181.215.226.65 : 443 : http://hctxrvjzfpvmzh2jllqhgvvkoepxb4kfzdjm6h7egcwlumggtktiftid.onion/rs.ht… I'm getting traffic from another (non-exit) relay : 155.138.146.249 : 9001 : http://hctxrvjzfpvmzh2jllqhgvvkoepxb4kfzdjm6h7egcwlumggtktiftid.onion/rs.ht… ( CCed) always from port 9001 but to different, high number destination (on my vps) ports which ufw is blocking. This isn't Tor traffic I'm blocking, right? That would only come to my ORport? Is this abuse attempts? Under the cover of Tor relay traffic? They're quite infrequent (sample) : Dec 23 14:33:29 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2228957.705152] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=37256 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 14:33:34 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2228962.788380] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=37256 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 14:52:36 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2230104.586835] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=55546 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 14:53:16 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2230144.487410] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=55546 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 14:53:54 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2230183.086653] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=55546 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 15:16:42 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2231550.336547] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=40998 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 ACK RST URGP=0 Dec 23 15:18:15 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2231644.112246] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=40998 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 15:22:31 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2231900.117391] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=40998 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 ACK RST URGP=0 Dec 23 15:42:30 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2233098.835686] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=32822 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 15:43:34 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2233162.852181] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=32822 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Dec 23 15:45:42 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2233290.874044] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=588 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=32822 WINDOW=0 RES=0x00 ACK PSH RST URGP=0 Dec 23 16:14:43 xxxxxxxx kernel: [2235032.148940] [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:16:3e:b0:d2:70:e4:5d:37:86:2c:2c:08:00 SRC=155.138.146.249 DST=181.215.226.65 LEN=1124 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=55 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=9001 DPT=47586 WINDOW=1027 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 Thanks, Pete

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An update regarding the raid in August
by Artikel 5 e.V. 24 Dec '24

24 Dec '24

Hello everyone! The holidays and the 38C3 are coming up. Unfortunately nobody from our organization will be able to attend the congress in person this year. In case that the police raid in August is going to be a topic for the relay operators meetup, we would like to provide you with a small update regarding the current state here. The legal complaint procedure is still ongoing but last week -after several delays- we were finally able to get access to the court records for the case. We are not allowed to (and will not) directly quote/publish any of this material. We can however make the following information public at this point: - This case is about an (unsuccessful) cybergrooming attempt from Q2/2024. - We have a list of IP-Adresses supposedly used by the perpetrator. - Only one of them is one of our exit nodes. - Others point to other exit nodes. - Some of these other exit nodes are also run by German organizations. - To our knowledge, none of these other organizations were visited like we were. - In contrast to what the prosecution stated as part of the complaint procedure, several pages in the case file clearly state that they knew and fully understood that the server in question was never located at the home/mail address of our organization. - This was clear even before the case was handed off to the local department responsible for our current registered address. - At least some of the people involved also fully understand Tor and the implications. - As we suspected, they also knew (and documented) upfront that this was a home address and not some sort of rented office or server farm. - In combination, it looks a lot like several involved parties did not fully read and/or understand the entire file before playing their part in the puzzle. It pretty much confirms what we already suspected. Whether all this is a simple result of repeated organizational failure, unfortunate lack of technical understanding or even malicious intent against us or the Tor network in general, is an interpretation we will leave up to you. Just be aware that if you are operating Tor exits in Germany, this could currently happen to you as well - even if you follow ALL the best-practices rules and recommendations currently out there. Maybe we just have the "luck" of being registered at the wrong city with the wrong people working on these cases. Maybe not. In any case... enjoy the holidays and (if you attend) the congress in Hamburg as well. Kind regards, Gero for Artikel 5 e.V.

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Re: Question about middle relays and common web usage annoyances
by Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T. 24 Dec '24

24 Dec '24

Good morning tierce, I suspect that the sites you're unable to access are using https://www.dan.me.uk/dnsbl or another blocklist provider that naively blocks middle relays and/or entry relays instead of/in addition to exit relays. If you don't want to or can't pay for third-party hosting to move your middle relay outside your network, one solution would be to contact your ISP and move from your single IP address to a block of five IP addresses, with one IP address dedicated to your middle relay and the other IP addresses dedicated to your browsing and other traffic needs. Make your day great, Isaac Grover, President/vCIO Aileron I.T. – “ Because #ProactiveIsBetter ” O: 715-377-0440, F:715-690-1029, W: www.aileronit.com -----Original Message----- From: tor(a)computhings.be Hello, I'm located in Belgium. I keep two small middle relays (no exit, not even guard)… https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/89B4597169A9DBB171F0B4629C73… https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/07E3A0DC6AD4A5F07D1AF942626E… If I browse the web using a common browser using the basic services of the ISPs (no torbrowser, no tor network) and at least since may 2023, I've observed that some websites (banks, federal services,…) simply don't respond when I want to open their webpages. If I use another IP from the same locations (using vpn, ssh proxy, whatever), those same websites simply respond and works without issue. If I switch back to the local ISP IP, those are unreachable, and so on. If I contact those ISPs or the banks IT services, for them there are no problem. For me, it's clear that hosting simple middle relays puts my ISPs IPs to some black lists handled by who knows who. If hosting basic middle relays is blocking common web services, it will be hard / nearly impossible for me to encourage family, friends or customers to host a basic middle relays. Maybe there is no need for more and more middle relays, I don't know. Does someone encounter the same kind of annoyances ? regards, tierce ------------------------------ Subject: Digest Footer _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave(a)lists.torproject.org ------------------------------ End of tor-relays Digest, Vol 167, Issue 13 *******************************************

