August 2018 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold
by livak 25 Aug '18

25 Aug '18

Hi ! In a an older thread I read: > Like Teor mentioned, it's important for operators to increase capacity > and stability, while still meaningfully supporting diversity. Emerald > Onion is not going to surpass 10% of exit capacity without first > helping ~10 other groups set up and manage their own 1%+ relays. As > more and more high-capacity groups come online, I think orgs like > Quintex and Emerald Onion can slowly increase capacity but stick > around the 10% line. Is there any help for setting up new high capacity exit relays ? Livak Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Yay, Complaints
by Conrad Rockenhaus 25 Aug '18

25 Aug '18

So, new equipment gets plugged into a colo…. I’m a dude that was looking to increase AS diversity on Tor and well, decided to add a new colo to the mix. Two exit relays are brought online on properly SWIPed IP addresses. These exit relays have only been online for about 24 hours. An organization, known as Irdeto Intelligence, ignores the fact that the IP addresses are SWIPed and sends abuse complaints to my upstream providers asking them to straighten me out, because I’m a pox on society because people are torrenting via Tor. They have sent over 40 emails in the last 12 hours. Some dude-man, who calls himself a “Network Security Administrator” who asked me to explain what Tor is……….because he’s a Network Security Administrator……..has told me that due to the volume of complaints I need to block the offending applications from their network. I told him that I spoke with them prior to bringing this stuff online, explained what Tor was, explained what a Tor exit was, explained that it will generate complaints, explained the DCMA liability, explained the whole thing…..and was told that they were okay with it. I’m sorry for the bitching and moaning…it’s just another case of doing everything right and now I’m quite worried that they’ll not only pull the plug, that I’ll have to fight to get my Cisco UCS blade server back (and other assorted equipment) which is totally not going to be cool. Conrad

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Freebsd trial with greypony.it was a success
by zimmer linux 24 Aug '18

24 Aug '18

Hi, Conrad Rockenhaus - with your guidance and support with freebsd, within just 21 days total running time, you have helped me set up and manage the fastest exit relay in all of Canada. See https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:ca%20flag:exit https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/D9B1E08CC91F7F42EEE5578EA8B0… Give yourself a pat on the back. If anyone wants to talk through running a freebsd relay, feel free to contact me off list. Zim

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Snowflake PT
by Nathaniel Suchy 24 Aug '18

24 Aug '18

Hi everyone, Tor Browser 8 Alpha includes the Snowflake PT as it comes near a final release, the adoption and usage of the Snowflake PT will continue to rise. I now have the following questions... 1) Will a command line tool like an obfs4proxy come out so those of us with infrastructure can run high capacity snowflake bridges. 2) Is the goal to replace OBFS4 with Snowflake or will they continue to co-exist? 3) How does Snowflake attempt to obfuscate, if at all it's traffic? How strong is the cryptography compared to obfs4proxy Looking forward to learning more about this :) Cordially, Nathaniel Suchy

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Dropping packets with TCP MSS=1400 to foil GFW active probing
by David Fifield 21 Aug '18

21 Aug '18

A paper from FOCI 2018 by Arun Dunna, Ciarán O'Brien, and Phillipa Gill on the subject of Tor bridge blocking in China has this interesting suggestion (Section 5.2): https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci18/presentation/dunna To do this, we write a series specific rules using iptables in order to drop packets from Chinese scanners. ... We use a rule to drop incoming Tor packets with an MSS of 1400. Further investigation would be needed to analyze potential false positives... We note that this method of dropping scan traffic successfully keeps our bridge relays from being blocked and allows our client in China to maintain access to the bridge. Like https://github.com/NullHypothesis/brdgrd, surely this trick won't work forever, but if you're setting up a new bridge, it's worth a try? This is completely untested, but I think the iptables rule would look something like this: iptables -A INPUT --protocol tcp --dport [your-bridge-port] -m tcpmss --mss 1400 -j DROP Then, after a while, check /var/lib/tor/stats/bridge-stats and see if you have any connections from "cn".

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Interested in running a FreeBSD Relay on Cogent?
by Conrad Rockenhaus 21 Aug '18

21 Aug '18

Would you like to trial a FreeBSD Relay on Cogent until October 1st? Yes, it has to be FreeBSD, because I use Bhyve as my hypervisor and some of my blades don’t support UG, which means, I support FreeBSD only on these series of servers. If you’re interested in a Model “A” (25GB HDD, 1vCPU, 2GB RAM, burstable up to 1gbit of bandwidth/unlimited transfer) running FreeBSD and would like to try it out until October 1st, just send me your Public Key. My hope is you will keep it online and hopefully increase the BSD Relay percentage to 7%. After October 1st its only $15/mo, which is my costs alone. You don’t have to worry about abuse complaints, I handle that for you. You just worry about running your exit and maintaining your OS. I take care of everything else. If you’re interested, send me a public key. Thanks, Conrad

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contact for relay in AS64484
by nusenu 20 Aug '18

20 Aug '18

please drop me an email if you are the operator of F0AA2DB7B4B2E7927F88286788773844B68E2C01 Unnamed at 191.96.249.110 thanks! -- https://twitter.com/nusenu_ https://mastodon.social/@nusenu

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Rendezvous on non-OR circuit?
by tor-markus 20 Aug '18

20 Aug '18

I've been running a tor relay for several days now (C65EF5E06B8338CF976D376048BE2C8FBD499C9C). During my regular checks I noticed something odd within the tor log files. [WARN] Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending) It occurs several times per hour and I couldn't find anything except the [bug tracker](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618) which seems to be outdated (newest message is four weeks old). I'm concerned that this could be some kind of "attack" that could compromise users, as I'm running an exit node. Does somebody have more information on this matter?

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question related to consensus weight fraction calculation
by Toralf Förster 19 Aug '18

19 Aug '18

I do wonder about any changes in the algorithm which drops the cw of a relay [1] by a magnitude within 1 year as seen in [2]? [1] https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/1AF72E8906E6C49481A791A6F8F8… [2] https://screenshotscdn.firefoxusercontent.com/images/040958f1-a5be-4630-955… -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E

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How long before a new relay shows up in Relay Search?
by hanzer＠riseup.net 17 Aug '18

17 Aug '18

Hello, I've recently set up a new relay: Tor 0.3.3.7 (git-035a35178c92da94) on a FreeBSD-11.2 machine. The Tor server's identity key fingerprint is: 'Chiron420 9C7BB4BCB58AC876D83B67277A0CF3BC73F4FDF6' A search for this relay on the metrics site says "No Results found!" <https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/Chiron420%209C7BB4BCB58AC876D…> Is this typical or might there be something awry in my setup? Thanks!

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