December 2015 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

IPv6 Only Exit Node
by Hans Wurscht 20 Dec '15

20 Dec '15

Hi I would like to operate an IPv6 only exit node. I.e. it's fine if tor relays through IPv4, but I want exiting traffic only through IPv6 (because I don't want my (only) IPv4 to be blocked, abused and such). The way I thought this would work is with the ExitPolicy set as below. But atlas says my IPv6 Exit Policy Summary would be "ExitPolicy reject *:*". Now I'm wondering if my ExitPolicy is wrong defined or if that's a bug of some kind. I'm running Tor v0.2.7.5 (git-6184c873e90d93b2) on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1k and Zlib 1.2.8. # No IPv4 exit, no exit to my own subnet, no exit to private network, no exit to link local ExitPolicy reject6 [2A02:168:4A06::]/42:* # Block my subnet ExitPolicy reject6 [FC00::]/7:* # Block private IPv6 ExitPolicy reject6 [FE80::]/10:* # Block link-local IPv6 ExitPolicy reject6 [2002::]/16:* # Block 6to4 addresses ExitPolicy reject6 *:25 # SMTP ExitPolicy reject6 *:119 # NNTP ExitPolicy reject6 *:135-139 # NetBIOS ExitPolicy reject6 *:445 # Microsoft AD ExitPolicy reject6 *:563 # NNTP over TLS ExitPolicy reject6 *:1214 # Kazaa ExitPolicy reject6 *:4661-4666 # ? ExitPolicy reject6 *:6346-6429 # Gnutella ExitPolicy reject6 *:6699 # WinMX ExitPolicy reject6 *:6881-6999 # BitTorrent ExitPolicy accept6 *:* # All else ExitPolicy reject private:* # Block private IPv4 ExitPolicy reject *:* # Block all IPv4 ## If set, and we are an exit node, allow client to use us for IPv6 traffic IPv6Exit 1 -- tor.x2a.ch | https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/6FAAD7CC7EBB008AEF2E5AE1BB9082CD8BD60…

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expected IPv6 traffic for an exit relay
by Toralf Förster 20 Dec '15

20 Dec '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I opened my exit for IPv6 after Moritz encouraged us to do so here at this list. I do observe a traffic of 1-2 GB. for IPv6, IPv4 is always abound 300 GB/day. The exit is configure for 8 MB/sec throughgput (==20 TB/month). I do wonder, what are expected values for IPv6. Furthermore between 11th of August and 25th of September I observed a traffic of about 30-40 GB per day for IPv6 - but why only in this time frame ? - -- Toralf, pgp: C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlZsQtUACgkQxOrN3gB26U6q3QD/X8RceaLv8uKKcUtcO1CbugCK f2nu+JG8xBVJe+kBFCYA/jSddQ7auahsc5YSmuqgJY1fzWu43xN5kWvGG89tyzxe =/91J -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors
by Raul Fournier 18 Dec '15

18 Dec '15

Feel free to opt-in my relay wagner 5525D0429BFE5DC4F1B0E9DE47A4CFA169661E33

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I relay subscription
by David Smith 17 Dec '15

17 Dec '15

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Re: [tor-relays] Webiron at it again...
by Juuso Lapinlampi 17 Dec '15

17 Dec '15

Bruteforce attacks generate a lot of traffic, so Webiron gets an excuse to blame the Tor network as a major source of abuse versus "regular" traffic. > "Tor: Please note as the abuse from Tor has gotten out of hand, we do > not give free passes to abuse coming from Tor exits. See the leader > board linked below for more details on the issue." We received this too. Quite oddly though, after sending them 6 or 7 email acknowledgements that our Tor exit IP-address is a Tor exit (duh), they have stopped sending us abuse complaints. Maybe we got a free pass after all, although I didn't request one. And yeah, Webiron's not to be taken very seriously.[1] I've lost their credibility a long time ago when they exclaimed that Tor exit operators would be held legally liable for the routed traffic - of course not. It's called fear mongering. -Wub [1]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2015-December/008259.html

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ornetradar notifications from 2015-12-15
by nusenu 16 Dec '15

16 Dec '15

say hi to a bunch of new AWS servers http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/738 subgroups: nickprefix: torpr http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/736 Nickprefix: Willy http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/739

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Unused Tor exit nodes capacity
by Dirk Eschbach 16 Dec '15

