May 2017 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

ansible-relayor, how to ?
by Petrusko 01 Apr '18

01 Apr '18

Hey! I'm planning to try the "ansible-relayor" to deploy some Tor relay instances. If I'm not wrong, it's a main goal ? 2 instances / IP... (soooory for being really noob about this!!!) But I'm lost... not found a tutorial, step by step, you know the tutorial so loved by all noobs! For now, on a fresh Debian8 install, there are : - tor 0.2.9.8 (fresh install from depo, client is ok when opening log file) - ansible - ansible-galaxy install nusenu.relayor - git clone https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor (the folder is stored in my /home...) Will it configure (automatically) many torrc file per instance ? +every key files /relay ? (I'm not too much lost!) Do have I to do this install on every server built ? Or relayor can manage few servers on different locations ? Command lines list use this tool if available ? Many thx for help !!! (and hard work for this tool :) -- Petrusko C0BF 2184 4A77 4A18 90E9 F72C B3CA E665 EBE2 3AE5

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Monitoring multiple relays
by Xza 01 Nov '17

01 Nov '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello, I have a couple relays / exits running. Now my question is : how do you manage them is there any dashboard or CLI tools to manage them ( statistics, ect.. ) I know the cli tool specially for Tor "arm" Thanks alot. - -- PGP : 29A4CE52 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQI4BAEBCgAiGxxEbyA8eWFuZGVyZXNvbkByaXNldXAubmV0PgUCV0SJlwAKCRBI of/XNyszSvv/D/9VtjI+bmiqK53v//StUbmpYjgQjYheYvwktFld+2XDURh52dmU sbk3lab2RS1eQJxjV0BVXMF9O2JUAlp4NA2UMpj8ZJlCk0h1S6p2o4/sAlsrHr8Z nb67HiaRIyEvi9cQiXFtDtK/onAkEuKskolyvh3ysJRRUubHSX1z8WuNJIc4xyGH ZpSLPGUOO6qI7mM8ztS0muEy1khmkHgtlyHi2l4K/NsW3I90cV3w6Db2AEnV6v1c tsfehqLExsHUdEo0U3hHU7yY1p2fzD5Z+C0tgVKTnP5Zus/Vr9OH/zFwxneo0E7a 5FHdnCZnNIG9W32uQgjDdmBEv/YFEd0um/vMWFGUehFANSt+DIps7E+AjwiJwm2i ov97JJurQkrSMX7ZchTEsy720Ju272olp2eDiHaXXTK2TkxcEq+d1gZfj7CXycPW 6mCrj6L6URJAZ34GJQfFFjv8QbFmKkAvGhxl/O8KXRbXxedbLH7PY73jmFjJcmxO +KnSeyqMe1KbzazYyFydP+VmgI2k1IlO89l8Jq1Gq9f2KOPY9UKFZjGDKLS0xGZW EnqU/KUINcrGejYFT8nYNxA+OFTd/ZGIX5qP4Vo5NsZ/pDLZjdxIcvHx1jjZbER+ 5Ku2bihm2KTNAGoYDqB3LGCm+QdEFG/p573xQCcXPk92GyhMJDi9EMPDgA== =mTa0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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GeoIP file
by Ian Zimmerman 28 Jun '17

28 Jun '17

How does the tor daemon read the GeoIP database file? Does it read the whole file once when starting up, or every time it needs to resolve an IP, or something in between (say, it builds an index in memory on startup and then seeks to locations in the file when looking up)? I am asking because I want to know if I need to restart, SIGHUP or in some other way kick the daemon after I install a new GeoIP file into place. -- Please *no* private Cc: on mailing lists and newsgroups Personal signed mail: please _encrypt_ and sign Don't clear-text sign: http://primate.net/~itz/blog/the-problem-with-gpg-signatures.html

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Who is running the two biggest Exits in the network?
by Paul 01 Jun '17

01 Jun '17

Since about mid April there are just two similar Exits making up now about 4.5% exit probability together. Located in Panama, run in the okservers.net network, AS395978 ,they don’t give up any further information about themselves. Personally I would feel better at least having a contact or even better, knowing who is giving that much effort. Probably a MyFamily configuration should be placed as well? https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/29C92C854E0F6652A77F3A8B231D693299396… https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/2CA4B2F36C2DDECFCB0B5A0D3300ED30E68E2… Paul

