tor-relays May 2017

tor-relays@lists.torproject.org

57 participants
39 discussions

Memory Problems with tor releay
by tor-relay.dirk＠o.banes.ch 27 May '17

27 May '17

Dear all, we are operating two exit nodes with each two tor processes out of Switzerland. The nodes worked quite stable until about 2-3 weeks ago. Since then we experience frequent disruptions (Up to several times a day). This is caused by a significant rise in memory consumption by the tor processes and ends with a tor process being killed by the Linux Kernel: May 22 00:30:43 tor2 kernel: [2257156.134100] Killed process 40964 (tor) total-vm:448088kB, anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB The systems are physical machines with Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS with 4 GB of memory. This was sufficient the last 2 years. For more details a sample of this behavior is documented in a Ticket [1]. Tor project team is researching but until now no hints lead to an improvement. Due to a tweet last week [2] and the follow up discussion with another operator I became suspicious that is not just just us having a problem rather it cloud be more common. Therefore here the question to you all - do you experience some strange behavior like described in the ticket as well ? Please let me know if so. If not - maybe it is just an unfortunate coincidence and we will end up make a clean install of both server hoping the problem will go away. best regards Dirk [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22255 [2]https://twitter.com/FrennVunDerEnn/status/864583496072876034

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neel@neelc.org relays: MyFamily and tor version update needed
by nusenu 26 May '17

26 May '17

Hi Neel, thanks for running FreeBSD tor relays. Your new relay added yesterday is not yet in sync with your other relays yet, please consider updating the MyFamily configuration to help protect tor clients from using a single operator in entry and exit position: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/0D8211D34F29F51D690303E319766E1B7C28B… https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/endtoend-correlation-groups#neel-chauha… You also might want to update these relays running a tor version that is vulnerable to TROVE-2017-002: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/1602E42D1DE3C7B3EF042F357F906DE55FA6C… https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D5B8C38539C509380767D4DE20DE84CF84EE8… tor 0.3.0.7 contains the fix for TROVE-2017-002 and can be installed via FreeBSD's pkg command. thanks, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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exit relay consensus weight
by Arisbe 26 May '17

26 May '17

Hello relay ops, I just made an interesting observation that I thought I would share. Yesterday I started a VPS exit relay at a well known hosting company in Moldova [0]. Within 24 hours I saw the consensus weight exceed 10000. The relay is bandwidth limited to 10 MiB/s. Not that I'm complaining! So it begs the question: Is there not enough exit relays on the Tor network? Arisbe [0] B06F093A3D4DFAD3E923F4F28A74901BD4F74EB1

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Legal Status of Relays Worldwide [was: kittens seized]
by grarpamp 25 May '17

25 May '17

>>> That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk >>> encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to >>> realize that there's nothing useful to them. >> This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to >> create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants, >> waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt... >> then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing >> found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100% >> of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases. >> Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit >> ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place. > Can they force an operator to decrypt, if he lives in other country > which is non-US and non-EU (e.g. Russia or China)? Depends if hosting country can extradite, or threat influence at things of value such as bank accounts, travel bans, people, etc. > Does it make sense > to run nodes in countries you don't live in or visit? If poor odds or afraid of such things, the farther distant and / or opposite legally, politically, logically and physically the better. > What happens if an operator themselves is anonymous? They lose the remaining hosting contract worth of bitcoin, get the account / card canceled, nym blacklisted, etc. For only running an exit / relay and nothing else... Policy / nuisance shutdowns by the hoster do happen often, nodes just move and redeployed elsewhere. Detainer for questioning, are rare, oops, you're free to go. Raids and confiscation, are rare, and property seems to be returned. Actual arrests / night in jail / charges, are even rarer, oops you're free to go. Charges that go to court, are extremely rare. Probably no one has *ever* been convicted that we know of? Because only running an exit / relay and nothing else, seems to be legal everywhere. (If it is illegal somewhere, then the operator is at fault for breaking that law.) And traffic passing through relays seems to have "ISP style" legal exceptions everywhere, that even cover "torts", so long as operators are not in business of inspecting or moderating. Which is why everything above is marked "rare". If you know of places where... a) relays themselves are illegal or b) ISP style exceptions do not exist ... you should definitely reply with such a list. Real problems are rare, and running relays is fun :) Legal environments typically apply equally so once you know your environment you can always add other overlay networks / services / nodes into to the mix if you're bored or have unused bandwidth in your contract: I2P, CJDNS, GNUNet, Freenet, Pond, VPNGate, XMPP / IRC, Remailers, Crypto Currencies, IPFS, etc...

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Upgrading a relay and changing IP address
by Cristian Consonni 25 May '17