16 Dec '15

Hello all, we are administrating 2 Tor Exits for privacyfoundation.ch [1]. In the last month we realized that the traffic which is going through our servers / throughput is by far less than the machines and the providers network can handle. We were internally and recently with Moritz from torservers.net looking at this problem but could not find a way to improve throughput. Even on the same machine the throughput between servers varies a lot with out any visible reason. I hope you can help. Our setup is two servers with a maximum of 4 tor processes (exit) each. Looking at CPU, Disk, RAM and so on the machines are not busy at all. Konsole output top - 09:57:49 up 16 days, 11:57, 1 user, load average: 1.14, 0.91, 0.81 Tasks:244 total, 3 running,241 sleeping, 0 stopped, 0 zombie %Cpu0 :12.5 us, 3.4 sy, 0.0 ni,79.7 id, 0.0 wa, 0.0 hi, 4.4 si, 0.0 st %Cpu1 :15.9 us, 5.4 sy, 0.0 ni,74.3 id, 0.3 wa, 0.0 hi, 4.1 si, 0.0 st %Cpu2 :14.3 us, 2.7 sy, 0.0 ni,77.0 id, 0.0 wa, 0.0 hi, 6.0 si, 0.0 st %Cpu3 : 9.5 us, 3.4 sy, 0.0 ni,80.3 id, 0.0 wa, 0.0 hi, 6.8 si, 0.0 st KiB Mem: 3877624 total, 2739880 used, 1137744 free, 1288 buffers KiB Swap: 4026364 total, 364264 used, 3662100 free. 10752 cached Mem Looking at the network connection it is without any problem possible to start big downloads without reducing TOR throughput. The servers are connected with 1 Gbit/s each. The big question now is: Why do the machines do not have more throughput ? Is the reason for this the way the distribution through the Tor network works. Moritz hinted it might have to do with the way the tor "bandwidth scanners" measure the ability of a server to handle traffic. Can you explain me / point me to documentation where this process is described and how this can be optimized. What are the criteria for tor exit node server traffic distribution ? How do the clients choose the exit ? I would be very happy if you could provide some answers / documentation which will set me on the right track. Thanks very much for you help. Dirk [1] https://globe.torproject.org/#/search/query=digiges

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Webiron at it again...
by Schokomilch NOC 15 Dec '15

15 Dec '15

Monday we received their usual spam about our exit-node sending spam, and of course instead of implementing the TorDNSEL on their sites, they rather want us to block a whole /24 range. Anyhow, one line caught our eyes: "Tor: Please note as the abuse from Tor has gotten out of hand, we do not give free passes to abuse coming from Tor exits. See the leader board linked below for more details on the issue." They also include a link to some fancy unresolved abuse ranking[1]. From that ranking we can see that they currently have 116 unresolved Tor abuse cases and at least 500 unresolved non-Tor cases. Assuming that 616 cases are enough we can try to calculate with 99% certainty, the true interval of the difference in Tor and non-Tor abuse. We will use 500/616 = 0.812 as an estimate for all non-Tor abuse and we will use 116/616 = 0.188 as an estimate for all Tor abuse. One can easily calculate that there is a difference of 62.3% between the 81.2% non-Tor and 18.8% Tor abuse cases. However this percentage (62.3%) is just one impression of a sample. Imagine we would sample 100 hosters just like webiron and then see what their difference is. And we want to be 99% sure that our measured value is within the interval. The formula can be found here[2]. Then we would receive an interval from 0.51 to 0.73. What this boils down to: If we were to check 100 companies that send abuse reports like Webiron, in 99 cases we would find a difference between Tor and non-Tor abuse to range between 51% and 73%: Two concrete examples: Tor abuse could be as high as 24.5% (lower end of the interval -> 0.51 = 75.5 non-Tor - 24.5 Tor) or as low as 13.5% (higher end of the interval -> 0.73 = 0.865 Non-Tor - 0.135 Tor) I think that having a tiny bit less than 1/4 of all abuse reports originating from Tor is a pretty great value and not "out of hand" at all. P.S.: We are pretty sure that this calculation is correct, but don't take our word for it. Also on a funny note: Their mx server blocks our mx server, so we can't even reply to their email, even though the Tor-exit runs on a different IP than the mx. [1] https://www.webiron.com/abuse_web_leaderboard/ [2] http://www.kean.edu/~fosborne/bstat/06d2pop.html?ModPagespeed=noscript

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Handling abuse request about stopforumspam.com
by Eran Sandler 15 Dec '15

15 Dec '15

Hi guys, One of my tor server seems to be getting a lot of abuse reports from the ISP from stopforumspam.com. http://www.stopforumspam.com/ipcheck/212.47.246.21 Any idea how to reduce those to a minimum in a reasonable way? Thanks, Eran

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uptime "algorithm"
by Dr. Who 15 Dec '15

15 Dec '15

As far as understand it is the flag HSdir given to nodes with a fast enough connection and a long enough uptime. If I keep my tor relay version always up to the current stable version I sometimes do have to restart the process. So I get a drop in my uptime and loose the HSdir flag for several days. Other nodes who don't care about versions keep the flag, despite the fact they might use older/inefficient/insecure/buggy versions. Wouldn't it be better to monitor the reason for a drop in uptime? In case at the same time a restart occurs the version increases it might be given the HSdir flag again? someone understands what I mean?

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