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Questions about OfflineMasterKey
by Cristian Consonni 31 May '17

31 May '17

Hi, On 18/05/2017 10:45, nusenu wrote:>> Currently, my server hosting kitten1 and kitten2 (tor guard and fallback >> directory) is under seizure since 14/05 11h. butplease revoke >> immediatly kitten1 & kitten2 tor node. >> Those nodes are also fallback directory. > > I don't know any context or background but if you fear this could happen end to use tor's OfflineMasterKey feature (without > copying the master key to the server) with a short keylifetime (i.e. 7 > days), especially if it is a fallback dir > (which requires a tor source code change to remove it). This feature is interesting and I did not know about it. However, I have been reading the documentation page[1] and I have the impression that the more I read the less I understand how it works. If I look inside the DataDir of one of my relays - a standard Debian install - see this: ``` ed25519_master_id_public_key ed25519_master_id_secret_key ed25519_signing_cert ed25519_signing_secret_key secret_id_key secret_onion_key secret_onion_key_ntor secret_onion_key_ntor.old secret_onion_key.old ``` So, here some of the things I think I have understood: * Tor uses a ed25519 key to generate the other keys need to decrypt incoming traffic and route it to its next destination on the network. I don't know how this works in practice, but probably it is too much detail at the moment. * In the standard install the master key is the `ed25519_master_id_secret_key` above, which has no passphrase. * If in `torrc` we declare `OfflineMasterKey 1` then the `ed25519_master_id_secret_key` will not reside anymore on the relay but on a separate machine. * In the process of generating the master key (with the command `tor --keygen`, all the files above will be generated. * To run the node with `OfflineMasterKey 1` you need to copy all the files generated in the previous step *with the exception of the master key*. I had also a few questions: * is the above correct? * if I use the offline master key protected with a passphrase will I need to input the passphrase every time I restart Tor (I have in mind what Apache does when you restart it and have certificates protected with a passphrase)? * Assuming that I am going to use a separate machine to generate the master key I need to make sure that the version of Tor on the machine that I use to generate the key and the relay? Thanks for your help. Cristian [1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorRelaySecurity/OfflineK…

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Encrypting the DataDir
by Cristian Consonni 31 May '17

31 May '17

On 15/05/2017 12:21, aeris wrote: > Private key are under encrypted volume and may be protected On 21/05/2017 10:02, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 09:12:39AM +0200, Petrusko wrote: >> @aeris, do they ask you to uncrypt the volume ? (good luck to you...) >> What can be the best ? Uncrypt the relay to help police when asking, >> when this relay is only a relay and storing nothing else ? > > That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk > encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to > realize that there's nothing useful to them. See also point two of > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-tor-trainings-dutch-and-belgia… >From the Tor Exit Guidelines: «Disk encryption might be useful to protect your node keys, but on the other hand unencrypted machines are easier to "audit" if required. We feel it's best to be able to easily show that you do Tor exiting, and nothing else (on that IP or server).» https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorExitGuidelines I was wondering if the argument about not encrypting the disk applies just to the full-disk encryption or if it is applicable also to the caso of encrypting just the DataDir on a fairly small file-based volume (say 100MB). In the second case, how big can the DataDir get? Cristian

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reminder: tor 0.3.1.1-alpha is _not_ recommended (known bug)
by nusenu 31 May '17

31 May '17

Since there were only 8 relays running 0.3.1.1-alpha I didn't bother to state this here, but since the number is rising since yesterday I just wanted to remind you that tor 0.3.1.1-alpha contains a bug that makes this not a good version to use. In the worst case (unlikely) you would publish a limited amount of memory via your relay descriptor https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22368#comment:7 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22378 Relays currently using tor 0.3.1.1-alpha (excluding Roger's): +------------------+------------------------------------------+ | nickname | contact | +------------------+------------------------------------------+ | Quincy | NULL | | ss666 | NULL | | sorryitsslow | NULL | | artiX | NULL | | ELECTRICSHEEP | NULL | | dahool | NULL | | BabylonNetwork01 | Babylon Network | noc <AT> babylon <DOT> | | BabylonNetwork03 | Babylon Network | noc <AT> babylon <DOT> | | BabylonNetwork00 | Babylon Network | noc <AT> babylon <DOT> | | BabylonNetwork02 | Babylon Network | noc <AT> babylon <DOT> | | Gentoo | gentoo.intel(a)gmail.com | | 0x000000000 | https://ban.ai | | HeirloomReaper | James Taylor <tor AT fornoreason dot net | | ireadconf | torrelay(a)fh-biergarten.de - 1QCHdyhPHLrK | +------------------+------------------------------------------+ If you are eager to run alpha level tor versions to uncover and report bugs early that is great but you might want to wait for tor 0.3.1.2-alpha or run master builds after https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=ab9976b7245f05a97e0285265c… https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/tor-nightly-master-stretch stay safe, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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Question about circuit/path live time
by Olaf Grimm 31 May '17