25 May '17

Hi, On 18/05/2017 01:56, Gunnar Wolf wrote: > Cristian Consonni dijo [Wed, May 17, 2017 at 05:04:29PM +0200]: >> AS you can see from the Debian package page[1] the latest available >> version of Tor packaged for Wheezy is 0.2.4.27-3, which to me looks >> quite behind either 0.2.5.12-4 available in Jessie (stable) or the >> 0.2.9.X series available through backports or testing. >> >> What's the best to do in this cases? >> * Should I start updating tor manually? >> * Should I update Debian on the server? (which could well me start with >> a fresh install? >> * Is it ok like it is now, provided that the system is updated? > > While Debian Wheezy (7, our "oldstable" release) still has security > support via LTS¹, it is not recommended to run a Tor relay with such > old packages. In fact, not even the version available in Jessie (8, > our "stable" release - 0.2.5.12-4) is recommended nowadays. > > I suggest you to update to _at least_ Jessie and use the version in > backports (depends on your sysadmining, but if your machine's only use > is to run a Tor node, I'd suggest installing Stretch, 9, which has > 0.2.9.9-1). I am running the relays on VPS providers so, I can choose (only) among the versions of Debian that are provided by the services as templates. When Stretch is release I will see if they make it available, in a reasonable time. I am settled anyhow to upgrade the nodes as soon as the new Debian version is released and I have a question. I have read that I can move the node keys when upgrading[1] and I will do that. One thing that will change with a fresh install is the IP address of the nodes. So, I was wondering, in general is a good thing to keep the same IP or changing it? Because in any case, I could try and do a dist-upgrade[2] so that I keep the old IP. I have also discovered now that DigitalOcean, one of the providers I use, provides a kernel-management interface[3] that could make the process easier. So, which is preferable between the two processes where one has the advantage of keeping the same IP (dist-upgrade) and the other not (fresh install)? Of course, I am assuming that I will be able to complete any of the two processes successfully. Cristian [1]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#UpgradeOrMove [2]: https://www.debian.org/releases/stable/amd64/release-notes/ [3]: https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-update-a-digitaloce…

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Kitten1 and kitten2 compromised (guard/hs/fallback directory)
by aeris 24 May '17

24 May '17

Dear Tor Project, Currently, my server hosting kitten1 and kitten2 (tor guard and fallback directory) is under seizure since 14/05 11h. Private key are under encrypted volume and may be protected, but please revoke immediatly kitten1 & kitten2 tor node. Those nodes are also fallback directory. Regards, -- Aeris https://imirhil.fr/ Protégez votre vie privée, chiffrez vos communications GPG : EFB74277 ECE4E222 OTR : 5769616D 2D3DAC72 https://café-vie-privée.fr/

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Problem starting 0.3.0.7 on Ubuntu?
by Alexander Dietrich 23 May '17

23 May '17

Hello, did anyone else run into a problem when upgrading from 0.2.9.10 to 0.3.0.7 on Ubuntu? Tor is no longer starting, with these messages in syslog: [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc". [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". [warn] Directory /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ cannot be read: Permission denied [warn] Checking service directory /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ failed. [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to configure rendezvous options. See logs for details. [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. The permissions on /var/lib/tor/SERVICE_NAME/ are "rwx--S---" and it's owned by debian-tor, which worked for 0.2.9.10. Thanks, Alexander -- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x52FA4EE1722D54EB

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(FWD) [tor-announce] Tor 0.3.0.7 is released, with a medium security fix for relays
by Roger Dingledine 21 May '17

21 May '17

For those of you who are not on tor-announce... now would be a good time to remember to subscribe to tor-announce. :) --Roger ----- Forwarded message from Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> ----- Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 18:57:59 -0400 From: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> To: tor-announce(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-announce] Tor 0.3.0.7 is released, with a medium security fix for relays Hi, all! There's a new Tor release (0.3.0.7) available on the website. It fixes a bug affecting relays running earlier versions of 0.3.0.x that could allow attackers to trigger an assertion failure on those relays. Clients are not affected; neither are relays running versions before 0.3.0.x. If you're running a relay with one of the affected versions, you should upgrade. Source is available on the website now; packages should be available over the next several days. =========== Changes in version 0.3.0.7 - 2017-05-15 Tor 0.3.0.7 fixes a medium-severity security bug in earlier versions of Tor 0.3.0.x, where an attacker could cause a Tor relay process to exit. Relays running earlier versions of Tor 0.3.0.x should upgrade; clients are not affected. o Major bugfixes (hidden service directory, security): - Fix an assertion failure in the hidden service directory code, which could be used by an attacker to remotely cause a Tor relay process to exit. Relays running earlier versions of Tor 0.3.0.x should upgrade. should upgrade. This security issue is tracked as TROVE-2017-002. Fixes bug 22246; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. o Minor features: - Update geoip and geoip6 to the May 2 2017 Maxmind GeoLite2 Country database. o Minor features (future-proofing): - Tor no longer refuses to download microdescriptors or descriptors if they are listed as "published in the future". This change will eventually allow us to stop listing meaningful "published" dates in microdescriptor consensuses, and thereby allow us to reduce the resources required to download consensus diffs by over 50%. Implements part of ticket 21642; implements part of proposal 275. o Minor bugfixes (Linux seccomp2 sandbox): - The getpid() system call is now permitted under the Linux seccomp2 sandbox, to avoid crashing with versions of OpenSSL (and other libraries) that attempt to learn the process's PID by using the syscall rather than the VDSO code. Fixes bug 21943; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha. _______________________________________________ tor-announce mailing list tor-announce(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-announce ----- End forwarded message -----

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OrNetStats
by nusenu 20 May '17

20 May '17

Hi, if you want to compare your relay(s) with other operators: https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/ Entries on the page link to compass (if you run more than one relay) or directly to atlas if you operate just one. regards, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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seized relays reported for blacklisting?
by nusenu 20 May '17

20 May '17

Hi Nicolas, according to aeris (CC) one(?) [1] of your relays got seized/compromised [2]. Did you report it to tor directory authorities, so they can blacklist the relay? thanks, nusenu [1] InFlames - C46A33E7E56F4F3FF2D36308A37E3DA21CD100FB [2] https://twitter.com/aeris22/status/865317501525045248 -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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tor-relays May 2017