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Announcing the shutdown of our Tor Relay "ExitTheMatrix"
by George Hartley 23 Dec '24

23 Dec '24

Hello dear list readers and contributors, We received UDP floods (mostly through DNS Amplification) which were usually 60-70 GBit/s in size, up until a month ago this was not a problem for most of the exit relays lifetime, because we had a custom Tilera sitting between our server and the remaining infrastructure. Since the Tilera hardware was leftover hardware that we initially bought, maintained and installed in agreement with the colocation contract, the DC had no responsibility for it. Last month the Tilera failed, and additionally the DC had constant issues with their line-cards. So, now we just had our 1GbE link and the default 10GbE scrubbing provided by the DC's routers. This was not nearly enough, the largest attack ever we saw after that was reported to be over 140 GBit/s and also knocked some other servers in the same room offline too. These attacks were not directed towards my VM's bridged failover IP on the colocated server that I share with my friend, but towards the game servers he was hosting on his main NIC IP. Right now, every single attack above 10 GBit/s traffic will result in a null-route if it exceeds 60 seconds. This is incredibly cheap for malicious attackers to achieve, so I decided to take the relay offline for good and wipe the keys as well, both on my encrypted online cloud sync provider (MEGA) as well as from my machines MEGASync folder. The fingerprint is / was: 0F8538398C61ECBE83F595E3716F7CE7E4C77B21 If you look it up now, you will see it used to be on my own link for a while, but since we don't have a static IPv4 assignment (VDSL2 is still incredibly popular in rural areas such as the one that I live in), so the constantly changing IP address would have been just a pain in the butt for clients (one forced DSL disconnect every 24 hours). I currently don't have enough money for a decent dedicated server or VM and a host that I can trust which doesn't have too many Tor relays already. In total, according to vnstat, we routed 20TB's of exit traffic per month for the last 3 months, the relay was up for a total of around 292 days with a fresh set of secret keys, the relay before that, same name but different keys, was online for around 60 days while optimizing the hypervisor, libvirtd and guest OS for maximum performance / throughput). According to my calculation, we have contributed roughly ~180 Terabytes of exit traffic, and maybe 500GB's of Guard traffic (this was mainly an exit relay, so I didn't expect much more). I personally have been hosting Tor (Exit) Nodes for almost 10 years under different names and e-mail addresses, and it is definitely a New Year's resolution to continue that fashion. Tor was incredibly helpful for me, so I will continue return the favor. I also will continue to be active on the mailing list to help new people, as long as my time allows for it. Happy Holidays to everyone reading this, I sincerely hope you have a good time with your family and friends. All the best, -GH

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Unable to bind to IPv6
by Eddie 23 Dec '24

23 Dec '24

I had an issue with my VPS that I didn't notice for a while where I had lost my IPv6 addressing. After contacting support they have restored the IPv6 address, but I'm now unable to bind to the address. I've a feeling it's more either my configuration or the VPS configuration at fault, not tor, but I thought I'd throw it out for ideas, as I'm not that confident (yet) with IPv6 stuff. Here's the interface: 2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000 link/ether a6:6a:08:73:42:27 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff altname enp0s18 inet xxx.yyy.87.222/26 brd xxx.yyy.87.255 scope global eth0 valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 aaaa:bbbb:1a:10::1/64 scope global dadfailed tentative valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::a46a:8ff:fe73:4227/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever root@fw1475:~# ip -6 route aaaa:bbbb:1a:10::/64 dev eth0 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium fe80::/64 dev eth0 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium default via aaaa:bbbb:1a:10:a46a:8ff:fe73:4227 dev eth0 proto static metric 1024 pref medium And the netplan configuration: root@fw1475:~# netplan status Online state: online DNS Addresses: 127.0.0.53 (stub) DNS Search: . ● 1: lo ethernet UNKNOWN/UP (unmanaged) MAC Address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 Addresses: 127.0.0.1/8 ::1/128 ● 2: eth0 ethernet UP (networkd: eth0) MAC Address: a6:6a:08:73:42:27 (Red Hat, Inc.) Addresses: xxx.yyy.87.222/26 aaaa:bbbb:1a:10::1/64 fe80::a46a:8ff:fe73:4227/64 (link) DNS Addresses: 1.1.1.1 1.0.0.1 Routes: default via xxx.yyy.87.193 (static) xxx.yyy.87.192/26 from xxx.yyy.87.222 (link) aaaa:bbbb:1a:10::/64 metric 256 fe80::/64 metric 256 default via aaaa:bbbb:1a:10:a46a:8ff:fe73:4227 metric 1024 (static) And this is what I get from the IPv6 OR port, determined by commenting/uncommenting the relevant line in my previously working configuration: 2024-12-14T20:36:38.782783+00:00 fw1475 tor[2317]: Dec 14 20:36:38.782 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind one of the listener ports. 2024-12-14T20:36:38.782821+00:00 fw1475 tor[2317]: Dec 14 20:36:38.782 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. Any ideas/help would be gratefully accepted. Cheers, Eddie

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