31 May '17

Dear readers ! For my relays I looking for a torrc parameter to reduce the circuit live time from default of 10 minutes to about 5 minutes. My intension: I dont' know is the point of time to switch the path between relays synchronized. An overlap (or different switching time) will reduce the path live time to less than 10 minutes. This is ok for me, because the circuit analysis time for attackers is less than 10 minutes (traceroute...). Synchronized relays keeps a whole circuit path open for 10 minutes, from guard to the exit. Am I right? Am I right with my intension to change the default circuit live time or is this not necessary? A short answer would be ok. Assuming torrc parameter: MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM (Default: 10 minutes) The backgroud of the story (and why I want to generate more noise): Last year, on July 19, my exit relay was seized at home. I knew about the danger, but I ignored it. According to the police, my relay was abused for about 5 months, again with the same (evil) web server as the target. I am assuming my Exit Relay was explicitly selected as an exit. To protect the relay operators, you might want to remove this function. A targeted compromising of an operator must not be possible. The police photographed some of the current connections displayed with ARM. A test with ARM showed an indication of a seemingly complete circuit from the guard to the exit. I see Source -> Target, Guard, Middle, Exit. I'm not sure, but I get a bad feeling. Please tell me that my interpretation of the displayed content in ARM is wrong. For the time being, I only have 2 Middle nodes as VPS online. Later, after the completion of the law procedure, I switch the two VPS middle nodes back to Exit Relays (Provider Keyweb and FlokiNET). The third middle node at home remains only a middle node. I swear this. Best regards! Olaf (node49/node49a/node49b)

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Neldoreth relay seized ?
by aeris 30 May '17

30 May '17

Dear Neldoreth relay’s operator, This day, we were informed of a Tor node seizure at FirstHeberg during the 13-14/05, related to Wanacry infection of the french company Renault. https://www.nextinpact.com/news/104398-wannacrypt-nud-tor-saisi-chez-firsth… FirstHeberg say the seized node was "traffic analyzed" during some times before being shuting down for content cloning and drive given to cops. They are at least 5 others relays seized under the same case at OVH and Online providers. https://www.nextinpact.com/news/104302-wannacrypt-nuds-tor-saisis-par-autor… https://gist.github.com/nusenu/3d7bbeb7c97af591d65003b4bfe70021/ After consensus investigation, it seems your Neldoreth node is the only hosted at FirstHeberg with a downtime during this timeframe (from 14/05 18:00 to 17/05 14:00). This node is currently running, but lost its guard flag since restart. Could you confirm if your node was seized or not ? If seizure confirmed or suspected, your private key is probably no more safe, so please report your fingerprint to bad-relays(a)lists.torproject.org for blacklisting to avoid reusage, and renew your private key. Regards -- Aeris https://imirhil.fr/ Protect your privacy, encrypt your communications GPG : EFB74277 ECE4E222 OTR : 5769616D 2D3DAC72 https://café-vie-privée.fr/

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New exit node best practices
by Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T. 29 May '17

29 May '17

Good evening, After many months of running a relay, I'm planning to establish up a family of exit nodes with geographically diverse VPS providers, shying away from the list of the most heavily used Tor friendly providers. Several questions: - Does establishing a family increase the risk of the nodes being taken down en masse? - Do you suggest providing ample contact information for the node directory, as opposed to little or none? - I'm being very upfront with sales@ regarding my purpose before signing up, and making sure they're okay with it. What questions should I be asking to be sure they'll be Tor friendly before shutting down my exit nodes? Make your day great, Isaac Grover, Senior I.T. Consultant Aileron I.T. - "Practical & Proactive I.T. Solutions" O: 715-377-0440, F:715-690-1029, W: www.aileronit.com

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